One of the most interesting points, Pillai said, was that the US had already been given several indications of Headley’s jehadi leanings by his wife and girlfriend. Most of this input had come in the aftermath of 9/11, when Headley had apparently told his girlfriend that the US deserved what it got. However, at the time, the US admitted to having received so many such inputs that they did not take it seriously.
They should have taken note of Headley and the warnings at least after 26/11. But he travelled unhindered to and from Pakistan and India. This could only mean one thing: that he was moving around with the blessings of the US government.
Pillai also brought up the US intelligence input to Indian agencies. It has been reported that the Americans had informed the Indian intelligence agencies about an impending attack via the sea route sometime in August 2008. However, Indian agencies did not take it as seriously as they should have, treating it only as a routine input. But the US didn’t mention the source of the information—that it had come from one of their own inside informants. Had they done so, it would have been treated with far greater importance. But the US ensured that the source was kept a secret, which they would have had no reason to do if Headley hadn’t been working for them all along.
Lastly, some US citizens—among them, relatives of those who had been killed at the Taj—have raised a point in a US court: how could the court accept Headley’s plea bargain when he had been involved in the killing of Americans abroad? By US law, a plea bargain by a killer of Americans is never accepted. Why was it done this time? The fact that the plea bargain wasn’t revoked means that the US definitely stood to gain by protecting Headley.
The former home secretary also raised a very pertinent question: why has the judge not passed a sentence on Headley despite the completion of the trial months ago? He suspects that even if Headley is given the ninety-nine-year imprisonment term, it will be a mere farce. He will be brought out and the US will give him a new identity, perhaps even alter his face with a little plastic surgery, and send him out to work for them elsewhere.
But despite the convincing argument, this theory needed to be vetted. After all, there are those who believe that the statement of a bureaucrat doesn’t hold much water once he is out of office. My quest took me to a former agent of the CIA, a man also closely associated with the case. The ex-CIA man agreed to talk to me via email on condition of anonymity and provided fresh insights into Headley’s personality. I quote verbatim from his email:
Me: Was DH a double agent?
‘Depends what you mean by that. He was at least a quadruple agent: DEA, LT, ISI and Al Qaida at the end. The point is that when people seem to work with so many organizations, he is not controlled by anyone of them. He is really working for #1, namely himself. He seems to use other organizations when it fits him. He is definitely NOT a controlled asset of any one of them. He is more of an excitement addict, willing to play ball with anyone that would provide him the means to do so. If you had watched the 14-day interview by the FBI upon his arrest, you realize that he was definitely NOT an American asset. He had used the DEA when it was convenient for him to do so. When he returned to Pakistan in late 2001, he was really his man, leaning toward LeT,’ wrote the former US intelligence man.
Headley was apparently plucked out of LeT and put in the big league after his handlers in Pakistan were convinced that he was an asset. The American view is that he was rejected by the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force and the CIA. The intelligence community in the US is said to have seen through his unstable nature—among other things, he was into steroids to boost his bodybuilding. They thought he was unreliable and a liability who might even claim lives and expose agents. The DEA thought he was manic and exhibited pathological tendencies. The FBI thought he had a violent temper with a history of wife-beating.
Given Headley’s identity issues and complex past, the ISI homed in on him because they thought he fit their bill perfectly. Despite his American connection, they touched base with him because he was essentially an Islamic fundamentalist with deep roots and a history in Pakistan. His US passport, fair complexion and western name were added assets that could be used in countries like India. In his interrogation reports, he is reported to have spoken of how the ISI took him under its wing and gave him a complete makeover, including the standard ISI case officer course, counterintelligence, counter surveillance, surveillance, comms, cover, VoIP, mobile security, etc. After 26/11, the LeT came under fire, so Headley switched to the HuJI and set off on his suicidal mission to Denmark, to finish his wasted life in an act that he, in his warped mind, thought would bring meaning to his existence.
