15
The firefight started early. At 10:00 Orlando had already withdrawn and Ciro’s people were spread out due to an unfortunate error by Orlando, who failed to advise his men of the reinforcements that were coming from the other slope. As a result Ciro was wounded in the lung, although it doesn’t seem to be too serious. Orlando failed to carry out my order about where the mine was to be placed and he retreated too early, in my opinion. I tried to take two hills that overlook Las Minas, but the men had already retreated completely and the lines had to be held some 200 meters from Mario’s house. They [the enemy] were allowed to arrive and gather there [while we] simultaneously opened fire along the whole line. Very conservative estimates indicate three confirmed casualties. Roberto withdrew too soon compromising the success of the operation. For tomorrow I have distributed everyone, putting in the first line Roberto and Raúl, who, when they retreated, left the field to César and Silva and occupied a line farther back. Fonso will cover the flank. Angelito Frías and Manolito, in charge of Ciro’s squadron, will take care of the road from Magdalena. In all of yesterday’s actions the only ones wounded were the guy who had an accident and Pompeyo Pena, [who was wounded] in the foot. News arrived from Fidel indicating that they’ve taken 19 prisoners and 18 weapons and bazooka shells, and that it’s possible that [the enemy] will surrender in 48 hours.
16
A completely peaceful day on this front. The soldiers are spending their time digging trenches in the Sierra Maestra. The lines are organized. The planes are active in the zone of Santo Domingo and El Jigüe. Fidel is saying that they have taken three more prisoners; he also said that messages had already been transmitted from him to Commander Quevedo, a fellow student from the university, from Dr. Vallejo to another doctor friend of his, and from a prisoner to his compañeros [to pressure them into surrendering]. Wrong instructions were given to the planes so that they bombed their own zones. At 12 noon a truce was announced in order to address the soldiers, but when they were gathered to listen, some isolated sharpshooters (ours) started shooting, causing them to disperse. A reinforcement squadron that had been requested from Almeida arrived, one that he had in reserve. Fidel sent instructions for Almeida to send some of his men from Palma Mocha Hill to the slope that goes down to Naranjal.
17
In this zone the tranquility was absolute, but in Mompié—apparently due to a betrayal—there was extensive bombing, even the hospital was hit and the wounded had to be transferred to a zone near Camilo. The International Red Cross announced that the handing over [of prisoners] to Batista’s army should take place in Casa de Piedra.
During the night they woke me to tell me that Fidel had sent news that reinforcements of the Rural Guards had arrived; but we already knew this because we had overheard a message from the little plane, but we hadn’t believed it because of the sketchy report that said there had been 12 killed, 21 prisoners and 33 weapons captured. Still missing is the report from Paz.
18
Nothing new in the zone. The Rural Guards’ only pastime is killing the pigs we had left wandering about. Fidel gives a report that the booty is now 66 weapons, 42 prisoners, and 18,000 bullets. The Red Cross message was rejected in the form that it was proposed by the army, that is, turning over [the prisoners] at Casa de Piedra, and a [counter] proposal was given to the International Red Cross delegate for this to occur on July 22 in Las Vegas. Mompié was bombed again.
19
The day was calm on all fronts in terms of reports and shots from light weapons, the planes enjoyed themselves shooting in El Jigüe. The rain was persistent.
20
De la O. called at dawn to advise us that a reinforcement at the beach had been destroyed, but that Cuevas6 had died in the battle. The day passed in absolute calm; all we heard was that the Red Cross had accepted Las Vegas as the place to turn over the wounded prisoners and had asked for confirmation of the time.
At dusk the long-awaited news arrived of the surrender of the soldiers led by Quevedo. There were a little more than a hundred, according to what we’ve been able to learn. There have been five deaths among our men: Cuevas and Banderas are the ones that I know about.7 There were two seriously wounded and two others. Everything remains calm. I immediately sent out to look for those men without arms on the list I had, and we began the march to the house in Mompié from where the others continued to the Sierra Maestra store. We spent our time waiting for news. Unity outside seems to be going well but the [Popular] Socialist Party isn’t included [in the unity call], which surprises me.
21
I haven’t been able to communicate with Fidel all day despite the continuous messages I’ve tried to send him. The latest news indicates he has moved to Naranjal, probably to distribute weapons, and that’s where I sent the messenger. The first delivery of prisoners to the International Red Cross is set for tomorrow, and I haven’t received a word from Fidel. Teté will be in charge of taking the message to the lines of the army in Las Vegas.
22
The uncertainty continued until mid-morning, when Fidel spoke. Teté had left for Las Vegas with a message. The response was very courteous but announced that the International Red Cross had not shown up, offering nevertheless to receive any seriously wounded before the scheduled hour. A communication arrived by radio from the Red Cross indicating that it could only get there tomorrow. Meanwhile, prisoners continued arriving at the Mompié house; they are hungry and cold. All the battalion officers who have surrendered—except their commander, who will remain a prisoner—were there. At night three gravely injured arrived, and we alerted Captain Durán of Las Vegas that they would be sent to him. I left to have a talk with Fidel and, before sending the men off, I had already received a communication from the aforementioned captain indicating that he would receive them in the morning because he considered nighttime movement dangerous. During the night one of the three wounded died.
