SECTION 1
ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila, respondents.
Ozaeta, Lichauco and Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent Secretary of Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent City Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.
LABRADOR, J.:
I. The case and issue, in general
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a legislative enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in significance. The enactment poses questions of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from the alien retailer. Through it, and within the field of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for economic independence and national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed to free the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so that the country and the nation may be free from a supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify the enactment?
II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.
III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.
IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved
a. The police power. —
There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but petitioner claims that its exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection of the laws. But before proceeding to the consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be well to bear in mind certain basic and fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in the determination of the ever recurrent conflict between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws. What is the scope of police power, and how are the due process and equal protection clauses related to it? What is the province and power of the legislature, and what is the function and duty of the courts? These consideration must be clearly and correctly understood that their application to the facts of the case may be brought forth with clarity and the issue accordingly resolved.
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause.
b. Limitations on police power. —
The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of our Constitution:
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed.
220, 226.)
c. The, equal protection clause. —
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
d. The due process clause. —
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review. —
Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It must not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional repository of police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the measures adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve public interest. On the other hand, courts, although zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise of the legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there has been a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into the wisdom of the law.
V. Economic problems sought to be remedied
With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue involved. If the disputed legislation were merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there would be no question that it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative power. But it goes further and prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from engaging therein. The problem becomes more complex because its subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as society itself, which from the immemorial has always been open to residents, irrespective of race, color or citizenship.
a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation. —
In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that they produce, the dealer, of course, is unknown. But as group life develops and families begin to live in communities producing more than what they consume and needing an infinite number of things they do not produce, the dealer comes into existence. As villages develop into big communities and specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced. Under modern conditions and standards of living, in which man's needs have multiplied and diversified to unlimited extents and proportions, the retailer comes as essential as the producer, because thru him the infinite variety of articles, goods and needed for daily life are placed within the easy reach of consumers. Retail dealers perform the functions of capillaries in the human body, thru which all the needed food and supplies are ministered to members of the communities comprising the nation.
There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the community. He ministers to the resident's daily needs, food in all its increasing forms, and the various little gadgets and things needed for home and daily life. He provides his customers around his store with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices needed for the daily cooking. He has cloths to sell, even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes that wear out. The retailer, therefore, from the lowly peddler, the owner of a small sari-sari store, to the operator of a department store or, a supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day existence.
b. The alien retailer's trait. —
The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the bigger centers of population (Time there was when he was unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly but gradually be invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the cities and big centers of population. He even pioneers, in far away nooks where the beginnings of community life appear, ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing their agricultural produce for sale in the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities the alien has replaced the native retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry without limit, and the patience and forbearance of a slave.
Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of ill-bred and insolent neighbors and customers are made in his face, but he heeds them not, and he forgets and forgives. The community takes note of him, as he appears to be harmless and extremely useful.
c. Alleged alien control and dominance. —
There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about the controlling and dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and other essentials, clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly through him. In big cities and centers of population he has acquired not only predominance, but apparent control over distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles, groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles. And were it not for some national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the Acefa, his control over principal foods and products would easily become full and complete.
Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one breath it is said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in another, it is charged that the law is merely the result of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is said, is not an element of control; also so many unmanageable factors in the retail business make control virtually impossible. The first argument which brings up an issue of fact merits serious consideration. The others are matters of opinion within the exclusive competence of the legislature and beyond our prerogative to pass upon and decide.
The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and white. Between the constitutional convention year (1935), wh
en the fear of alien domination and control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official statistics unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien of the retail trade, as witness the following tables:
(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and Nationality of Owners, Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics, Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)
The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on Filipino establishments already include mere market vendors, whose capital is necessarily small..
The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien participation has steadily increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap through their assests and gross sales which average between six and seven times those of the very many Filipino retailers. Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien invests more capital, buys and sells six to seven times more, and gains much more. The same official report, pointing out to the known predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks that the Filipino retailers were largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by respondents, the native investment is thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer is practically helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and supply.
d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention. —
It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is the legislature's target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization would never have been adopted. The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien dominance and control when they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other things, that "it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of the retail trade; . . . ." (II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67 of Petitioner.) That was twenty-two years ago; and the events since then have not been either pleasant or comforting. Dean Sinco of the University of the Philippines College of Law, commenting on the patrimony clause of the Preamble opines that the fathers of our Constitution were merely translating the general preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers from alien interests that had already brought under their control the commercial and other economic activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 114); and analyzing the concern of the members of the constitutional convention for the economic life of the citizens, in connection with the nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he says:
But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the country is not desirable and that if such a situation should remain, political independence alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength. Filipino private capital is not big enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the national economy. Moreover, it is but of recent formation and hence, largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under such conditions, the government as the instrumentality of the national will, has to step in and assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the struggle for the economic freedom of the nation in somewhat the same way that it did in the crusade for political freedom. Thus . . . it (the Constitution) envisages an organized movement for the protection of the nation not only against the possibilities of armed invasion but also against its economic subjugation by alien interests in the economic field. (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p. 476.)
Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino businessmen, manufacturers and producers believe so; they fear the dangers coming from alien control, and they express sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is Resolution No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National convention of Filipino Businessmen, and a similar resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second National Convention of Manufacturers and Producers. The man in the street also believes, and fears, alien predominance and control; so our newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not only to control but to alien stranglehold. We, therefore, find alien domination and control to be a fact, a reality proved by official statistics, and felt by all the sections and groups that compose the Filipino community.
e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail. —
But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly endanger the national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and action and thorough organization, alien retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison and concert on such vital matters as the fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles to be made available in the market, and even the choice of the goods or articles they would or would not patronize or distribute, that fears of dislocation of the national economy and of the complete subservience of national economy and of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers and consumers alike can be placed completely at their mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose an article of daily use is desired to be prescribed by the aliens, because the producer or importer does not offer them sufficient profits, or because a new competing article offers bigger profits for its introduction. All that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article, eliminating it from their stocks, offering the new one as a substitute. Hence, the producers or importers of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and free enterprise correspondingly suppressed.
We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of alien domination. Grave abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a fact within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly overlook or ignore in the interests of truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling on the part of the public that alien participation in the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable practices, the mention of a few of which would suffice for our purposes; that at some time or other they have cornered the market of essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to justify and enhance profits to unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience and prejudice of the consuming public, so much so that the Government has had to establish the National Rice and Corn Corporation to save the public from their continuous hoarding practices and tendencies; that they have violated price control laws, especially on foods and essential commodities, such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 1168), authorizing their immediate and automatic deportation for price control convictions; that they have secret combinations among themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of the law of supply and demand; that they have connived to boycott honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their demands, in unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise. They are believed by the public to have evaded tax laws, smuggled goods and money into and out of the land, violated import and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in derision and contempt of lawful authority. It is also believed that they have engaged in corrupting public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government. As a matter of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the Government and by their own lawful diplomatic representatives, action which impliedly admits a prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the above practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things
may come in the future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population, therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy of the State.
f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security. —
We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed law is not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the legitimate desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized representatives, to free the nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.
VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. — The next question that now poses solution is, Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to his beloved country and his beloved kin and countrymen. The experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may seem.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being merely transient and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function of retail distribution to his hands.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out above, their secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which they are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a national which fully justify the legislative classification adopted in the retail trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over the alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other.
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction. —
The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities we have earlier cited, we can also refer to the case of Linsey vs. Natural Carbonic Fas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly defined the application of equal protection clause to a law sought to be voided as contrary thereto:
. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis but is essentially arbitrary."
c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification. —
The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has already been affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United States. In the case of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of a condition therein limiting the ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens of the Philippine Islands or the United States, thus denying the right to aliens, it was held that the Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. The legislature in enacting the law had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from foreign interlopers. We held that this was a valid exercise of the police power, and all presumptions are in favor of its constitutionality. In substance, we held that the limitation of domestic ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippines does not violate the equal protection of the law and due process or law clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering said decision we quoted with approval the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I, as follows:
"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the object of which is to encourage American shipping, and place them on an equal footing with the shipping of other nations. Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of American shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. It is not to give the vessel an American character, that the license is granted; that effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment. But it is to co
nfer on her American privileges, as contra distinguished from foreign; and to preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners; in surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American commercial marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this whole system is projected."
The rule in general is as follows:
Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)
In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of hawkers and peddlers, which provided that no one can obtain a license unless he is, or has declared his intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was held valid, for the following reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to limit the business of those who are supposed to have regard for the welfare, good order and happiness of the community, and the court cannot question this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N. E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a statute which prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of liquors, was found not to be the result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to discriminate, but was based on the belief that an alien cannot be sufficiently acquainted with "our institutions and our life as to enable him to appreciate the relation of this particular business to our entire social fabric", and was not, therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115 (1926), the U.S. Supreme Court had under consideration an ordinance of the city of Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard rooms) to aliens. It held that plainly irrational discrimination against aliens is prohibited, but it does not follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear in some instances such a relation to a legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis of permitted classification, and that it could not state that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude must be allowed for the legislative appraisement of local conditions and for the legislative choice of methods for controlling an apprehended evil. The case of State vs. Carrol, 124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30 (Washington, 1922), the business of pawn brooking was considered as having tendencies injuring public interest, and limiting it to citizens is within the scope of police power. A similar statute denying aliens the right to engage in auctioneering was also sustained in Wright vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P. 151 (Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said that aliens are judicially known to have different interests, knowledge, attitude, psychology and loyalty, hence the prohibitions of issuance of licenses to them for the business of pawnbroker, pool, billiard, card room, dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the licensing of aliens as barbers was held void, but the reason for the decision was the court's findings that the exercise of the business by the aliens does not in any way affect the morals, the health, or even the convenience of the community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479 (1947), a California statute banning the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to person ineligible to citizenship was held void, because the law conflicts with Federal power over immigration, and because there is no public interest in the mere claim of ownership of the waters and the fish in them, so there was no adequate justification for the discrimination. It further added that the law was the outgrowth of antagonism toward the persons of Japanese ancestry. However, two Justices dissented on the theory that fishing rights have been treated traditionally as natural resources. In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law which imposed a tax on every employer of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of age, was declared void because the court found that there was no reason for the classification and the tax was an arbitrary deduction from the daily wage of an employee.
d. Authorities contra explained. —
It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United States hold that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not a valid ground for classification. But in this decision the laws declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or were the result or product of racial antagonism and hostility, and there was no question of public interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the United States Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine law making unlawful the keeping of books of account in any language other than English, Spanish or any other local dialect, but the main reasons for the decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of business there would be no other system of distribution, and (2) that the Chinese would fall prey to all kinds of fraud, because they would be deprived of their right to be advised of their business and to direct its conduct. The real reason for the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no public benefit would be derived from the operations of the law and on the other hand it would deprive Chinese of something indispensable for carrying on their business. In Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220 (1885) an ordinance conferring powers on officials to withhold consent in the operation of laundries both as to persons and place, was declared invalid, but the court said that the power granted was arbitrary, that there was no reason for the discrimination which attended the administration and implementation of the law, and that the motive thereof was mere racial hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a law prohibiting aliens to engage as hawkers and peddlers was declared void, because the discrimination bore no reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification was proposed.
The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said, aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers with whom they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy, except in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes to the land. These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown on many occasions and instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency. We can do no better than borrow the language of Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and significance of the distinction between the alien and the national, thus:
. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country are without the intimate knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that our own people have. So it is likewise known that certain classes of aliens are of different psychology from our fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to suppose that the foreign born, whose allegiance is first to their own country, and whose ideals of governmental environment and control have been engendered and formed under entirely different regimes and political systems, have not the same inspiration for the public weal, nor are they as well disposed toward the United States, as those who by citizenship, are a part of the government itself. Further enlargement, is unnecessary. I have said enough so that obviously it cannot be affirmed with absolute confidence that the Legislature was without plausible reason for making the classification, and therefore appropriate discriminations against aliens as it relates to the subject of legislation. . . . .
VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.
a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive. —
We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been stated by the highest authority in the United States that:
. . . . And the guaranty of du
e process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. . . . .
x x x x x x x x x
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. . . . (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)
Another authority states the principle thus:
. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering the scope of the police power in a constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to inquire whether the restriction it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable, and not whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .
x x x x x x x x x
. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the persons whom it affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular class, and must not be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302., 1:1)- 1074-1075.)
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:
. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. . . .
Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of constitutionality:
In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the police power to regulate the operation of a business, is or is not constitutional, one of the first questions to be considered by the court is whether the power as exercised has a sufficient foundation in reason in connection with the matter involved, or is an arbitrary, oppressive, and capricious use of that power, without substantial relation to the health, safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the public.
b. Petitioner's argument considered. —
Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those privileges long ago recognized as essential to the orderly pursuant of happiness by free men; that it is a gainful and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to prohibit and penalized. This arguments overlooks fact and reality and rests on an incorrect assumption and premise, i.e., that in this country where the occupation is engaged in by petitioner, it has been so engaged by him, by the alien in an honest creditable and unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the citizens and without ultimate danger to their economic peace, tranquility and welfare. But the Legislature has found, as we have also found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly abused by the alien, thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys a monopolistic control of the occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.
The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied the bill, which later was enacted into law:
This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If the persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are the ones who owe no allegiance to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our free institutions, and who have no permanent stake in our people's welfare, we are not really the masters of our destiny. All aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at the mercy of other people.
In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons who are not citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this bill seeks to take away from the hands of persons who are not citizens of the Philippines a power that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life and endanger our national security it respects existing rights.
The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.
If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is none the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country. The removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and domination, is one of the noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of due process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of legislative authority.
c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative action. —
The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional restrictions of due process on the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from economic control and domination, thru the exercise of the police power. The fathers of the Constitution must have given to the legislature full authority and power to enact legislation that would promote the supreme happiness of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue now before us, they expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a resolution expressing their belief that the legislation in question is within the scope of the legislative power. Thus they declared the their Resolution:
That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of retail trade; but it abstain from approving the amendment introduced by the Delegate for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter because it is convinced that the National Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which limits to Filipino and American citizens the privilege to engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the Memorandum for the Petitioner.)
It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a principle objective is the conservation of the patrimony of the nation and as corollary the provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation, development and utilization of its natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the oper
ation of the public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines." The nationalization of the retail trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective of the Constitution. Can it be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid and unconstitutional?
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the approval of the radical measures is, therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant to its duties towards the country and its people would it view the sorry plight of the nationals with the complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the demands of public interest and national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of legislation, the Legislature was in duty bound to face the problem and meet, through adequate measures, the danger and threat that alien domination of retail trade poses to national economy.
d. Provisions of law not unreasonable. —
A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable the Legislature has been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives; and similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of aliens. The right or privilege is denied to those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations of the Court on this case, attention was called to the fact that the privilege should not have been denied to children and heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the law itself, its aims and purposes. Beside, the exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review. It is well settled that the Court will not inquire into the motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative judgment. The Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative power. Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a violation of due process, is not its reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the provisions are not unreasonable. These principles also answer various other arguments raised against the law, some of which are: that the law does not promote general welfare; that thousands of aliens would be thrown out of employment; that prices will increase because of the elimination of competition; that there is no need for the legislation; that adequate replacement is problematical; that there may be general breakdown; that there would be repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of these arguments are directed against the supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the legislative prerogative; they do not import invalidity.
VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law
A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title thereof is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional provision which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:
No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to appraise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of the title and the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate" does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and "prohibition", which terms express the two main purposes and objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been included within the term regulation.
Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors. (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in page 41 of Answer.)
Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the Legislature shall be stated in the tale, the title to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, etc." sufficiently expresses the subject of an act prohibiting the sale of such liquors to minors and to persons in the habit of getting intoxicated; such matters being properly included within the subject of regulating the sale. (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of restraint and prohibition of acts usually done in connection with the thing to be regulated. While word regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit, there is no absolute reason why it should not have such meaning when used in delegating police power in connection with a thing the best or only efficacious regulation of which involves suppression. (State vs. Morton, 162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that the title need not be an index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, See. 4803, p. 345.) The above rule was followed the title of the Act in question adopted the more general term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore, the law also contains other rules for the regulation of the retail trade which may not be included in the terms "nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were the title changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit", there would have been many provisions not falling within the scope of the title which would have made the Act invalid. The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the principle governing the drafting of statutes, under which a simple or general term should be adopted in the title, which would include all other provisions found in the body of the Act.
One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have received the notice, action and study of the legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the legislators have been appraised of the nature of the law, especially the nationalization and the prohibition provisions. The legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law, and a great many of the persons affected by the prohibitions in the law conducted a campaign against its approval. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. The objection must therefore, be overruled.
IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations
Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. We find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights can be inferred the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But the nationals
of China are not discriminating against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State (plaston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)
X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should have been given in the law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes for them to close. Our legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative authority and does not transcend the limitations of due process and equal protection guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the law should be addressed to the Legislature; they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I agree to the proposition, principle or rule that courts may not inquire into the wisdom of an the Act passed by the Congress and duly approved by the President of the Republic. But the rule does not preclude courts from inquiring and determining whether the Act offends against a provision or provisions of the Constitution. I am satisfied that the Act assailed as violative of the due process of law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution does not infringe upon them, insofar as it affects associations, partnership or corporations, the capital of which is not wholly owned by the citizens of the Philippines, and aliens, who are not and have not been engaged in the retail business. I am, however, unable to persuade myself that it does not violate said clauses insofar as the Act applies to associations and partnerships referred to in the Act and to aliens, who are and have heretofore been engaged in said business. When they did engage in the retail business there was no prohibition on or against them to engage in it. They assumed and believed in good faith they were entitled to engaged in the business. The Act allows aliens to continue in business until their death or voluntary retirement from the business or forfeiture of their license; and corporations, associations or partnership, the capital of which is not wholly owned by the citizens of the Philippines to continue in the business for a period of ten years from the date of the approval of the Act (19 June 1954) or until the expiry of term of the existence of the association or partnership or corporation, whichever event comes first. The prohibition on corporations, the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, to engage in the retail business for a period of more than ten years from the date of the approval of the Act or beyond the term of their corporate existence, whichever event comes first, is valid and lawful, because the continuance of the existence of such corporations is subject to whatever the Congress may impose reasonably upon them by subsequent legislation.1 But the prohibition to engage in the retail business by associations and partnerships, the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizen of the Philippines, after ten years from the date of the approval of the Act, even before the end of the term of their existence as agreed upon by the associates and partners, and by alien heirs to whom the retail business is transmitted by the death of an alien engaged in the business, or by his executor or administrator, amounts to a deprivation of their property without due process of law. To my mind, the ten-year period from the date of the approval of the Act or until the expiration of the term of the existence of the association and partnership, whichever event comes first, and the six-month period granted to alien heirs of a deceased alien, his executor or administrator, to liquidate the business, do not cure the defect of the law, because the effect of the prohibition is to compel them to sell or dispose of their business. The price obtainable at such forced sale of the business would be inadequate to reimburse and compensate the associates or partners of the associations or partnership, and the alien heirs of a deceased alien, engaged in the retail business for the capital invested in it. The stock of merchandise bought and sold at retail does not alone constitute the business. The goodwill that the association, partnership and the alien had built up during a long period of effort, patience and perseverance forms part of such business. The constitutional provisions that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law2 and that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws3 would have no meaning as applied to associations or partnership and alien heirs of an alien engaged in the retail business if they were to be compelled to sell or dispose of their business within ten years from the date of the approval of the Act and before the end of the term of the existence of the associations and partnership as agreed upon by the associations and partners and within six months after the death of their predecessor-in-interest.
The authors of the Constitution were vigilant, careful and zealous in the safeguard of the ownership of private agricultural lands which together with the lands of the public domain constitute the priceless patrimony and mainstay of the nation; yet, they did not deem it wise and prudent to deprive aliens and their heirs of such lands.4
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that section 1 of the Act, insofar as it compels associations and partnership referred to therein to wind up their retail business within ten years from the date of the approval of the Act even before the expiry of the term of their existence as agreed upon by the associates and partners and section 3 of the Act, insofar as it compels the aliens engaged in the retail business in his lifetime his executor or administrator, to liquidate the business, are invalid, for they violate the due process of law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution.
JAVIER VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986
EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents.
Raul S. Roco and Lorna Patajo-Kapunan for petitioner.
CRUZ, J.:
The new Solicitor General has moved to dismiss this petition on the ground that as a result of supervening events it has become moot and academic. It is not a
s simple as that. Several lives have been lost in connection with this case, including that of the petitioner himself. The private respondent is now in hiding. The purity of suffrage has been defiled and the popular will scorned through a confabulation of those in authority. This Court cannot keep silent in the face of these terrible facts. The motion is denied.
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. The incident naturally heightened tension in the province and sharpened the climate of fear among the electorate. Conceivably, it intimidated voters against supporting the Opposition candidate or into supporting the candidate of the ruling party.
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were to run true to form. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.
The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight. The nation, already indignant over the obvious manipulation of the presidential elections in favor of Marcos, was revolted by the killing, which flaunted a scornful disregard for the law by the assailants who apparently believed they were above the law. This ruthless murder was possibly one of the factors that strengthened the cause of the Opposition in the February revolution that toppled the Marcos regime and installed the present government under President Corazon C. Aquino.
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent-both of whom have gone their separate ways-could be a convenient justification for dismissing this case. But there are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
It is a notorious fact decried by many people and even by the foreign press that elections during the period of the Marcos dictatorship were in the main a desecration of the right of suffrage. Vote-buying, intimidation and violence, illegal listing of voters, falsified returns, and other elections anomalies misrepresented and vitiated the popular will and led to the induction in office of persons who did not enjoy the confidence of the sovereign electorate. Genuine elections were a rarity. The price at times was human lives. The rule was chicanery and irregularity, and on all levels of the polls, from the barangay to the presidential. This included the rigged plebiscites and referenda that also elicited the derision and provoked the resentments of the people.
Antique in 1984 hewed to the line and equaled if it did not surpass the viciousness of elections in other provinces dominated by the KBL. Terrorism was a special feature, as demonstrated by the killings previously mentioned, which victimized no less than one of the main protagonists and implicated his rival as a principal perpetrator. Opposition leaders were in constant peril of their lives even as their supporters were gripped with fear of violence at the hands of the party in power.
What made the situation especially deplorable was the apparently indifferent attitude of the Commission on Elections toward the anomalies being committed. It is a matter of record that the petitioner complained against the terroristic acts of his opponents. All the electoral body did was refer the matter to the Armed Forces without taking a more active step as befitted its constitutional role as the guardian of free, orderly and honest elections. A more assertive stance could have averted the Sibalom election eve massacre and saved the lives of the nine victims of the tragedy.
Public confidence in the Commission on Elections was practically nil because of its transparent bias in favor of the administration. This prejudice left many opposition candidates without recourse except only to this Court.
Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of the election returns, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to prevent the impending proclamation of his rival, the private respondent herein. 1 Specifically, the petitioner charged that the elections were marred by "massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of respondent Pacificador." 2 Particular mention was made of the municipalities of Caluya, Cabate, Tibiao, Barbaza, Laua-an, and also of San Remigio, where the petitioner claimed the election returns were not placed in the ballot boxes but merely wrapped in cement bags or Manila paper.