But does all this make Headley a double agent, as Pillai believed? Yes and no, says the former CIA agent. ‘Headley only worked for DEA, and he was not a controlled asset when in Pakistan. In the post-9/11 environment, there was hysteria in USG security agencies about the nature and size of the threat. It was reasonable that one agency (DEA) allowed him to go back to Pakistan to gather information, no longer on the drug trade but on the security threat to the US. It seems that after his return to Pakistan, it was impossible for the DEA agent in Islamabad to meet and control the asset in Lahore. It may also be the case that Headley was run out of New York, and the Islamabad guy was not really aware of his new tasking. In any case, Headley just let his relationship with DEA lapse and moved on to sign on with Lashkar Toiba. I’m not aware of a formal termination with DEA, it simply lost touch with him,’ he explained.
The Guardian’s Adrian Levy disagrees with Pillai. He feels that the US government’s refusal to allow access to Headley does not mean that he is a double agent. According to Adrian, the US always acts with naked self-interest, cajoling and threatening others around to its point of view, even if it goes against their national interests, and even if it means trading a plea bargain with Headley in Chicago to shut out India, or undermining cops in London who were working on the biggest anti-terror inquiry post 9/11, just to win an election back home.
In August 2006, while British detectives and spies were running a £35-million inquiry into the so-called liquid bombers plot—British Islamist terrorists with links to Pakistan were being secretly monitored as they experimented with smuggling liquid bombs inside soft-drink bottles onto airliners that would have been blown to pieces—the US ordered the snatching of protagonist Rashid Rauf, a British expatriate living in Pakistan, and that too without telling London.
Certain that news of Rauf’s arrest in Pakistan would cause those being monitored in the UK by British security services to take flight, thus skewering one of the most significant police inquiries in years, furious and incredulous detectives were forced to roll up their inquiry in the UK too soon, and before sufficient evidence had been harvested.
But it worked for the US. With a mid-term election coming up in America, George W. Bush could point to Rauf’s arrest as a coup in his war on terror. Adrian remembers how in London, the police looked on in dismay and disgust at the ruins of their complex inquiry.
So when Headley, the central witness to the largest act of terror in the Indian subcontinent, was allowed to cook a deal, one that denied India free access and ensured he was never extradited, there weren’t many expressions of surprise. ‘Business as usual’ was the refrain you were most likely to hear in Westminster and New Scotland Yard. ‘The US putting itself first as usual.’
Be that as it may, the former US intelligence man firmly debunks the notion that America had an inkling of the Mumbai attack. ‘Not true that the USG knew about Mumbai in advance. One just needs to see the questions of the 14-day interview by the FBI after Headley was arrested. This is simply the over-fertile imagination of some commentators who try to link stuff instead of simply relying on facts. Besides at the time, I was part of the intelligence community, monitoring threats worldwide, and there was no advance notice of Mumbai,’ he said.
What is absolutely clear is that David Headley or Daood Gilani was nothing more than an ‘excitement junkie’ who
masqueraded as a jehadi. Headley was making a fool of everyone and taking them for a ride. He deceived Americans, leading them to believe he was helping them in maintaining homeland security. He conned Pakistanis into trusting him as a reformed Muslim who wanted to serve Islam. He convinced Rahul Bhatt that he was willing to fill the shoes of an absentee father. But everywhere, he was only playing people along. In the process, he enjoyed life, he had his women and drugs, he travelled, he had access to a lot of money. He was like so many other jehadis who very conveniently circumvent religion when it comes to enjoying the pleasures of life.
Take, for instance, Faisal Shaikh, the kingpin of the Mumbai train bombings of 2007; he had a girlfriend named Manisha, who worked in a bar in the north-eastern Mumbai suburb of Chembur. While working at The Indian Express, I managed to interview Manisha, who told me that Faisal regularly visited the bar, though he did not drink; Manisha was paid handsomely for services rendered.
I also checked with the late Shahid Azmi, a lawyer who represented several train bombing accused, on the double standards of jehadis. Azmi, who himself believed in the Salafi brand of Islam, said, ‘There are decrees issued by muftis and priests making special exemptions and bending Islamic laws to favour the Mujahideens.’ Azmi was later murdered.