23
I was somewhat delayed in returning, reaching Mompié a little after 2:00 at the same time that a message arrived from the members of the International Red Cross asking that I go. Franqui and Faustino were already there. I conferred with the representatives sent by the Red Cross, who offered their help in getting medicines for us and asked me to write a letter to the committee asking for this and the recognition of one of our delegations in Caracas. We turned over 216 prisoners and announced more for tomorrow. Captain Durán went to greet me and showed himself to be very easy to get along with.8
24
It was a day of continually contradictory orders. The remaining soldiers, something around 29, were turned over at 4:00 in the afternoon. Orders were given to all the men to head down the mountain because the truce would end at 6:00. Raúl [Castro Mercader] will stay in the Sierra Maestra with his people and Fonso, while all the rest will go to Las Vegas, supported by 30 of Camilo’s men, who will be in an intermediary position from which to attack Las Vegas or the reinforcements arriving from Santo Domingo.
Everything went badly because the men didn’t follow orders and remained half way or something like that because we couldn’t find them. The messenger, who should have made contact with Camilo, didn’t bother to wake me and slept peacefully. The International Red Cross signed the certificate that the prisoners had been handed over, signed by the delegate of the Cuban Red Cross. Santo Domingo is completely surrounded as of today and there’s talk of troops coming up from Estrada Palma. The plan of attack on Las Vegas is as follows:
I = Minas de Frío
II = Las Vegas
1= El Guajiro 8
2 = Manuel9 6
3 = Silva 15
4 = Joel 18
5 = Me 18
6 = Laferté 20
710 = Camilo 30
Dotted lines = roads
---Double = Jibacoa River
Arrows = direction of our forces
25
The day began slowly; it was only around noon that I could give final instructions to the group lea
ders and each one left to take his position. Captain César Suárez hadn’t shown up because “it was raining a lot.” Joel, el Guajiro [Luis Crespo] and Silva took their own initiative. At night we left the home of el Gallego so we wouldn’t be seen by the army. We quickly met up with Camilo, but there was a group that had dropped behind, and we learned later that Laferté had been badly hurt and could not walk, significantly delaying the return march. I had to improvise by having one of the aides man the bazooka and left the troop under the command of César Suárez, in whom I have no confidence as captain. Since then, 12 shots of all kinds have been heard coming from the direction of Santo Domingo and the air force has been active.
26
This morning we explored the area, already having decided on the places where the people will be posted, but they haven’t been moved there yet because César Suárez advised that he couldn’t reach the spot because he “has seven barefoot men.” If the one assigned to open fire isn’t in his position, there’s no need for the others to be there. I sent Manuel to another hill that’s closer, Fajardo will have the second under his command, and Lázaro the third; Angelito will go with me between the second and third. The other side of the river has been abandoned. Camilo is in his position. Firefights and mortar shots have been heard all morning. A P-47 machine-gunned the area of Santo Domingo. The radio broadcast news of various battles; in one of them it was reported that Manuel Acuña had been killed. Yesterday’s results are: (for the army) 24 prisoners, three dead, 25 guns, one bazooka; on our side, two slightly wounded.
27
The day is spent in preparations. In Santo Domingo almost no fighting is heard. A message is intercepted reporting that a major was killed and Sánchez Mosquera was gravely wounded in the head. Everything is ready to begin combat but not a shot has been fired yet.
28
This morning a communiqué arrived from el Guajiro advising us that two women had said that the captain stated that he was surrounded and that he didn’t want to fight; if the rebels withdrew, he said, they would leave. I sent a message to Fidel asking if he wanted us to cut them down. Before receiving an answer, another message came from César Suárez indicating that Finalé11 wanted to talk to me, according to him, to avoid bloodshed because tomorrow the troop was going to be withdrawn from Las Vegas along with tanks and planes. So then I sent a note to Captain Durán Batista inviting him to confer in Bismark’s house.12 Guillermo Morales took the message but the response was negative. I sent a second message telling him what Finalé said and warning him to surrender—or rather, to go, leaving his weapons. He refused to answer, saying tomorrow would bring the response. When we left, a localized battle began at Mango Hill, with bombs and other powerful weapons. At nightfall the results of the battle were still not known.
29
I was advised early that the men commissioned by the captain were coming and were in Bismark’s house. I went down a short distance to meet them. They were Lieutenant Soto, second-in-command of the company, and a first-class sergeant. They told me that they didn’t want to leave their weapons but offered to leave us enough food for a regiment. I told them that it was impossible given the number of men they had and that they had withdrawn from Las Minas de Frío and San Lorenzo. They told me that a tank had passed by yesterday and more were coming today. We climbed up and had barely arrived when the sentry informed us that the army was on the move with a white flag and another of the Red Cross; I ordered [my men] to open fire and a brief shoot-out began. We quickly went down and encountered squads that hadn’t fired because they saw the Red Cross flag. I took Angelito Frías’s squadron and some men from other squads to pursue the Rural Guards. What we saw was a wanton spectacle of defeat: backpacks and helmets strewn all along the trail, pouches with bullets and all kinds of equipment, even a jeep and a tank that was intact.
We continued advancing and at the first shots we encountered three civilians wounded by wild mortar fire by the guardsmen from Arroyones. Later we captured the first prisoners, among them one of the company’s doctors. We were shot at, too, but by our people who were confused. We continued advancing and took a group that surrendered in a jeep. There another bad mistake occurred and our people killed a guardsman and seriously wounded one of the other two men who were accompanying me, Lieutenant Ángel Frías.
By now we had 60 prisoners, among them the tank captain, [Gómez] Oquendo, and I was in the uncomfortable situation of being besieged by our own forces, who opened fire when they could scarcely see a helmet move. I sent a soldier to tell them to cease fire with hands in the air and at one point that worked, but then they kept firing for a while, wounding two more guardsmen. Finally things calmed down a little and the line of Rural Guards was put in motion toward Las Vegas. We weren’t able to capture either the captain who commanded the company or his second-in-charge.
Yesterday’s action, in which the reinforcements were detained, cost the Rural Guards two deaths and some wounded, as well as some weapons. While I was thinking of grabbing the tank, a note came from Captain Vega indicating that the Rural Guards of Arroyones were in talks to surrender, but that they wanted us to show them a prisoner from Las Vegas. I had to leave everything to take Oquendo to talk with them, without any result. When I returned I found a message from Fidel calling me urgently, telling me, among other things, that the Rural Guards had left Santo Domingo and that Paz had been killed.
30
I reached Llorona Hill as the sun was rising, but Fidel hadn’t been able to wait for me because he had to prepare an attack at Arroyones before 6:00. I had a snooze, expecting to hear mortar fire, but heard none. I assumed the Arroyones operation was finished and sent the men to look for fugitives, with the result that at noon they brought in the captain and a second lieutenant as prisoners. There’s still a first lieutenant and some soldiers missing.
Toward the end of the day I was informed that an intense gunfight was heard on the way to Arroyones. I left Angelito Frías’s squadron and went with all the men to that zone, but when we reached El Jigüe I found that there was nothing in Arroyones. No soldiers were seen in Las Mercedes, but some people said they had seen them there. At that point a message arrived asking for a doctor because Daniel was badly wounded. I sent a message to Las Vegas and went as fast as I could with everything I had at hand only to find a corpse on my arrival. Daniel had died from a mortar wound in his belly, 10 centimeters deep, but he could have been saved if he had had immediate medical attention.
The Arroyones ambush had been marred by several serious errors but the result was 16 dead soldiers and others gravely wounded by a mine. The men had hurried off to look for guardsmen and a mortar shot hit Daniel; there was a moment of confusion and he was left alone with his small group, wounded, suffering greatly until his death a few hours later. René Ramos [Daniel] and I were political enemies with profound ideological differences separating us, but he knew how to die fulfilling his duty on the front line. And when one dies in that way it’s because one feels an inner conviction, something that I had denied him; so at this moment I stand corrected.13
With no time for mourning, we continued to Las Mercedes, organizing a siege without knowing for sure if the Rural Guards are there or not. Simultaneously we were to scout the area while organizing the men to complete the encirclement, with the aid of Lalo and Guillermo, who had come [to join us]. The map of the positions is as follows:
31
As night ended the first shots were heard that we later learned were from the sentry shooting above Lalo’s men, and once day broke, there was an intense firefight near Jíbaro with Rural Guards responding immediately. I sent for the doctors; we had news of the first wounded. The air force started machine-gunning early on all the surrounding hills, which continued all day. At night Fidel came to the top of El Jigüe and we conferred there. He told me that commander Corzo14 had asked for machine-gun belts and parts for the Cristobal [carbine]. Fidel ordered me to carry out an attack with the 81, 60 and 50 mortars on the enemy positi
on, but it had to be at dawn. The mortars were tested at night. During the day three of the fugitives from Las Vegas were taken prisoner. The Jíbaro lines were reinforced with [Reinaldo] Mora’s squadron.15
Che during the campaign in Las Villas, 1958.
Che addressing the people after the capture of Fomento.
Che in Fomento, 1958.
Combatant José Ramón Silva.
Che with some members of his column (including Zobeida Rodríguez and Víctor Bordón) during the capture of Fomento, December 18,1958.
Che at Radio Nacional, Placetas, December 24,1958.
Che in Las Tullerías Hotel, Placetas, Las Villas, preparing for the capture of Santa Clara.
Che and Aleida March leaving Placetas to capture Remedios and Caibarién.
Camilo Cienfuegos and Lolita Rosell in Jobo Rosado, Yaguajay.
Che during the battle of Santa Clara.
Combatants of Column Eight, including Rogelio Acevedo, José R. Silva, Dr. Oscar Fernández Mell and Antonio (with the bazooka).