The Involvement Question
Traditionally, political scientists have framed the involvement question as an element that tends to distract parties, to divide their strategic attention, and to compete for the time and energy of senior decision makers and the bureaucracy. However, in the context of an increasingly global international system—and, even more so, in regard to the Persian Gulf region or the greater Middle East—multiple levels and kinds of involvement and interaction are simply a fact of life. In the case of a nuclear Iran and the United States, both sides will be involved in complex and interactive ways.
Since 1979, Iran has imagined itself as a revolutionary, ideological force in the Muslim world. Even as it has struggled with existential security issues—such as Saddam Hussein’s invasion—it has had continuous global geopolitical and economic involvements with European great powers, India, and China. In recent years, and often through the mechanism of the IRGC, Iran has expanded its international contacts, for example in Latin America and Africa.49 Nonetheless, for Iran, domestic and regional issues are dominant, particularly to maintain the legitimacy of the regime (even as the military contests with the clerical leadership) and to maintain partnerships with Syria, Hezbollah, and others. Its focus is relatively narrow, though expanding.
At the same time, the unstable nature of its domestic politics, regional politics, and the uncertainties stemming from the Arab Spring make it plain that the Iranian leadership will have to juggle more balls at a faster pace. The internal power struggle of the regime and the larger issue of domestic political unrest both pose existential first-order questions for the supreme leader, president, and top military leaders. Iran’s leadership is at odds with itself and many of its people, particularly the younger generation.
Confusion regarding US policy also demands Tehran’s strategic attention. After Iran rebuffed Obama’s request for it to unclench its fist, the rhetoric emanating from Washington has become more bellicose. General Martin E. Dempsey, incoming chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned Iran during his Senate confirmation hearing that the pursuit of nuclear weapons or increased attacks in Iraq would be a “serious miscalculation.”50 Describing the Tehran regime as a “destabilizing force,” Dempsey articulated what he saw as Iran’s intent to seek a “Beirut-like moment”—a reference to the 1983 Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, Lebanon, and the subsequent withdrawal of US forces—to “send a message they have expelled us from Iraq.”51 In Afghanistan, the prospect of a US drawdown and ultimate withdrawal would provide a similar incentive. NATO has, in fact, passed control of coalition operations in Herat City, the capital of Herat province in western Afghanistan where Iranian influence is strong, to Afghan forces.
Friction between the United States and Iran is not limited to ground wars. Since 2007, when Admiral Michael Mullen disclosed that the Iranian navy had given control of the Persian Gulf to the IRGC, US and Iranian naval forces have increasingly chafed against each other. Five small Iranian speedboats harassed US Navy ships in the Strait of Hormuz in January 2008. In two separate incidents four months later, US ships fired warning shots at Iranian patrol boats sailing to within 200 yards. In April 2010, an Iranian naval jet in the Gulf of Oman flew as low as 300 feet over the aircraft carrier USS Eisenhower. It is not likely naval tensions will subside. In response to a suggestion by Admiral Mullen that Tehran and Washington establish a hotline to avoid accidental escalation, Iran’s defense minister rejected the idea outright, announcing instead that Iran was mass producing a new missile designed to destroy warships, and the head of the IRGC navy similarly dismissed any such request, referring to the US presence in the Gulf as “illegitimate.”52
The political ferment in the Arab world provides both danger and opportunity that will occupy the minds of Iranian strategists. In Bahrain and among the Shia of Saudi Arabia’s eastern province, Iran will be tempted to make common cause with traditionally oppressed peoples. The crisis in Syria forces Iran to aid (even as it condemns) what has been its most reliable state partner. The fortunes of Hezbollah and Lebanon remain constantly volatile. As if that were not enough, Tehran is also energetically reaching out to Turkey, hoping for a sympathetic ear from the leading Justice and Development (AK) party and making common cause against the Kurds, to Egypt, and to the two Palestinian factions.
As the world’s primary security provider, the United States will inevitably be involved elsewhere for the foreseeable future. Some critics have even described the United States as being on the verge of strategic exhaustion. Indeed, two senior Obama administration officials wrote of “nine primary elements of the [world we inherit]: the costs of the Iraq War; military overextension; strategic preoccupation, confusion and distraction; disregard for the rule of law; softening power and alienated allies; public disillusionment; financial indebtedness; a divided and fearful policy; and the enduring promise and potential of America.”53 Broadly speaking, the administration has intended to reduce commitments in the Middle East while refocusing on global issues such as climate change or on other regions like East Asia. But it has been unable to carry out such a strategic repositioning. From the surge of forces in Afghanistan to the Libya war and the coming of the Arab Spring, Washington’s engagement in the region has hardly diminished. Iran and the United States are more frequently in contact—engaged at cross purposes in more and more places and at moments of local political tumult. A fundamentally unstable relationship is increasingly being tested.