But the rearmament drive was now seriously threatened by the food crisis. In spring 1936 Hitler again personally intervened, in the face of Schacht’s bitter objections, to allocate Darré once more scarce foreign currency – 60 million Reich Marks on this occasion – for the import of seed-oil.281 The armaments position was becoming desperate. Schacht had to explain to Blomberg in December that an increase in raw-material imports was out of the question. By early 1936, available supplies of raw materials for rearmament had shrunk to a precariously low level. Only one to two months’ supplies were left. Schacht demanded a slow-down in the pace of rearmament.282
As Hitler entered his fourth year as Chancellor, the economic situation posed a real threat to rearmament plans. At the very time that international developments encouraged the most rapid expansion possible, the food crisis – and the social unrest it had stirred – was sharply applying the brakes to it. Other indicators were also discouraging. Fears of a new rise in unemployment seemed likely to be borne out. In January 1936 the Reich Labour Ministry was gloomily reporting unemployment still running at around 2.5 million, with, it seemed, little prospect of a further lasting reduction.283 Any slow-down in rearmament, as Goerdeler and Schacht were advocating, would inevitably bring increased unemployment in its train. Politically, the problems of the winter had given new life to the underground KPD, while reports from within the NSDAP repeatedly emphasized the poor morale and low spirits of party members.284 It was little wonder that Hitler and other Nazi leaders had been seriously concerned about the possible consequences of a lasting period of food shortages, rising prices, and social tension, both for domestic stability and for foreign-policy ambitions. Almost two years later, he would remark that a renewed food crisis, without adequate foreign exchange to master it, would amount to a ‘waning point (Schwäcbungsmoment) of the regime’. He saw this as all the more reason to hasten expansion to gain ‘living-space’.285
In early 1936, too, domestic as well as foreign-policy considerations almost certainly played a part in the timing of Hitler’s next big gamble: to destroy what was left of the Versailles and Locarno treaties by reoccupying the demilitarized Rhineland.
Certainly, that was the view of Foreign Minister Neurath. Speaking to Ulrich von Hassell, German ambassador in Rome, who had been urgently summoned (for the second time within a few days) to Berlin on 18 February to discuss the Rhineland question, Neurath was of the opinion that ‘for Hitler in the first instance domestic motives were decisive (maßgebend)’. Hitler, he went on, ‘felt the deterioration of mood in favour of the regime and was looking for a new national slogan to fire the masses again’. The usual election, alongside a plebiscite, would be the way, the Foreign Minister presumed.286 Hitler himself spoke openly of his domestic motives at a meeting with Hassell that evening, describing how he wanted to couch his appeal ‘both abroad, as well as to his own nation’.287 Weeks later, Hassell remained sure that domestic considerations had been dominant in Hitler’s mind, and that the timing to coincide with ‘Heroes’ Memorial Day’ on 8 March had been determined in order to maximize the propaganda effect.288
Hitler needed no convincing of the domestic advantages and propaganda capital to be gained from a dramatic national triumph. It would certainly offer an opportunity to deflect from the problems of the previous winter – the ‘food crisis’, the escalating ‘Church struggle’. The sagging morale could be dispelled overnight, the regime’s position strengthened at home as well as abroad, Hitler’s own popularity still further enhanced. In the Rhineland itself, where reports had been painting a dismal picture of especially unfavourable economic conditions, and where clashes between the party and the Catholic Church were seriously undermining support for the regime – never specially strong in this area – the abolition of the demilitarized zone through unilateral German action was certain of a rapturous welcome.289 A step which could unquestionably – as the Foreign Ministry knew – have been accomplished through patient diplomacy within a year or two was, then, undertaken with all the risk and drama of a military coup at least in part because of the notable propaganda gains Hitler saw to be made from a sudden coup. As Neurath had foreseen, the elections and plebiscite immediately called for 29 March underlined the domestic considerations involved. The masses could be reinvigorated, sagging morale among the party membership dispelled, activists again given activity.290
As on other occasions, domestic and foreign-policy considerations were closely intertwined in Hitler’s thinking. The domestic advantages would not have weighed so heavily had not international circumstances, framed by the Abyssinian crisis, opened up an opportunity to strike which Hitler felt he could not miss.
