124. Taylor, ch. 15.
125. Taylor, pp. 412–24, 506. Goebbels’ aide, Wilfred von Oven, estimated in his diary entry for 15 February a total of 200,000–300,000 victims, and went on to write of a historically unprecedented killing of ‘300,000 women, children and defenceless civilians within a few hours’. – Von Oven, Finale Furioso, pp. 580–82 (15.2.45).
126. Das Reich, 4.3.45, p. 3, with the headline: ‘The Death of Dresden. A Beacon of Resistance’. The bombing, the article claimed, was an attempt to compel capitulation through mass murder so that the ‘death sentence’ could be carried out on what was left. ‘Against this threat’, it concluded, ‘there is no other way out than through fighting resistance.’ See also Bergander, pp. 184–5; and Taylor, p. 425.
127. Klemperer, p. 676.
128. BfZ, Sterz-Sammlung, letters of DRK-Schwester Ursel C., 16.2.45, 20.2.45; O’Gefr. Rudolf L., 16.2.45, 18.2.45; O’Gefr. Ottmar M., 26.2.45. Only a single letter in Jörg Echternkamp (ed.), Kriegsschauplatz Deutschland 1945: Leben in Angst – Hoffnung auf Frieden. Feldpost aus der Heimat und von der Front, Paderborn, 2006, p. 152, mentions the bombing of Dresden, but then only to indicate worry about the population and relatives in the area. One letter that came into the hands of the British army, dated 20 February, though sent from Unna in Westphalia and with no direct reference to the attack on Dresden, did speak of bitterness and sense of impotence at the ‘terror-flights’ heading for Germany, but determination to fight on and conviction of victory. – LHC, Dempsey Papers, no. 288 Pt. II, p. 8 (18.3.45). The Berlin population seems to have been understandably concerned about the raids on the capital but, to go from reports covering February 1945, no comments about Dresden were registered by the Wehrmacht agents gathering information on popular opinion in the city, though some general feeling was expressed (e.g. p. 252) that the war was almost over and it was pointless to continue. – Das letzte halbe Jahr, pp. 248–93. The Government Presidents of Bavarian provinces gave no indication, in their reports for March 1945, of reactions of the population, preoccupied with its own concerns, to the Dresden bombing.
129. BAB, R55/622, fo. 181, Briefübersicht Nr. 10, 9.3.45.
130. See von Oven, Finale Furioso, p. 579 (12.2.45), for Goebbels’ fury at Ley’s public claim that holding the Red Army at the Oder had been ‘The German Miracle’, at a time when tens of thousands were fleeing in panic and trying desperately to reach the western banks of the Oder.
131. Cited in Taylor, p. 428; Erich Kästner, Notabene 1945: Ein Tagebuch, Berlin, 1961, pp. 55–6 (8.3.45); Jacob Kronika, Der Untergang Berlins, Flensburg, 1946, p. 70 (22.3.45). Goebbels, often frustrated by Ley’s outspoken statements, noted in his diary the outrage at the latter’s comments about Dresden. – TBJG, II/15, p. 457 (9.3.45). Ley’s article, ‘Without Baggage’ (‘Ohne Gepäck’) had appeared on 3 March in Der Angriff, 53, p. 2. In a broadcast from the encircled Breslau two days later, Gauleiter Hanke picked up the theme, declaring that what had once been seen as essential cultural property (unerläßliche Kulturgüter) could be now viewed on closer inspection as ‘the thoroughly dispensable matter of civilization’ (durchaus entbehrliches Zivilisationsgut). – Kästner, p. 47 (5.3.45).
