More important, it is the logic of each vision, rather than the isolated examples, which point in the direction each has tended to go. Except for that sub-set who are explicitly racist or Social Darwinists, followers of the constrained vision have no reason to expect the kind of vast differences in capabilities which are the logical consequence of conceiving knowledge and reason in ways which make them accessible to the few but not to the many. There is no need to question the sincerity of those with the unconstrained vision when they make the well-being of the masses their central concern, for it is not by choice but by the logic of their assumptions that this well-being of the masses is achievable only through the leadership and commitment of the elite.
Which vision is more of a vision of equality depends upon the particular aspect of equality considered salient. By and large, the elite and the mass are closer in capability and morality in the constrained vision, while they are more equally entitled to comparable shares of benefits in the unconstrained vision.
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
The crucial difference between the constrained and the unconstrained visions of man is not in their perceptions of people as they are. What fundamentally distinguishes the two visions is their respective perceptions of human potential. The average person as he exists today is not seen in optimistic terms by those with the unconstrained vision. On the contrary, some of the most sweeping dismissals of the current capabilities of ordinary people have come from those with the unconstrained vision, from Godwin in the eighteenth century to George Bernard Shaw in the twentieth-even as they urged sweeping economic equalization. Indeed, one of the arguments for sweeping equalization of material conditions is that it will enable the masses to improve themselves, in addition to enjoying life more fully. In short, the gap between the actual and the potential is greater in the unconstrained vision than in the constrained vision. So too is the gap between the existing masses of people and those who have advanced further toward the intellectual and moral potentialities of man.
The concept of "equality" thus has opposite implications in the two visions. To those with the unconstrained vision, a greater equalization of material conditions is imperative, even if the means of accomplishing this require the more morally and intellectually advanced to restrict the discretion of others in the marketplace, or through judicial activism in the law, or by other social or political devices. The concepts of compassion, leadership, commitment, and rationality are featured prominently in the unconstrained vision.
To those with the constrained vision, however, the gap between the actual and the potential is much smaller, and with it there is a correspondingly smaller difference between the intellectual and moral elite, on the one hand, and the ordinary person on the other. Vast differences may exist within given areas of specialization-hence Burke's reverence for authorities within their respective specialtiesn-but believers in this vision have long pointed out areas where ordinary people are greatly superior to intellectuals, so that there is no such general superiority as to justify one group's restricting the discretion of others and acting as surrogate decisionmakers for them. To those with the constrained vision, equality of discretion is more important than equality of condition.
The two visions' respective estimates of existing human capability (intellectual and moral) differ not so much in their estimates of the mean as in their estimates of the variance. The extent to which the discretion of some should be substituted for the discretion of otherswhether through influence or power- depends not on the average rationality of man in general but on the differential rationality of different sets of human beings. The greater this differential, the stronger the case for surrogate decision-makers to exercise discretion for others.
Where this differential is thought to exist only within given areas of specialization, individuals lacking particular expertise may remain "free to choose" to purchase such expertise as they see fit- from doctors, lawyers, photographers, etc.- but where the differential is thought to be general and pervasive, then the layman lacks the prerequisites even for choosing the amount and kind of surrogate decision-making needed, much less to reject their fundamental principles. Thus, "a more equal world is a better world, even if most people prefer inequality"72
It is not over the degree of equality that the two visions are in conflict, but over what it is that is to be equalized. In the constrained vision, it is discretion which is to be equally and individually exercised as much as possible, under the influence of traditions and values derived from the widely shared experience of the many, rather than the special articulation of the few. In the unconstrained vision, it is the material conditions of life which are to be equalized under the influence or power of those with the intellectual and moral standing to make the well-being of others their special concern.
Chapter 7
Visions of Power
'he role of power in social decision-making has tended to be much greater in the tradition of the unconstrained vision than among those with the constrained vision. That is, much more of what happens in society is explained by the deliberate exertion of power- whether political, military, or economic-when the world is conceived in the terms of the unconstrained vision. As a result, unhappy social circumstances are more readily condemned morally- being the result of someone's exertion of power- and more readily seen as things which can be changed fundamentally by the exertion of power toward different goals. The constrained vision, in which systemic processes produce many results not planned or controlled by anyone, gives power a much smaller explanatory role, thus offering fewer opportunities for moral judgments and fewer prospects for sweeping reforms to be successful in achieving their goals.
