A first step in the new accord between army and navy was to arrange a more suitable political environment for the high-risk expansionism. The Yonai government, with its continued hankering after improved relations with the western powers, did not fit the bill. So the army proposed replacing it. The navy concurred. A Prime Minister more in tune with the new thinking was required. ‘Now when a political change may be unavoidable within the next four or five days, and the military have been perfecting preparations to meet the abrupt changes in the latest world situation, the character of the Yonai Cabinet is not at all suitable for making negotiations with Germany and Italy and it might even cause a fatal delay,’ reported the Vice-War Minister Anami Korechika. ‘The conclusion is that a Cabinet change is inevitable in order to face this grave situation. The army unanimously will support Prince Konoye’s [= Konoe] candidacy.’78
The engineered resignation of Yonai took place on 16 July 1940. The next day, Kido, wholly in tune with the national ‘renovationist’ spirit that had established itself during the 1930s, and prominent in attuning the imperial court to the dominant thinking in the military, presided over a meeting of six former prime ministers (including Konoe) and the President of the Privy Council. Their task of nominating the next Prime Minister was accomplished in only half an hour–record time. Predictably, the army’s favourite, Prince Konoe, thought also to command public support ‘at this time when the end of the China Incident is gradually approaching’,79 was entrusted with the formation of a new Cabinet.80 He would soon, as had been the case in his first administration when he presided over the extension of the war in China, again prove himself the weak and vacillating, but compliant, tool of expansionist forces in the military.
These forces now had prominent representatives in the government. The army had indicated that it wanted Tojo Hideki as Army Minister and Matsuoka Yosuke as Foreign Minister.81 These duly occupied their places in the new Cabinet, which took office on 22 July. The following day, Konoe told the Japanese people in a radio address that the old world order was collapsing. Japan had to be ready to welcome the new world order.82 The same day, the German ambassador in Tokyo reported to his Foreign Ministry that the new Konoe Cabinet was certain to follow a policy of seeking closer alignment with the Axis.83 The way was now open to cement the shift in policy. It did not take long to make the fateful choice.
IV
Even before his new Cabinet was formed, Konoe arranged a meeting with the key figures–Matsuoka, Tojo and Yoshida (who were to take over the Foreign, Army and Navy Ministries)–at his villa in Ogikubo, a suburb of Tokyo. Matsuoka, the most forceful personality in what Konoe came to call the ‘Four Pillars Conference’, prepared a draft statement and played the dominant role. The participants reached an informal agreement on the shape of future foreign policy. They accepted that, to establish the ‘new order’ in east Asia, Japan would strengthen ties with the Axis powers and conclude a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union for the following five to ten years (building up her own military forces in the north to become impregnable to any subsequent possible Soviet attack once the pact had expired). At the same time, Japan would ‘draw into’ the ‘New Order’ the western colonial possessions in east Asia. And, though conflict was to be avoided if possible, Japan would ‘resist armed intervention by the United States related to the establishment of the New Order in East Asia’.84 The meeting stopped short of endorsing a military alliance with Germany and Italy. The Navy Minister, Yoshida, was still opposed to such a step. The army, however, made plain that it now favoured converting cooperation with the Axis powers into a formal tripartite military pact. ‘We should resolve to share our fate with Germany and Italy,’ was how the vice-chief of the army General Staff, Sawada Shigeru, put it in mid-July.85 The recourse to ‘fate’ was redolent of Matsuoka’s rhetorical flourish more than three years earlier, just after the conclusion in November 1936 of the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Pact, when he had stated: ‘It is characteristic of the Japanese race that, once we have promised to cooperate, we never look back or enter into an alliance with others. It is for us only to march side by side, resolved to go forward together, even if it means committing "double suicide”.’86
The deliberations in the ‘Four Pillars Conference’ at Ogikubo were soon formalized as policy. Noting that the world was ‘at a major turning point’, the new Konoe Cabinet laid down the framework of its foreign policy on 26 July in its ‘Outline of a Basic National Policy’ (which had been drafted in the Army Ministry). It envisaged Japan building ‘a new order in Great East Asia’, resting upon the ‘three solidly united’ nations of Japan, Manchukuo and China (naturally, under Japanese leadership). At the same time, Japan was to be converted into a ‘national defence state’ ready for war.87
