According to Chamberlain’s diary account of the meeting with Reynaud, the French Prime Minister, through buying off Italian entry into the war by an appeal to Mussolini, accompanied by territorial concessions, hoped to release ten divisions to throw into the defence against the Germans. The British ministers pointed out that this was unlikely to make any real difference to the military position. Reynaud suggested, however, that Mussolini’s own self-interest in safeguarding Italian independence in the event of a French and British collapse might predispose him towards a proposal for a European settlement. Chamberlain suspected that Mussolini might indeed look to a four-power conference, though only once Paris had fallen. Churchill made plain his opposition to any appeal to the Italian dictator. ‘The P[rime]M[inister] disliked any move towards Musso,’ noted Chamberlain. ‘It was incredible that Hitler would consent to any terms that we could accept, though if we could get out of this jam by giving up Malta and Gibraltar and some African colonies he would jump at it. But the only safe way was to convince Hitler that he couldn’t beat us. We might do better without the French than with them if they tied us up to a conference which we should enter with our case lost beforehand.’ Halifax disagreed, arguing ‘that there could be no harm in trying Musso and seeing what the result was. If the terms were impossible we could still reject them.’ Chamberlain supported Halifax, but had the impression that Attlee, though he said little, favoured the Prime Minister’s position. There was evident division within the War Cabinet. Views were still not hard and fast. Chamberlain, despite voicing support for Halifax’s proposal, inclined towards Churchill’s view that ‘it would be best for us to fight on in the hope of maintaining sufficient air strength to keep the German at bay till other forces can be mobilised[,] perhaps in U.S.A.’ And Churchill, whatever his own preference, was ruling nothing out at this stage. He told Reynaud, as the French Prime Minister prepared to depart, that ‘we would try to find some formula on which Musso would be approached but we must have time to think’.89
After Reynaud’s departure, what was described as a short ‘informal Meeting of War Cabinet Ministers’, without the presence of the Cabinet Secretary, took place. This was probably to brief the fifth member of the War Cabinet, Arthur Greenwood, who had not been present at the deliberation with Reynaud, on what had taken place.90 Then the War Cabinet formally reconvened. It was, noted Halifax, ‘a discursive meeting’. The Prime Minister was ‘rather jumpy, secretaries kept coming in with messages, and the general atmosphere was like Waterloo Station: very difficult to do business’.91 The discussion, if not always sharply focused, still centred around the question of whether or not to approach Mussolini. The differences, as they had been in Reynaud’s presence, were most plainly articulated by Churchill and Halifax. Churchill emphasized that Britain still possessed powers to resist, which the French did not. He also pointed out that France was likely to be offered decent terms by Germany, whereas ‘there was no limit to the terms which Germany would impose upon us if she had her way’. He was anxious to avoid being ‘forced into a weak position in which we went to Signor Mussolini and invited him to go to Herr Hitler and ask him to treat us nicely’. Halifax attached, he said, ‘more importance than the Prime Minister to the desirability of allowing France to try out the possibilities of European equilibrium’–a somewhat optimistic concept in the circumstances. The Foreign Secretary emphasized that there should be no suggestion of any terms which might jeopardize British independence. But he repeated the suggestion that a Mussolini alarmed at the prospect of German hegemony in Europe might be prepared to look to the balance of power. ‘At any rate,’ he said, ‘he could see no harm in trying this line of approach.’ Greenwood saw no objection to the course proposed by Halifax, though he imagined Mussolini had little scope for action independent of Hitler, and thought demands affecting British security would soon enough be raised. Chamberlain, too, was ready to discuss Italian demands with Mussolini, but only if the Italian leader were ‘prepared to collaborate with us in getting tolerable terms’, pointing out, however, Reynaud’s view that a specific offer, not generalities, would be demanded. Churchill wanted no decision until it was seen how much of the army could be brought home from France.92
At this point Halifax read out the communiqué, agreed with the French, to the United States, seeking Roosevelt’s intercession, and also his account of his interview the previous day with Bastianini. While the former was uncontentious, Churchill once more voiced his opposition to any direct British approach to Mussolini. What Halifax had suggested, he stated, ‘implied that if we were prepared to give Germany back her colonies and to make certain concessions in the Mediterranean, it was possible for us to get out of our present difficulties’. This option was, in his view, not open, since ‘the terms offered would certainly prevent us from completing our re-armament’. Halifax rejoined that, if so, the terms would be refused. Churchill repeated his earlier point that Hitler, apparently holding the whip-hand, had to be shown that he could not conquer Britain. At the same time, the minutes noted, ‘he did not raise objection to some approach being made to Signor Mussolini’. Despite the opposition to such a move that he had voiced at every turn so far, Churchill was still not closing the door on the possibility of an overture to the Italian leader. At the very least, his comment implied that he did not at this juncture feel confident enough to override his colleagues, particularly Halifax, in pressing his own preference.