Conflicting visions of the role of power are involved in a wide spectrum of issues. Power in the sense of direct force and violence is involved not only in issues of war and peace but also in issues of crime and punishment. Political power and its efficacy are also storm centers in the conflict of visions. The existence, magnitude, and effectiveness of various economic and social powers are also seen very differently by the two visions. Along with differences as to the magnitude, pervasiveness, or effectiveness of power, the two visions differ also as to the degree of inequality with which power is shared or concentrated, mitigated or amplified, by various social conditions. The role of legal rights as bulwarks against power is therefore seen in drastically different terms by those with the constrained and unconstrained visions. Moreover, power is defined to mean drastically different things in the two visions.
FORCE AND VIOLENCE
Force and violence take many forms, from crime to war, and including the implicit threat of force and violence behind government. The causal reasons and moral justifications for force differ completely as between the constrained and the unconstrained visions. Reason, as an alternative to force, likewise plays a different role in the two visions, in everything from child-rearing to international relations. It is not a difference in "value premises," however. Both visions prefer articulated reason to force, at a given level of efficacy. But they differ greatly in their assessment of the efficacy of articulated reason. The use of force is particularly repugnant to those with the unconstrained vision, given the effectiveness they attribute to articulated reason.
As in other areas of human life, the unconstrained vision seeks to discover the special reasons for evils involving force and violence-war and crime, for example-while the constrained vision takes these evils for granted as inherent in human nature and seeks instead to discover contrivances by which they can be contained-that is, to discover the causes of peace or of law and order.
War
Given the horrors of war, and the frequent outcome in which there are no real winners, those with the unconstrained vision tend to explain the existence and recurrence of this man-made catastrophe in terms of either misunderstandings, in an intellectual sense, or of hostile or paranoid emotions raised to such a pitch as to override rationality. In short, war results from a failure of
understanding, whether caused by lack of forethought, lack of communication, or emotions overriding judgment. Steps for a peace-seeking nation to take to reduce the probability of war therefore include (1) more influence for the intellectually or morally more advanced portions of the population, (2) better communications between potential enemies, (3) a muting of militant rhetoric, (4) a restraint on armament production or military alliances, either of which might produce escalating counter-measures, (5) a de-emphasis of nationalism or patriotism, and (6) negotiating outstanding differences with potential adversaries as a means of reducing possible causes of war.
Those with the constrained vision see war in entirely different terms. According to this vision, wars are a perfectly rational activity from the standpoint of those who anticipate gain to themselves, their class, or their nation, whether or not these anticipations are often mistaken, as all human calculations may be. That their calculations disregard the agonies of others is no surprise to those with the constrained vision of human nature. From this perspective, the steps for a peace-seeking nation to take to reduce the probability of war would be the direct opposite of those proposed by people with the alternative vision: (1) raising the cost of war to potential aggressors by military preparedness and military alliances, (2) arousal of the public to awareness of dangers, in times of threat, (3) promotion of patriotism and willingness to fight, as the cost of deterring attack, (4) relying on your adversaries' awareness of your military power more so than on verbal communication, (5) negotiating only within the context of deterrent strength and avoiding concessions to blackmail that would encourage further blackmail, and (6) relying more on the good sense and fortitude of the public at large (reflecting culturally validated experience) than on moralists and intellectuals, more readily swayed by words and fashions.
Like other evils, war was seen by those with the constrained vision as originating in human nature and as being contained by institutions. To those with the unconstrained vision, war was seen as being at variance with human nature and caused by institutions. War was seen by Godwin as being a consequence of political institutions in general' and more specifically as a consequence of undemocratic institutions. "War and conquest," according to Godwin, "will never be undertaken, but where the many are the instruments of the few."
This localization of evil is one of the hallmarks of the unconstrained vision. There must clearly be some cause for evils, but insofar as these causes are not so widely diffused as to be part of human nature in general, then those in whom the evils are localized can be removed, opposed, or neutralized, so as to produce a solution. The specifics of this localization-whether in undemocratic institutions, as in Godwin, or in a capitalistic economy, as in some modern writers-are less crucial than the localization itself, which makes a solution possible. Evils diffused throughout the human race can only be dealt with by trade-offs, through artificial devices which themselves produce other unfortunate side effects.