Keen to coordinate the civilian and military arms of government in the interests of building a national consensus behind the shift in foreign policy, Konoe resurrected the Liaison Conference, which had fallen into abeyance two and a half years earlier. On 27 July the Liaison Conference adopted the ‘Main Principles for Coping with the Changing World Situation’, which in effect enshrined as government policy the strategy devised in the discussions between the army and navy leaders earlier in the month.88 This decision now confirmed, even if the wording remained vague, the two crucial shifts in policy: the southern advance and the strengthening of relations with the Axis powers.89
‘Political unity with Germany and Italy’, the document ran, ‘will be strengthened immediately in an attempt to effect readjustment of diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia.’ Preparations for the southern advance were to be accelerated, though timing would depend upon exploiting the changing circumstances to best advantage. A deterioration in relations with the United States was accepted as inevitable, though friction was to be avoided where possible. Pressure was to be exerted on French Indochina to cease supplies to Chiang Kai-shek and to provide Japan with supplies, use of airfields and troop passage. Measures would be adopted ‘to eliminate immediately the antagonistic attitude of Hong Kong’, and Burma would be blockaded to prevent aid reaching the Chinese nationalists. Diplomatic efforts would be made to obtain important resources from the Dutch East Indies. Wherever diplomacy failed, it was made clear, armed strength would be deployed, if circumstances demanded it.
The resolution of the ‘China Incident’ through elimination of aid to Chiang Kai-shek and the ‘immediate subjugation of the Chungking regime by every possible means’ still underpinned the whole strategy. But, as the comments on the document by Imperial General Headquarters made clear, the previous emphasis on settlement of the ‘China Incident’ had now given way to the southern advance as first priority.90 So even if it proved impossible to end the war in China, armed strength was contemplated in the southern advance, ‘depending upon the situation’. In such an event, efforts would be made to restrict Japan’s adversaries to Great Britain alone. ‘However,’ it was acknowledged, ‘thorough preparations for the commencement of hostilities against the United States will be made as it may prove impossible to avoid war with that country.’ Indeed, even as the Liaison Conference was taking the decision for the southern advance, the United States government was contemplating moves to restrict Japanese access to the vital oil of the Dutch East Indies.91 Japan and the United States were now set on a collision course.
In July, in the deliberation over the ‘Main Principles for Coping with the Changing World Situation’, Japanese navy officials had sought to prevent the army going ahead with plans to invade the Dutch East Indies. A compromise formulation was reached, stipulating that armed force would be used only if favourable circumstances arose, and that ‘for the present diplomatic means’ would be used. But once the United States tightened the noose by threatening Japan’s access to crucial resources, the navy’s stance became more belligerent. On 1 August the Operations Section of the navy General Staff made plain its support for the stationing of troops in French Indochina. It saw this as a step towards control over Thailand
, Burma and Malaya in the southern advance. It would secure necessary raw materials–coal, rubber, iron ore and phosphorus–for Japan’s military effort, and it would be strategically advantageous in a war against the United States and Great Britain. The navy envisaged America responding to a Japanese occupation of French Indochina with an embargo on scrap iron and oil. But an American embargo, the General Staff’s analysis pointed out, ‘would be a matter of life or death to the empire. In that event the empire will be obliged to attack the Dutch East Indies to secure oil.’ The navy concluded that military operations against French Indochina should proceed by November, if not earlier; and that ‘Japan must be resolved to wage war against other powers’. All preparations were to be undertaken for the mobilization of the fleet. An attack on the Dutch East Indies was only foreseen if the United States imposed tougher economic sanctions. But in its decision for ‘preparatory mobilization’ of the fleet, which for naval planners meant a state of readiness close to full mobilization for war, the navy General Staff had not only shown that it was ready to contemplate war with America; it had taken the first step in that direction.92