On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. 3 On June 7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. 4 On certiorari before this Court, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the petitioner had seasonably made. 5 Finally, on July 23, 1984, the Second Division promulgated the decision now subject of this petition which inter alia proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the elected assemblyman of the province of Antique. 6
This decision was signed by Chairman Victoriano Savellano and Commissioners Jaime Opinion and Froilan M. Bacungan. Previously asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was a former law partner of private respondent Pacificador, Opinion had refused. 7
The petitioner then came to this Court, asking us to annul the said decision.
The core question in this case is one of jurisdiction, to wit: Was the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election?
The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution.
Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of all member of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials.
Section 3 provides:
The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and dec
ided en banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for decision.
While both invoking the above provisions, the petitioner and the respondents have arrived at opposite conclusions. The records are voluminous and some of the pleadings are exhaustive and in part even erudite. And well they might be, for the noble profession of the law-despite all the canards that have been flung against it-exerts all efforts and considers all possible viewpoints in its earnest search of the truth.
The petitioner complains that the Proclamation made by the Second Division is invalid because all contests involving the members of the Batasang Pambansa come under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections en banc. This is as it should be, he says, to insure a more careful decision, considering the importance of the offices involved. The respondents, for their part, argue that only contests need to be heard and decided en banc and all other cases can be-in fact, should be-filed with and decided only by any of the three divisions.
The former Solicitor General makes much of this argument and lays a plausible distinction between the terms "contests" and "cases" to prove his point. 8 Simply put, his contention is that the pre-proclamation controversy between the petitioner and the private respondent was not yet a contest at that time and therefore could be validly heard by a mere division of the Commission on Elections, consonant with Section 3. The issue was at this stage still administrative and so was resoluble by the Commission under its power to administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, 9 not its authority as sole judge of the election contest.
A contest, according to him, should involve a contention between the parties for the same office "in which the contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder but also to have himself inducted into the office." 10 No proclamation had as yet been made when the petition was filed and later decided. Hence, since neither the petitioner nor the private respondent had at that time assumed office, there was no Member of the Batasang Pambansa from Antique whose election, returns or qualifications could be examined by the Commission on Elections en banc.
In providing that the Commission on Elections could act in division when deciding election cases, according to this theory, the Constitution was laying down the general rule. The exception was the election contest involving the members of the Batasang Pambansa, which had to be heard and decided en banc. 11 The en banc requirement would apply only from the time a candidate for the Batasang Pambansa was proclaimed as winner, for it was only then that a contest could be permitted under the law. All matters arising before such time were, necessarily, subject to decision only by division of the Commission as these would come under the general heading of "election cases."
As the Court sees it, the effect of this interpretation would be to divide the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections into two, viz.: (1) over matters arising before the proclamation, which should be heard and decided by division in the exercise of its administrative power; and (2) over matters arising after the proclamation, which could be heard and decided only en banc in the exercise of its judicial power. Stated otherwise, the Commission as a whole could not act as sole judge as long as one of its divisions was hearing a pre-proclamation matter affecting the candidates for the Batasang Pambansa because there was as yet no contest; or to put it still another way, the Commission en banc could not do what one of its divisions was competent to do, i.e., decide a pre-proclamation controversy. Moreover, a mere division of the Commission on Elections could hear and decide, save only those involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa, all cases involving elective provincial and city officials from start to finish, including pre-proclamation controversies and up to the election protest. In doing so, it would exercise first administrative and then judicial powers. But in the case of the Commission en banc, its jurisdiction would begin only after the proclamation was made and a contest was filed and not at any time and on any matter before that, and always in the exercise only of judicial power.
This interpretation would give to the part more powers than were enjoyed by the whole, granting to the division while denying to the banc. We do not think this was the intention of the Constitution. The framers could not have intended such an irrational rule.
We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matters related thereto, including those arising before the proclamation of the winners.
It is worth observing that the special procedure for the settlement of what are now called "pre-proclamation controversies" is a relatively recent innovation in our laws, having been introduced only in 1978, through P.D. No. 1296, otherwise known as the 1978 Election Code. Section 175 thereof provided:
Sec. 175. Suspension and annulment of proclamation.-The Commission shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies and any of its decisions, orders or rulings shall be final and executory. It may, motu proprio or upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing order the suspension of the proclamation of a candidate-elect or annul any proclamation, if one has been made, on any of the grounds mentioned in Sections 172, 173 and 174 thereof.
Before that time all proceedings affecting the election, returns and qualifications of public officers came under the complete jurisdiction of the competent court or tribunal from beginning to end and in the exercise of judicial power only. It therefore could not have been the intention of the framers in 1935, when the Commonwealth Charter was adopted, and even in 1973, when the past Constitution was imposed, to divide the electoral process into the pre-proclamation stage and the post-proclamation stage and to provide for a separate jurisdiction for each stage, considering the first administrative and the second judicial.
Besides, the term "contest" as it was understood at the time Article XII-C. Section 2(2) was incorporated in the 1973 Constitution did not follow the strict definition of a contention between the parties for the same office. Under the Election Code of 1971, which presumably was taken into consideration when the 1973 Constitution was being drafted, election contests included the quo warranto petition that could be filed by any voter on the ground of disloyalty or ineligibility of the contestee although such voter was himself not claiming the office involved. 12
The word "contests" should not be given a restrictive meaning; on the contrary, it should receive the widest possible scope conformably to the rule that the words used in the Constitution should be interpreted liberally. As employed in the 1973 Constitution, the term should be understood as referring to any matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after proclamation of the winner, whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute. Needless to stress, the term should be given a consistent meaning and understood in the same sense under both Section 2(2) and Section 3 of Article XII-C of the Constitution.
The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that "election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.
All these came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections insofar as they applied to the members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa and, under
Article XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, could be heard and decided by it only en banc.
We interpret "cases" as the generic term denoting the actions that might be heard and decided by the Commission on Elections, only by division as a general rule except where the case was a "contest" involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which had to be heard and decided en banc.
As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases involving members of the Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided by the Commission en banc was to insure the most careful consideration of such cases. Obviously, that objective could not be achieved if the Commission could act en banc only after the proclamation had been made, for it might then be too late already. We are all-too-familiar with the grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy of many unscrupulous candidates which has resulted in the frustration of the popular will and the virtual defeat of the real winners in the election. The respondent's theory would make this gambit possible for the pre- proclamation proceedings, being summary in nature, could be hastily decided by only three members in division, without the care and deliberation that would have otherwise been observed by the Commission en banc.
After that, the delay. The Commission en banc might then no longer be able to rectify in time the proclamation summarily and not very judiciously made by the division. While in the end the protestant might be sustained, he might find himself with only a Phyrric victory because the term of his office would have already expired.
It may be argued that in conferring the initial power to decide the pre- proclamation question upon the division, the Constitution did not intend to prevent the Commission en banc from exercising the power directly, on the theory that the greater power embraces the lesser. It could if it wanted to but then it could also allow the division to act for it. That argument would militate against the purpose of the provision, which precisely limited all questions affecting the election contest, as distinguished from election cases in general, to the jurisdiction of the Commission en banc as sole judge thereof. "Sole judge" excluded not only all other tribunals but also and even the division of the Commission A decision made on the contest by less than the Commission en banc would not meet the exacting standard of care and deliberation ordained by the Constitution
Incidentally, in making the Commission the "sole judge" of pre- proclamation controversies in Section 175, supra, the law was obviously referring to the body sitting en banc. In fact, the pre-proclamation controversies involved in Aratuc vs. Commission on Elections, 13 where the said provision was applied, were heard and decided en banc.
Another matter deserving the highest consideration of this Court but accorded cavalier attention by the respondent Commission on Elections is due process of law, that ancient guaranty of justice and fair play which is the hallmark of the free society. Commissioner Opinion ignored it. Asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was formerly a law partner of the private respondent, he obstinately insisted on participating in the case, denying he was biased. 14
Given the general attitude of the Commission on Elections toward the party in power at the time, and the particular relationship between Commissioner Opinion and MP Pacificador, one could not be at least apprehensive, if not certain, that the decision of the body would be adverse to the petitioner. As in fact it was. Commissioner Opinion's refusal to inhibit himself and his objection to the transfer of the case to another division cannot be justified by any criterion of propriety. His conduct on this matter belied his wounded protestations of innocence and proved the motives of the Second Division when it rendered its decision.
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. 15 To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. 16 The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
The relationship of the judge with one of the parties may color the facts and distort the law to the prejudice of a just decision. Where this is probable or even only posssible, due process demands that the judge inhibit himself, if only out of a sense of delicadeza. For like Caesar's wife, he must be above suspicion. Commissioner Opinion, being a lawyer, should have recognized his duty and abided by this well-known rule of judicial conduct. For refusing to do so, he divested the Second Division of the necessary vote for the questioned decision, assuming it could act, and rendered the proceeding null and void. 17
Since this case began in 1984, many significant developments have taken place, not the least significant of which was the February revolution of "people power" that dislodged the past regime and ended well nigh twenty years of travail for this captive nation. The petitioner is gone, felled by a hail of bullets sprayed with deadly purpose by assassins whose motive is yet to be disclosed. The private respondent has disappeared with the "pomp of power" he had before enjoyed. Even the Batasang Pambansa itself has been abolished, "an iniquitous vestige of the previous regime" discontinued by the Freedom Constitution. It is so easy now, as has been suggested not without reason, to send the recrds of this case to the archives and say the case is finished and the book is closed.
But not yet.
Let us first say these meager words in tribute to a fallen hero who was struck down in the vigor of his youth because he dared to speak against tyranny. Where many kept a meekly silence for fear of retaliation, and still others feigned and fawned in hopes of safety and even reward, he chose to fight. He was not afraid. Money did not tempt him. Threats did not daunt him. Power did not awe him. His was a singular and all-exacting obsession: the return of freedom to his country. And though he fought not in the barricades of war amid the sound and smoke of shot and shell, he was a soldier nonetheless, fighting valiantly for the liberties of his people against the enemies of his race, unfortunately of his race too, who would impose upon the land a perpetual night of dark enslavement. He did not see the breaking of the dawn, sad to say, but in a very real sense Evelio B. Javier made that dawn draw nearer because he was, like Saul and Jonathan, "swifter than eagles and stronger than lions."
A year ago this Court received a letter which began: "I am the sister of the late Justice Calixto Zaldivar. I am the mother of Rhium Z. Sanchez, the grandmother of Plaridel Sanchez IV and Aldrich Sanchez, the aunt of Mamerta Zaldivar. I lost all four of them in the election eve ambush in Antique last year." She pleaded, as so did hundreds of others of her provincemates in separate signed petitions sent us, for the early resolution of that horrible crime, saying: "I am 82 years old now. I am sick. May I convey to you my prayer in church and my plea to you, 'Before I die, I would like to see justice to my son and grandsons.' May I also add that the people of Antique have not stopped praying that the true winner of the last elections will be decided upon by the Supreme Court soon."
That was a year ago and since then a new government has taken over in the wake of the February revolution. The despot has escaped, and with him, let us pray, all the oppressions and repressions of the past have also been banished forever. A new spirit is now upon our land. A new vision limns the horizon. Now we can look forward with new hope that under the Constitution of the future every Filipino shall be truly sovereign in his own country, able to express his will through the pristine ballow with only his conscience as his counsel.
This is not an impossible dream. Indeed, it is an approachable goal. It can and will be won if we are able at last, after our long ordeal, to say never again to tyranny. If we can do this with courage and conviction, then and only then, and not until then, can we truly say that the case is finished and the book is closed.
WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the supervening events that have legally rendered it moot and academic, this petition would have been granted and the decision of the Commission on Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.
Fernan and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I concur and reserve the filing of a separate concurrence.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring in the result:
I concur in the result. The questioned Decision of the Second Division of the COMELEC, dated July 23, 1984, proclaiming private respondent, Arturo F. Pacificador, as the duly elected Assemblyman of the province of Antique, should be set aside for the legal reason that all election contests, without any distinction as to cases or contests, involving members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa fall under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc pursuant to Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution.
