But the Palestinians still seemed reluctant to act against the terrorists and take real action (arrests, weapons confiscation, etc.). Despite Arafat’s promise to cooperate, no serious orders to act had been given to his security forces (they privately acknowledged this to me). This was not encouraging. Without Palestinian action against the terrorists, there would be no cease-fire. And without a cease-fire, we could not move forward.
Even more discouraging, our intelligence and Israeli actions indicated that Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad were stepping up suicide bombing attacks in an effort to derail our mission.
The Israelis actually had great success blocking these attacks, but it was impossible to stop them all. For every ten attempts they foiled or countered, one got through. About every third day during this initial trip, a suicide attack would set back our progress and bring on retaliation attacks, sometimes with tragic collateral casualties, by the Israelis. It was obvious that these attacks would eventually cause the process to collapse. I felt like we were shoveling sand against the tide.
As casualties on both sides mounted, and the inevitable retaliation attacks destroyed Palestinian Authority facilities, anger grew in Israel and the streets of the Palestinian areas. I visited some of the sites of the attacks. The pointless murder of innocents sickened me.
AS ALL this was going on, I worked on the Palestinian security forces to take action to break the cycle of violence: Arresting terrorist leaders would demonstrate their good faith and compliance with the Tenet/Mitchell plans.
They wanted that more than I did, they told me; but the Israelis were screwing them up by tossing on the table not one but many different lists of people they wanted arrested. Palestinian security claimed they were eager to pick up all the bad guys, but only if they had a single, authoritative list to act on.
“Fine,” I told them, “I’ll provide one list, compiled by our [not Israeli] intelligence, that will benchmark your effort.”
I gave them a list of thirty-three men who were on every list of bad guys; nobody had any doubt of their guilt.
Very little happened. Arrests were made; but only a few of them, at best, were real; and many of the “arrested” were actually either free or living under loose house arrest.
It was clear that the security heads would not—or could not—take any real action without a major commitment and direct order from Arafat. And Arafat was not about to give that order.
DURING THE next three weeks, I continued my Trilateral Committee meetings, I met frequently with Sharon and Arafat and their lieutenants, but I also met with international leaders and representatives from numerous organizations and nations. All of them offered support.
The “Quad,” or “Quartet” (the U.S., the UN, the European Union, and Russia), was an especially important and helpful group. The UN, EU, and Russian representatives—Terje Larson, Miguel Moratinos, and Andrei Vdovin—became friends of mine, and provided tireless support for my mission. The EU representative Javier Solana visited several times to offer assistance and encouragement.
I also talked frequently with leaders from the region, particularly old friends from Arab nations. Both their frustration and their strong desire to see our mission work were evident.
On a more personal level, I tried to get a sense of ordinary people on both sides. I really wanted to know them and to understand their situation and views. I attended ceremonies and observances in Israel and in Palestinian areas. I ate meals with Israeli and Palestinian families. I ate dinner in both East and West Jerusalem. Everywhere, I was deeply touched by the desperate desire for peace. “Don’t give up,” everyone pleaded, with one voice. People on the street came up to me to beg me to hang in there. I visited Gaza and saw the awful conditions in the crowded refugee camps. On one occasion, I met with the kids from Seeds of Peace. “Why can’t the adults figure it out?” they asked with heartrending openness. “We have.”
FOR MY own sanity and well-being, I worked out at the Marine House that billeted the Marine security detachment at our consulate in Jerusalem; and I sometimes dined with these hard-charging Leather-necks to keep my spirits up. Through them, I met Father Peter Vasko, an American Franciscan (the order has responsibility for the care of Christian sites in Jerusalem for the Catholic Church). Father Peter, the Marines’ unofficial chaplain, decided to look after my spiritual welfare as well. I sometimes ate with the Franciscans at their monastery, attended Sunday Mass with them, and enjoyed evenings talking to these dedicated and devout monks. Father Peter gave me a fascinating tour of the Old City.
One evening, the Custos (the Vatican custodian of the holy sites and the Franciscan superior in Jerusalem) presented me with the Papal Gold Cross for my efforts for peace in the region.
“Thank you from the bottom of my heart,” I told him when I accepted the award, “though I’m deeply distressed that we haven’t been more successful.”
“It’s important that we try,” he said in response. “That’s justification enough.”
I also met the Christian patriarchs from the sixteen other denominations who shared responsibility for the Christian sites. These holy men never failed to remind me that the Christians in the region had serious and long-standing concerns that the major combatants often ignored.