The stance adopted by the navy General Staff was not universally accepted even within the navy. Cassandra voices were raised. The head of the Ship Procurement Headquarters stated categorically that if the United States cut off all oil and supplies of essential minerals, ‘the navy could barely fight for one year’. The Navy Minister Yoshida, whose health was becoming seriously affected by the anxiety, concurred. ‘I trust that the navy General Staff will seriously investigate the relationship between the extent of our naval armaments and our prospects in a protracted war,’ he stated. He added that he did not favour military operations if they were to result in a total United States embargo against Japan. Admiral Nomura Kichisaburo, who in 1941 would be sent to Washington as Japanese ambassador, also warned that a war against the United States ‘would, of necessity, be a long one, and this would be very disadvantageous to Japan’. Even the planners in the navy General Staff accepted this logic. ‘We are not very confident of our capacity for endurance’ in a protracted war with the United States, they acknowledged. Yet, basing all their hopes on a decisive blow in a short conflict, they continued to reckon with and plan for war, ‘for the survival of the empire, whether we like it or not’.93
The fatalism built into the navy plans for the southern advance nevertheless served the interests of naval leaders. The shift from a northern, land policy, to a southern advance likely to lead to confrontation with the United States in the Pacific meant a sizeable shift in allocation of war resources from the army to the navy. The question of whether Japan could win a war against America became subordinated to the short-term benefits to the navy through a major expansion in its resources.94
V
While the navy was making its fateful choice for likely conflict with an adversary whom it was doubtful it could defeat, the politicians were embarking upon the steps that would lead to a full-blown military alliance with the Axis powers. On 30 July 1940 the Foreign Ministry prepared a statement bearing Matsuoka’s hallmark, ‘On Strengthening Cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy’. The Konoe government adopted the statement as its guideline, hardening the position adopted at the Ogikubo Conference earlier in the month. It was now expressly stated that Japan was prepared to enter into military alliance with Germany and Italy against Britain, reserving Japan’s right of independent decision on the use of force. The document envisaged a military alliance explicitly directed at Great Britain. However, cooperation was to extend to the event of Japan or Germany and Italy becoming involved in war with the United States, though the commitment in such a case only went as far as an agreement to ‘confer on measures to be taken’.95
The new tone of Japanese policy was rapidly recognized. The American ambassador noted already on 1 August that the Konoe government ‘gives every indication of going hell-bent towards the Axis and the establishment of the New Order in East Asia’. ‘The German military machine and system and their brilliant successes have gone to the Japanese head like strong wine,’ he added.96
Immediately, Matsuoka began to put out feelers about Germany’s attitude towards a prospective military alliance. The German response was initially cool. By mid-August, however, the Germans had changed their mind. The revised stance was most likely triggered by Churchill’s announcement on 20 August that the Americans were supplying fifty American destroyers to help the British war effort. It was not much more than a symbolic contribution, but it was taken as a clear signal that the United States was not holding to strict neutrality, and was prepared to provide significant aid to the beleaguered Great Britain, which might even lead eventually to her entering the war against the Axis powers.97 Closer relations with Japan suddenly took on a new importance to the Germans. On 23 August the Japanese ambassador in Berlin was informed by Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, that he would be sending an envoy, Heinrich Stahmer, to Tokyo as minister plenipotentiary. His brief was to discover Japanese intentions and, if there was willingness, to open negotiations towards an agreement.98
Matsuoka’s draft of 30 July had meanwhile been favourably received by the army. Indeed, the army began to press Matsuoka hard to conclude negotiations quickly.99 Within the navy, however, serious differences of opinion remained. The top navy leaders still feared that closer relations with the Axis powers would serve to provoke the United States. Yoshida, the Navy Minister, as noted earlier, was particularly opposed to a pact. But, as some navy leaders wavered–under pressure, it seems, not only from the army but also from middle-echelon naval officers–he became increasingly isolated. Inwardly tormented, he succumbed to a nervous collapse, was taken to hospital on 3 September and resigned next day.100