FELICIANO, J., concurring in the result:
I agree with the result reached, that is, although this petition has become moot and academic, the decision, dated 23 July 1984, of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections which had proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador as the duly elected Assemblyman of the Province of Antique must be set aside or, more accurately, must be disregarded as bereft of any effect in law. I reach this result on the same single, precisely drawn, ground relied upon by Melencio-Herrera, J.: that all election contests involving members of the former Batasan Pambansa must be decided by the Commission on Elections en banc under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution. These Sections do not distinguish between "pre-proclamation" and "post-proclamation" contests nor between "cases" and "contests."
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I concur and reserve the filing of a separate concurrence.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring in the result:
I concur in the result. The questioned Decision of the Second Division of the COMELEC, dated July 23, 1984, proclaiming private respondent, Arturo F. Pacificador, as the duly elected Assemblyman of the province of Antique, should be set aside for the legal reason that all election contests, without any distinction as to cases or contests, involving members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa fall under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc pursuant to Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution.
FELICIANO, J., concurring in the result:
I agree with the result reached, that is, although this petition has become moot and academic, the decision, dated 23 July 1984, of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections which had proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador as the duly elected Assemblyman of the Province of Antique must be set aside or, more accurately, must be disregarded as bereft of any effect in law. I reach this result on the same single, precisely drawn, ground relied upon by Melencio-Herrera, J.: that all election contests involving members of the former Batasan Pambansa must be decided by the Commission on Elections en banc under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution. These Sections do not distinguish between "pre-proclamation" and "post-proclamation" contests nor between "cases" and "contests."
G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980
PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Raul M. Gonzales for petitioners
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners, in their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.
The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 6,5 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation."
For their part, petitioners igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following statutory provisions:
Sec 7. Terms of Office — Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980.
.... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4.
Sec. 4. ...
Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein:
provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and
the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima fascie evidence of such fact.
... (Batas Pambansa Big. 52) (Paragraphing and Emphasis supplied).
Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials — ... The election shall be held on January 30, 1980. (Batas Pambansa, Blg. 52)
Section 6. Election and Campaign Period — The election period shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Art. XII-C of the Constitution. The period of campaign shall commence on December 29, 1979 and terminate on January 28, 1980. (ibid.)
In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also question the accreditation of so
me political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1)Art. XIIC of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be it. from any form of harassment and discrimination. "The question of accreditation will not be taken up in this case but in that of Bacalso, et als. vs. COMELEC et als. No. L-52232) where the issue has been squarely raised,
Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and void for being violative of the Constitution.
I . The procedural Aspect
At the outset, it should be stated that this Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities, hence, traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution. For one, there is a misjoinder of parties and actions. Petitioner Dumlao's interest is alien to that of petitioners Igot and Salapantan Petitioner Dumlao does not join petitioners Igot and Salapantan in the burden of their complaint, nor do the latter join Dumlao in his. The respectively contest completely different statutory provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has joined this suit in his individual capacity as a candidate. The action of petitioners Igot and Salapantan is more in the nature of a taxpayer's suit. Although petitioners plead nine constraints as the reason of their joint Petition, it would have required only a modicum more of effort tor petitioner Dumlao, on one hand said petitioners lgot and Salapantan, on the other, to have filed separate suits, in the interest of orderly procedure.
For another, there are standards that have to be followed inthe exercise of the function of judicial review, namely (1) the existence of an appropriate case:, (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question: (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity and (4) the necessity that the constiutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case (People vs. Vera 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).
It may be conceded that the third requisite has been complied with, which is, that the parties have raised the issue of constitutionality early enough in their pleadings.
This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other three criteria.
A. Actual case and controversy.
It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies.
Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC from implementing said provision. Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is being asked to review on Certiorari. His is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to be rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly within the primary jurisdiction (see concurring Opinion of now Chief Justice Fernando in Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, 96 [1978]) of respondent COMELEC as provided for in section 2, Art. XII-C, for the Constitution the pertinent portion of which reads:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall have the following power and functions:
1) xxx
2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision must also be related to section 11 of Art. XII-C, which provides:
Section 11. Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.
B. Proper party.
The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement" (People vs. Vera, supra).
In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their Petition, that Igot is said to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied that neither one has been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being candidates for local elective positions. Neither one of them has been calle ed to have been adversely affected by the operation of the statutory provisions they assail as unconstitutional Theirs is a generated grievance. They have no personal nor substantial interest at stake. In the absence of any litigate interest, they can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial redress.
It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan have instituted this case as a taxpayer's suit, and that the rule enunciated in People vs. Vera, above stated, has been relaxed in Pascual vs. The Secretary of Public Works (110 Phil. 331 [1960], thus:
... it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that "the expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.
In the same vein, it has been held:
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and they may, therefore, question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. (Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., et als., vs. Gimenez, et als., 15 SCRA 479 [1965]).
However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec. 7, BP Blg. 51, and sections 4, 1, and 6 BP Blg. 52, do not directly involve the disbursement of public funds. While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]), citing Philippine Constitution Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice, this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.
C. Unavoidability of constitutional question.
Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a wellsettled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented."
We have already stated that, by the standards set forth in People vs. Vera, the present is not an "appropriate case" for either petitioner Dumlao or for petitioners Igot and Salapantan. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that this suit be dismissed.
II. The substantive viewpoint.
We have resolved, however, to r
ule squarely on two of the challenged provisions, the Courts not being entirely without discretion in the matter. Thus, adherence to the strict procedural standard was relaxed in Tinio vs. Mina (26 SCRA 512 [1968]); Edu vs. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970]); and in Gonzalez vs. Comelec (27 SCRA 835 [1969]), the Opinion in the Tinio and Gonzalez cases having been penned by our present Chief Justice. The reasons which have impelled us are the paramount public interest involved and the proximity of the elections which will be held only a few days hence.
Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him personally is belied by the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other candidates for local positions based on the challenged provision have already been filed with the COMELEC (as listed in p. 15, respondent's Comment). This tellingly overthrows Dumlao's contention of intentional or purposeful discrimination.
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law would be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65 year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection neither does it permit of such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated are sinlilarly treated.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all Chose belonging to the same class (Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978] citing Felwa vs. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336 [1967]; Inchong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]). The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even it at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies" (Chief Justice Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 1977 ed., p. 547).
There is an additional consideration. Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of the questioned provision. Well accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach. Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt (Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 55 [1978], citing Cooper vs. Telfair 4 Dall 14; Dodd, Cases on Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. 1942, 56). Lastly, it is within the compentence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for office provided they are reasonable, as in this case.
In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and which they challenge, may be divided in two parts. The first provides:
a. judgment of conviction jor any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact ...
The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute, of the well-settled principle that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of constitutionality," and that Courts will not set aside a statute as constitutionally defective "except in a clear case." (People vs. Vera, supra). We are constrained to hold that this is one such clear case.
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.
WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid. Said paragraph reads:
SEC. 4. Special disqualification. — In addition to violation of Section 10 of Article XII(C) of the Constitution and disqualifications mentioned in existing laws which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired elective provincial, city or municipal official, who has receive
d payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.
2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that "... the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., concurs and submits a brief separate opinion.
De Castro, J., abstain as far as petitioner Dumlao is concerned.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
But as regards the matter of equal protection, I reiterate my view for Peralta that Sec. 9(1) Art. XI I is more expensive than the equal protection clause.
AQUINO, J, concurring:
concur in the result as to paragraph I of the dispositive part of the decision. I dissent as to paragraph 2. In my opinion, paragraph 2, section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is valid, being similar to certain presumptions in Articles 217 and 315 of the Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885. See U.S. v. Luling, 34 Phil. 725 and People v. Mingoa, 92 Phil. 856.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
concur but wish to add that a judgment of conviction as provided in Sec. 4, par. 2 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 should be one which is final and unappealable.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring.
It is particularly gratifying that the reiteration in the ably-written and scholarly opinion of the Court, penned by Justice Melencio-Herrera, of the standard that must be met before the power of judicial review may be availed of, set forth with such lucidity and force by Justice Laurel in the two leading cases of Angara v. Electoral Commission 1 and People v. Vera, 2 did not constitute an obstacle to this Court ruling on the crucial constitutional issues raised. It was a cause for concern, for me at least, that counsel of private parties in not a few cases in the recent past had shown less than full awareness of the doctrines, procedural in character, that call for application whenever the exercise of this awesome and delicate responsibility of adjudging the validity of a statute or presidential decree is invoked. 3 While this Court cannot be accused of being bound by the letters of judicial timidity, it remains true that no cavalier disregard of tried and tested concepts should be given encouragement. A petitioner who bases his claim for relief on asserted constitutional deficiencies deserves to be heard. That goes without saying. For the judiciary must ever endeavor to vindicate rights safeguarded by the fundamental law. In that sense, this Tribunal is not susceptible to the reproach that it has imprisoned itself in its allegiance to the philosophy of judicial self-restraint. There are, however, limits to judicial activism. It cannot be too strongly stressed that a petition of this character must ever remain an orderly proceeding that cannot be oblivious of the requisites to be complied with to justify a pronouncement on constitutional issues. Where there is exuberance in the exercise of judicial power, the forms of litigation are but slight retaining walls. It is right and proper that the voice of the Solicitor General should be heard in protest against such neglect of rudimentary precepts. Necessarily then, whenever objections based on refusal to abide by the procedural principles are presented, this Court must rule. It would suffice if thereby the petition is dismissed for non-observance of the controlling doctrines. There are times, however, when the controversy is of such a character that to resolve doubts, erase uncertainty, and assure respect for constitutional limitations, this Tribunal must pass on the merits. This is one such case. I therefore concur with the opinion of the Court.
It may be a task of superfluity then to write a concurring opinion. Nonetheless, a few words may not be amiss on what for me is the proper approach to take as to the lack of power of this Court to pass on the motives of the legislative body, on the lack of persuasiveness of petitioner's argument based on the equal protection guarantee, and on the fundamental concept of fairness of which the due process clause is an embodiment, thus calling for the nullification of the disqualification of a candidate upon the mere filing of charges against him.
