I don’t know what Kabila will do, but I will try to get Massengo to visit the fronts so as to change people’s attitude toward him. Then the peasants must be organized throughout the zone and the front put under a single command. In two months, if everything works out well, we could have [Front de] Force encircled and then try to cut off its electricity so that it loses its strategic importance. Everything is looking much brighter—today, at least.
A few days later, however, dark shadows were reemerging. Aly had some serious altercations with the leaders in his area and was now at the Lake [Base], unwilling to return although he would not say so. In the recently abandoned area at Front de Force, activity had completely fallen off. We had sent someone to Kigoma to find a couple of oxyacetylene bags, with the idea of sabotaging the overhead power lines, but these were extremely difficult to transport because of the weight and the men’s negative attitude; in fact, they didn’t want to carry out any action without the Cubans. The reconnoitering for a site from which to fire cannon at the intake pipes of the hydro-electric power station did not yield any positive results. And here, after the initial euphoria, the soldiers became tired of the active life and asked to return to the fun and games at their Upper Base.
The picture was most depressing with regard to the relations of Massengo and Kabila with the leaders in the Fizi area, and of the revolution in general with the Tanzanian government. Kabila and Massengo went to Kibamba, but we heard immediately that the Tanzanian authorities refused to deliver a quantity of weapons we had requested, including the necessary fuses for the anti-tank mines, and were demanding Kabila’s immediate presence. We knew this to be the case because the person sent to get the weapons was Changa, our “admiral,” and he had been told personally that nothing would be delivered and that Kabila himself should go and talk to the government. This was the only time Kabila had made a serious attempt to cross into the Congo (at least there was no proof to the contrary), and now he was obliged to return to discuss some problem or other.
At the Lake Base, some members of Fizi’s rival group, who had been arguing for liquidation in the combat zone, were arrested. Massengo did not have a proper prison there and so he sent them to be held in Uvira. In fact, he decided to take them there himself and to use the trip to carry out an inspection of the affected zone. They left by launch. This is Aly’s version of events; it gives a clear idea of the turn they now took.
8-9-65
From Compañero: Aly
To Compañero: Tatu
Re: Compañero Tom’s trip to Kazima
Compañero Massengo’s trip to Changa and Aly’s to Uvira
We left on the 16th at 21:00, intending to leave Compañero Tom at Kazima and to continue on to Uvira with the three counterrevolutionary prisoners, despositing some weapons there and inspecting the area, the latter to be conducted by Massengo.
We reached Kazima at 24:30. On arriving in Kazima, Compañero Massengo ordered the squad leader to come aboard, but a soldier climbed up, discovered that President Massengo was on board and started talking to him; he offered to bring him some cigars and various trifles on his way back.
When he got off, the soldier asked for some soap and said that, if it was not forthcoming, the boat would not be allowed to leave. Compañero Tom got off and told the squad not to shoot, which they ignored once Compañero Tom was 100 meters away.
Each of them fired a few shots and ran away; one was captured later.
Compañero Massengo called the soldiers and officers to the shore and ordered them to capture the rest of the squad, saying that he would pick them up on his way back.
We continued on toward Uvira, but on reaching Mubembe at 9:00 a.m. Compañero Massengo said we should stop there and then travel on at night.
We received rather a frosty reception in the village. Compañero Massengo talked with the chairman there and a student compañero from China, asking them to call together the local population for a meeting to inform them of the political situation.
The meeting began at approximately 12:30 and lasted until 17:00. At that time Compañero Ernesto came to tell us not to say anything but that they wanted the prisoners released, otherwise there would be bloodshed.
At 17:30 Compañero Massengo said we would leave and go down to the shore. Once we were there, Compañero Massengo told us to get on board the boat, and when we delayed briefly, Ernesto called out again, saying that we were stupid and that they were going to start shooting at the boat. They immediately began to take up positions and to speak in a threatening manner; a squad came to take the prisoners off the boat, and this was done without any response, until one of the sailors fired his rifle and made off after the rebels, with Massengo and a few others following behind. They began to give blasts on the whistle to gather the troop together and succeeded in capturing 11 soldiers, but not the prisoners, whose insubordination seemed to have infected the soldiers.
The pressure exerted by these men and the reports received made it impossible to continue to Uvira, as things were worse farther on.
We know that those who freed the prisoners were from Fizi and Baraka, and some other men were mentioned whose names I no longer remember as I didn’t want to take notes in front of them.
I want you to know that at no time did Massengo come to warn us of the danger in that place or that he was aware of the danger as it was common knowledge; but we were not aware of it because we didn’t know the language well and it was all discussed at the meeting in which we did not take part—but he did.
As far as we could tell from Ernesto, this situation did not arise just now.
Bearing this in mind, I would like to know what is to be done; what should be our attitude now that things are passing from words to deeds, and dangerous deeds at that.
As far as you are concerned, you should be quite careful because they—that is, the rebels—are quite strong and are not well known to us.
