[Words illegible] Quite possibly President de Gaulle will make propaganda about perfidious Washington, yet even he will be inhibited by his much-heralded disapproval of our activities in South Vietnam.
South Korea—As for the rest of the Far East the only serious point of concern might be South Korea. But if we stop pressing the Koreans for more troops to Vietnam (the Vietnamese show no desire for additional Asian forces since it affronts their sense of pride) we may be able to cushion Korean reactions to a compromise in South Vietnam by the provision of greater military and economic assistance. In this regard, Japan can play a pivotal role now that it has achieved normal relations with South Korea.
# 104
McNaughton Memo to Goodpaster on “Forces Required to Win”
Excerpts from memorandum from Assistant Secretary McNaughton to Lieut. Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 2, 1965, “Forces Required to Win in South Vietnam,” as provided in the body of the Pentagon’s study.
Secretary McNamara this morning suggested that General Wheeler form a small group to address the question, “If we do everything we can, can we have assurance of winning in South Vietnam?” General Wheeler suggested that he would have you head up the group and that the group would be fairly small. Secretary McNamara indicated that he wanted your group to work with me and that I should send down a memorandum suggesting some of the questions that occurred to us. Here are our suggestions:
1. I do not think the question is whether the 44-battalion program (including 3d-country forces) is sufficient to do the job although the answer to that question should fall out of the study. Rather, I think we should think in terms of the 44-battalion buildup by the end of 1965, with added forces—as required and as our capabilities permit—in 1966. Furthermore, the study surely should look into the need for forces other than ground forces, such as air to be used one way or another in-country. I would hope that the study could produce a clear articulation of what our strategy is for winning the war in South Vietnam, tough as that articulation will be in view of the nature of the problem.
2. I would assume that the questions of calling up reserves and extending tours of duty are outside the scope of this study.
3. We must make some assumptions with respect to the number of VC. Also, we must make some assumptions with respect to what the infiltration of men and material will be especially if there is a build-up of U.S. forces in South Vietnam. I am quite concerned about the increasing probability that there are regular PAVN forces either in the II Corps area or in Laos directly across the border from II Corps. Furthermore, I am fearful that especially with the kind of build-up here envisioned, infiltration of even greater numbers of regular forces may occur. As a part of this general problem of enemy build-up, we must of course ask how much assistance the USSR and China can be expected to give to the VC. I suspect that the increased strength levels of the VC and the more “conventional” nature of the operations implied by larger force levels may imply that the often-repeated ratio of “10 to 1” may no longer apply. I sense that this may be the case in the future, but I have no reason to be sure. For example, if the VC, even with larger forces engaged in more “conventional” type actions, are able to overrun towns and disappear into the jungles before we can bring the action troops to bear, we may still be faced with the old “ratio” problem.
4. I think we might avoid some spinning of wheels if we simply assumed that the GVN will not be able to increase its forces in the relevant time period. Indeed, from what Westy has reported about the battalions being chewed up and about their showing some signs of reluctance to engage in offensive operations, we might even have to ask the question whether we can expect them to maintain present levels of men—or more accurately, present levels of effectiveness.
5. With respect to 3d-country forces, Westy has equated the 9 ROK battalions with 9 U.S. battalions, saying that, if he did not get the former, he must have the latter. I do not know enough about ROK forces to know whether they are in all respects “equal to” U.S. forces (they may be better in some respects and not as good in others). For purposes of the study, it might save us time if we assumed that we would get no meaningful forces from anyone other than the ROKs during the relative time frame. (If the Australians decide to send another battalion or two, this should not alter the conclusions of the study significantly.) . . .
9. At the moment, I do not see how the study can avoid addressing the question as to how long our forces will have to remain in order to achieve a “win” and the extent to which the presence of those forces over a long period of time might, by itself, nullify the “win.” If it turns out that the study cannot go into this matter without first getting heavily into the political side of the question, I think the study at least should note the problem in some meaningful way.
10. I believe that the study should go into specifics—e.g., the numbers and effectiveness and uses of the South Vietnamese forces, exactly where we would deploy ours and exactly what we would expect their mission to be, how we would go about opening up the roads and providing security for the towns as well as protecting our own assets there, the time frames in which things would be done, command relationships, etc. Also, I think we should find a way to indicate how badly the conclusions might be thrown off if we are wrong with respect to key assumptions or judgments. . . .
# 105
McNamara’s Memo on July 20, 1965, on Increasing Allied Ground Force
Excerpts from memorandum from Secretary McNamara for President Johnson, drafted on July 1, 1965, and revised on July 20, as provided in the body of the Pentagon’s study. Paragraphs in italics are the study’s paraphrase or explanation.