1. The challenge to the provision in question is predicated on what was referred to as "a known fact in the province of Nueva Vizcaya that the aforesaid provision was concocted and designed precisely to frustrate any bid of herein petitioner to make a political come back [sic] as governor of Nueva Vizcaya. The wordings [sic] of the law is so peculiarly attuned to discriminate against herein petitioner because every condition imposed as disqualification grounds are known to be possessed by him because he was a former elective provincial official who has received his retirement benefits, he desires to run for the same elective office and at the commencement of the term of office to which he now seeks to be elected, he shall have reached 65 years of age. 4 Clearly then, the plea for invalidating such provision is the motive attributed to the Interim Batasang Pambansa. For petitioner, it amounted to a constitutional infirmity fatal in character. The weakness of the petition is thus apparent. No decision of this Tribunal can be cited in support of such a proposition. It would be to extend unduly the concept of judicial review if a court can roam far and wide and range at will over the variety and diversity of the reasons, the promptings that may lead a legislator to cast his vote for or against a proposed legislation. It is not what inspired the introduction of a bill but the effect thereof if duly enacted that is decisive. That would be the test for its validity or lack of it. There is this relevant excerpt from McCray v. United States: 5 "The decisions of this Court [Supreme Court of the United States] from the beginning lend no support whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose of motive has caused the power to be exerted. 6 The late Chief Justice Warren, who penned the opinion in United States v. O' Brien 7 put the matter thus: "Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter. When the issue is simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to statements by legislators for guidance as to the purpose of the legislature, because the benefit to sound decision-making in this circumstance is thought sufficient to risk the possibility of misreading Congress' purpose. It is entirely a different matter when we are asked to void a statute that is, under well-settled criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis of what fewer than a handful of Congressmen said about it. What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork. We decline to void essentially on the ground that it is unwise legislation which Congress had the undoubted power to enact and which could be reenacted in its exact form if the same or another legislator made a 'wiser' speech about it." 8
2. If, however, the provision in question is susceptible to the reproach that it amounts to a denial of equal protection, then his plea for nullification should be accorded a sympathetic response. As the opinion of the Court makes clear, such imputation is not deserving of credence. The classification cannot be stigmatized as lacking in rationality. It is germane to the subject. Age, as well as the fact of retirement and the receipt of retirement benefits are factors that can enter into any legislative determination of what disqualifications to impose. As was pointed out in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration: 9 "It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be al
lowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest. 10 It cannot be denied that others similarly fall under the same ban. It was not directed at petitioner solely. The most that can be said is that he falls within the-proscribed class. The point was likewise raised as to why should national officials be excluded in the above provision. The answer is simple. There is nothing to prevent the legislative body from following a system of priorities. This it did under the challenged legislative provision. In its opinion, what called for such a measure is the propensity of the local officials having reached the retirement age and having received retirement benefits once again running for public office. Accordingly, the provision in question was enacted. A portion of the opinion in the aforesaid J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. finds relevance: "It was confronted with a situation that caned for correction, and the legislation that was the result of its deliberation sought to apply the necessary palliative. That it stopped short of possibly attaining the cure of other analogous ills certainly does not stigmatize its effort as a denial of equal protection. We have given our sanction to the principle underlying the exercise of police power and taxation, but certainly not excluding eminent domain, that 'the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to the policy of all "or none." ' Thus, to reiterate, the invocation by petitioner of the equal protection clause is futile and unavailing ." 11
3. That brings us to the assailed provision as to the sufficiency of the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes as subversion, insurrection, rebellion or others of similar nature before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation, being a prima facie evidence of such fact and therefore justifying the disqualification of a candidate. The opinion of the Court invoked the constitutional presumption of innocence as a basis for its being annulled. That conclusion is well-founded. Such being the case, I am in full agreement. I would add that such a provision is moreover tainted with arbitrariness and therefore is violative of the due process clause. Such a constitutional right, to quote from Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. Beson, 12 is "not a mere formality that may be dispensed with at will. Its disregard is a matter of serious concern. It is a constitutional safeguard of the highest order. It is a response to man's innate sense of justice." 13 As rightfully stressed in the opinion of the Court, the time element may invariably preclude a full hearing on the charge against him and thus effectively negate the opportunity of an individual to present himself as a candidate. If, as has been invariably the case, a prosecutor, whether in a civil court or in a military tribunal saddled as he is with so many complaints filed on his desk would give in to the all-too-human propensity to take the easy way out and to file charges, then a candidate Would be hard put to destroy the presumption. A sense of realism for me compels a declaration of nullity of a provision which on its face is patently offensive to the Constitution.
Hence my concurrence.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
Files a separate opinion dissenting from the adverse ruling on Dumlaos candidacy and declining to rule on the invalidity of the first part of Section 4 of the questioned Law; and concurs with the pronouncement that the mere filing of charges shall be prima facie cause for disqualification is void.
I. I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the petition insofar as it upholds the discriminatory and arbitrary provision of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which would impose a special disqualification on petitioner Patricio Dumlao from running for the elective local office of governor of his home province of Nueva Vizcaya and would in effect bar the electors of his province from electing him to said office in the January 30 elections, simply because he is a retired provincial governor of said province "who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected."
To specially and peculiarly ban a 65-year old previously retired elective local official from running for the same elective office (of governor, in this case) previously held by him and from which he has retired is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable. Persons similarly situated are not similarly treated, e.g. a retired vice-governor, mayor or councilor of 65 is entitled to run for governor (because the disqualification is for the retiree of 65 to run for the same elective office from which he retired) but petitioner is barred from doing so (although he may run for any other lesser office). Both are 65 and are retirees, yet one is barred from running for the office of governor. What is the valid distinction? Is this not an arbitrary discrimination against petitioner who has cause to that "the aforesaid provision was concocted and designed precisely to frustrate any bid of petition to make a political comeback as governor of Nueva Vizcaya 1 — (since no other case by a former governor similarly barred by virtue of said provision can never be cited 2 ). Is there not here, therefore a gross denial of the cardinal constitutional guarantee that equal protection and security shall be given under the law to every person, under analogous if not Identical circumstances?
Respondent's claim, as accepted by the majority, is that the purpose of the special disqualification is "to infuse new blood in local governments but the classification (that would bar 65-year old retirees from running for the same elective local office) is not rational nor reasonable. It is not germane nor relevant to the alleged purpose of "infusing new blood" because such "old blood" retirees may continue in local governments since they are not disqualified at all to run for any other local elective office such as from provincial governor, vice-governor, city, municipal or district mayor and vice- mayor to member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Sangguniang Panglunsod and Sangguniang Bayan, other than the local elective office from which they retired.
Furthermore, other 65-year olds who have likewise retired from the judiciary and other branches of government are not in any manner disqualified to run for any local elective office, as in the case of retired Court of First Instance Judge (former Congressman) Alberto S. Ubay who retired with full substantial retirement benefits as such judge in 1978 at age 70 and now at past 71 years of age, is running as the official KBL candidate for governor of his province. And even in the case of 65-year old local elective officials, they are disqualified only when they have received payment of the retirement benefits to which they are entitled under the law (which amount to very little, compared to retirement benefits of other executive officials and members of the judiciary). If they have not received such retirement benefits, they are not disqualified. Certainly, their disqualification or non-disqualification and consequent classification as "old blood" or "new blood" cannot hinge on such an irrelevant question of whether or not they have received their retirement benefits.
The classification is patently arbitrary and unreasonable and is not based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences that would justify the special disqualification of petitioner, which, it is claimed, "is based on a presumption that elective local officials who have retired and are of advanced age cannot discharge the functions of the office they seek as those who are differently situated." 3 Such presumption is sheer conjecture. The mere fact that a candidate is less than 65 or has "young or new blood" does not mean that he would be more efficient, effective and competent than a mature 65year old like petition er who has had experience on the job and who was observed at the hearing to appear to be most physically fit. Sufice it to city the outstanding case of the incumbent ebullient Minister of Foreign Affairs, General Carlos P. Romulo, who was elected a 80 as a member of the Interim Batasan Pambansa and who has just this month completed 81 years of age and has been hailed by the President himself as "the best foreign minister the Republic has ever had
Age has simply just never been a yards
tick for qualification or disqualification. Al. the most, a minimum age to hold public office has been required as a qualification to insure a modicum of maturity 'now reduced to 21 years in the present batas), but no maximum age has ever been imposed as a disqualification for elect public office since the right and win of the people to elect the candidate of their choice for any elective office, no matter his age has always been recognized as supreme.
The disqualification in question therefore is grossly violative of the equal protection clause which mandates that all persons subjected to legislation shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed. The guarantee is meant to proscribe undue favor and individual or class privilege on the one hand and hostile discrimination and the oppression of in quality on the other. The questioned provision should therefore at the least be declared invalid in its application insofar as it would disqualify petitioner from running for the office of governor of his province.
As aptly restated by the Chief Justice, "Persons similarly situated should be similarly treated. Where no valid distinction could be made as to the relevant conditions that call for consideration, there should be none as to the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. There can be no undue favoritism or partiality on the one hand or hostility on the other. Arbitrary selection and discrimination against persons in thus ruled out. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not Identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that full within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest." 4
Finally, this arbitrary disqualification is likewise grossly violative of Article XII, sub-article C, section 9(1) of the 1973 Constitution that Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.
II. I concur with the majority's declaration of invalidity of the portion of the second paragraph of Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which would make the mere filing of charges of subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation prima facie evidence of the fact of commission of an act of disloyalty to the State on the part of the candidate and disqualify him from his candidacy. Such a provision could be the most insidious weapon to disqualify bona fide candidates who seem to be headed for election and places in the hands of the military and civil prosecutors a dangerous and devastating weapon of cutting off any candidate who may not be to their filing through the filing of last-hour charges against him.
I also concur with the pronouncement made in the majority decision that in order that a judgment of conviction may be deemed "as conclusive evidence" of the candidate's disloyalty to the State and of his disqualification from office, such judgment of conviction must be final and unappealable. This is so specifically provided in Section 22 of the 1978 Election Code. 5 Otherwise, the questioned provision would deny the bona fide candidate substantive due process and would be grossly violative of his constitutional right of presumption of innocence and of the above-quoted provision of the 1973 Constitution protecting candidates for public office from any form of harassment and discrimination.
ADDENDUM
When the case was voted upon a second time last January 21st, there appeared to be a majority in favor of the declarations and pronouncements above referred to in the two preceding paragraphs, in view of the urgency of the matter and the evil sought to be avoided. However, as of this writing, January 23, 1980 in the afternoon, such majority seems to have been dissipated by the view that the action to nullify such second paragraph of section 4 of the Batas in question is premature and has not been properly submitted for ajudication under the strict procedural require . If this be the case, my above views, termed as concurrences, should be taken as dissents against the majority action.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
But as regards the matter of equal protection, I reiterate my view for Peralta that Sec. 9(1) Art. XI I is more expensive than the equal protection clause.
AQUINO, J, concurring:
concur in the result as to paragraph I of the dispositive part of the decision. I dissent as to paragraph 2. In my opinion, paragraph 2, section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is valid, being similar to certain presumptions in Articles 217 and 315 of the Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885. See U.S. v. Luling, 34 Phil. 725 and People v. Mingoa, 92 Phil. 856.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
concur but wish to add that a judgment of conviction as provided in Sec. 4, par. 2 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 should be one which is final and unappealable.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring.
It is particularly gratifying that the reiteration in the ably-written and scholarly opinion of the Court, penned by Justice Melencio-Herrera, of the standard that must be met before the power of judicial review may be availed of, set forth with such lucidity and force by Justice Laurel in the two leading cases of Angara v. Electoral Commission 1 and People v. Vera, 2 did not constitute an obstacle to this Court ruling on the crucial constitutional issues raised. It was a cause for concern, for me at least, that counsel of private parties in not a few cases in the recent past had shown less than full awareness of the doctrines, procedural in character, that call for application whenever the exercise of this awesome and delicate responsibility of adjudging the validity of a statute or presidential decree is invoked. 3 While this Court cannot be accused of being bound by the letters of judicial timidity, it remains true that no cavalier disregard of tried and tested concepts should be given encouragement. A petitioner who bases his claim for relief on asserted constitutional deficiencies deserves to be heard. That goes without saying. For the judiciary must ever endeavor to vindicate rights safeguarded by the fundamental law. In that sense, this Tribunal is not susceptible to the reproach that it has imprisoned itself in its allegiance to the philosophy of judicial self-restraint. There are, however, limits to judicial activism. It cannot be too strongly stressed that a petition of this character must ever remain an orderly proceeding that cannot be oblivious of the requisites to be complied with to justify a pronouncement on constitutional issues. Where there is exuberance in the exercise of judicial power, the forms of litigation are but slight retaining walls. It is right and proper that the voice of the Solicitor General should be heard in protest against such neglect of rudimentary precepts. Necessarily then, whenever objections based on refusal to abide by the procedural principles are presented, this Court must rule. It would suffice if thereby the petition is dismissed for non-observance of the controlling doctrines. There are times, however, when the controversy is of such a character that to resolve doubts, erase uncertainty, and assure respect for constitutional limitations, this Tribunal must pass on the merits. This is one such case. I therefore concur with the opinion of the Court.
It may be a task of superfluity then to write a concurring opinion. Nonetheless, a few words may not be amiss on what for me is the proper approach to take as to the lack of power of this Court to pass on the motives of the legislative body, on the lack of persuasiveness of petitioner's argument based on the equal protection guarantee, and on the fundamental concept of fairness of which the due process clause is an embodiment, thus calling for the nullification of the disqualification of a candidate upon the mere filing of charges against him.