132. See David Irving, Goebbels: Mastermind of the Third Reich, London, 1996, p. 503.
133. BAB, NS19/1022, fo. 5, Brandt to Berlepsch, 3.1.45. The Lebensleuchter appears to have taken the form of a large candle in an elaborate Nordic-styled holder. According to a file notice, Himmler agreed a few days later to have all children of teachers at ‘NAPOLAs’ (Nationalpolitische Erziehungsanstalten) – Party schools (by this time under SS control) – presented with the ‘light of life’. SS-Obergruppenführer Heißmeyer, head of the NAPOLAs, was to give a list of the children to Himmler’s adjutant, SS-Standartenführer Dr Rudolf Brandt. The number of candleholders available was, however, Brandt warned, currently very small and they were intended only for a third or fourth war child, so that he did not know whether Himmler’s promise could be fulfilled. Heißmeyer said he would acquire the requisite details under a pretext and leave it to Brandt to decide to what extent the distribution of the candleholders could be carried out. The file notice on this absurd issue appears to have been consulted on the first day of February, March and April 1945, presumably with little or no action to follow. – BAB, NS19/424, fo. 2, Vermerk, 9.1.45.
134. BAB, NS19/1318, fo. 3, Brandt to Berger, 10.1.45.
135. BAB, NS19/2903, fo. 3, Brandt to Justizwachtmeister Ernst Krapoth, Oberhausen, 1.3.45.
136. Albert Speer, Erinnerungen, Frankfurt am Main and Berlin, 1969, p. 435.
137. H. R. Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler, pb. edn., London, 1962, pp. 119–20, 134, 140.
138. IWM, EDS, F.3, M.I. 14/368 (2), unfoliated, Krosigk: Memorandum zur heutigen Finanz- und Währungslage, 10.1.45; IWM, EDS, F.3, M.I.14/368 (1), unfoliated, distributed to Bormann, Goebbels, Göring, Economics Minister Walther Funk, and Price Commissar Hans Fischböck (8.2.45). In post-war interrogations, Krosigk reaffirmed the sharp deterioration in Reich finances after July 1944 on account of the worsening military situation. People were not saving; money had to be printed. There was a huge and growing tax deficit by early 1945. – Ardsley Microfilms, Irving Collection, D1/Göring/1, Krosigk interrogation, 4.6.45; according to Funk (interrogation 4.6.45), holdings in gold had dropped from 900 million Marks in 1940 to 400 million by 1944.
139. IWM, EDS, F.3, M.I. 14/368 (1), Krosigk to Speer, 26.2.45 (also in M.I. 14/285 (no. 26), Personal Papers of Albert Speer); Krosigk to Bormann, 26.2.45, 27.2.45; Krosigk to Funk, 28.2.45; Krosigk to Dr Gerhard Klopfer, head of the legal section of the Party Chancellery and a key right-hand man of Bormann, 27.2.45. See also Speer’s letter to Krosigk on the financial situation, BAB, R3/1624, fo. 5, 14.2.45, and Speer, p. 435. Krosigk had sought a meeting with Speer on 13 February. – IWM, EDS, F.3, M.I. 14/369, unfoliated, Krosigk to Speer, 13.2.45.
140. TBJG, II/15, p. 613 (28.3.45).
141. The Bormann Letters, ed. H. R. Trevor-Roper, London, 1954, p. 170 (4.2.45).
142. The Bormann Letters, p. 173 (5.2.45).
143. The Bormann Letters, p. 177 (7.2.45).
144. The Bormann Letters, p. 186 (19.2.45). When she fled to the Tyrol in late April, accompanied by her nine children, Gerda Bormann took both her own and her husband’s letters with her. She died of cancer in March 1946, but her papers, including the letters, were saved by sympathizers. See The Bormann Letters, pp. viii, xxii–xxiii.
145. TBJG, II/15, pp. 328–9 (7.2.45), 334–5 (8.2.45), 357, 359 (11.2.45). Goebbels admitted that he needed a new directive from Hitler if he were to overcome obstacles to meet the target of 768,000 men needed by the following August and force the armaments industry to give up a monthly quota of 80,000 men, which they were resisting. His frustrations were recorded by von Oven, Finale Furioso, pp. 575–7 (8.2.45).
