63. François-Poncet, 221–2; Weinberg, i.173–4, 203·
64. See Gerhard Paul and Klaus-Michael Mahlmann, Milieus und Widerstand. Eine Verhaltensgeschichte der Gesellschaft im Nationalsozialismus, Bonn, 1995, 60–77, 203–23, 352–71. See also Gerhard Paul, ‘Deutsche Mutter – heim zu Dir!’ Warum es mißlang, Hitler an der Saar zu schlagen. Der Saarkampf 1933 bis 1935, Cologne, 1984.
65. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 284.
66. Paul and Mahlmann, Milieus, 66, 73–7.
67. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 283.
68. Schultheß’ Europäischer Geschichtskalender, Bd.76 (1936), Munich, 1936, 14 (90.76 per cent).
69. Paul and Mahlmann, Milieus, 222.
70. Domarus, 472.
71. Domarus, 476. Ward Price was convinced, so he wrote in the Völkischer Beobachter after the interview, of Hitler’s ‘love of peace’ (cit. Domarus, 474 n.19). He still thought in 1937 that Hitler was sincere in his ‘desire for peace’ (G. Ward Price, I Know these Dictators, I43).
72. Domarus, 485.
73. DRZW, i.415 and n.62, 416.
74. Klaus-Jürgen Müller, General Ludwig Beck. Studien und Dokumente zur politisch-militärischen Vorstellungswelt und Tätigkeit des Generalstabschefs des deutschen Heeres 1933–1938, Boppard am Rhein, 339–42; and Hans-Jürgen Rautenberg, ‘Drei Dokumente zur Planung eines 300.000-Mann-Friedensheeres aus dem Dezember 1933’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 22 (1977), 103–39.
75. DRZW, i.403–10, 416; Müller, Beck, I92–4, 341; Müller, Heer, 208.
76. Müller, Beck, I89, 339–44.
77. Müller, Beck, I90.
78. François-Poncet, 224–5; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 294–5; Domarus, 481; Müller, Beck, I95; Weinberg, i.205.
79. Domarus, 482.
80. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 295.
81. Schmidt, 295–6; François-Poncet, 225; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 297.
82. Domarus, 489.
83. Seraphim, Das politische Tagebuch Rosenbergs, 74–5. For the difficulties facing Hitler in the timing of announcing Germany’s new military strength, see Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 295–6.
84. Domarus, 489; Müller, Beck, I95; François-Poncet, 226; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 298. The secret decree on the air-force had been agreed in cabinet on 26 February – before the announcement of the visit by Simon and Eden – to take effect on 1 March, and be announced a few days later (Weinberg, i.205).
85. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 298. Göring told the British Air Attaché that the Germans had 1,500 aircraft; in reality the number was 800. The British had reckoned with a Luftwaffe of 1,300 aircraft by October 1936.
86. Schmidt, 296.
87. Müller, Beck, I95; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 287–8.
88. François-Poncet, 229.
89. Friedrich Hoßbach, Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler 1934–1938, Wolffenbüttel/Hanover, 1949, 94–5.
90. Hoßbach, 95.
91. Müller, Heer, 208; for the surprise of army leaders, see also Esmonde M. Robertson, Hitler’s Pre-War Policy and Military Plans, 1933–1939, London, 1963, 56.
92. Müller, Heer, 209.
93. Hoßbach, 95–6.
94. Müller, Heer, 208–10; Müller, Beck, I96; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 287–9, 298–9.
95. Müller, Heer, 208. Feeling in the Foreign Office was nevertheless that what was achieved by Hitler’s action could have been brought about by negotiation (Schmidt, 296). Fritsch, too, was of the view that, though unavoidable, the announcement of general conscription could have been made ‘with less drama’ (cit. Müller, Heer, 209).
96. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 303–4. And see Rosenberg’s information from within the British Air Ministry, Seraphim, Das politische Tagebuch Rosenbergs, 75·
97. Hoßbach, 96.
98. Hoßbach, 96; Müller, Heer, 209.
99. Domarus, 491; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 299.
100. Hoßbach, 96; Müller, Heer, 209; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 299; Hitler, Monologe, 343 (16 August 1942).
101. François-Poncet, 228–9.
102. Seraphim, Das politische Tagebuch Rosenbergs, 77. See DGFP, C, III, 1005–6, No.532, 1015, No.538. The official record notes the French ambassador’s protest, states that the Italian ambassador refrained from any comment, and indicates the British ambassador’s inquiry about continuation of discussions raised in the Anglo-French communiqué of 3 February.
