On Nov. 24, a select committee of the National Security Council met to discuss the option papers formally presented to the council three days earlier. This group comprised Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Mr. McCone, General Wheeler, McGeorge Bundy and Under Secretary of State George W. Ball. William Bundy attended to keep a record and to represent the working group.
In the account of this meeting, Mr. Ball makes his first appearance in the Pentagon history as the Administration dissenter on Vietnam. William Bundy’s memorandum of record says Mr. Ball “indicated doubt” that bombing the North in any fashion would improve the situation in South Vietnam and “argued against” a judgment that a Vietcong victory in South Vietnam would have a falling-domino effect on the rest of Asia.
While the working-group sessions had been in progress, the study discloses, Mr. Ball had been writing a quite different policy paper “suggesting a U.S. diplomatic strategy in the event of an imminent GVN collapse.”
“In it, he advocated working through the U.K. [United Kingdom, or Britain] who would in turn seek cooperation from the U.S.S.R., in arranging an international conference (of smaller proportions than those at Geneva) which would work out a compromise political settlement for South Vietnam,” the analyst says. The words in parentheses are the analyst’s.
Of those present at the November 24 meeting, the memorandum of record indicates, only Mr. Ball favored Option A. The study gives the impression this was conceived as a throwaway option by the Working Group. The group’s analysis labeled it “an indefinite course of action” whose “sole advantages” were these:
“(a) Defeat would be clearly due to GVN failure, and we ourselves would be less implicated than if we tried Option B or Option C, and failed.
“(b) The most likely result would be a Vietnamese negotiated deal, under which an eventually unified Communist Vietnam would reassert its traditional hostility to Communist China and limit its own ambitions to Loas and Cambodia.”
At the Nov. 24 meeting, however, Mr. Rusk said that while he favored bombing North Vietnam, he did not accept an analysis by Mr. McNaughton and William Bundy that if the bombing failed to save South Vietnam “we would obtain international credit merely for trying.”
“In his view,” the analyst writes, “the harder we tried and then failed, the worse our situation would be.”
McGeorge Bundy demurred to some extent, the account goes on, but Mr. Ball “expressed strong agreement with the last Rusk point.”
General Wheeler, reflecting the viewpoint of the Joint Chiefs, argued that the hard, fast bombing campaign of Option B actually entailed “less risk of a major conflict before achieving success,” in words of the study, than the gradually rising air strikes of Option C.
The study adds that Mr. Bundy and Mr. McNaughton may have deliberately loaded the language of Option B to try to frighten the President out of adopting it lest it create severe international pressure for quick negotiations.
General Wheeler’s argument presaged a running controversy between the Joint Chiefs and the civilian leadership after the bombing campaign began in the coming year.
The meeting on Nov. 24 ended without a clear majority decision on which option should be recommended to the President. The principals resumed when Ambassador Taylor reached Washington to join the strategy talks on Nov. 27, 1964.
In a written briefing paper, he told the conferees:
“If, as the evidence shows, we are playing a losing game in South Vietnam . . . it is high time we change and find a better way.” He proposed gradually increasing air strikes against the North for a threefold purpose:
“First, establish an adequate government in SVN; second, improve the conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign; finally persuade or force the D.R.V. to stop its aid to the Vietcong and to use its directive powers to make the Vietcong desist from their efforts to overthrow the Government of South Vietnam.”
To improve anti-Communist prospects in the South, the Ambassador proposed using the lever of American air strikes against the North to obtain promises from the Saigon leaders that they would achieve political stability, strengthen the army and the police, suppress dissident Buddhist and student factions, replace incompetent officials and get on with the war effort.
The analyst says that the Ambassador had thus revised his earlier view that Washington should bomb the North merely to prevent “a collapse of national morale” in Saigon. He still favored some form of bombing in an emergency, but now he wanted something solid from the Saigon leaders in exchange for a coherent program of rising air war.
In the course of discussions on Nov. 27, however, the Ambassador acknowledged that while bombing “would definitely have a favorable effect” in South Vietnam, “. . . he was not sure this would be enough really to improve the situation,” the analyst reports, again quoting from William Bundy’s memorandum of record.
“Others, including McNamara, agreed with Taylor’s evaluation, but the Secretary [Mr. McNamara] added that ‘the strengthening effect of Option C could at least buy time, possibly measured in years.’ ”
Ambassador Taylor proposed that the Administration therefore adopt a two-phase program culminating in the bombing of infiltration facilities south of the 19th Parallel in North Vietnam, in effect Option A plus the first stages of Option C. Phase I would consist of 30 days of the Option A type of actions, such as intensification of the coastal raids on the North, air strikes by American jets at infiltration routes and one or two reprisal raids against the North. Meanwhile, Ambassador Taylor would obtain the promises of improvement from the Saigon leadership.
At the end of the 30 days, with the promises in hand, the United States would then move into Phase II, the air war. The air raids were to last two to six months, during which Hanoi was apparently expected to yield.