Well, what can we say about the mullahs and muftis and priests? They thrive on fatwas to push the community into medieval times. A fatwa was issued on 28 October 2011 by the jehadi forum Minbar Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad (the pulpit of monotheism and jehad). Sheikh Abu Humam Al-Athari, a member of its Shari’a council, unequivocally permitted a mujahideen to capture the women of infidels and have sexual intercourse with them, even those who were married, on the grounds that their marriage bonds were dissolved as soon as they were taken captive. These women were regarded as ‘maale ganimat’ or spoils of war. There are even instances when sodomy was said to be permissible, as the applicant sought to enlarge the cavity in his rectum so that he could carry explosives in it for suicide missions!
One only wishes Muslims would adhere to the Quranic teachings and the peaceful preaching of Prophet Mohammad. The Quran has clearly said: ‘If you kill one man unjustly, it is like killing the whole of humanity, and if you save one human life, it is like saving the whole nation (Holy Quran, Maedah: verse 32).’
Headley is a perfect example of the consequence of misinterpreted and distorted teachings of the Quran, given a free hand as he was, and an excuse to kill. But will somebody explain to me this: Where is the license for jehad and indiscriminate, inhuman killings in the name of religion?
Headley has left an indelible scar on the soul of Mumbai. There are many who will never be able to forget or forgive his hand in the betrayal. But many others have tried to move on. Vilas has married, and his wife Sujata and he live happily in the heart of the city, secure in the knowledge that the cops don’t suspect him any more. But mention Headley to him and his eyes take on a glazed look.
Rahul Bhatt, the man who pined for a father figure all his life, felt the gravest impact of the betrayal. He occasionally has feelings of loss, hurt and abandonment, but he is looking into the future with his real father, Mahesh Bhatt, and will soon be seen in a movie. His eyes get misty at the mention of Headley; he still misses David’s company. But Rahul hopes that someday he will find his place under the spotlight. As Andy Dufresne said in Shawshank Redemption, ‘Hope is a good thing, maybe the best of things, and no good thing ever dies.’
And Headley? Well, it is only a matter of time. Whatever happens, there is no doubt that he will not end his life in the electric chair. He will be out soon, Agent Headley, working for the Americans again. We can only hope that he, and the other David Coleman Headleys of this world, will not be allowed to wreak any more havoc on mankind.
DAVID HEADLEY’S VISITS TO
INDIA: A TIMELINE
FIRST VISIT:
14 September 2006 to 14 December 2006
SECOND VISIT:
21 February 2007 to 15 March 2007. Had married Faiza, medical student in Lahore, in the last week of February 2007, before this visit; went back to Lahore to attend to personal issues.
THIRD VISIT:
20 March 2007 to 17 May 2007: Left Mumbai to spend three days with Shazia and kids in Dubai. Handlers didn’t know of this, only Rana did.
FOURTH VISIT:
20 May 2007 to 7 June 2007: Celebrated Vilas’s birthday.
FIFTH-SIXTH VISITS:
4 September 2007: Came to Delhi, reconnaissance of NDC. Came to Mumbai same evening. Reconnaissance of Taj (Jazdar), Sena Bhavan, Mathoshree, Pune (he would visit Pune twice in later years); went to Lahore for Eid for four or five days. Handlers didn’t know, Rana did. After returning to Mumbai, he met Rajaram Rege, visited Willingdon golf course.
SEVENTH VISIT:
10 April 2008: BARC reconnaissance. Boat rides the same evening from Taj, Marine Drive.
11 April 2008: Cuffe Parade fishermen’s colony.
12 April 2008: Boat ride.
14 April 2008: More conversations with fishermen.
EIGHTH VISIT:
1 July 2008 to 31 July 2008: Taj, Mumbai Police headquarters, bought wristbands at Siddhivinayak, Chabad House; visited Osho’s ashram in Pune.
FINAL VISIT BEFORE 26/11:
September 2008: Conversation with Rahul on Marriott Islamabad bombing.
FINAL VISIT AFTER 26/11:
March 2009.
Author’s Note: This is the actual timeline of Headley’s visits to India. In the main narrative, I have not adhered to the chronology, but instead focused on the nature and significance of his movements during these visits.
SOURCES
This book is the result of extensive collation of information from various sources, including official records, files and documents from investigating agencies of many countries, interviews with several high-profile investigating officials and figures of authority as well as news reports.