103. Domarus, 491–5, here 494.
104. François-Poncet, 230; William Shirer, Berlin Diary, 1934–1941, (1941) Sphere Book edn, London, 1970, 32.
105. Shirer, 33.
106. Shirer, 33–4.
107. Domarus, 491–5; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 299.
108. François-Poncet, 230.
109. DBS, ii.275–82.
110. DBS, ii.277–9.
111. DBS, ii.279.
112. Jens Petersen, Hitler-Mussolini, 397–400.
113. Schmidt, 296; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 304; Weinberg, i.206.
114. François-Poncet, 231.
115. Schmidt, 297.
116. Seraphim, Das politische Tagebuch Rosenbergs, 77; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 302.
117. The following is based on Schmidt’s account, 298–308.
118. Eden, Facing the Dictators, I33 (and, for Eden’s impressions on first meeting Hitler on 20 February 1934, 61). See also Winston Churchill’s published comment in 1935, ‘Hitler and his Choice, 1935’, reprinted in his Great Contemporaries, London, 1941, 223–31, here 230: ‘Those who have met Herr Hitler face to face in public business or on social terms have found a highly competent, cool, well-informed functionary with an agreeable manner, a disarming smile, and few have been unaffected by a subtle personal magnetism.’
119. Schmidt, 301–2 (where he gives the figure of 126, not 128, Memelländer).
120. Eden, Facing the Dictators, I35.
121. Schmidt, 306.
122. Schmidt, 307. The official account of the talks is recorded in DGFP, C, III, 1043–80, No.555.
123. Schmidt, 306–8.
124. Friedelind Wagner, 128–9, recounted how her mother, Winifred Wagner, a guest at the banquet in honour of Simon and Eden, told of Hitler ‘slapping his knees and clapping his hands like a schoolboy’ in pleasure at his diplomatic success. For the suggestion that this meeting, nevertheless, brought the first sign of recognition on Hitlers part that British resistance to his desired alliance with Great Britain might be stronger than he had originally bargained for, see Josef Henke, England in Hitler’s politischem Kalkül 1935–1939, Boppard am Rhein, 1973, 38–9. An indication of Hitler’s new assertiveness, revealed at the discussions with his British guests, was the raising of demands for the return of colonies which he mistakenly regarded as an attempt to ‘persuade’ the British into friendly cooperation. (See Klaus Hildebrand, Vom Reich zum Weltreich. Hitler, NSDAP und koloniale Frage 1919–1945, Munich, 1969, 447ff; Klaus Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, London, 1973, 36–7; Klaus Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich. Deutsche Außenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler 1871–1945, Stuttgart, 1995, 598.)
125. Eden, Facing the Dictators, I36.
126. Eden, Facing the Dictators, I33–4, 139.
127. Weinberg, i.207; A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, (1961) revised edn, Harmondsworth, 1964, 116–17.
128. TBJG, I.2, 485 (15 April 1935).
129. TBJG, I.2, 486 (17 April 1935).
130. Domarus, 506.
131. Domarus, 511.
132. After the Dollfuss affair of July 1934, and given the continued instability of the position of Austria, Mussolini was anxious to ward off any possible repeated German coup there, particularly since his own eyes were cast on Abyssinia, and he was aware of powerful opposition at home to his proposed adventure. Neurath was reportedly concerned – as the Italian leader no doubt intended him to be – about Mussolini’s pro-western and anti-German position adopted at Stresa (William E. Dodd and Martha Dodd (eds.), Ambassa
dor Dodd’s Diary, 1933–1938, London, 1941, 236–45). See also Robert Mallett, The Italian Navy and Fascist Expansionism, 1935–40, London, 1998, 28–9.
133. Domarus, 505–14. For the reception in Germany, see Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth’, I25–6. The Times described the speech as ‘reasonable, straightforward, and comprehensive’ (cit. Toland, 372).
134. Domarus, 512–13.
135. Jost Dülffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine. Reichspolitik und Flottenbau 1910–1939, Düsseldorf, 1973, 256–7.
136. Dülffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine, 266–7.
137. DRZW, i.455–8.
138. Dülffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine, 280, 291, 301, and see 319–20; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 308–9; Weinberg, 1.212.
139. Schmidt, 317. See Spitzy, 92–122, for a biting description of Ribbentrop’s personality and style as German ambassador in London. The development of Ribbentrop’s foreign-policy ideas, with differing emphasis to those of Hitler but ultimately devoid of independent standing, is examined in Wolfgang Michalka, Ribbentrop und die deutsche Weltpolitik 1933–1940. Außenpolitische Konzeptionen und Entscheidungsprozesse im Dritten Reich, Munich, 1980.