The others agreed, and the proposal was redefined further at a meeting on Nov. 28. William Bundy was assigned the task of drawing up a formal policy paper outlining the proposal. The Cabinet-level officials agreed to recommend it to the President at a White House meeting scheduled for Dec. 1, right after Mr. Johnson’s Thanksgiving holiday at his ranch.
On Nov. 28, the same day that his closest advisers made their decision to advise him to bomb North Vietnam, Mr. Johnson was asked at a news conference at the ranch:
“Mr. President, is expansion of the Vietnam war into Laos or North Vietnam a live possibility at this moment?”
“I don’t want to give you any particular guide posts as to your conduct in the matter,” Mr. Johnson told the newsmen about their articles. “But when you crawl out on a limb, you always have to find another one to crawl back on.
“I have just been sitting here in this serene atmosphere of the Pedernales for the last few days reading about the wars that you [speculating newsmen] have involved us in and the additional undertakings that I have made decisions on or that General Taylor has recommended or that Mr. McNamara plans or Secretary Rusk envisages. I would say, generally speaking, that some people are speculating and taking positions that I think are somewhat premature.”
“At the moment,” he concluded, “General Taylor will report to us on developments. We will carefully consider these reports. . . . I will meet with him in the early part of the week. I anticipate there will be no dramatic announcement to come out of these meetings except in the form of your speculation.”
William Bundy’s draft policy paper, written the next day, said the bombing campaign “would consist principally of progressively more serious air strikes, of a weight and tempo adjusted to the situation as it develops (possibly running from two to six months).” The words in parentheses are Mr. Bundy’s.
The draft paper added: “Targets in the D.R.V. would start with infiltration targets south of the 19th Parallel and work up to targets north of that point. This could eventually lead to such measures as air strikes on all major military-related targets, aerial mining of D.R.V. ports, and a U.S. naval blockade of the D.R.V. . . .
“Concurrently,”
it continued, “the U.S. would be alert to any sign of yielding by Hanoi, and would be prepared to explore negotiated solutions that attain U.S. objectives in an acceptable manner.” [See Document #88.]
Apparently at Mr. McNamara’s suggestion, the analyst says, a final sentence in this paragraph was deleted; it read, “The U.S. would seek to control any negotiations and would oppose any independent South Vietnamese efforts to negotiate.” Also removed, possibly during a final meeting of the top officials on Nov. 30 to review the policy paper and “apparently on the advice of McGeorge Bundy,” was a proposal that the President make a major speech indicating the new direction that Washington’s policy was taking.
Likewise deleted was a provision to brief “available Congressional leaders . . . (no special leadership meeting will be convened for this purpose)” on new evidence being compiled on North Vietnamese infiltration into the South, as a public justification of the bombing.
A separate recommendation from the Joint Chiefs for a series of major raids—like those in their retaliation proposal for the Vietcong mortar strike at Bienhoa air base on Nov. 1—was deleted for unspecified reasons, the analyst says, “in effect, presenting a united front to the President.”
The paper that was sent to the President made no mention of American ground troops to provide security for airfields in the South when the bombing began, as General Wheeler had reminded the conferees on Nov. 24 would be necessary.
The writer notes the “gap” between the drastic concessions expected from Hanoi and the relatively modest bombing campaign that was expected to break Hanoi’s will. He puts forward “two by no means contradictory explanations of this gap.” This is the first:
“There is some reason to believe that the principals thought that carefully calculated doses of force could bring about predictable and desirable responses from Hanoi. Underlying this optimistic view was a significant underestimate of the level of the D.R.V. commitment to victory in the South and an overestimate of the effectiveness of U.S. pressures in weakening that resolve.”
A related factor, the account says, “which, no doubt, commended the proposal to the Administration was the relatively low cost—in political terms—of such action.” The context here indicates that the Administration thought the public would find an air war less repugnant than a ground war.
The President seems to have shared the view of his chief advisers, the analyst writes, that “the threat implicit in minimum but increasing amounts of force (‘slow squeeze’) would . . . ultimately bring Hanoi to the table on terms favorable to the U.S.”
“McGeorge Bundy, as the President’s assistant for national security affairs, was in a position to convey President Johnson’s mood to the group,” the account goes on. It adds that notes taken at a White House meeting on Dec. 1 when the senior officials met with Mr. Johnson to present the bombing plan “tend to confirm that the President’s mood was more closely akin to the measures recommended” than to other, harsher bombing plans.
“A second explanation of the gap between ends and means is a more simple one,” the account comments. “In a phrase, we had run out of alternatives other than pressures.”
A memorandum by Assistant Secretary McNaughton on Nov. 6, 1964, made the point succinctly: “Action against North Vietnam is to some extent a substitute for strengthening the Government in South Vietnam. That is, a less active VC (on orders from D.R.V.) can be matched by a less efficient GVN. We therefore should consider squeezing North Vietnam.” The words in parentheses are Mr. McNaughton’s. [See Document #85.]
Doubts at Two Poles
The two dissenters from the view that “calculated doses of force” would bring Hanoi around were, at opposite poles, the Joint Chiefs and the intelligence agencies.