In a memorandum to the President drafted on 1 July and then revised on 20 July, immediately following his return from a week-long visit to Vietnam, he recommended an immediate decision to increase the U.S.-Third Country presence from the current 16 maneuver battalions (15 U.S., one Australian), and a change in the mission of these forces from one of providing support and reinforcement for the ARVN to one which soon became known as “search and destroy”—as McNamara put it, they were “by aggressive exploitation of superior military forces . . . to gain and hold the initiative . . . pressing the fight against VC-DRV main force units in South Vietnam to run them to ground and destroy them.” . . .
His specific recommendations, he noted, were concurred in by General Wheeler and Ambassador-designate Lodge, who accompanied him on his trip to Vietnam, and by Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador Johnson, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland, with whom he conferred there. The rationale for his decisions was supplied by the CIA, whose assessment he quoted with approval in concluding that 1 July version of his memorandum. It stated:
Over the longer term we doubt if the Communists are likely to change their basic strategy in Vietnam (i.e., aggressive and steadily mounting insurgency) unless and until two conditions prevail: (1) they are forced to accept a situation in the war in the South which offers them no prospect of an early victory and no grounds for hope that they can simply outlast the U.S. and (2) North Vietnam itself is under continuing and increasingly damaging punitive attack. So long as the Communists think they scent the possibility of an early victory (which is probably now the case), we believe that they will persevere and accept extremely severe damage to the North. Conversely, if North Vietnam itself is not hurting, Hanoi’s doctrinaire leaders will probably be ready to carry on the Southern struggle almost indefinitely. If, however, both of the conditions outlined above should be brought to pass, we believe Hanoi probably would, at least for a period of time, alter its basic strategy and course of action in South Vietnam.
McNamara’s memorandum of 20 July did not include this quotation, although many of these points were made elsewhere in the paper. Instead, it concluded with an optimistic forecast:
The overall evaluation is that the course of action recommended in this memorandum—if the military and political moves are properly i
ntegrated and executed with continuing vigor and visible determination—stands a good chance of achieving an acceptable outcome within a reasonable time in Vietnam.
Never again while he was Secretary of Defense would McNamara make so optimistic a statement about Vietnam—except in public.
This concluding paragraph of McNamara’s memorandum spoke of political, as well as military, “vigor” and “determination.” Earlier in the paper, under the heading “Expanded political moves,” he had elaborated on this point, writing:
Together with the above military moves, we should take political initiatives in order to lay a groundwork for a favorable political settlement by clarifying our objectives and establishing channels of communications. At the same time as we are taking steps to turn the tide in South Vietnam, we would make quiet moves through diplomatic channels (a) to open a dialogue with Moscow and Hanoi, and perhaps the VC, looking first toward disabusing them of any misconceptions as to our goals and second toward laying the groundwork for a settlement when the time is ripe; (b) to keep the Soviet Union from deepening its military [sic] in the world until the time when settlement can be achieved; and (c) to cement support for U.S. policy by the U.S. public, allies and friends, and to keep international opposition at a manageable level. Our efforts may be unproductive until the tide begins to turn, but nevertheless they should be made.
Here was scarcely a program for drastic political action. McNamara’s essentially procedural (as opposed to substantive) recommendations amounted to little more than saying that the United States should provide channels for the enemy’s discreet and relatively facesaving surrender when he decided that the game had grown too costly. This was, in fact, what official Washington (again with the exception of Ball) meant in mid-1965 when it spoke of a “political settlement.” (As McNamara noted in a footnote, even this went too far for Ambassador-designate Lodge, whose view was that “any further initiative by us now [before we are strong] would simply harden the Communist resolve not to stop fighting.” In this view Ambassadors Taylor and Johnson concurred, except that they would maintain “discreet contacts with the Soviets.”)
McNamara’s concluding paragraph spoke of “an acceptable outcome.” Previously in his paper he had listed “nine fundamental elements” of a favorable outcome. These were:
(a) VC stop attacks and drastically reduce incidents of terror and sabotage.
(b) DRV reduces infiltration to a trickle, with some reasonably reliable method of our obtaining confirmation of this fact.
(c) U.S./GVN stop bombing of North Vietnam.
(d) GVN stays independent (hopefully pro-U.S., but possibly genuinely neutral).
(e) GVN exercises governmental functions over substantially all of South Vietnam.
(f) Communists remain quiescent in Laos and Thailand.
(g) DRV withdraws PAVN forces and other North Vietnamese infiltrators (not regroupees) from South Vietnam.
(h) VC/NLF transform from a military to a purely political organization.
(i) U.S. combat forces (not advisors or AID) withdraw.
Chapter 8
The Buildup:
July, 1965 - September, 1966
Highlights of the Period: July, 1965-September, 1966
The U.S. military effort in Vietnam, according to the Pentagon study, continued to intensify—both on the ground and in the air—throughout 1965 and well into 1966, despite continuing evidence that this escalation was bringing “an acceptable outcome” no closer to realization.
Here, in chronological order, are highlights of this period:
JULY 1965
John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense, defined “win” for the U.S. as “demonstrating to the VC that they cannot win.”
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara was assured by a special study group headed by Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, that “there appears to be no reason why we cannot win if such is our will.” He approved the request for 100,000 more U.S. troops by Gen. William S. Westmoreland, the U.S military commander in Vietnam.
Mr. McNamara, in a memo to the President, said he thought Gen. Westmoreland’s three-phase strategy plan “stands a good chance” of success; he noted that casualties would increase and suggested that U.S. “killed-in-action might be in the vicinity of 500 a month by the end of the year . . .”
The Pentagon study notes that U.S. strategy “did not take escalatory reactions into account.”
NOVEMBER 1965
General Westmoreland asked for 154,000 more men; this would have brought the total number of U.S. troops in Vietnam to 375,000, the study says. General Westmoreland explained to Adm. U. S. Grant Sharp, the U.S. commander in the Pacific, that the Vietcong-North Vietnamese rate of troop buildup was expected to be “double that of U.S.”
Mr. McNamara, in a memo to the President, recommended that the U.S. supply a total of nearly 400,000 men by the end of 1966, and added that this “will not guarantee success.”
DECEMBER 1965
General Westmoreland requested a total of 443,000 troops by the end of 1966. The air war was continuing at the rate of 1,500 sorties weekly.
JANUARY 1966
General Westmoreland increased his troop request to 459,000.
A McNamara memorandum conceded that the air war “has not successfully interdicted infiltration.” A second memo warned, “We are in an escalating miltary stalemate.” It included coalition, neutralist “or even anti-U.S.” governments as among outcomes U.S. should be able to accept. But it still urged more troops and bombing.
MARCH 1966
Secretary McNamara, after months of pressure from the Joint Chiefs, recommended that the U.S. bomb the petroleum, oil and lubricant supplies in North Vietnam. Admiral Sharp had predicted this would “bring the enemy to the conference table or cause the insurgency to wither.”
APRIL 1966
Several White House policy meetings were held to consider Vietnam options. George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State, urged “cutting our losses,” conceding that there were “no really attractive options open to us.”
MAY 1966
The President decided to order the P.O.L. air strikes. The C.I.A. estimated that this would not halt “infiltration of men and supplies.”
JUNE 1966
The P.O.L. air strikes started, hitting storage sites in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas.
JULY 1966
By the end of the month, the Defense Intelligence Agency estimated, 70 per cent of North Vietnam’s original storage capacity had been destroyed.
AUGUST 1966
The major storage sites were destroyed; the study calls the flow of men and materiel to the South “undiminished” and notes North Vietnam’s “adaptability and resourcefulness” in switching to small, dispersed sites that were almost impossible to bomb.
The Joint Chiefs passed on to Mr. McNamara a new ground-troop request from General Westmoreland: a total of 542,588 for 1967.
SEPTEMBER 1966
A report to Secretary McNamara said that Operation Rolling Thunder “had no measurable direct effect” on Hanoi’s capability.
The study group recommended building an electronic barrier across the Vietnam demilitarized zone.
Chapter 8
The Buildup: July, 1965—September, 1966
—BY FOX BUTTERFIELD
The Pentagon’s secret study of the Vietnam war indicates that the rapid expansion of American forces in 1965 and 1966 occurred because “no one really foresaw what the troop needs in Vienam would be” and because the ability of the enemy forces “to build up their effort was consistently underrated.”
“It would seem,” the study asserts, that the American planners would have been “very sensitive to rates of infiltration and recruitment by the [Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army]; but very little analysis was, in fact, given to the implications of the capabilities of the VC/VNA in this regard.”
As a result of the unanticipated enemy build-up, the Pentagon study disc
loses, Gen. William C. Westmoreland’s troop requests jumped from a total of 175,000 men in June, 1965, to 275,000 that July, to 443,000 in December and then to 542,000 the following June. Neither the requests of the American commander in Vietnam nor President Lyndon B. Johnson’s rapid approval of all but the last of them was made public.
At the same time, the study says, the Johnson Administration’s continual expansion of the air war during 1965 and 1966 was based on a “colossal misjudgment” about the bombing’s effect on Hanoi’s will and capabilities.
In particular, the study discloses that the Administration’s decision in 1966 to bomb North Vietnam’s oil-storage facilities was made despite repeated warning from the Central Intelligence Agency that such action would not “cripple Communist military operations.” Instead the study says, Washington apparently accepted the military’s estimate that the bombing would “bring the enemy to the conference table or cause the insurgency to wither from lack of support.” But the flow of men and supplies to the South continued “undiminished.”
The Pentagon study of this period of escalation in the air and on the ground also makes these disclosures:
• American military commanders were confident of victory. General Westmoreland, for example, told Washington in July, 1965, that by using his search-and-destroy strategy he could defeat the enemy “by the end of 1967.” And the same month, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assured Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara that “there is no reason we cannot win if such is our will.”