On the way back we passed through Kazima and picked up the political commissar, but not those who were supposed to be prisoners, because they had not been recaptured.
Back at a hamlet, although we made the signals we had taught them the night before, they opened fire.
Awaiting a prompt reply, I remain yours with revolutionary greetings,
Aly
Fortunately, Aly’s suspicions were unfounded as Massengo himself had to go on board the boat and was exposed to the same dangers.
Almost immediately, Massengo sent me a letter indicating how insecure the compañeros leading the Congolese revolution felt. It is dated Kibamba, September 6.
To Comrade Dr. Tatu
Makungu
Comrade Doctor:
I greet you after a few days’ separation. On military matters I have followed your advice: Comrade Lieutenant-Colonel Lambert will coordinate the activities of the Lulimba-Makungu and Kalonda-Kibuyu fronts.
Comrade Kabila and I were ready to visit you, but unfortunately the circumstances were such that we could not carry out this plan for the time being. Five days after we arrived in Kibamba, Compañero Kabila received an urgent call from President Nyerere of Tanzania. The political situation inside the country is not very serious, and we had hoped that with an effort on our part we could overcome some of the problems that irresponsible people have caused. Today we proceeded to arrest some members of the counterrevolutionary gang1 and the people did not protest, indicating that their defects are recognized. The leader of this gang is the traitor Gbenyé, who, after having received several million, sent these agents everywhere with the aim of burying the revolution and then going off to negotiate with those in Leopoldville.
The imperialists promised Gbenyé that they would let him form a government if he succeeded in killing off the revolution and uniting all the agents of imperialism within his future government, with the aim of maintaining neocolonialism in the Congo.
Gbenyé used the meeting of East African heads of state (Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya) to state that we should resolve our problems with
Leopoldville, and promised that after the reconciliation with Leopoldville we would establish a federation with the East African states. This is why Compañero Kabila has just been called to Dar es-Salaam; the intention may well be to put pressure on us. They even refused to allow Compañero Kabila to be accompanied by one of our people to Dar es-Salaam.
Despite all this, we will never agree to such a reconciliation. We ask you to discuss this with your embassy.
I should also point out that I am leaving today for Uvira, along with the Cuban Captain Aly, and that when I return I will also go to Kibamba. I hope to find your reply on these matters by then, especially your good advice about the problem I’ve mentioned above.
We consider that the major African leaders don’t want the complete liberation of the Congo, fearing that when the Congo wins total independence under the leadership of genuine revolutionaries the rest of Africa will be in danger of following its example.
Anyway the situation is not yet serious, and we are pretty sure we can get through this period.
On the basis of what I have just written, I hope that you will be able to give us some advice about how to resolve some of these problems.
The letter raised a number of interesting points: Gbenyé’s activity and links with the imperialists, which have not been clearly demonstrated to the extent that Massengo suggested; his promises to African leaders, of which we also have no proof; and the pressure on Kabila from Dar es-Salaam, which certainly did exist. It is worth mentioning his approach to the Cubans at this point, which might have occurred in an earlier and more relaxed period, for now the enemy was about to unleash an offensive. I replied immediately along the following lines:
Dear Comrade,
I have just spoken with your envoy Comrade Charles Bemba; he will be able to tell you how I see the situation, but I will make a brief balance sheet.
My impression is that it has really been shown it is possible to remain on the plain. After the actions at Mundandi’s front, we have just laid an ambush that resulted in seven or eight enemy soldiers killed and six weapons captured.2 We placed ambushes on two roads: the road from Nyangi to Lulimba, and the one from [Front de] Force to Lulimba.
I think we should apply more pressure in this area and try to drive out the Tshombists who are close to Lulimba, so that we have a road open to the lake. I am aware of the problems in Baraka and Fizi, but it is very important for us to have a direct supply route.
On the problems you outlined to me. First, you should rest assured that we will support you in relation to the Tanzanian government, and also—as far as we are able—in meeting your needs. I’d like to talk with you, but I understand your difficulties in leaving the General Staff headquarters. In a few more days, I will be free to go and speak with you. I would then like to visit other parts of the same front and ask you not to keep me at the Lake [Base]; my job is what I am doing now.
Like you, I am optimistic about the long term, but it is necessary to pay more attention to political and military organization. We have made some progress but not enough, and we will be able to advance more by fighting more. Combat is a great school for soldiers. Moreover, the enemy is our great source of weapons; if we cannot use the lake, we still have the battlefield.
I welcome your decision to appoint Comrade Lambert as coordinator, even though his role is becoming more difficult. In my view, his real responsibility should be as commander of the front. I would also draw your attention to the fact that the Rwandan comrades have fought very well with us and have now done the same with the Congolese comrades. Captain Zakarias is very brave, despite some flaws that can be corrected over time.
One point that needs to be stressed is the policy toward the peasants. Without the support of the population, we will not have any real successes. I hope to talk with you at greater length about this when we see each other.