140. Michael Bloch, Ribbentrop, paperback edn., London, 1994, 54–8. The continued efforts on Ribbentrop’s part to cultivate good relations with ‘fellow-travellers of the Right’ in Britain and the mutual misunderstandings which ensued are detailed by G. T. Waddington, ‘“An idyllic and unruffled atmosphere of complete Anglo-German misunderstanding”: Aspects of the Operations of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop in Great Britain, 1934–1939’, History, 82 (1997), 44–72.
141. Bloch, Ribbentrop, 69; Domarus, 515; DGFP, C, IV. 253, n.2.
142. For the talks, and their consequences, see esp. Dülffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine, 325–54.
143. DGFP, C, IV, 257.
144. Schmidt, 318.
145. DGFP, C, IV, 250.
146. DGFP, C, IV, 277–8; Bloch, Ribbentrop, 73.
147. Schmidt, 319.
148. Ribbentrop, 41. British sources in Berlin were nevertheless claiming by early 1936 that Hitler, disappointed that the Naval Treaty had not produced the desired close relations with Britain, regretted his haste in concluding it (Geoffrey T. Waddington, ‘Hitler, Ribbentrop, die NSDAP und der Niedergang des Britischen Empire 1935–1938’, Vf Z, 40 (1992), 273–306, here 277).
149. Other powers, Sir John Simon had told the German delegation, were merely to be informed that the British Government ‘had decided’ to accept the German Reich Chancellor’s proposal (DGFP, C, IV, 280).
150. Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini, London, 1983, 228–35, quotation 232.
151. See Taylor, 118–29, for the Abyssinian crisis and its impact. The feeble British response to Italian aggression underlined Hitler’s growing feeling that Britain was weak and lacked the will to oppose his territorial ambitions in Europe. It played its part in persuading him that there was little prospect of Britain intervening should he act to remilitarize the Rhineland (Henke, 40–47).
152. See Donald Cameron Watt, ‘The Secret Laval-Mussolini Agreement of 1935 on Ethiopia’, in Esmonde M. Robertson (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War, London, 1971, 225–42.
153. Sonderarchiv Moscow, 1235-VI-2, Reichskanzlei, Lammers, Vermerk, 16 October 1935.
154. Monologe, I08 (25 October 1941).
155. See Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, 236–7.
156. Schleunes, 116.
157. Kurt Pätzold, Faschismus, Rassenwahn, Judenverfolgung. Eine Studie zur politischen Strategie und Taktik des faschistischen deutschen Imperialismus 1933–193s, Berlin (East), 1975, 194–5; Ian Kershaw, ‘The Persecution of the Jews and German Popular Opinion in the Third Reich’, Yearbook of the Leo Baeck Institute, 26 (1981), 261–89, here 264–5; David Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution: Public Opinion under Nazism, Oxford/Cambridge, Mass., 1992, 35; Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews. The Years of Persecution, 1933– 39, London, 1997, 137ff.
158. Adam, 114–15, 119–20; Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 35.
159. ‘How Popular was Streicher?’, (no author), Wiener Library Bulletin, 5/6 (1957), 48; Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 35.
160. David Bankier, ‘Hitler and the Policy-Making Process on the Jewish Question’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 3 (1988), 1–20, here 9.
161. Akten der Partei-Kanzlei, 4 Bde., ed. Institut für Zeitgeschichte [Helmut Heiber (Bde. 1–2) and Peter Longerich (Bde.3–4)], Munich etc., 1983–92, Teil I, Regesten, Bd. 1, 98, No.10807, Microfiche, 124 05038, Wiedemann to Bormann, 30 April 1935: ‘I’ve told the Führer about the reservations over these signs on account of the Olympics. Nothing has changed in the Führer’s decision that there is no objection to these signs’ (‘Ich habe dem Führer von den Bedenken, die wegen der Olympiade in Bezug auf diese Schilder geltend gemacht wurden, erzählt. An der Entscheidung des Führers, daß gegen diese Schilder nichts einzuwenden ist, hat sich dadurch nichts geändert)’. See also Bankier, ‘Hitler and the Policy-Making Process on the Jewish Question’, 9.
162. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 28–35.
163. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 33.
164. Otto Dov Kulka, ‘Die Nürnberger Rassengesetze und die deutsche Bevölkerung im Lichte geheimer ΝS-Lage- und Stimmungsberichte’, VfZ, 32 (1984), 582–624, here 609.
165. Cit. Marlis Steinert, Hitlers Krieg und die Deutschen. Stimmung und Haltung der deutschen Bevölkerung im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Düsseldorf, 1970, 57; Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 38.
166. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 38.
167. Adam, 118 (where other examples are also given). See Hans Mommsen, ‘Der nationalsozialistische Polizeistaat und die Judenverfolgung vor 1938’, VfZ, I0 (1962), 73, 84, Dok. Nr.II, for the subsequent ban imposed in Bavaria by the Bavarian Political Police on 6 March 1935.
168. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 38–41; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, 50, 127–30, 205–6; Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth’, I01–2.
169. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 70–76; Kershaw, ‘The Persecution of the Jews’, 265–72.
170. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 74–5; Kershaw, ‘The Persecution of the Jews’, 268–70.
171. Bayern, i.430, 442–7; Bayern ii.293–4; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, 234 n.28; Pätzold, Faschismus, Rassenwahn, Judenverfolgung, 216–21.
172. TBJG, I.2, 493–4 (15 July 1935); Adam, 120; Ted Harrison, ‘“Alter Kämpfer” im Widerstand’, VfZ, 45 (1997), 385–423, here 400–401; Reuth, Goebbels, 330–31; Irving, Mastermind, 206–7. See Helmut Genschel, Die Verdrängung der Juden, I09–10, for the spreading of the boycott to numerous other areas during the spring and summer.
173. Adam, 120.
174. Schacht, 347; Adam, 123; Genschel, 111. Economic concerns, alongside the need to avoid conflict with the police, had doubtless been behind the fruitless order by Heß to the party on 1 April 1935 to avoid ‘terror actions against individual Jews’. A further order in June to maintain party discipline was equally ineffective (Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter, 212).
175. Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter, 212.
176. Adam, 121; see also Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 37.
177. Lothar Gruchmann, ‘“Blutschutzgesetz” und Justiz. Zu Entstehung und Auswirkung des Nürnberger Gesetzes vom 15. September 1935’, VfZ, 3 (1983), 418–42, here 430; Mommsen ‘Polizeistaat’, 70–71.
178. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 36–7.
179. Adam, 115, 119.
180. Adam, 120.
181. ‘Das Reichsministerium des Innern und die Judengesetzgebung. Aufzeichnungen von Dr. Bernhard Lösener’, VfZ, 9 (1961), 262–311, here 277–8.
182. Gruchmann, ‘“Blutschutzgesetz” und Justiz’, 418–23.
183. Cit. Gruchmann, ‘“Blutschutzgesetz” und Justiz’, 425.
184. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 44.
185. Frick himself had on 26 July instructed registry offices to postpone such forthcoming marriages indefinitely (Adam, 122). An indefinite postponement was decreed in Württemberg in August (Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 44).
186. Gruchmann, ‘“Blutschutzgesetz” und Justiz’, 426–30; Adam, 122; Jeremy Noakes, ‘The Development of Nazi Policy towards the German-Jewish “Mischlinge” 1933–1945’, Yearbook of the Leo Baeck Institute, 34 (1989), 291–354, here 307–8.
187. Adam, 122.
188. Kurt Pätzold (ed.), Verfolgung, Vertreibung, Vernichtung. Dokumente des faschistischen Antisemitismus 1933 bis 1942, Leipzig, 1983, 103; Adam, 123; Schacht, 349–52; Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 44–5; 1MT, xii, 638 (where Schacht claimed that the laws he expected were to give the Jews legal protection, in line with demands he claimed he had been making to Hitler).
189. Bayern i.430.
190. DGFP, C, IV, 569.
191. Kulka, ‘Die Nürnberger Rassengesetze’, 615–18; Adam, 123–4; Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter, 212–13; Schacht, 356, states that the meeting was packed to capacity, lasted nearly two hours, and that Frick protested at his ‘Over-trenchant method of speech’.
192. DGFP, C, IV, 570.
193. DGFP, C, IV, 570. In fact, during the Nuremberg Rally Hitler chastised Streicher – though in gentle fashion – for the mistakes of the Stürmer. Goebbels thought Streicher had taken note, but that it would make no difference. (TBJG, I.2, 513 (11 September 1935)).
194. Kulka, ‘Die Nürnberger Rassengesetze’, 618–19 and n.126; Adam, 124.
195. TBJG, I.2, 515 (17 September 1935).
196. Kulka, ‘Die Nürnberger Rassengesetze’, 620 n. 128, citing the Jewish Chronicle, 30 August 1935. See also Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 44.
197. Schleunes, 119.
198. Adam, 126 n.66.
199. IfZ, MA-1569/42, Frame 1081, Interrogation of Dr Bernhard Lösener for US War Crimes Trials at Nuremberg; ‘Das Reichsministerium des Innern und die Judengesetzgebung’, 273; Adam, 126–7. The comment indicates that little work had been done prior to this point on preparing legislation.
200. IfZ, MA-1569/42, Frames 1081–2, Lösener testimony: ‘Das Reichsministerium des Innern und die Judengesetzgebung’, 274.