146. Von Oven, Finale Furioso, p. 587 (25.2.45).
147. TBJG, II/15, p. 364 (12.2.45).
148. Rudolf Semmler, Goebbels – the Man Next to Hitler, London, 1947, pp. 183–4 (18–20.2.45); Ralf Georg Reuth, Goebbels, Munich and Zurich, 1990, pp. 581–2. The suggestion appealed to Hitler, and was dropped only when it was pointed out by his military advisers that such an appalling breach of the Geneva Convention could backfire drastically, since the Allies might use their superiority in the air to start using gas and chemical warfare and, anyway, held more prisoners than those in German hands. – IMT, vol. 35, pp. 181–6, doc. 606-D. Hitler had already told Goebbels before the attack on Dresden that, should the British go over to gas warfare he would have 250,000 British and American prisoners of war shot. – TBJG, II/15, p. 368 (12.2.45).
149. Von Oven, Finale Furioso, p. 571 (7.2.45).
150. Von Oven, Finale Furioso, pp. 587–8 (25.2.45); and see also p. 577 (9.2.45). Goebbels suggested in mid-February providing an opening to the British, but Hitler thought – as he invariably did – that the right point for this had not been reached. In any case, Goebbels had just to
ld Hitler that it was crucial to hold the west; that was more important than losing territory in the east. – TBJG, II/15, pp. 367–8 (12.2.45).
151. TBJG, II/15, pp. 337 (8.2.45), 366 (12.2.45).
152. Von Oven, Finale Furioso, p. 582 (16.2.45).
153. TBJG, II/15, pp. 379–81 (13.2.45).
154. TBJG, II/15, p. 383 (28.2.45).
155. BAB, R3/1535, fos. 18–28, Zur Rüstungslage Februar–März 1945, with statistical appendices, fos. 29–31, quotation fo. 28, 30.1.45.
156. TBJG, II/15, p. 290 (1.2.45).
157. Speer, p. 432.
158. Speer, p. 428, refers to Hitler’s clash with an angry Guderian over withdrawal of troops from the Courland, which the latter had pressed for, as a possible sign of a drop in authority. The fact was, however, that Hitler’s word was final. The troops cut off in the Courland remained there.
159. TBJG, II/15, pp. 311 (5.2.45), 338 (8.2.45).
160. Von Oven, Finale Furioso, p. 588 (25.2.45). Forster claimed to have told Hitler directly to seek negotiations with the western powers. However, Hitler’s secretary Christa Schroeder, Er war mein Chef: Aus dem Nachlaß der Sekretärin von Adolf Hitler, Munich and Vienna, 1985, p. 74, recalled what was, presumably, a subsequent meeting from which Forster, who had been determined to tell Hitler in most forthright terms of the despairing situation in Danzig, came away revitalized and certain that Hitler could save Danzig.
161. Karl Wahl, ‘… es ist das deutsche Herz’: Erlebnisse und Erkenntnisse eines ehemaligen Gauleiters, Augsburg, 1954, p. 385. Almost twenty years later Wahl produced a very similar, but if anything even more apologetic, version of the meeting, in Karl Wahl, Patrioten oder Verbrecher, Heusenstamm bei Offenbach am Main, 1973, pp. 155–61.
162. Wahl, ‘… es ist das deutsche Herz’, p. 386.
163. Rudolf Jordan, Erlebt und erlitten: Weg eines Gauleiters von München bis Moskau, Leoni am Starnberger See, 1971, pp. 251–8 (quotations, pp. 257–8).
164. TBJG, II/15, p. 323 (6.2.45); Speer, p. 431.
165. TBJG, II/15, p. 377 for Hitler’s recognition that Yalta meant there would be no break in the coalition; and p. 381 for the communiqué, and Goebbels’ reaction to it. A British intelligence report on 22 February suggested that ‘the very hopelessness of Germany’s fate after the war may be one of the reasons for the continuance of a struggle which daily becomes more desperate’. – Hastings, Armageddon, p. 417. For the negotiations at Yalta, see DRZW, 10/2 (Loth), pp. 289–300. The outcome of the Conference was not immediately made known to the German public, though detailed information – gleaned in the main from illicit listening to foreign broadcasts – soon seeped out. – Das letzte halbe Jahr, pp. 251–2 (23.2.45).