1. The challenge to the provision in question is predicated on what was referred to as "a known fact in the province of Nueva Vizcaya that the aforesaid provision was concocted and designed precisely to frustrate any bid of herein petitioner to make a political come back [sic] as governor of Nueva Vizcaya. The wordings [sic] of the law is so peculiarly attuned to discriminate against herein petitioner because eve
ry condition imposed as disqualification grounds are known to be possessed by him because he was a former elective provincial official who has received his retirement benefits, he desires to run for the same elective office and at the commencement of the term of office to which he now seeks to be elected, he shall have reached 65 years of age. 4 Clearly then, the plea for invalidating such provision is the motive attributed to the Interim Batasang Pambansa. For petitioner, it amounted to a constitutional infirmity fatal in character. The weakness of the petition is thus apparent. No decision of this Tribunal can be cited in support of such a proposition. It would be to extend unduly the concept of judicial review if a court can roam far and wide and range at will over the variety and diversity of the reasons, the promptings that may lead a legislator to cast his vote for or against a proposed legislation. It is not what inspired the introduction of a bill but the effect thereof if duly enacted that is decisive. That would be the test for its validity or lack of it. There is this relevant excerpt from McCray v. United States: 5 "The decisions of this Court [Supreme Court of the United States] from the beginning lend no support whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose of motive has caused the power to be exerted. 6 The late Chief Justice Warren, who penned the opinion in United States v. O' Brien 7 put the matter thus: "Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter. When the issue is simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to statements by legislators for guidance as to the purpose of the legislature, because the benefit to sound decision-making in this circumstance is thought sufficient to risk the possibility of misreading Congress' purpose. It is entirely a different matter when we are asked to void a statute that is, under well-settled criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis of what fewer than a handful of Congressmen said about it. What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork. We decline to void essentially on the ground that it is unwise legislation which Congress had the undoubted power to enact and which could be reenacted in its exact form if the same or another legislator made a 'wiser' speech about it." 8
2. If, however, the provision in question is susceptible to the reproach that it amounts to a denial of equal protection, then his plea for nullification should be accorded a sympathetic response. As the opinion of the Court makes clear, such imputation is not deserving of credence. The classification cannot be stigmatized as lacking in rationality. It is germane to the subject. Age, as well as the fact of retirement and the receipt of retirement benefits are factors that can enter into any legislative determination of what disqualifications to impose. As was pointed out in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration: 9 "It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest. 10 It cannot be denied that others similarly fall under the same ban. It was not directed at petitioner solely. The most that can be said is that he falls within the-proscribed class. The point was likewise raised as to why should national officials be excluded in the above provision. The answer is simple. There is nothing to prevent the legislative body from following a system of priorities. This it did under the challenged legislative provision. In its opinion, what called for such a measure is the propensity of the local officials having reached the retirement age and having received retirement benefits once again running for public office. Accordingly, the provision in question was enacted. A portion of the opinion in the aforesaid J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. finds relevance: "It was confronted with a situation that caned for correction, and the legislation that was the result of its deliberation sought to apply the necessary palliative. That it stopped short of possibly attaining the cure of other analogous ills certainly does not stigmatize its effort as a denial of equal protection. We have given our sanction to the principle underlying the exercise of police power and taxation, but certainly not excluding eminent domain, that 'the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to the policy of all "or none." ' Thus, to reiterate, the invocation by petitioner of the equal protection clause is futile and unavailing ." 11
3. That brings us to the assailed provision as to the sufficiency of the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes as subversion, insurrection, rebellion or others of similar nature before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation, being a prima facie evidence of such fact and therefore justifying the disqualification of a candidate. The opinion of the Court invoked the constitutional presumption of innocence as a basis for its being annulled. That conclusion is well-founded. Such being the case, I am in full agreement. I would add that such a provision is moreover tainted with arbitrariness and therefore is violative of the due process clause. Such a constitutional right, to quote from Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. Beson, 12 is "not a mere formality that may be dispensed with at will. Its disregard is a matter of serious concern. It is a constitutional safeguard of the highest order. It is a response to man's innate sense of justice." 13 As rightfully stressed in the opinion of the Court, the time element may invariably preclude a full hearing on the charge against him and thus effectively negate the opportunity of an individual to present himself as a candidate. If, as has been invariably the case, a prosecutor, whether in a civil court or in a military tribunal saddled as he is with so many complaints filed on his desk would give in to the all-too-human propensity to take the easy way out and to file charges, then a candidate Would be hard put to destroy the presumption. A sense of realism for me compels a declaration of nullity of a provision which on its face is patently offensive to the Constitution.
Hence my concurrence.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
Files a separate opinion dissenting from the adverse ruling on Dumlaos candidacy and declining to rule on the invalidity of the first part of Section 4 of the questioned Law; and concurs with the pronouncement that the mere filing of charges shall be prima facie cause for disqualification is void.
I. I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the petition insofar as it upholds the discriminatory and arbitrary provision of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which would impose a special disqualification on petitioner Patricio Dumlao from running for the elective local office of governor of his home province of Nueva Vizcaya and would in effect bar the electors of his province from electing him to said office in the January 30 elections, simply because he is a retired provincial governor of said province "who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected."
To specially and peculiarly ban a 65-year old previously retired elective local official from running for the same elective office (of governor, in this case) previously held by him and from which he has retired is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable. Persons similarly situated are not similarly treated, e.g. a retired vice-governor, mayor or councilor of 65 is entitled to run for governor (because the disqualification is for the retiree of 65 to run for the same elective office from which he retired) but petitioner is barred from doing so (although he may run for any other lesser office). Both are 65 and are retirees, yet one is barred from running for the office of governor. What is the valid distinction? Is this not an arbitrary discrimination against petitioner who has cause to that "the aforesaid provision
was concocted and designed precisely to frustrate any bid of petition to make a political comeback as governor of Nueva Vizcaya 1 — (since no other case by a former governor similarly barred by virtue of said provision can never be cited 2 ). Is there not here, therefore a gross denial of the cardinal constitutional guarantee that equal protection and security shall be given under the law to every person, under analogous if not Identical circumstances?
Respondent's claim, as accepted by the majority, is that the purpose of the special disqualification is "to infuse new blood in local governments but the classification (that would bar 65-year old retirees from running for the same elective local office) is not rational nor reasonable. It is not germane nor relevant to the alleged purpose of "infusing new blood" because such "old blood" retirees may continue in local governments since they are not disqualified at all to run for any other local elective office such as from provincial governor, vice-governor, city, municipal or district mayor and vice- mayor to member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Sangguniang Panglunsod and Sangguniang Bayan, other than the local elective office from which they retired.
Furthermore, other 65-year olds who have likewise retired from the judiciary and other branches of government are not in any manner disqualified to run for any local elective office, as in the case of retired Court of First Instance Judge (former Congressman) Alberto S. Ubay who retired with full substantial retirement benefits as such judge in 1978 at age 70 and now at past 71 years of age, is running as the official KBL candidate for governor of his province. And even in the case of 65-year old local elective officials, they are disqualified only when they have received payment of the retirement benefits to which they are entitled under the law (which amount to very little, compared to retirement benefits of other executive officials and members of the judiciary). If they have not received such retirement benefits, they are not disqualified. Certainly, their disqualification or non-disqualification and consequent classification as "old blood" or "new blood" cannot hinge on such an irrelevant question of whether or not they have received their retirement benefits.
The classification is patently arbitrary and unreasonable and is not based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences that would justify the special disqualification of petitioner, which, it is claimed, "is based on a presumption that elective local officials who have retired and are of advanced age cannot discharge the functions of the office they seek as those who are differently situated." 3 Such presumption is sheer conjecture. The mere fact that a candidate is less than 65 or has "young or new blood" does not mean that he would be more efficient, effective and competent than a mature 65year old like petition er who has had experience on the job and who was observed at the hearing to appear to be most physically fit. Sufice it to city the outstanding case of the incumbent ebullient Minister of Foreign Affairs, General Carlos P. Romulo, who was elected a 80 as a member of the Interim Batasan Pambansa and who has just this month completed 81 years of age and has been hailed by the President himself as "the best foreign minister the Republic has ever had
Age has simply just never been a yardstick for qualification or disqualification. Al. the most, a minimum age to hold public office has been required as a qualification to insure a modicum of maturity 'now reduced to 21 years in the present batas), but no maximum age has ever been imposed as a disqualification for elect public office since the right and win of the people to elect the candidate of their choice for any elective office, no matter his age has always been recognized as supreme.
The disqualification in question therefore is grossly violative of the equal protection clause which mandates that all persons subjected to legislation shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed. The guarantee is meant to proscribe undue favor and individual or class privilege on the one hand and hostile discrimination and the oppression of in quality on the other. The questioned provision should therefore at the least be declared invalid in its application insofar as it would disqualify petitioner from running for the office of governor of his province.
As aptly restated by the Chief Justice, "Persons similarly situated should be similarly treated. Where no valid distinction could be made as to the relevant conditions that call for consideration, there should be none as to the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. There can be no undue favoritism or partiality on the one hand or hostility on the other. Arbitrary selection and discrimination against persons in thus ruled out. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not Identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that full within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest." 4
Finally, this arbitrary disqualification is likewise grossly violative of Article XII, sub-article C, section 9(1) of the 1973 Constitution that Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.
II. I concur with the majority's declaration of invalidity of the portion of the second paragraph of Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which would make the mere filing of charges of subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation prima facie evidence of the fact of commission of an act of disloyalty to the State on the part of the candidate and disqualify him from his candidacy. Such a provision could be the most insidious weapon to disqualify bona fide candidates who seem to be headed for election and places in the hands of the military and civil prosecutors a dangerous and devastating weapon of cutting off any candidate who may not be to their filing through the filing of last-hour charges against him.
I also concur with the pronouncement made in the majority decision that in order that a judgment of conviction may be deemed "as conclusive evidence" of the candidate's disloyalty to the State and of his disqualification from office, such judgment of conviction must be final and unappealable. This is so specifically provided in Section 22 of the 1978 Election Code. 5 Otherwise, the questioned provision would deny the bona fide candidate substantive due process and would be grossly violative of his constitutional right of presumption of innocence and of the above-quoted provision of the 1973 Constitution protecting candidates for public office from any form of harassment and discrimination.
ADDENDUM
When the case was voted upon a second time last January 21st, there appeared to be a majority in favor of the declarations and pronouncements above referred to in the two preceding paragraphs, in view of the urgency of the matter and the evil sought to be avoided. However, as of this writing, January 23, 1980 in the afternoon, such majority seems to have been dissipated by the view that the action to nullify such second paragraph of section 4 of the Batas in question is premature and has not been properly submitted for ajudication under the strict procedural require . If this be the case, my above views, termed as concurrences, should be taken as dissents against the majority action.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
But as regards the matter of equal protection, I reiterate my view for Peralta that Sec. 9(1) Art. XI I is more expensive than the equal protection clause.
AQUINO, J, concurring:
concur in the result as to paragraph I of the dispositive part of the decision. I dissent as to paragraph 2. In my opinion, paragraph 2, section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is valid, being similar to certain presumptions in Articles 217 and 315 of the Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885. See U.S. v. Luling, 34 Phil. 725 and People v. Mingoa, 92 Phil. 856.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
concur but wish to add that a judgment of conviction as provided in Sec. 4, par. 2 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 should be one which is final and unappealable.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring.