War, as seen in the constrained vision of The Federalist Papers, seemed to require virtually no explanation. The Federalists considered it axiomatic that if the thirteen recently independent American colonies did not form one nation, they would inevitably and incessantly be at war with each other. To the Federalists, it was obvious that "nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it."2 Far from seeing war as an evil with localized origins in despots, they argued that there were "almost as many popular as royal wars."3 The idea of special causes of war was rejected out of hand:
It is sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what inducements could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon each other? It would be a full answer to this question to say- precisely the same inducements which have, at different times, deluged in blood all the nations in the world .4
Within this constrained vision, war did not require a specific explanation. Peace required explanation-and specific provisions to produce it. One of these provisions was military power: "A nation, despicable by its weakness, forfeits even the privilege of being neutral."5 This was the direct opposite of Godwin's unconstrained vision, in which a nation whose "inoffensiveness and neutrality" would present no military threat to cause a "misunderstanding" with other nations or to "provoke an attack."6 To Godwin, the buildup of military power and the forging of military alliances, or balance-of-power policies, were likely to lead to war.7 Godwin deplored the cost of maintaining military forces, which included not only economic costs but also such social costs as submission to military disciplines and the spread of patriotism, which he characterized as "high-sounding nonsense"9 and "the unmeaning rant of romance."10 Within this vision, the military man was a lesser man for his occupation.11
Within the constrained vision of Adam Smith, however, the demands on a soldier, and the weight of responsibility on him for defending his people, elevated his profession to a nobler plane than others,12 even though Smith conceded that there is a "diminution of humanity" when one is repeatedly in a situation where one must either kill or be killed.13 This was apparently an acceptable cost-or trade-off, a solution being impossible. Patriotism Smith saw as both natural and beneficial, as morally efficient, despite his acknowledgment of its perverse side effects.14 Again, it was a trade-off that Smith accepted, with no sign of seeking a solution.
Crime
Crime is another phenomenon seen in entirely different terms by believers in the constrained and unconstrained visions. The underlying causes of crime have been a major preoccupation of those with an unconstrained vision of human nature. But those with the constrained vision generally do not look for any special causes of crime, any more than they look for special causes of war. For those with the constrained vision, people commit crimes because they are people- because they put their own interests or egos above the interests, feelings, or lives of others. Believers in the constrained vision emphasize social contrivances to prevent crime or punishment to deter it. But to the believer in the unconstrained vision, it is hard to understand how anyone would commit a terrible crime without some special cause at work, if only blindness. Condorcet asked:
Is there any vicious habit, any practice contrary to good faith, any crime, whose origin and first cause cannot be traced back to the legislation, the institutions, the prejudices of the country wherein this habit, this practice, this crime can be observed?15
Godwin likewise said: "It is impossible that a man would perpetrate a crime, in the moment when he sees it in all its enormity."16 In the twentieth century as well, it has been said in a highly acclaimed book that "healthy, rational people will not injure others."17 Within this vision, people are forced to commit crimes by special reasons, whether social or psychiatric. Reducing those special reasons (poverty, discrimination, unemployment, mental illness, etc.) is therefore the way to reduce crime:
The basic solution for most crime is economic- homes, health, education, employment, beauty. If the law is to be enforced- and rights fulfilled for the poor- we must end poverty. Until we do, there will be no equal protection of the laws. To permit conditions that breed antisocial conduct to continue is our greatest crime.18
In both visions, the conclusions follow logically from the initial assumptions. Both visions also recognize that most people are horrified at certain crimes and would be morally incapable of committing them. They differ as to why this is so. The constrained vision of human nature sees this revulsion at the thought of committing certain crimes as the product of social conditioning- a sense of general morality, personal honor, and humane feelings, all cultivated by the many traditions and institutions of society. The unconstrained vision sees human nature as itself averse to crime, and society as undermining this natural aversion through its own injustices, insensitivities, and brutality.
Society "drains compassion from the human spirit and breeds crime,"19 according to a modern version of the unconstrained vision. Given human nature as seen in the unconstrained vision, such crimes as robbery, riots, rape, and mugging are "inher
ently irrational" and are explained only by irrational conditions imposed upon the unfortunate segment of society.20 Such evils of society as poverty, unemployment, and overcrowding "are the fountainheads of crime."21 From this perspective, criminals are not so much the individual causes of crime as the symptoms and transmitters of a deeper social malaise:
Crime reflects more than the character of the pitiful few who commit it. It reflects the character of the entire society.22
In this vein, the assassinations of John F. Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and Martin Luther King during the 1960s were regarded as reflections on American society in general, not just the particular assassins. Those who argued this way often reflected the unconstrained vision in a wide range of social, economic, and political issues. But, in the constrained vision of human nature, natural incentives to commit crimes are so commonplace that artificial counter-incentives must be created and maintained- notably moral training and punishment. Adam Smith acknowledged that the infliction of punishment is itself a negative experience to humane individuals, but again it was a cost he was willing to pay- a necessary trade-off in a situation with no solution: