Whereas it is essential that the world fully understand that the American people are united in their determination to take all steps that may be necessary to assist the peoples of South Viet Nam and Laos to maintain their independence and political integrity.
Now, therefore, be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled:
That the United States regards the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of South Viet Nam and Laos as vital to its national interest and to world peace;
Sec. 2. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared, upon the request of the Government of South Viet Nam or the Government of Laos, to use all measures, including the commitment of armed forces to assist that government in the defense of its independence and territorial integrity against aggression or subversion supported, controlled or directed from any Communist country.
Sec. 3. (a) The President is hereby authorized to use for assistance under this joint resolution not to exceed $________ during the fiscal year 1964, and not to exceed $________ during the fiscal year 1965, from any appropriations made available for carrying out the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, in accordance with the provisions of that Act, except as otherwise provided in this joint resolution. This authorization is in addition to other existing authorizations with respect to the use of such appropriations.
(b) Obligations incurred in carrying out the provisions of this joint resolution may be paid either out of appropriations for military assistance or appropriations for other than military assistance except that appropriations made available for Titles I, III, and VI of Chapter 2, Part I, of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, shall not be available for payment of such obligations.
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, when the President determines it to be important to the security of the United States and in furtherance of the purposes of this joint resolution, he may authorize the use of up to $________ of funds available under subsection (a) in each of the fiscal years 1964 and 1965 under the authority of section 614 (a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and is authorized to use up to $________ of such funds in each such year pursuant to his certification that it is inadvisable to specify the nature of the use of such funds, which certification shall be deemed to be a sufficient [words illegible].
(d) Upon determination by the head of any agency making personnel available under authority of section 627 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, or otherwise under that Act, for purposes of assistance under this joint resolution, any officer or employee so made available may be provided compensation and allowances at rates other than those provided by the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, the Career Compensation Act of 1949, as amended, and the Overseas Differentials and Allowances Act to the extent necessary to carry out the purposes of this joint resolution. The President shall prescribe regulations under which such rates of compensation and allowances may be provided. In addition, the President may utilize such provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, as he deems appropriate to apply to personnel of any agency carrying out functions under this joint resolution.
# 67
Cable from Taylor Warning on the “March North” Campaign
Excerpts from cablegram from Ambassador Taylor in Saigon to the State Department, July 25, 1964.
The GVN public campaign for “Marching North” (reported EMBTEL 201) may take several courses. In the face of U.S. coolness and absence of evidence of real grassroots support outside certain military quarters, it may die down for a while although it is hardly likely to disappear completely. On the other hand, the proponents of a “Quick Solution” may be able to keep it alive indefinitely as an active issue, in which case it is likely to forment an increasing amount of dissatisfaction with the U.S. (assuming that we continue to give it no support) to the serious detriment of our working relations with the GVN and hence of the ultimate chances of success of the in-country pacification program. In such a case, Vietnamese leaders in and out of government, unable to find a vent to their frustration in “Marching North” may seek other panaceas in various forms of negotiation formulas. General Khanh may find in the situation an excuse or a requirement to resign.
Finally, this “March North” fever can get out of hand in an act of rashness—one maverick pilot taking off for Hanoi with a load of bombs—which could touch off an extension of hostilities at a time and in a form most disadvantageous to U.S. interests.
Faced with these unattractive possibilities, we propose a course of action designed to do several things.
We would try to avoid head-on collision with the GVN which unqualified U.S. opposition to the “March North” campaign would entail. We could do this by expressing a willingness to engage in joint contingency planning for various forms of extended action against GVN [sic]. Such planning would not only provide an outlet for the martial head of steam now dangerously compressed but would force the generals to look at the hard facts of life which lie behind the neon lights of the “March North” slogans. This planning would also gain time badly needed to stabilize this government and could provide a useful basis for military action if adjudged in our interest at some future time. Finally, it would also afford U.S. an opportunity, for the first time, to have a frank discussion with GVN leaders concerning the political objectives which they would envisage as the purposes inherent in military action against the DRV. . . .
It would be important, however, in initiating such a line of action that we make a clear record that we are not repeat not assuming any commitment to supplement such plans. . . .
# 68
U.S. Note to Canada on Points for Envoy to Relay to Hanoi
United States note delivered at the Canadian Embassy in Washington, Aug. 8, 1964, for transmission to J. Blair Seaborn, Canadian member of the International Control Commission.
Canadians are urgently asked to have Seaborn during August 10 visit make following points (as having been conveyed to him by U.S. Government since August 6):
A. Re Tonkin Gulf actions, which almost certainly will come up:
1. The DRV has stated that Hon Ngu and Hon Me islands were attacked on July 30. It should be noted that the USS MAD-DOX was all of that day and into the afternoon of the next day, over 100 miles south of those islands, in international waters near the 17th parallel, and that the DRV attack on the MADDOX took place on August 2nd, more than two days later. Neither the MADDOX or any other destroyer was in any way associated with any attack on the DRV islands.
2. Regarding the August 4 attack by the DRV on the two U.S. destroyers, the Americans were and are at a complete loss to understand the DRV motive. They had decided to absorb the August 2 attack on the grounds that it very well might have been the result of some DRV mistake or miscalculation. The August 4 attack, however—from the determined nature of the attack as indicated by the radar, sonar, and eye witness evidence both from the ships and from their protecting aircraft—was, in the American eyes, obviously deliberate and planned and ordered in advance. In addition, premeditation was shown by the evidence that the DRV craft were waiting in ambush for the destroyers. The attack did not seem to be in response to any action by the South Vietnamese nor did it make sense as a tactic to further any diplomatic objective. Since the attack took place at least 60 miles from nearest land, there could have been no question about territorial waters. About the only reasonable hypothesis was that North Vietnam was intent either upon making it appear that the United States was a “paper tiger” or upon provoking the United States.
3. The American response was directed solely to patrol craft and installations acting in direct support of them. As President Johnson stated: “Our response for the present will be limited and fitting.”
4. In view of uncertainty aroused by the deliberate and unprovoked DRV attacks this
character, U.S. has necessarily carried out precautionary deployments of additional air power to SVN and Thailand.
B. Re basic American position:
5. Mr. Seaborn should again stress that U.S. policy is simply that North Vietnam should contain itself and its ambitions within the territory allocated to its administration by the 1954 Geneva Agreements. He should stress that U.S. policy in South Vietnam is to preserve the integrity of that state’s territory against guerrilla subversion.
6. He should reiterate that the U.S. does not seek military bases in the area and that the U.S. is not seeking to overthrow the Communist regime in Hanoi.
7. He should repeat that the U.S. is fully aware of the degree to which Hanoi controls and directs the guerrilla action in South Vietnam and that the U.S. holds Hanoi directly responsible for that action. He should similarly indicate U.S. awareness of North Vietnamese control over the Pathet Lao movement in Laos and the degree of North Vietnamese involvement in that country. He should specifically indicate U.S. awareness of North Vietnamese violations of Laotian territory along the infiltration route into South Vietnam.
8. Mr. Seaborn can again refer to the many examples of U.S. policy in tolerance of peaceful coexistence with Communist regimes, such as Yugoslavia, Poland, etc. He can hint at the economic and other benefits which have accrued to those countries because their policy of Communism has confirmed itself to the development of their own national territories and has not sought to expand into other areas.
9. Mr. Seaborn should conclude with the following new points:
a. That the events of the past few days should add credibility to the statement made last time, that “U.S. public and official patience with North Vietnamese aggression is growing extremely thin.”
b. That the U.S. Congressional Resolution was passed with near unanimity, strongly re-affirming the unity and determination of the U.S. Government and people not only with respect to any further attacks on U.S. military forces but more broadly to continue to oppose firmly, by all necessary means, DRV efforts to subvert and conquer South Vietnam and Laos.
c. That the U.S. has come to the view that the DRV role in South Vietnam and Laos is critical. If the DRV persists in its present course, it can expect to continue to suffer the consequences.
d. That the DRV knows what it must do if the peace is to be restored.
e. That the U.S. has ways and means of measuring the DRV’s participation in, and direction and control of, the war on South Vietnam and in Laos and will be carefully watching the DRV’s response to what Mr. Seaborn is telling them.
# 69
Summary of Taylor’s Report Sent to McNamara by Joint Chiefs
Excerpts from Summary of Ambassador Taylor’s first mission report from Saigon, on Aug. 10, 1964, as transmitted on Aug. 14 by Col. A. R. Brownfield, acting special assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for counterinsurgency and special activities, to Secretary McNamara, through Col. Alfred J. F. Moody, the Secretary’s military assistant. Colonel Brownfield’s covering memorandum said this summary had also been supplied to Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and to Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance, for their appearance before the House Armed Services Committee on Aug. 18.
. . . The basis of this report and monthly reports hereafter are the results of a country-wide canvass of responsible U.S. advisors and observers. The canvass dealt with: Army and public morale, combat effectiveness of military units, U.S./GVN counterpart relationships, and effectiveness of GVN officials.
—In broad terms, the canvass results are surprisingly optimistic at the operational levels of both the civil and military organizations. This feeling of optimism exceeds that of most senior U.S. officials in Saigon. Future reports should determine who is right.
