CHAPTER FIVE.

  NELSON HUNTS THE FRENCH.

  At this time Sir Horatio Nelson had been despatched to the Mediterraneanwith a small squadron to ascertain the object of the great expeditionwhich was fitting out, under Napoleon Bonaparte, at Toulon.

  Nelson had for a long time past been displaying, in a series ofcomplicated and difficult operations in the Mediterranean, thosesplendid qualities which had already won for him unusual honours andfame, and which were about to raise him to that proud pinnacle which heultimately attained as England's greatest naval hero. His address andsuccess in matters of diplomacy had filled his superiors and theGovernment with sentiments of respect; his moral courage in riskingreputation and position, with unflinching resolution, by _disobeying_orders when by so doing the good and credit of his country could beadvanced, made him an object of dread to some, of admiration to others,while his lion-like animal courage and amiability endeared him to hisofficers and men. Sailors had begun to feel that where Nelson led theway victory was certain, and those who were ordered to join his fleetesteemed themselves most fortunate.

  The defeat of the French armament was considered by the EnglishGovernment a matter of so great importance, that Earl St. Vincent, thenengaged in blockading the Spanish fleet, was directed, if he thought itnecessary, to draw off his entire fleet for the purpose, and relinquishthe blockade. He was, however, told that, if he thought a detachmentsufficient, he was to place it under the command of Sir Horatio Nelson.The Earl did consider a detachment sufficient, and had already made uphis mind to give the command to Nelson, being thoroughly alive to hisgreat talents and other good qualities. He accordingly sent him to theMediterranean with three ships of the line, four frigates, and a sloopof war.

  This force was now, by the addition to which we have referred, augmentedso largely that Nelson found himself in possession of a fleet with whichhe might not only "watch" the enemy, but, if occasion should offer,attack him.

  He was refitting after a storm in the Sardinian harbour of St. Pietro,when the reinforcements hove in sight. As soon as the ships were seenfrom the masthead of the Admiral's vessel, Nelson immediately signalledthat they should put to sea. Accordingly the united fleet set sail, andbegan a vigorous search for the French armament, which had left Toulon ashort time before.

  The search was for some time unsuccessful. No tidings could be obtainedof the destination of the enemy for some time, but at length it waslearned that he had surprised Malta.

  Although his fleet was inferior in size to that of the French, Nelson--and indeed all his officers and men--longed to meet with and engagethem. The Admiral, therefore, formed a plan to attack them while atanchor at Gozo, but he received information that the French had leftthat island the day after their arrival. Holding very strongly theopinion that they were bound for Egypt, he set sail at once in pursuit,and arrived off Alexandria on the 28th of June 1798.

  There, to his intense disappointment, he found that nothing had beenseen or heard of the enemy. Nelson's great desire was to meet withNapoleon Bonaparte and fight him on the sea. But this wish was not tobe gratified. He found, however, that the governor of Alexandria wasendeavouring to put the city in a state of defence, for he had receivedinformation from Leghorn that the French expedition intended to proceedagainst Egypt after having taken Malta.

  Leaving Alexandria, Nelson proceeded in various directions in search ofthe French, carrying a press of sail night and day in his anxiety tofall in with them, but being baffled in his search, he was compelled toreturn to Sicily to obtain fresh supplies in order to continue thepursuit.

  Of course Nelson was blamed in England for his want of success in thisexpedition, and Earl St. Vincent was severely censured for having sentso young an officer on a service so important. Anticipating theobjection, that he ought not to have made so long a voyage without morecertain information, Nelson said, in vindication of his conduct:--

  "Who was I to get such information from? The Governments of Naples andSicily either knew not, or chose to keep me in ignorance. Was I to waitpatiently until I heard certain accounts? If Egypt were their object,before I could hear of them, they would have been in India. To donothing was disgraceful; therefore I made use of my understanding. I ambefore your lordships' judgment; and if, under all circumstances, it isdecided that I am wrong, I ought, for the sake of our country, to besuperseded; for at this moment, when I know the French are not inAlexandria, I hold the same opinion as off Cape Passaro--that, under allcircumstances, I was right in steering for Alexandria; and by thatopinion I must stand or fall."

  It was ere long proved that Nelson _was_ right, and that Earl St.Vincent had made no mistake in sending him on a service so important;for we now know that in all the British fleet there was not another manso admirably adapted for the duty which was assigned to him, of finding,fighting, and conquering, the French, in reference to whom he wrote tothe first lord of the Admiralty, "Be they bound to the antipodes, yourlordship may rely that I will not lose a moment in bringing them toaction!"

  Re-victualled and watered, the British fleet set sail on the 25th ofJuly from Syracuse. On the 28th, intelligence was received that theenemy had been seen about four weeks before, steering to the South Eastfrom Candia.

  With characteristic disregard of the possible consequences to his ownfame and interest, in his determination to "do the right," Nelson atonce resolved to return to Alexandria. Accordingly, with all sail set,the fleet stood once more towards the coast of Egypt.

  Perseverance was at length rewarded. On the 1st of August 1798, aboutten in the morning, they sighted Alexandria, and saw with inexpressibledelight that the port was crowded with the ships of France.

  And here we venture to say that we sympathise with the joy of theBritish on this occasion, and shall explain why we do so.

  Not every battle that is fought--however brilliant in military or navaltactics it may be, or in exhibitions of personal prowess--deserves oursympathy. Only that war which is waged against oppression is entitledto respect, and this, we hold, applies to the war in which the Britishwere engaged at that time.

  France, under the Directory, had commenced a career of unwarrantableconquest, for the simple purpose of self-aggrandisement, and her greatgeneral, Bonaparte, had begun that course of successful warfare in whichhe displayed those brilliant talents which won for him an empire,constituted him, in the ordinary acceptation of the word, a hero, andadvanced France to a high position of tyrannical power. But brillianttalents and success could not free him from the charge of being awholesale murderer.

  To oppose such pretentions and practices was a bounden duty on the partof those who loved justice, just as much as it is the duty of every onewho has the power to thwart the designs of, and forcibly overcome, ahighwayman or a pirate.

  Observe, reader, that we do not intend here to imply an invidiouscomparison. We have no sympathy with those who hold that England wasand always is in favour of fair play, while France was bent on tyranny.On the contrary, we believe that England has in some instances beenguilty of the sin which we now condemn, and that, on the other hand,many Frenchmen of the present day would disapprove of the policy ofFrance in the time of Napoleon the First. Neither do we sympathise withthe famous saying of Nelson that "one Englishman is equal to threeFrenchmen!" The tendency to praise one's-self has always been regardedamong Christian nations as a despicable, or at least a pitiable,quality, and we confess that we cannot see much difference between aboastful man and a boastful nation. Frenchmen have always displayedchivalrous courage, not a whit inferior to the British, and historyproves that in war they have been eminently successful. The questionwhether they could beat us or we could beat them, if tested in a fairstand-up fight with equal numbers, besides being an unprofitable one, isnot now before us. All that we are concerned about at present is, thatin the war now under consideration the British _did_ beat the French,and we rejoice to record the fact solely on the ground that we fought ina righteous cause.

>   With these remarks we proceed to give an account of one of the greatestnaval victories ever achieved by British arms.