With my revolutionary greetings,
Tatu
I maintained an optimistic tone, which continued for a while longer. In spite of our difficulties, we had inflicted some losses on the enemy and had the potential to wear them down and force them to retreat from certain positions as too costly to defend.
During these days, the long-awaited messengers arrived. They turned out to be Aragonés, Fernández Mell and Margolles,3 who had come to stay at the front. When I learned who was coming, I feared that they might have a message urging me to return immediately to Cuba or to give up the struggle because it did not occur to me that the party’s organization secretary would relinquish his job to come to the Congo, especially in a situation like this where nothing was clear and there were quite a few negatives. Aragonés insisted on coming and Fidel gave his consent; it was the same with Margolles; and Fernández Mell, an old comrade-in-arms, was the man I had requested to come from Cuba in order to strengthen the command structure. Karim also joined us; he would replace Tom as the political commissar given his greater ideological and educational development.
The first three entered the country clandestinely as doctors. We didn’t know if they would really be able to stay because they were whites, but our position was such that we could do virtually whatever we wanted in our own camp; the problems began when we began to involve ourselves in the Congolese camp to organize things.
Because of his size, Compañero Aragonés was given the Swahili name “Tembo” (elephant), and Fernández Mell, because of his character, was called “Siki” (vinegar). Other names came from a vocabulary book. Tembo was given the number 120 on the list of members of our force. Taking into account our losses—four killed, two returned to Cuba, and Compañero Changa (who, though on the list, operated in Kigoma and organized the lake crossings)—we had 113 men or, not counting the four doctors, 107 combatants. The force was large enough to achieve something, but as we have seen, several circumstances that I could not or did not know how to avoid meant that these men were dispersed over a wide area, so that we could never count on more than 30 or 40 men at the time of any action. Furthermore, nearly everyone suffered at least one attack of malaria—and some much more than once—which meant that this force was not capable of deciding the outcome of a campaign. It might have formed the nucleus of a new type of army if the conditions of the Congolese compañeros had been different.
The morale of our troop had improved somewhat, as evident in the fact that three of the compañeros who had planned to return to Cuba now asked to resume their full duties: Abdallah, Anzali and Bahati.
It appeared as though the Liberation Army was also getting reinforcements in the form of contingents trained in China and Bulgaria. These guys’ first priority was to take 15 days’ leave to visit their families here, and then extend this vacation when it proved to be too brief. Besides, they were cadres trained for the revolution so it would be irresponsible to risk their lives on the battlefield; they had come to infuse their compañeros with the mountain of knowledge they had acquired in six months of theoretical studies, but it would be a crime against the revolution to actually make them fight.
This was the attitude that permeated all the groups, regardless of whether they had been in China, Bulgaria or the Soviet Union. Such were the consequences of training students from the petty-bourgeois milieu in the Congo, all bearing a burden of resentment and an urge to imitate the colonialists.
Those chosen were French-speaking students, or sons of political bosses who had absorbed everything negative in European culture and none of the revolutionary spirit born with its proletariat. They returned with a superficial gloss of Marxism, full of their own importance as “cadres” and a great desire to command that was expressed in acts of indiscipline or even conspiracy.
The humble ordinary combatants, capable of giving their lives for a cause they barely understood, were disregarded by leaders who avoided the centers of the struggle and lacked revolutionary cadres to assist them. We were determined to reveal these cadres among the debris, but time finally ran out for us.
1. Che’s note: These were the three pri
soners Aly mentioned.
2. Che’s note: In fact seven weapons were captured, but a Rwandan took one, causing a dispute when it was discovered, and he was ordered to give it back.
3. Captain Aldo Margolles, then Cuban vice-minister of the interior.
TAKING THE PULSE
It was necessary to maintain the action on the Katenga-Lulimba road in order to prevent the arrival of reinforcements so that the number of isolated enemy troops would remain small enough for us to attack. We doubled the number of ambushes and placed Pombo and Nane at the front. We began to focus on a point that we broke through day after day but the enemy rapidly restored its position, until finally a strong garrison was placed there that prevented us from continuing.
After sending Azima and a small group ahead to reconnoiter, I left for Lulimba. It was a cloudy day, and intermittent rain slowed us down and forced us to seek shelter in some of the abandoned houses that were a frequent sight along the way. The road had also fallen into disrepair, even before the recent events had convulsed the region. In mid-morning, there were sounds of fighting and aircraft coming from the direction of the ambush; we learned what had happened several days later, when Moja reported that the guardsmen had broken our defenses at the cost of a few armored cars, and probably some casualties among their soldiers, and had been able to reinforce Lulimba. Enemy troops also advanced from Lulimba to help their comrades at the point where they had broken through, which made us think that there had never been only 53 soldiers there, as the captured payroll indicated, but many more. At a certain point we thought that Lulimba was the goal of the battle, but in fact they were reinforcing key points in order to launch an offensive. We guessed this later because of the major work going on at Front de Force and Nyangi, but we had no intelligence from the enemy camp.