Greenwood then made a telling point. He reckoned, like others, that Mussolini would demand Malta, Gibraltar and Suez. (Chamberlain thought he might also want Somaliland, Kenya or Uganda.) Greenwood added his certainty that negotiations would break down; ‘but Herr Hitler would get to know of them, and it might have a bad effect on our prestige’. Halifax argued that this was a good reason not to mention particulars in the approach, but ‘that if we got to the point of discussing the terms of a general settlement and found that we could obtain terms which did not postulate the destruction of our independence, we should be foolish if we did not accept them’. Greenwood pointed out that by the time discussions were undertaken Paris was likely to have fallen, and asked whether, therefore, there was any real chance that negotiations would serve a purpose. At this, the meeting ended inconclusively with adjournment to the following day. Archibald Sinclair, Secretary of State for Air and leader of the Liberal Party, who despite political differences had been a friend of Churchill since serving as his second-in-command during the First World War and had supported his condemnation of the Munich Agreement, was invited to attend. Halifax was asked to circulate for discussion the draft of a possible communication to Italy along with a record of his discussion with Bastianini the previous evening.93
The draft ‘Suggested Approach to Signor Mussolini’, prepared by Halifax and circulated on 26 May to the War Cabinet, summarized the proposal advanced by Reynaud earlier that day. It emphasized the difficulty for Mussolini, should the Germans establish European domination; that Great Britain and France would fight to the end to preserve their independence; that if Mussolini would cooperate ‘in securing a settlement of all European questions which safeguard[s] the independence and security of the Allies’, they would seek to accommodate his interests; and that if he secretly specified his precise wishes in ‘the solution of certain Mediterranean questions’, they would try to satisfy them.94 Though seemingly Reynaud’s proposals, in practice they accorded closely both in the idea of Italian mediation and even in their wording with what Halifax had been saying, also to the Italian ambassador, before the visit of the French Prime Minister. In other words, the proposals, especially the third one opening up the prospect of a general European settlement, were at least in part Halifax’s more than they were Reynaud’s.95
The first of two War Cabinet meetings next day, 27 May, was predominantly concerned with the appalling military situation.96 The German air force had started pounding the beaches in Dunkirk. Around the coast of southern England, hastily improvised flotillas of small ships, trawlers
, tug boats, tiny motor launches–anything that was serviceable–were being assembled and setting sail to try to do their bit in rescuing the stranded army.97 But the chances of a large-scale evacuation of troops from the port looked remote. Four British divisions, cut off near Lille, looked unlikely even to reach Dunkirk. Belgium, it was clear, was close to surrender. Later that day the news indeed came through that King Leopold had asked for a cessation of hostilities.98 The mood in Whitehall was very grim. ‘See very little light anywhere,’ Cadogan jotted down after the Cabinet meeting. ‘Position of B.E.F. quite awful, and I see no hope for more than a tiny fraction of them.’99 Churchill’s private secretary, John Colville, had gleaned something of the tense debates in Cabinet, perhaps from some indiscretion of the Prime Minister. Noting the serious fear now of French collapse, he added: ‘The Cabinet are feverishly considering our ability to carry on the war alone in such circumstances, and there are signs that Halifax is being defeatist. He says that our aim can no longer be to crush Germany but rather to preserve our own integrity and independence.’100
The second meeting, late that afternoon, concentrated on the suggested approach to Mussolini. According to Halifax’s diary entry, there was ‘a long and rather confused discussion about, nominally, the approach to Italy, but also largely about general policy in the event of things going really badly in France’.101
Halifax began by mentioning that the French ambassador in London, M. Charles Corbin, had been to see him that morning, on instructions from Reynaud, to press for the inclusion of ‘geographical precision’ in the approach. Halifax had pointed out the opposition of his colleagues to anything beyond a general approach. The Foreign Secretary mentioned the view of the British ambassador in Rome, Sir Percy Loraine, that ‘nothing we could do would be of any value at this stage, so far as Signor Mussolini was concerned’. Chamberlain agreed ‘that the proposed French approach to Signor Mussolini would serve no useful purpose’, but was willing to go ahead with it to prevent France subsequently claiming that Britain had been unwilling even to allow the chance of negotiations with Italy. Churchill’s caustic summary of this argument was ‘that nothing would come of the approach, but that it was worth doing to sweeten relations with a failing ally’.
Sinclair also took the view that an approach to Italy would prove futile. Any sign of weakness would be an encouragement to the Germans and Italians, and would undermine morale at home and in the Dominions. ‘The suggestion that we were prepared to barter away pieces of British territory’, Sinclair declared, ‘would have a deplorable effect and would make it difficult for us to continue the desperate struggle which faced us.’ He thought it was better to await the outcome of Roosevelt’s attempted mediation.
Attlee and Greenwood also opposed any Anglo-French approach. Attlee declared that ‘the approach suggested would inevitably lead to our asking Signor Mussolini to intercede to obtain peace-terms for us’. Following the French suggestion of geographical precision would simply prompt Mussolini to ask for more; and if Britain refused, it would appear she was letting down her allies. Greenwood thought the approach ‘would put us in the wrong’, and if word leaked ‘that we had sued for terms at the cost of ceding British territory, the consequences would be terrible’. He concluded that ‘it would be heading for disaster to go any further with those approaches’.
Churchill’s line was similar. He was ‘increasingly oppressed’, he said, ‘with the futility of the suggested approach to Signor Mussolini, which the latter would certainly regard with contempt’. The integrity of Britain’s fighting position would be ruined by such an approach. Even avoiding geographical precision would not help; it would be obvious which territories were meant. The best help to Reynaud, argued Churchill, was ‘to let him feel that, whatever happened to France, we were going to fight it out to the end’.
Churchill became more vehement in his forceful opposition to Halifax’s proposal:
At the moment our prestige in Europe was very low. The only way we could get it back was by showing the world that Germany had not beaten us. If, after two or three months, we could show that we were still unbeaten, our prestige would return. Even if we were beaten, we should be no worse off than we should be if we were now to abandon the struggle. Let us therefore avoid being dragged down the slippery slope with France. The whole of this manoeuvre was intended to get us so deeply involved in negotiations that we should be unable to turn back. We had gone a long way already in our approach to Italy, but let us not allow M. Reynaud to get us involved in a confused situation.
He drew his conclusion: ‘The approach proposed was not only futile, but involved us in a deadly danger.’
Chamberlain intervened in a conciliatory manner. Though he agreed that the proposed approach would not serve any useful purpose, he thought ‘that we ought to go a little further with it, in order to keep the French in a good temper’. He favoured temporizing until the outcome of Roosevelt’s approach was known. This met with some agreement. But Churchill looked no further than fighting it out as an example. ‘If the worst came to the worst,’ he stated, ‘it would not be a bad thing for this country to go down fighting for the other countries which had been overcome by the Nazi tyranny.’
Halifax had been quiet to this point. But he recognized the increasing signs of his isolation in the War Cabinet, and Churchill’s strident tones now prompted his intervention. ‘He was conscious’, the Foreign Secretary said, ‘of certain rather profound differences of points of view’. Halifax thought it would have been of value to have the French government declare that they would fight to the end for their independence. Moreover, he could see no resemblance between what he was proposing and the suggestion ‘that we were suing for terms and following a line which would lead us to disaster’. He hinted, correctly, that Churchill had changed his mind since the previous day, when he had indicated that he would be thankful to get out of the current difficulties on terms, as long as they did not affect the independence of the country, even if it meant cession of some territory. Now, said Halifax, ‘the Prime Minister seemed to suggest that under no conditions would we contemplate any course except fighting to a finish’. He agreed that acceptable terms were unlikely. But if it were to prove possible to attain a settlement which would not impair Britain’s fundamental interests, he could not accept Churchill’s view, and ‘would think it right to accept an offer which would save the country from avoidable disaster’.
Churchill was dismissive. The issue was most unlikely to arise. ‘If Herr Hitler was prepared to make peace on the terms of the restoration of German colonies and the overlordship of Central Europe, that was one thing,’ Churchill declared, in a mooted concession striking in itself. ‘But it was quite unlikely’, he went on, ‘that he would make any such offer.’ Halifax, undeterred, offered a hypothetical scenario. Would the Prime Minister be prepared to discuss terms which Hitler, ‘being anxious to end the war through knowledge of his own internal weaknesses’, might offer to France and England? The old, misplaced optimism in Hitler’s presumed internal problems–thought to be serious and imminent economic crisis102–reared its head once more in the question. Churchill replied that he would not join France in asking for terms; but he would consider them if he were told what they were. Chamberlain once more defused the heated exchange between Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister. The dispute closed with agreement that Churchill’s reply to Reynaud should be along the lines that Chamberlain had earlier suggested–not complete refusal, but no commitment either, in awaiting the outcome of Roosevelt’s approach.103
The discussion had been more heated than the official minutes suggested. Halifax noted in his diary that he ‘thought Winston talked the most frightful rot, also Greenwood, and after bearing it for some time’, he went on, ‘I said exactly what I thought of them, adding that if that was really their view, and if it came to the point, our ways would separate’. From the invariably calm, unruffled Halifax, these words, implying that he threatened resignation, were strong indeed. H
e repeated his threat privately to Churchill after the meeting, but by then the Prime Minister had ‘mellowed’, as Halifax put it, and ‘was full of apologies and affection’. It had been a clash of personalities, as well as a disagreement about substance. Churchill’s emotional temperament was the antithesis of Halifax’s instinctive cool rationality. According to Halifax, ‘it does drive me to despair when he works himself up into a passion of emotion when he ought to make his brain think and reason’.104 Halifax agreed with Churchill, and the other members of the War Cabinet, that an approach to Mussolini was almost certain to prove fruitless. But he was still not prepared to dismiss the attempt. And what he had been unable to stomach was Churchill’s apparent insistence that it would be better to go down fighting, even if Britain were to be devastated in the process, than to contemplate any possible negotiated settlement which might save the country from disaster.105
At ten o’clock that evening the War Cabinet was summoned for its third meeting that day. Churchill presented it with the dismal news that Belgium was on the verge of capitulation. The consequences, not just for the chances of prolonged French military resistance, but also for the prospects of evacuating the British Expeditionary Force, were grave in the extreme. ‘Of course we did not expect that the Belgians would hold out indefinitely,’ Chamberlain noted in his diary, ‘but this sudden collapse opens our flank and makes it unlikely that any substantial number of the B.E.F. will get away. I confess I had not much hope of extricating them but there was a chance which has now almost vanished.’106
Meanwhile, too, it had become clear that Roosevelt’s attempt to intercede with Mussolini had been peremptorily rebuffed. In fact, Mussolini had declined even to receive the American ambassador in Rome, who sought to present the President’s message verbally. Nor was any reply forthcoming. The contempt with which the approach was received could not have been more clearly expressed. Roosevelt’s message was conveyed to Mussolini by the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano, who told the ambassador straight away that it would be rejected.107 ‘Roosevelt is off the track,’ Ciano said. ‘It takes more than that to dissuade Mussolini. In fact, it is not that he wants to obtain this or that; what he wants is war, and, even if he were to obtain by peaceful means double what he claims, he would refuse.’108