“The J.C.S. differed from this view on the grounds that if we were really interested in affecting Hanoi’s will, we would have to hit hard at its capabilities,” the account says. The Joint Chiefs wanted the United States to demonstrate a willingness to apply unlimited force.
Their bombing plan, deleted from the position paper before it was presented to the President, asserted that the destruction of all of North Vietnam’s major airfields and its petroleum supplies “in the first three days” was intended to “clearly . . . establish the fact that the U.S. intends to use military force to the full limits of what military force can contribute to achieving U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia . . . The follow-on military program—involving armed reconnaissance of infiltration routes in Laos, air strikes on infiltration targets in the D.R.V. and then progressive strikes throughout North Vietnam—could be suspended short of full destruction of the D.R.V. if our objectives were achieved earlier.”
The analyst remarks that the Joint Chiefs’ plan was “shunted aside because both its risks and costs were too high,” but the author does not attempt to evaluate the possible effect of the plan on Hanoi’s will.
Like Mr. Ball, the account says, the intelligence community “tended toward a pessimistic view” of the effect of bombing on the Hanoi leaders.
The intelligence panel within the Bundy working group, composed of representatives from the three leading intelligence agencies—the C.I.A., the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency—“did not concede very strong chances for breaking the will of Hanoi,” the author writes.
“The course of actions the Communists have pursued in South Vietnam over past few years implies a fundamental estimate on their part that the difficulties facing the U.S. are so great that U.S. will and ability to maintain resistance in that area can be gradually eroded—without running high risks that this would wreak heavy destruction on the D.R.V. or Communist China,” the panel’s report said.
If the United States now began bombing, the panel said, the Hanoi leadership would have to ask itself “a basic question” about how far the United States was willing to step up the war “regardless of the danger of war with Communist China and regardless of the international pressures that could be brought to bear. . . .” The decision of the Hanoi leadership was thus uncertain for a number of reasons, the panel cautioned, and “in any event, comprehension of the other’s intentions would almost certainly be difficult on both sides, and especially as the scale of hostilities mounted.”
The panel then cast doubt on the so-called Rostow thesis of how much Hanoi feared destruction of its industry. This thesis, named for its proponent, Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the State Department’s Policy Planning Council, underlay much of the Administration’s hope for the success of a bombing campaign.
The panel said: “We have many indications that the Hanoi leadership is acutely and nervously aware of the extent to which North Vietnam’s transportation system and industrial plant is vulnerable to attack. On the other hand, North Vietnam’s economy is overwhelmingly agricultural and, to a large extent, decentralized in a myriad of more or less economically self-sufficient villages. Interdiction of imports and extensive destruction of transportation facilities and industrial plants would cripple D.R.V. industry. These actions would also seriously restrict D.R.V. military capabilities, and would degrade, though to a lesser extent, Hanoi’s capabilities to support guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam and Laos. We do not believe that such actions would have a crucial effect on the daily lives of the overwhelming majority of the North Vietnam population. We do not believe that attacks on industrial targets would so greatly exacerbate current economic difficulties as to create unmanageable control problems. It is reasonable to infer that the D.R.V. leaders have a psychological investment in the work of reconstruction they have accomplished over the last decade. Nevertheless, they would probably be willing to suffer some damage to the country in the course of a test of wills with the U.S. over the course of events in South Vietnam.”
As in the case of earlier intelligence findings that contradicted policy intentions, the study indicates no effort on the part of the President or his most trusted advisers to reshape the
ir policy along the lines of this analysis.
One part of the intelligence panel’s report that the Administration did accept was a prediction that China would not react in any major way to a bombing campaign unless American or South Vietnamese troops invaded North Vietnam or northern Laos. The study indicates that this analysis eased Administration fears on this point.
Chinese reaction to systematic bombing of North Vietnam was expected to be limited to providing Hanoi with antiaircraft artillery, jet fighters and naval patrol craft. The panel predicted that the Soviet role was “likely to remain a minor one,” even where military equipment was concerned. However, the Russians subsequently sent large-scale shipments of formidable antiaircraft equipment to North Vietnam.
“Cautious and Equivocal”
Now that a decision to bomb North Vietnam was drawing near, the study says, Mr. Johnson became “cautious and equivocal” in approaching it. Two analysts of this period, in fact, differ in their characterization of his decision at the two-and-a-half-hour White House meeting on Dec. 1, 1964, a month after the election, when the bombing plan was presented to him.
One analyst says that at this meeting the President “made a tentative decision” to bomb, ordering the preparatory Phase I put into effect and approving Phase II, the air war itself, “in principle.”
The second analyst says that while the President approved the entire bombing plan “in general outline at least . . . it is also clear that he gave his approval to implement only the first phase of the concept.”
The President tied the actual waging of air war to reforms by the Saigon Government, this analyst says, and left an impression by the end of the meeting that he was “considerably less than certain that future U.S. actions against North Vietnam [the air war] would be taken, or that they would be desirable.”