 
; It is particularly gratifying that the reiteration in the ably-written and scholarly opinion of the Court, penned by Justice Melencio-Herrera, of the standard that must be met before the power of judicial review may be availed of, set forth with such lucidity and force by Justice Laurel in the two leading cases of Angara v. Electoral Commission 1 and People v. Vera, 2 did not constitute an obstacle to this Court ruling on the crucial constitutional issues raised. It was a cause for concern, for me at least, that counsel of private parties in not a few cases in the recent past had shown less than full awareness of the doctrines, procedural in character, that call for application whenever the exercise of this awesome and delicate responsibility of adjudging the validity of a statute or presidential decree is invoked. 3 While this Court cannot be accused of being bound by the letters of judicial timidity, it remains true that no cavalier disregard of tried and tested concepts should be given encouragement. A petitioner who bases his claim for relief on asserted constitutional deficiencies deserves to be heard. That goes without saying. For the judiciary must ever endeavor to vindicate rights safeguarded by the fundamental law. In that sense, this Tribunal is not susceptible to the reproach that it has imprisoned itself in its allegiance to the philosophy of judicial self-restraint. There are, however, limits to judicial activism. It cannot be too strongly stressed that a petition of this character must ever remain an orderly proceeding that cannot be oblivious of the requisites to be complied with to justify a pronouncement on constitutional issues. Where there is exuberance in the exercise of judicial power, the forms of litigation are but slight retaining walls. It is right and proper that the voice of the Solicitor General should be heard in protest against such neglect of rudimentary precepts. Necessarily then, whenever objections based on refusal to abide by the procedural principles are presented, this Court must rule. It would suffice if thereby the petition is dismissed for non-observance of the controlling doctrines. There are times, however, when the controversy is of such a character that to resolve doubts, erase uncertainty, and assure respect for constitutional limitations, this Tribunal must pass on the merits. This is one such case. I therefore concur with the opinion of the Court.
It may be a task of superfluity then to write a concurring opinion. Nonetheless, a few words may not be amiss on what for me is the proper approach to take as to the lack of power of this Court to pass on the motives of the legislative body, on the lack of persuasiveness of petitioner's argument based on the equal protection guarantee, and on the fundamental concept of fairness of which the due process clause is an embodiment, thus calling for the nullification of the disqualification of a candidate upon the mere filing of charges against him.
1. The challenge to the provision in question is predicated on what was referred to as "a known fact in the province of Nueva Vizcaya that the aforesaid provision was concocted and designed precisely to frustrate any bid of herein petitioner to make a political come back [sic] as governor of Nueva Vizcaya. The wordings [sic] of the law is so peculiarly attuned to discriminate against herein petitioner because every condition imposed as disqualification grounds are known to be possessed by him because he was a former elective provincial official who has received his retirement benefits, he desires to run for the same elective office and at the commencement of the term of office to which he now seeks to be elected, he shall have reached 65 years of age. 4 Clearly then, the plea for invalidating such provision is the motive attributed to the Interim Batasang Pambansa. For petitioner, it amounted to a constitutional infirmity fatal in character. The weakness of the petition is thus apparent. No decision of this Tribunal can be cited in support of such a proposition. It would be to extend unduly the concept of judicial review if a court can roam far and wide and range at will over the variety and diversity of the reasons, the promptings that may lead a legislator to cast his vote for or against a proposed legislation. It is not what inspired the introduction of a bill but the effect thereof if duly enacted that is decisive. That would be the test for its validity or lack of it. There is this relevant excerpt from McCray v. United States: 5 "The decisions of this Court [Supreme Court of the United States] from the beginning lend no support whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose of motive has caused the power to be exerted. 6 The late Chief Justice Warren, who penned the opinion in United States v. O' Brien 7 put the matter thus: "Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter. When the issue is simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to statements by legislators for guidance as to the purpose of the legislature, because the benefit to sound decision-making in this circumstance is thought sufficient to risk the possibility of misreading Congress' purpose. It is entirely a different matter when we are asked to void a statute that is, under well-settled criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis of what fewer than a handful of Congressmen said about it. What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork. We decline to void essentially on the ground that it is unwise legislation which Congress had the undoubted power to enact and which could be reenacted in its exact form if the same or another legislator made a 'wiser' speech about it." 8
2. If, however, the provision in question is susceptible to the reproach that it amounts to a denial of equal protection, then his plea for nullification should be accorded a sympathetic response. As the opinion of the Court makes clear, such imputation is not deserving of credence. The classification cannot be stigmatized as lacking in rationality. It is germane to the subject. Age, as well as the fact of retirement and the receipt of retirement benefits are factors that can enter into any legislative determination of what disqualifications to impose. As was pointed out in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration: 9 "It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest. 10 It cannot be denied that others similarly fall under the same ban. It was not directed at petitioner solely. The most that can be said is that he falls within the-proscribed class. The point was likewise raised as to why should national officials be excluded in the above provision. The answer is simple. There is nothing to prevent the legislative body from following a system of priorities. This it did under the challenged legislative provision. In its opinion, what called for such a measure is the propensity of the local officials having reached the retirement age and having received retirement benefits once again running for public office. Accordingly, the provision in question was enacted. A portion of the opinion in the aforesaid J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. finds relevance: "It was confronted with a situation that caned for correction, and the legislation that was the result of its deliberation sought to apply the necessary palliative. That it stopped short of possibly attaining the cure of other analogous ills certainly does not stigmatize its effort as a denial of equal protection. We have given our sanction to the principle underlying the exercise of police power and taxation, but certainly not excluding eminent domain, that 'the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to the policy of all "or none." ' Thus, to reiterate, the invocation by petitioner of the equal protection clause is futile and unavailing ." 11
3. That brings us to the assailed provision as to the sufficiency of the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes as subversion, insurrection, rebellion or others of similar nature before a civil cou
rt or military tribunal after preliminary investigation, being a prima facie evidence of such fact and therefore justifying the disqualification of a candidate. The opinion of the Court invoked the constitutional presumption of innocence as a basis for its being annulled. That conclusion is well-founded. Such being the case, I am in full agreement. I would add that such a provision is moreover tainted with arbitrariness and therefore is violative of the due process clause. Such a constitutional right, to quote from Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. Beson, 12 is "not a mere formality that may be dispensed with at will. Its disregard is a matter of serious concern. It is a constitutional safeguard of the highest order. It is a response to man's innate sense of justice." 13 As rightfully stressed in the opinion of the Court, the time element may invariably preclude a full hearing on the charge against him and thus effectively negate the opportunity of an individual to present himself as a candidate. If, as has been invariably the case, a prosecutor, whether in a civil court or in a military tribunal saddled as he is with so many complaints filed on his desk would give in to the all-too-human propensity to take the easy way out and to file charges, then a candidate Would be hard put to destroy the presumption. A sense of realism for me compels a declaration of nullity of a provision which on its face is patently offensive to the Constitution.
Hence my concurrence.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
Files a separate opinion dissenting from the adverse ruling on Dumlaos candidacy and declining to rule on the invalidity of the first part of Section 4 of the questioned Law; and concurs with the pronouncement that the mere filing of charges shall be prima facie cause for disqualification is void.
I. I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the petition insofar as it upholds the discriminatory and arbitrary provision of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which would impose a special disqualification on petitioner Patricio Dumlao from running for the elective local office of governor of his home province of Nueva Vizcaya and would in effect bar the electors of his province from electing him to said office in the January 30 elections, simply because he is a retired provincial governor of said province "who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected.
To specially and peculiarly ban a 65-year old previously retired elective local official from running for the same elective office (of governor, in this case) previously held by him and from which he has retired is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable. Persons similarly situated are not similarly treated, e.g. a retired vice-governor, mayor or councilor of 65 is entitled to run for governor (because the disqualification is for the retiree of 65 to run for the same elective office from which he retired) but petitioner is barred from doing so (although he may run for any other lesser office). Both are 65 and are retirees, yet one is barred from running for the office of governor. What is the valid distinction? Is this not an arbitrary discrimination against petitioner who has cause to that "the aforesaid provision was concocted and designed precisely to frustrate any bid of petition to make a political comeback as governor of Nueva Vizcaya 1 — (since no other case by a former governor similarly barred by virtue of said provision can never be cited 2 ). Is there not here, therefore a gross denial of the cardinal constitutional guarantee that equal protection and security shall be given under the law to every person, under analogous if not Identical circumstances?
Respondent's claim, as accepted by the majority, is that the purpose of the special disqualification is "to infuse new blood in local governments but the classification (that would bar 65-year old retirees from running for the same elective local office) is not rational nor reasonable. It is not germane nor relevant to the alleged purpose of "infusing new blood" because such "old blood" retirees may continue in local governments since they are not disqualified at all to run for any other local elective office such as from provincial governor, vice-governor, city, municipal or district mayor and vice- mayor to member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Sangguniang Panglunsod and Sangguniang Bayan, other than the local elective office from which they retired.
Furthermore, other 65-year olds who have likewise retired from the judiciary and other branches of government are not in any manner disqualified to run for any local elective office, as in the case of retired Court of First Instance Judge (former Congressman) Alberto S. Ubay who retired with full substantial retirement benefits as such judge in 1978 at age 70 and now at past 71 years of age, is running as the official KBL candidate for governor of his province. And even in the case of 65-year old local elective officials, they are disqualified only when they have received payment of the retirement benefits to which they are entitled under the law (which amount to very little, compared to retirement benefits of other executive officials and members of the judiciary). If they have not received such retirement benefits, they are not disqualified. Certainly, their disqualification or non-disqualification and consequent classification as "old blood" or "new blood" cannot hinge on such an irrelevant question of whether or not they have received their retirement benefits.
The classification is patently arbitrary and unreasonable and is not based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences that would justify the special disqualification of petitioner, which, it is claimed, "is based on a presumption that elective local officials who have retired and are of advanced age cannot discharge the functions of the office they seek as those who are differently situated." 3 Such presumption is sheer conjecture. The mere fact that a candidate is less than 65 or has "young or new blood" does not mean that he would be more efficient, effective and competent than a mature 65year old like petition er who has had experience on the job and who was observed at the hearing to appear to be most physically fit. Sufice it to city the outstanding case of the incumbent ebullient Minister of Foreign Affairs, General Carlos P. Romulo, who was elected a 80 as a member of the Interim Batasan Pambansa and who has just this month completed 81 years of age and has been hailed by the President himself as "the best foreign minister the Republic has ever had
Age has simply just never been a yardstick for qualification or disqualification. Al. the most, a minimum age to hold public office has been required as a qualification to insure a modicum of maturity 'now reduced to 21 years in the present batas), but no maximum age has ever been imposed as a disqualification for elect public office since the right and win of the people to elect the candidate of their choice for any elective office, no matter his age has always been recognized as supreme.
The disqualification in question therefore is grossly violative of the equal protection clause which mandates that all persons subjected to legislation shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed. The guarantee is meant to proscribe undue favor and individual or class privilege on the one hand and hostile discrimination and the oppression of in quality on the other. The questioned provision should therefore at the least be declared invalid in its application insofar as it would disqualify petitioner from running for the office of governor of his province.
As aptly restated by the Chief Justice, "Persons similarly situated should be similarly treated. Where no valid distinction could be made as to the relevant conditions that call for consideration, there should be none as to the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. There can be no undue favoritism or partiality on the one hand or hostility on the other. Arbitrary selection and discrimination against persons in thus ruled out. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not Identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that full within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest." 4
Finally, this arbitrary disqualification is likewise grossly violative of Article XII, sub-a
rticle C, section 9(1) of the 1973 Constitution that Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.
II. I concur with the majority's declaration of invalidity of the portion of the second paragraph of Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which would make the mere filing of charges of subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation prima facie evidence of the fact of commission of an act of disloyalty to the State on the part of the candidate and disqualify him from his candidacy. Such a provision could be the most insidious weapon to disqualify bona fide candidates who seem to be headed for election and places in the hands of the military and civil prosecutors a dangerous and devastating weapon of cutting off any candidate who may not be to their filing through the filing of last-hour charges against him.