V
Under the terms of the 1919 peace settlement, the German Reich had been prohibited from erecting fortifications, stationing troops, or undertaking any military preparations on the left bank of the Rhine and within a 50 kilometre strip on the right bank. The status of the demilitarized Rhineland had subsequently been endorsed by the Locarno Pact of 1925, which Germany had signed. Any unilateral alteration of that status by Germany would not only amount to a devastating breach of the post-war settlement and reneging on an international agreement; it would also threaten the very basis of western security which that settlement had endeavoured to establish. From a German nationalist perspective, however, the current status of the Rhineland was intolerable.
The remilitarization of the Rhineland would have been on the agenda of any German nationalist government. The army viewed it as essential for the rearmament plans it had established in December 1933, and for western defence.291 The Foreign Ministry presumed the demilitarized status would be ended by negotiation at some point. Diplomats were aware that it would have been done away with when Germany reintroduced military service, had not caution prevailed because of its anchorage in the Locarno Pact as well as the Versailles Treaty.292 Hitler had talked confidentially of the abolition of the demilitarized zone as early as 1934. He spoke of it again, in broad terms, in summer 1935. By the end of the year, the French were reckoning that they would soon face a fait accompli in the Rhineland. Hitler referred in a meeting with the British Ambassador on 13 December to the need to end the demilitarized zone, saying he regretted not having taken the step along with the introduction of conscription the previous March. Around that time, Hitler discussed with his military advisers the problems that might arise from reoccupying the zone.293 The opportunity was by then beginning to present itself. However likely the reoccupation would have been within the next year or two, the seizing of that opportunity, the timing and character of the coup, were Hitler’s. They bore his hallmark at all points.
The opportunity was provided by Mussolini. As we have noted, his Abyssinian adventure, provoking the League of Nations’ condemnation of an unprovoked attack on a member-state and the imposition of economic sanctions, broke the fragile Stresa Front. Italy, faced with a pessimistic military outlook, sanctions starting to bite, and looking for friends, turned away from France and Britain, towards Germany. The stumbling-block to good relations had since 1933 been the Austrian question. Since the Dollfuss assassination in mid-1934, the climate had been frosty. This now swiftly altered. Mussolini signalled in January 1936 that he had nothing against Austria in effect becoming a satellite of Germany.294 The path to the ‘Axis’ immediately opened up. Later the same month he publicly claimed the French and British talk of possible joint military action against Italy in the Mediterranean – not that this was in reality ever likely – had destroyed the balance of Locarno, and could only lead to the collapse of the Locarno system. Hitler took note. Then, in an interview with Ambassador Hassell, Mussolini indicated that, for Italy, Stresa was ‘finally dead’, and that in the event of sharper sanctions, Italy would leave the League of Nations, thereby effectively killing the Locarno agreement. He acknowledged to Hassell that Italy would offer no support for France and Britain should Hitler decide to take action in response to the ratification of the Franco-Soviet mutual assistance
pact, currently before the French Chamber of Deputies, and viewed by Berlin as a breach of Locarno.295 The message was clear: from Italy’s point of view, Germany could re-enter the Rhineland with impunity.
The Abyssinian crisis had also damaged Anglo-French relations, and driven the two democracies further apart. This was particularly the case after the storm of protest once news had leaked out in December 1935 of the proposed Hoare-Laval Plan (named after Sir Samuel Hoare and Pierre Laval, the British and French Foreign Ministers) – rewarding Italy’s aggression (in a foretaste of what would happen in a different context at Munich in 1938) by offering it two-thirds of Abyssinian territory.296 The French government realized that a move to remilitarize the Rhineland was inevitable. Most observers tipped autumn 1936, once the Olympics were out of the way. Few thought Hitler would take great risks over the Rhineland when conventional diplomacy would ultimately succeed. Ministers rejected independent military action against flagrant German violation. In any case, the French military leadership – grossly exaggerating German armed strength – had made it plain that they opposed military retaliation, and that the reaction to any fait accompli should be purely political.297 The truth was: the French had no stomach for a fight over the Rhineland. And Hitler and the German Foreign Office sensed this.298 Soundings had also led Hitler and Neurath to a strong presumption that Britain, too, would refrain from any military