Matsuoka helped influence the choice of Yoshida’s replacement–the reticent, softly spoken, more accommodating Oikawa Koshiro, who soon showed himself in agreement with the demands for closer relations with Germany and Italy. Oikawa, in any case, was pushed in that direction by his deputy, Vice-Minister Toyoda Teijiro, a more assertive, politically astute and opportunistic individual, who emerged as the dominant figure in the ministry.101 Even now, however, fear of war against the United States and Great Britain appears to have held Oikawa back from endorsing the move to a full military alliance with Germany and Italy. He was particularly concerned to avoid an obligation to go to war automatically should the Axis powers become involved in war with the United States. This seemed to be what Matsuoka now had in mind. By early September, the Foreign Minister had hardened the position he had taken in his draft of 30 July, aimed at Britain, by including new wording in a revised draft. It was now explicitly stated that ‘in the event of a danger of either contracting party entering into a state of war with the United States, the other contracting party will assist that party by all possible means’. It amounted to a proposal for a military alliance directed now squarely against the United States as well as Britain. And, from a duty to ‘confer on measures to be taken’, as stated in the draft of 30 July, the obligation would now be to provide assistance ‘by all possible means’. Probably, Matsuoka’s more pronounced anti-American line was a response to the American government’s moves towards the imposition of the much feared embargo on oil. He believed in diplomacy through strength. He most likely felt that Japanese firmness would serve as a deterrent. Instead, it increased the chances of Japan becoming involved in war with the United States.102
Reservations about the implications of such an alliance, particularly fears that Japan could be drawn through German actions into a war with America as well as Britain, persisted on the Japanese side and were specifically voiced by the new Navy Minister, Oikawa. Matsuoka was forced to bow to such views, and he accordingly toned down his draft, omitting the automatic obligation to provide assistance.103 But despite Oikawa’s reluctance to embrace a military alliance which was now favoured by the government, the army and more radical factions within the navy itself, he had not opposed giving Mat
suoka the authorization to negotiate closer ties with Germany and Italy. The Foreign Minister was left, therefore, with a fairly free hand to conduct discussions with Stahmer, once the German plenipotentiary (an amateur diplomat who had formerly headed the Far East section of Ribbentrop’s Dienststelle, his agency for foreign affairs104) had arrived in Tokyo on 7 September 1940 after a fortnight’s wearisome journey, first by air from Berlin to Moscow, then by the trans-Siberian railway to the Japanese capital.105
The Germans were keen to have an outright military alliance to deter the United States from entering the war. They were, therefore, less than enamoured by the weaker draft proposed by Matsuoka. But having paved the way, the Japanese Foreign Minister was himself most keen to press ahead with the alliance. ‘I’ll do it even if it costs me my job,’ he remarked, ‘and I’ll finish it up in one or two weeks.’106 The breakthrough came when he showed himself willing to accept the stipulation that Japan would retain her independence in deciding whether to join in such a war. With this concession, the Navy Ministry’s hesitancy gave way. At the Liaison Conference on 14 September, Oikawa resignedly accepted the need for the alliance. ‘There is no other way,’ he remarked.107 Looking back after the war, Oikawa indicated that he had been persuaded by Matsuoka’s firm undertakings about retaining autonomy to avoid being dragged into a conflict, and on the German as well as Japanese intention to keep the Americans out of the war. He remarked, too, that the navy could not sustain its opposition when the alliance was so widely favoured. ‘The navy no longer had any grounds for opposing the proposal,’ he commented. ‘Not only that, but it seemed to me that for the navy to insist stubbornly on its own views (regardless of public opinion, which at that time was turning in favour of the Axis) would lead to a violent internal confrontation. So I told the Cabinet that the navy had no alternative to tide us over the current critical situation.’108 That evening Tojo was able to report confidentially to the Lord Privy Seal, Kido, that the army and navy had reached agreement on the question of Japan’s relations with Germany and Italy.109 The die was cast.