VIET CONG SITUATION:
Strategy:
—The communist strategy as defined by North Vietnam and the puppet National Liberation Front is to seek a political settlement favorable to the communists. This political objective to be achieved by stages, passing first through “neutralism” using the National Liberation Front machinery, and then the technique of a coalition government.
Tactics:
—The VC tactics are to harass, erode and terrorize the VN population and its leadership into a state of demoralization without an attempt to defeat the RVNAF or seize and conquer terrain by military means. U.S./GVN progress should be measured against this strategy and these tactics.
Status:
In terms of equipment and training, the VC are better armed and led today than ever in the past.
—VC infiltration continues from Laos and Cambodia.
—No indication that the VC are experiencing any difficulty in replacing their losses in men and equipment.
—No reason to believe the VC will risk their gains in an overt military confrontation with GVN forces, although they have a sizable force with considerable offensive capability in the central highlands.
GVN SITUATION:
Political:
—The slow pace of the CI campaign and the weakness of his government has caused Khanh to use the March North theme to rally the homefront, and offset the war weariness.
—U.S. observers feel the symptoms of defeatism are more in the minds of the inexperienced and untried leadership in Saigon than in the people and the Army.
—We may face mounting pressure from the GVN to win the war by direct attack on Hanoi which if resisted will cause local politicians to seriously consider negotiation or local soldiers to consider a military adventure without U.S. consent.
—For the present, the Khanh government has the necessary military support to stay in power.
—It is estimated that Khanh has a 50/50 chance of lasting out the year.
—The government is ineffective, beset by inexperienced ministers who are jealous and suspicious of each other.
—Khanh does not have confidence or trust in most of his ministers and is not able to form them into a group with a common loyalty and purpose.
—There is no one in sight to replace Khanh.
—Khanh has, for the moment, allayed the friction between the Buddhists and Catholics.
—Khanh has won the cooperation of the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai.
—Khanh has responded to our suggestions for improved relations between GVN and U.S. Mission.
—The population is confused and apathetic.
—Khanh has not succeeded in building active popular support in Saigon.
—Population support in the countryside is directly proportionate to the degree of GVN protection.
—There are grounds to conclude that no sophisticated psychological approach is necessary to attract the country people to the GVN at this time. The assurance of a reasonably secure life is all that is necessary.
—The success of U.S. attacks on North Vietnam, although furnishing a psychological lift to the GVN, may have whetted their appetite for further moves against the DRV. . . .
Military:
—The regular and paramilitary personnel strengths are slowly rising and by January 1965 should reach 98% of the target strength of 446,000.
—The RVNAF desertion rate has decreased to .572% or ½ the rate of last March.
—Three VNAF squadrons of A-1H aircraft will be combat ready by 30 September 1964 and the fourth by 1 December 1964 with a two to one pilot to cockpit ratio.
—The evaluation of RVNAF units reports the following number combat effective:
28 of 30 regiments
100 of 101 infantry, marine and airborne battalions 17 of 20 ranger battalions
19 of 20 engineer battalions
—The principal defects are low present for duty strengths and weak leadership at the lower levels. Both are receiving corrective treatment.
—Extensive intelligence programs are underway to improve our intelligence capability by the end of the year.
GVN OVERALL OBJECTIVE:
—Increase in percentage of population control represents pro
gress toward stabilizing the in-country situation. Using July figures as a base, the following percentages should be attainable.
U.S. MISSION OBJECTIVES:
Do everything possible to bolster the Khanh Government.
Improve the in-country pacification campaign against the VC.
Concentrating efforts on strategically important areas such as the provinces around Saigon (The Hop Tac Plan).
Undertake “show-window” social and economic projects in secure urban and rural areas.
Be prepared to implement contingency plans against North Vietnam with optimum readiness by January 1, 1965.
Keep the U.S. public informed of what we are doing and why. . . .
# 70
William Bundy Memo on Actions Available to U.S. after Tonkin
Excerpts from second draft of a memorandum, “Next Courses of Action in Southeast Asia,” by William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Aug. 11, 1964. A summary was cabled to the Pacific command and the embassies in Saigon and Vientiane on Aug. 14 with requests for comments. According to the Pentagon study, the full draft was edited in the office of Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton. Words that were deleted at that time are shown below in double parentheses; words that were inserted at that time are shown in italics. Boldface type denotes underlining in the original document. Also, according to the McNaughton office’s editing, the second paragraph, beginning “We have agreed . . .,” was to be moved below, to follow the heading “Phase One—‘Military Silence’ (through August).”
I. INTRODUCTION