166. Speer, p. 433.
CHAPTER 7. CRUMBLING FOUNDATIONS
1. BA/MA, MSg2/2697, diary of Lieutenant Julius Dufner, fo. 151, 7.4.45.
2. On all fronts, the Germans could muster in early 1945 almost 320 weakened divisions, including those tied up in peripheral areas such as Norway and the Courland. East and west, their enemies faced them with around 630 full-strength divisions, nearly 500 of them on the eastern front alone. – http://www.angelfire.com/ct/ww2europe/stats.html.
3. The film was awarded a number of prizes. It appears, however, to have run for only a few days in Berlin, and to have been shown mainly for Party members and for the Wehrmacht. See David Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema 1933–1945, Oxford, 1983, p. 234. Hitler, according to Goebbels, was delighted at the impact of the film, which was said to have made a huge impression on the General Staff. – TBJG, II/15, p. 370 (12.2.45).
4. BAB, NS6/134, fo. 14, Kurzlage des Ob.d.M., 17.3.45. Himmler requested, though with little effect, assistance from Karl Kaufmann, Gauleiter of Hamburg and Reich Commissar for Shipping, on 8 March in providing ships to transport refugees from Danzig. – BAB, NS19/2606, fos. 60–61, Himmler’s request – passing on one to him from Gauleiter Albert Forster – and reply from Kaufmann, 8.3.45.
5. Goebbels wanted to block mention of the evacuation in the Wehrmacht report. ‘On account of the strong psychological effects of the Kolberg film, we can do without that at present,’ he noted. – TBJG, II/15, p. 542 (20.3.45).
6. BA/MA, N647/13, NL Balck, Kriegstagebuch, Bd. 12, fo. 13.
7. The above course of military events draws upon: DZW, 6, pp. 517–61; DRZW, 10/1(Zimmermann), pp. 409–43, (Lakowski), pp. 550–608; DRZW, 8 (Ungváry), pp. 919–43; Lothar Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, pb. edn., Munich, 1975, pp. 418–35; Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, Da Capo edn., New York, 1996, pp. 411–29; Brian Taylor, Barbarossa to Berlin: A Chronology of the Campaigns on the Eastern Front 1941 to 1945, vol. 2, Stroud, 2008, pp. 280–306; John Erickson, The Road to Berlin, Cassell edn., London, 2003, pp. 443–7, 508–26; Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands, Munich, 1995, pp. 343–64, 377–90; Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 798–802, 810–14; Antony Beevor, Berlin: The Downfall 1945, pb. edn., London, 2007, ch. 8; Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944–45, London, 2004, ch. 12.
8. Kurt Pätzold and Manfred Weißbecker, Geschichte der NSDAP 1920–1945, Cologne, 1981, p. 378.
9. BAB, NS6/137, fo. 6, Vermerk from Willi Ruder, head of the Arbeitsstab für NS-Führungsfragen in the Party Chancellery, 5.3.45; fo. 29, draft circular for distribution to the Gauleiter, 5.3.45.
10. The V1 cruise-missile and V2 rocket had long since failed to live up to expectations. Shortages of fuel and pilots greatly restricted the deployment of the Me262 fighter, jet-propelled and with higher speeds than anything the Allies could match. Only 200 or so were used, with heavy losses, and prototype new rockets and planes were barely in production by the time hostilities ceased. – DRZW, 10/1(Boog), pp. 828–9. Only a handful of the fleet of new, technologically advanced U-boats, which Dönitz persuaded Hitler would prove so crucial, were available by the end of the war. – Howard D. Grier, Hitler, Dönitz and the Baltic Sea: The Third Reich’s Last Hope, 1944–1945, Annapolis, Md., 2007, pp. xviii–xix, 170–79.