action in the event of a coup. They saw Britain as for the time being weakened militarily, preoccupied politically with domestic affairs and with the Abyssinian crisis, unwilling to regard the preservation of the demilitarization of the Rhineland as a vital British interest, and possessing some sympathy for German demands.299 The chances of success in a swift move to remilitarize the Rhineland were, therefore, high; the likelihood of military retaliation by France or Britain relatively low. That was, of course, as long as the assessment in Berlin of the likely reactions of the European powers was correct. Nothing was certain. Not all Hitler’s advisers favoured the risk he was increasingly prepared to take without delay. But Hitler had been proved right in his boldness when leaving the League of Nations in 1933 and reintroducing conscription in 1935. He had gained confidence. His role in the Rhineland crisis was still more assertive, less than ever ready to bow to the caution recommended by the military and diplomats.300
Rumours were rife in Berlin at the beginning of February that Hitler was planning to march troops into the Rhineland in the near future.301 Nothing at that point had been decided. Hitler pondered the matter while he was in Garmisch-Partenkirchen for the opening of the Winter Olympics on 6 February.302 He invited objections, particularly from the Foreign Office. During February, he discussed the pros and cons with Neurath, Blomberg, Fritsch, Ribbentrop, Göring, then with Hassell, the ambassador in Rome. A wider circle within the Foreign Office and military leadership were aware of the pending decision. Fritsch and Beck were opposed; Blomberg as usual went along with Hitler. Foreign Minister Neurath also had grave doubts. He thought ‘speeding up’ the action was not worth the risk. Though it was not likely that Germany would face military retaliation, further international isolation would be the result. Hassell also argued that there was no hurry, since there would be future chances to abolish the demilitarized zone. Both were of the view that Hitler should at least await the ratification of the French-Soviet Pact by the Senate in Paris. This, as an alleged breach of Locarno, was to serve as the pretext. Hitler preferred to strike after ratification by the Chamber of Deputies, without waiting for the Senate.303 Whatever the caution of the career diplomats, Hitler was, as always, egged on in the most unctuous fashion by the sycophantic Ribbentrop.304
Hitler told Hassell that the reoccupation of the Rhineland was ‘from a military point of view an absolute necessity’. He had originally had 1937 in mind for such a step. But the favourable international constellation, the advantage of the French-Soviet Pact (given the anti-Soviet feeling in Britain and France) as the occasion, and the fact that the military strength of the other powers, especially of the Russians, was on the increase and would soon alter the military balance, were reasons for acting sooner, not later. He did not believe there would be military retaliation. At worst there might be economic sanctions.305 At discussions on 19 February, Hassell argued that the change for the better in Italy’s fortunes in Abyssinia and the dropping of oil sanctions had lessened the chances of Italian support. Hitler countered by stressing the disadvantages of delay. ‘Attack in this case, too,’ he characteristically argued – to ‘lively assent from Ribbentrop’ – ‘was the better strategy.’ He would use the Franco-Russian Pact as a pretext, and offer a seemingly generous package – continuation of the demilitarized zone on both sides, a three-power air pact, and non-aggression pact with France – to the western powers. There was little chance that it would prove acceptable. Hassell had even before this already formed the view that Hitler was ‘more than 50 per cent determined’ to act. The sceptical Fritsch also thought by the middle of the month that the decision had been taken. Neurath was by this time also resigned to the move, whatever his reservations.306
But Hitler continued to waver. His arguments had failed to convince the diplomats and military leaders. The sycophantic Ribbentrop was in favour, Blomberg nervously supportive. Otherwise, the advice he was receiving favoured caution, not boldness. This was the case as late as the end of February. However determined Hitler was on an early strike, the precise timing still had to be decided. On 27 February, remilitarizing the Rhineland was the topic at lunch. Göring and Goebbels had both joined Hitler. ‘Still somewhat too early,’ summed up Goebbels.307 The following day, Hitler remained undecided. Goebbels advised him to wait till ‘the Russian pact is perfect’, meaning until it had been ratified by the French Senate.308 Later that day, Goebbels accompanied Hitler to Munich, discussing the Rhineland question on the train. ‘The Führer still wavering (unschlüssig),’ noted Goebbels in his diary. He himself continued to argue for a delay until the Senate’s ratification. There would be further talks next day before Hitler would decide.309 At lunch on 29 February, he had yet to make up his mind.