One of the most important sources of information was the unabridged statement that David Headley gave to officers of India’s National Investigation Agency as they interrogated him for a period of seven days for over thirty hours.
Excerpts from the dossiers that the US FBI Joint Task Force maintained on Tahawwur Rana and David Headley have been used. These were made available by Adrian Levy.
I have also used excerpts from the interview of David Headley’s wife Faiza Outalha by Shammy Baweja for Headlines Today.
Some details have been taken from the case files of the trial of David Headley in a Chicago court.
Apart from these, I have accessed news reports that appeared in the Chicago Tribune, Philadelphia Inquirer, New York Times, Washington Post, The Times of India, The Indian Express, The Hindu, among others, as well as agencies like the Press Trust of India, Indo-Asian News Service and Reuters. Some of the major articles that I have used include:
(i) ‘FBI knew of activities before Mumbai attack’ by Brian Bennett, Tribune, Washington Bureau, 18 October 2010.
(ii) ‘Local man cited in India attack’ by Jeff Coen and Josh Meyer, Tribune, 8 December 2009.
(iii) ‘US urgently briefs India in effort to head off attacks’ by Josh Meyer, Tribune, 13 December 2009.
(iv) ‘Chicago terror suspects were bugged’ by Jeff Coen and Josh Meyer, Tribune, 15 December 2009.
(v) ‘Business an alleged terror front’ by Antonio Olivo, Tribune, 3 January 2010.
(vi) ‘Trial will probe alleged Chicago ties to Mumbai attack’ by Annie Sweeney, Tribune, 5 May 2011.
(vii) ‘Pak PM’s PRO admits he is Headley’s half-brother’ by Sachin Parashar and Vishwa Mohan, Times News Network, 29 November 2009.
(viii) ‘Headley provides more details about Mumbai attacks’ by Sebastian Rotella, Washington Post, 24 May 2011.
(ix) ‘Headley travelled to India nine times on business visa’, Express News Service, 9 November 2009.
(x) ‘American suspect in Mumbai attack was DEA informant’ by Joseph Tanfani, John Shiffman and Kathleen
Brady Shea, Philadelphia Inquirer, 15 December 2009.
(xi) ‘DEA Deployed Mumbai Plotter Despite Warning’ by Ginger Thompson, Eric Schmitt and Souad Mekhennet, The New York Times, 27 November 2010.
(xii) ‘Before ’08 Mumbai attacks, US was warned key figure in plot had terror ties’ by Sebastian Rotella, ProPublica, 16 October 2010.
(xiii) ‘In alleged terror plot, a troubling twist’ by Sebastian Rotella, Tribune, 31 October 2009.
(xiv) ‘David Headley and Tahawwur Rana arrested in Chicago’, Global Jihad, 28 October 2009.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This book was never planned; it was born out of fortuitous circumstances. On a dull Sunday morning in July last year, I received two calls that set it off: one from Bollywood journalist Subhash Jha and the other from Rahul Bhatt, who later became a friend and co-author of this book. Both wanted me to tell the story of David Headley. Rahul, on his part, was keen that I write about Headley’s betrayal.
At the time, I was in the middle of two other books, and was also wary of the transnational nature of the subject, as it would mean a lot of research across countries. And of course, I did not have a publisher for the book. As always, it was Velly Thevar, my wife and teacher of seventeen years, who exhorted me to take the plunge. And as I never say no to her, even if it means jumping off a plane without a parachute, I dived into the project head-on.
My colleague and friend Aditya Prakash Iengar assured me that he would be willing to don many hats for the smooth sailing of the project. A Tambrahm masquerading as a blue-blooded Bong, Aditya started off as my literary agent. He reverted soon enough with the good news and the bad news. He said several publishers were interested, but they wanted the manuscript in a couple of weeks, as Headley’s trial was ongoing in a Chicago court.
At the time, I was wrapping up Dongri to Dubai, and there were a lot of loose ends to be addressed. I have to admit that but for Adi I would never have been able to wrap up D2D so fast and start off on Headley. He also dedicated himself sincerely to ‘Rahul and I’ and helped me transcribe notes, plot the story, pore over the FBI documents. If I could accomplish this feat and finish the book in record time, it is solely due to him. Thank you so much, Adi.