11. BAB, NS6/137, fos. 19–21, draft of propaganda directives for the Wehrmacht, 9.3.45.
12. BAB, NS6/136, fos. 1, 16–19, Parteirednereinsatz, 6.3.45,13.3.45, 24.3.45.
13. BAB, NS6/137, fos. 9–14, Vorlage, probably for Pg. Gerhard Klopfer, from SS-Obersturmbannführer Dr Beyer, of SD office III/V, with attached partial copy of the sketch of a lecture by SS-Obersturmbannführer von Kilpinski and covering letter of 19.3.45 from Ernst Kaltenbrunner, head of the SD, 20.3.45.
14. BAB, R55/610, fos. 182–3, Westfalen-Süd, Merkpunkte zur Versammlungsaktion Februar/März 1945, 12.3.45.
15. Das letzte halbe Jahr: Stimmungsberichte der Wehrmachtpropaganda 1944/45, ed. Wolfram Wette, Ricarda Bremer and Detlef Vogel, Essen, 2001, p. 310 (31.3.45).
16. BA/MA, MSg2/2697, diary of Lieutenant Julius Dufner, fos. 123–7 (entries for 5, 7, 9, 12.3.45). Hitler did not lay the wreath in Berlin on the final ‘Heroes’ Memorial Day’. Göring substituted for him.
17. BAB, R55/622, fo. 181, Briefübersicht Nr. 10, 9.3.45.
18. BAB, NS6/137, Der Reichspropagandaleiter der NSDAP an alle Gaupropagandaleiter, 5.3.45.
19. TBJG, II/15, p. 471 (11.3.45).
20. Guderian, p. 427.
21. BAB, NS6/169, fos. 115–21, Guderian to Bormann, 26.2.45; Bericht des Dienstleiters der Partei-Kanzlei, Pg. Mauer, undated. The characteristic demeaning of General Staff officers, part of the standard reportage of Party propagandists, is repeated, for example, in NS6/374, fo. 18, report to Dr Gerhard Klopfer, head of Abteilung III (Staatliche Angelegenheitern) in the Party Chancellery, by Oberleutnant Koller, part of the Sondereinsatz team, 16.3.45, and in NS6/140, fos. 44–5, Vorlage for Bormann, signed by Willi Ruder, 6.3.45, offering critical comments on General Staff officers attending an NSFO course in Egerndorf. Even Goebbels rejected the constant attempt to make Wehrmacht officers the scapegoats for the military defeats of the previous two years as a crass overs
implification, with harmful consequences for the authority of officers. – TBJG, II/15, p. 406 (3.3.45). The Party Chancellery itself thought the repeated talk about sabotage and failure of officers (which for long it had promoted) had to be halted if trust between the Party leadership and the Wehrmacht was to be improved. – NS6/137, fo. 27, Vorlage for Bormann, 7.3.45.
22. BAB, NS19/2068, fos. 57, 65, Meldungen aus dem Ostraum, 15.3.45 (includes reports from Danzig, Stettin and Küstrin); in addition, for Küstrin, NS6/135, fos. 190, 192–8, part of a long report for Borman from the Kreisleiter of Küstrin-Königsberg, 5.4.45.
23. BAB, NS6/354, fos. 100–101v, Bormann: Rundschreiben 156/45g, Plünderungen durch deutsche Soldaten in geräumten Gebieten, to Gauleiter and other Party functionaries, 24.3.45, attaching a copy of Keitel’s order of 8.3.45 threatening punishment by court martial for any soldier suspected of looting. See also NS6/135, fo. 83, Pg. Noack (of Abt. IIF of the Party Chancellery, Arbeitsstab für NS-Führungsfragen) to NS-Führungsstab der Wehrmacht, reporting complaints about plundering of property by soldiers, 14.3.45; and fo. 199, Vermerk für Pg. Stosch, re plundering, 19.3.45.