But the following day, Sunday, 1 March, with Munich bathed in beautiful spring-like weather, Hitler turned up at the hotel where Goebbels was staying in a good mood. The decision had been taken. ‘It’s another critical moment, but now is the time for action,’ wrote Goebbels. ‘Fortune favours the brave! He who dares nothing wins nothing.’310
The next day, 2 March, Goebbels attended a meeting in the Reich Chancellery at 11a.m. The heads of the armed forces – Göring, Blomberg, Fritsch and Raeder – were there. So was Ribbentrop. Hitler told them he had made his decision. The Reichstag would be summoned for Saturday, 7 March. There the proclamation of the remilitarization of the Rhineland would be made. At the same time, he would offer Germany’s re-entry into the League of Nations, an air pact, and a non-aggression treaty with France. The acute danger would thereby be reduced, Germany’s isolation prevented, and sovereignty once and for all restored. The Reichstag would be dissolved and new elections announced, with foreign-policy slogans. Fritsch had to arrange for the troop transport during Friday night. ‘Everything has to happen as quick as lightning.’ Troop movements would be camouflaged by making them look like SA and Labour Front exercises. The military leaders had their doubts.311 Members of the cabinet were informed individually only on the afternoon of the following day, Frick and Heß as late as the evening. By then, invitations to the Reichstag had already gone out – but, to keep up the deception, only to a beer evening.312 By Wednesday Hitler was working on his Reichstag speech; Goebbels was already preparing the election campaign. Warning voices from the Foreign Ministry could still be registered on the Thursday. By Friday evening Hitler had completed his speech. The cabinet met to be informed for the first time collectively of what was planned. Goebbels announced that the Reichstag would meet at noon the next day.313 The only item on the agenda was a government declaration.314 To prevent any leaks, plans for the election campaign were fi
nalized. Workers in the Propaganda Ministry were not permitted to leave the building overnight. ‘Success lies in surprise,’ noted Goebbels. ‘Berlin trembles with tension,’ he added next morning.315
The Reichstag, too, was tense as Hitler rose, amid enormous applause, to speak. The Kroll Opera, where the Reichstag still met, close to the ruins of the building that had burned down in 1933, was packed to the rafters. Hundreds of pressmen filled the galleries. Numerous diplomats were present – though the English and French ambassadors, guessing what was coming, had stayed away. On the platform, among the members of the cabinet, Blomberg was visibly white with nerves. None were visible in Göring, sitting behind Hitler and looking about to burst with pride. Goebbels read a typed copy of the speech as Hitler spoke. The deputies, all in Nazi uniform, still did not know what to expect.316
The speech was aimed not just at those present in the Kroll Opera, but at the millions of radio listeners. After a lengthy preamble denouncing Versailles, restating Germany’s demands for equality and security, and professing peaceful aims, a screaming onslaught on Bolshevism brought wild applause. This took Hitler into his argument that the Soviet-French Pact had invalidated Locarno. He read out the memorandum which Neurath had given to the ambassadors of the Locarno signatories that morning, stating that the Locarno Treaty had lost its meaning. He paused for a brief moment, then continued: ‘Germany regards itself, therefore, as for its part no longer bound by this dissolved pact… In the interest of the primitive rights of a people to the security of its borders and safeguarding of its defence capability, the German Reich government has therefore from today restored the full and unrestricted sovereignty of the Reich in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.’317 At this, wrote William Shirer, witnessing the scene, the 600 Reichstag deputies, ‘little men with big bodies and bulging necks and cropped hair and pouched bellies and brown uniforms and heavy boots, little men of clay in his fine hands, leap to their feet like automatons, their right arms upstretched in the Nazi salute, and scream “Heil’S’’’.318 When the tumult eventually subsided, Hitler advanced his ‘peace proposals’ for Europe: a non-aggression pact with Belgium and France; demilitarization of both sides of their joint borders; an air-pact; non-aggression treaties, similar to that with Poland, with other eastern neighbours; and Germany’s return to the League of Nations.319 Some thought Hitler was offering too much.320 They had no need to worry. As Hitler knew, there was not the slightest chance of his ‘offer’ proving acceptable. He moved to the climax. ‘Men, deputies of the German Reichstag! In this historic hour when in the western provinces of the Reich German troops are at this moment moving into their future peace-time garrisons, we all unite in two sacred inner vows.’ He was interrupted by a deafening tumult from the assembled deputies. ‘They spring, yelling and crying, to their feet,’ William Shirer recorded. ‘The audience in the galleries does the same, all except a few diplomats and about fifty of us correspondents. Their hands are raised in slavish salute, their faces now contorted with hysteria, their mouths wide open, shouting, shouting, their eyes, burning with fanaticism, glued on the new god, the Messiah. The Messiah plays his role superbly.’321 Patiently he waited for silence. Then he made the two vows: never to yield to force when the honour of the people was at stake; and to strive for better understanding with Germany’s European neighbours. He repeated his promise of the previous year, that Germany had no territorial demands to make in Europe.322 But outside Germany trust in Hitler’s word was beginning to wear thin.323