I also concur with the pronouncement made in the majority decision that in order that a judgment of conviction may be deemed "as conclusive evidence" of the candidate's disloyalty to the State and of his disqualification from office, such judgment of conviction must be final and unappealable. This is so specifically provided in Section 22 of the 1978 Election Code. 5 Otherwise, the questioned provision would deny the bona fide candidate substantive due process and would be grossly violative of his constitutional right of presumption of innocence and of the above-quoted provision of the 1973 Constitution protecting candidates for public office from any form of harassment and discrimination.
ADDENDUM
When the case was voted upon a second time last January 21st, there appeared to be a majority in favor of the declarations and pronouncements above referred to in the two preceding paragraphs, in view of the urgency of the matter and the evil sought to be avoided. However, as of this writing, January 23, 1980 in the afternoon, such majority seems to have been dissipated by the view that the action to nullify such second paragraph of section 4 of the Batas in question is premature and has not been properly submitted for ajudication under the strict procedural require . If this be the case, my above views, termed as concurrences, should be taken as dissents against the majority action.
G.R. No. L-52304 January 28, 1980
RAMON B. CENIZA, FEDERICO C. CABILAO, JR., NELSON J. ROSAL and ALEJANDRO R. ALINSUG, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
Petition for prohibition and mandamus moth a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
On December 22. 1979, the Interim Batasang Pambansa enacted Batas Blg. 51 providing for local elections on January 30, 1980. Section of the statute provides:
SEC. 3. Cities. — There shall be in each city such elective local officials as provided in their respective charters, including the city mayor, the city vice-mayor, and the elective members of the sangguniang panglungsod, all of whom shall' be elected by the qualified voters in the city. In addition thereto, there shall be appointive sangguniang panglungsod members consisting of the of the city association of barangay councils, the President of the city federation of the kabataang barangay, and one representative each from the agricultural and industrial labor sectors who shall be appointed by the President (Prime Minister) whenever, as de by the sangguniang panglungsod, said sectors are of sufficient number in the city to warrant representation.
Until cities are reclassified into highly urbanized and component cities in accordance with the standards established in the Local Government Code as provided for in Article XI, Section 4(1) of the Constitution. any city now existing with an annual regular derived from infrastructure and general funds of not less than forty million pesos (P40,000,000.00) at the time of the approval of this Act shag be classified as a highly urbanized city. All other cities shall be considered components of the provinces where they are geographically located.
The City of Baguio, because of its special functions as the summer capital of the Philippines, shall be classified as a highly urbanized city irrespective of its income.
The registered voters of a component city may be entitled to vote in the election of the officials of the province of which that city is a component, if its charter so provides. However, voters registered in a highly urbanized city, as hereinabove defined shall not participate nor vote in the election of the officials of the province in which the highly urbanized city is geographically located.
To implement this Act, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC, for short) adopted Resolution No. 1421, which reads as follows:
WHEREAS, Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 in calling for the election of the provincial governor, provincial vice-governor and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in each province classified the chartered cities of the Philippines into "highly urbanized" and "component" cities based on the annual regular income of each city, and provided that "the registered voter of a component city may be entitled to vote in the election of the officials of the province of which that city is a component, if its charter provides", but that "voters registered in a highly urbanized city, shall not participate nor vote in the election of the officials of the province in which the highly urbanized city is geographically located";
WHEREAS, inasmuch as the charters of the different cities vary with respect to the right of their registered voters to vote for the provincial officials of the provinces where they are located, there is need to study the various charters of the cities and determine what cities shall and shall not vote for provincial officials pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 51;
WHEREAS, the voters in the cities should be accordingly informed if they are going to vote for provincial officials or not, for their proper guidance;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Elections, by virtue of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, the 1978 Election Code and Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 (51) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that the qualified voters in each city shall or shall not be entitled to vote for the provincial officials of the province where they are geographically located, to wit:
A. Cities not entitled to participate in the election of pro- provincial officials
1. Baguio
11. Mandaue
2. Bais
12. Manila
3. Canlaon
13. Naga
4. Caloocan
14. Ormoc
5. Cebu
15. Oroquieta
6. Cotabato
16. Ozamis
7. Dagupan
17. Pasay
8. Davao
18. Quezon
9. General Santo
19. San Carlos (Pangasinan)
10. Iloilo
20. Zamboanga
Because the City of Cebu has an income of P51,603,147,64, it is classified as a highly urbanized city and the voters thereof cannot take part in the election of the elective provincial officials of the province of Cebu, although the Charter of Cebu City 1 allows the qualified voters of the city to vote in the election of the provincial officials of the Province of Cebu.
The City of Mandaue, not having an annual regular income of not less than ?40 million, is classified as a component city. But the registered voters of the city cannot vote for the provincial elective officials because its Charter 2 expressly provides that the registered voters of the city cannot participate in the election of the provincial officials of the Province of Cebu, except to be a candidate therefor.
The petitioners filed the instant suit as taxpayers and registered voters in the Cities of Cebu and Mandaue. They are members of a civic and non-partisan group known as D-O-E-R-S (an accronym for "DEMOCRACY OR EXTINCTION: RESOLVED TO SUCCEED) which counts lawyers among its members, and extends free legal assistance to citizens regardless of economic and social status in meritorious cases involving violation of civil liberties and basic human rights. They vigorously assail Section 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, which uses the annual income of a given c
ity as the basis for classification of whether or not a particular city is a highly urbanized city whose voters may not participate in the election of provincial officials of the province where the city is geographically located; and Republic Act No. 5519, otherwise known as the Charter of Mandaue City, which went into effect without the benefit of ratification by the residents of Mandaue in a plebiscite or referendum. They pray that upon filing of the instant petition, a restraining order be issued "temporarily prohibiting the holding of election for Provincial Governor and other elective provincial officials in the province where the 18 cities listed by the respondent COMELEC are located, particularly Cebu City and Mandaue City, and temporarily prohibiting the National Treasurer to release public funds and the COA to pass in audit said funds in connection with and for the purpose of holding local elections in said provinces; and after hearing, to make the injunction permanent declaring unconstitutional and therefore void Section 96, Art. XVIII of the Charter of Mandaue, otherwise known as RA 5519," and should the stopping of the provincial elections in the provinces concerned be not possible, the respondent COMELEC be directed "to allow the qualified registered voters in the cities listed by said respondent, particularly Cebu City and Mandaue City, to participate in the election of, and vote for, the Provincial Governor and other elective provincial officials and preparing the corresponding official ballots for this purpose which shall provide spaces therein for Provincial Governor and other elective provincial officials of the provinces concerned, particularly the province of Cebu."
The petitioners contend that "Section 3 of Batas Blg. 885 3 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu city as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection."
We find no merit in the petition. The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that "The state shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the barrio, to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities." 4 To this end, the Constitution directs the National Assembly to "enact a local government code which may not thereafter be amended except by the majority vote of all its members, defining a more responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective system of recall, allocating among the different local governments their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of local government units," 5 and empowered local government units "to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to limitations as may be provided by law." 6 Art. XI, Section 4(1) of the said Constitution places highly urbanized cities outside the supervisory power of the province where they are geographically located. This is as it should be because of the complex and varied problems in a highly urbanized city due to a bigger population and greater economic activity which require greater autonomy.
Corollary to independence however, is the concomitant loss of the right to participate in provincial affairs, more particularly the selection of elective provincial officials since these provincial officials have ceased to exercise any governmental jurisdiction and authority over said city. Thus, in the case of Teves vs. Commission on Election 7 this Court, in holding that the registered voters of the City of Dumaguete cannot vote for the provincial officials of Negros Oriental because the charter of the city does not expressly allow the voters in the city to do so, ruled:
The creation of Dumaguete City has made it a political entity separate from and independent of the province of Negros Oriental. The purpose of an election is to enable the electorate to choose the men that will run their government, whether national, provincial, municipal or city. It so, no useful end will be served by allowing — in the absence of express legislative preference — the voters of a city to ceased to have any governmental jurisdiction and authority over said city.
To confirm our view that the city of Dumaguete has been segregated from the province of Oriental Negros for purposes of provincial elections, we should point to the penultimate section of the charter providing that "until otherwise provided by law, the City of Dumaguete shall continue as part of the first representative district of the Province of Oriental Negros." This is an express exception to the general effect of separation — an exception that serves to reiterate or even establish the rule. In other words, the Congress meant that the inhabitants of the city may not vote for provincial officials, but may vote for their representative in Congress.
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances.
The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voter's right of suffrage. In the case of Teves v. Commission on Election 8 the Court said.
Petitioners' contention is that, as the Charter of Dumaguete City is silent as to the right of its qualified voters to participate in the election of provincial officials of Negros Oriental and as said voters are residents of the province, they are clearly entitled to vote for said provincial officials.
The charters of other recently formed cities are articulate on the matter. Thus, in the case of Bacolod, Cabanatuan Legaspi Naga, and Ormoc, their charters expressly prohibit the residents therein from voting for provincial officials of the province to which said cities formerly belonged. Upon the other hand, the charters of Cagayan de Oro, Butuan, Cavite, Iloilo, Calbayog Lipa San Pablo, and Dagupan contain provisions extending their part in the election of the provincial official cities were previously included.
The question that presents itself has reference to the effect of the omission in the charter of Dumaguete City of an express provision on the right of its residents to vote for provincial officials of Negros Oriental, in the light of the legislative practice that, when desired, the right is either recognized or withdrawn expressly. We are inclined to overrule petitioners' position.
The equal protection of the law contemplates equality in the enjoyment of similar rights and privileges granted by law. It would have been discriminatory and a denial of the equal protection of the law if the statute prohibited an individual or group of voters in the city from voting for provincial officials while granting it to another individual or groups of voters in the same city.
Neither can it be considered an infringement upon the petitioners' rights of suffrage since the Constitution confers no right to a voter in a city to vote for the provincial officials of the province where the city is located. Their right is limited to the right to vote for elective city officials in local elections which the questioned statues neither withdraw nor restrict.
The petitioners further claim that to prohibit the voters in a city from voting for ele
ctive provincial officials would impose a substantial requirement on the exercise of suffrage and would violate the sanctity of the ballot, contrary to the provisions of Art. VI, Section 1 of the Constitution. The prohibition contemplated in the Constitution, however, has reference to such requirements, as the Virginia poll tax, invalidated in Harper vs. Virginia Board of Elections, 9 or the New York requirement that to be eligible to vote in a school district, one must be a parent of a child enrolled in a local public school, nullified in Kramer vs. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, which impose burdens on the right of suffrage without achieving permissible estate objectives. In this particular case, no such burdens are imposed upon the voters of the cities of Cebu and Mandaue. They are free to exercise their rights without any other requirement, save that of being registered voters in the cities where they reside and the sanctity of their ballot is maintained.
It is also contended that the prohibition would subvert the principle of republicanism as it would deprive a citizen his right to participate in the conduct of the affairs of the government unit through the exercise of his right of suffrage. It has been pointed out, however, that the provincial government has no governmental supervision over highly urbanized cities. These cities are independent of the province in the administration of their affairs. Such being the case, it is but just and proper to limit the selection and election of the provincial officials to the voters of the province whose interests are vitally affected and exclude therefrom the voters of highly urbanized cities.
Petitioners assail the charter of the City of Mandaue as unconstitutional for not having been ratified by the residents of the city in a plebiscite. This contention is untenable. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected 10 is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective 11 in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on June 21, 1969.
Finally, the petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province, 234,582 are from Cebu City and 44,358 come from Mandaue City, so that 278,940 electors, or close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of Cebu. Such charge has no factual and legal basis. "Gerrymandering" is a "term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. 12 The questioned statutes in this particular case do not apportion representative districts. The said representative districts remain the same. Nor has it been shown that there is an unfair advantage in favor of the candidates of the party in power. As the Solicitor General pointed out, it may even be that the majority of the city voters are supporters of the administration candidates, so that the enactment of the questioned statutes will work to their disadvantage.
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur
Teehankee, J., took no part.
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