DURING MY frequent meetings with Sharon and Arafat (never together; these two old rivals couldn’t stand each other), I tried to organize a senior-level political committee below Sharon and Arafat to oversee our efforts and provide a high-level group where we could open other areas for discussion besides security matters. I saw this committee as being made up of people at the ministerial level, like Abu Mazen and Abu Ala’a, the senior Palestinians, and Shimon Peres and Ben Eleazar, on the Israeli side, with me, perhaps, as the U.S. representative. This oversight body would oversee the security measures taken on the ground, and (I hoped) resolve differences, disagreements, or reports of violations. But on top of that, it could also open the political dialogue; and in so doing we might square the circle—satisfy the Palestinian demand for political progress without compromising the Israeli demand for security before negotiations on political issues could begin. That is, we might not make political commitments; yet a beginning of talk on these issues would give the Palestinians a sense that we were fulfilling expectations. This in turn would build confidence. In this way, we’d be opening a two-track approach: On one track, security. On the second, parallel track, political issues. I thought this parallel approach might get us around the sequentialism issue that was proving to be such a stumbling block.
Sharon was a little unsure about all this. “Why should we make political commitments up front?” he told me. “It looks like we’re caving in to terrorism and doing it under the pressure of violence.” He was leery of big political steps. Big political steps would show his hand; and he never showed his hand. Neither did Arafat. I never actually knew what either of them was really after or what they saw as a long-term solution.
Sharon would surely take security steps up front. And I’m convinced that if he had the right security cooperation from the other side, he would withdraw from certain areas, move certain checkpoints. I think he could implement the entire Tenet plan without a problem. Now when he got down the road, would he make the kind of political commitments on settlements and other more difficult issues (such as Barak offered)? That remained to be seen.
The Palestinians were very leery that he could or would do any of that. They were convinced that he’d be glad to move forward on Tenet and get the security concessions out of the way; but he would stall on political progress once the security situation leveled off.
In my mind that was always a possibility. I simply wasn’t sure. Would he move forward or not? I can’t say. He could definitely start a process. I wasn’t sure whether he could finish one.
As for the other side—I don’t think Arafat could even start it.
Sharon and Arafat eventually came around and agreed to set up the committee; but for one reason or anot
her, we could never get it off the ground.
For three weeks we tried to get something started, to get an agreement working on the ground and to get the violence tamped down. It didn’t work.
I knew time was running out and we were close to it all falling apart.
The attacks and retaliations escalated. Targeted assassinations by the Israelis sometimes spilled over and killed nearby innocents. The Israelis had suffered a large number of casualties; innocents on buses or in cafes were brutally slaughtered by suicide bombers—young brainwashed Palestinians, agonized by the plight of their people. We were one event away from collapse.
It came on December 12 when a suicide bomber blew up a bus near the settlement town of Emmanuel. Ten Israelis were killed and thirty wounded. This brought the total killed since I’d arrived to forty-four, and it ended the Israeli willingness to continue the talks. They were now going to retaliate big-time. Arafat’s headquarters in Gaza, his helicopters, and many of his government facilities were bombed.
I was deeply dismayed that things had not worked out.
Many nights I had stood on my small balcony at the King David gazing at the softly lighted Old City of Jerusalem. I knew of no other place on earth that had seen so much glory and triumph and so much sorrow and violence, all in the name of religion.
It was decided that I would come back to the States for consultations, rather than stand helplessly by while the spiral of violence continued, and there was no immediate hope of talks.
Before we left, I was joined by Bill Burns; and on the way home we passed through Jordan and Egypt to talk to King Abdullah and President Mubarak. Since I knew both of them well, it was not easy to call on them after our failure to make progress. Both of them had high expectations and hopes for peace; and I felt their disappointment and frustration.
I arrived back in the U.S. on the seventeenth of December, and debriefed the President and Secretary Powell on the twentieth. They were still determined to make this work—a most encouraging development. The President thanked me for my efforts, and the Secretary told me to be ready to reengage when things settled down.
“I’ll be ready to go back at any time,” I told him.
In the days following, both Sharon and Arafat sent letters to the President asking for my return. In his reply, the President insisted on more action on the ground to curb the violence; but the news from Secretary Powell was slightly more positive. He asked me to prepare to go back after the holidays . . . if the situation improved.
OVER THE Christmas and New Year’s holidays I reflected on my trip: It seemed to me that the extremists were calling the shots. If it looked like we were making progress or creating hope for a peaceful resolution, they would attack with a vengeance, knowing retaliatory strikes would follow and talks would break down. Unless Palestinian security forces put genuine effort into curbing these attacks, there was no hope.
On a personal level, I knew that both sides had tested me at every opportunity, trying to measure my commitment and impartiality. On a more positive note, I felt I had made connections on both sides and had the trust of key people; and with the exception of a few members who felt compelled to create political theater (outrageous political statements, heated diatribes, screaming), I liked the makeup of the Trilateral Committee. Yet if I went back, I was determined to put an end to the screaming and the diatribes. The time for venting and posturing was past.
My greatest conviction: We could make progress if we could get a break in the violence.
As I followed the daily news, I sensed that things were quieting down.
The Palestinians had grown desperate. The Israelis had destroyed their headquarters in Gaza; Arafat was pinned down in Ramallah (the Israelis refused to let him go anywhere); things were coming apart; and they didn’t know what the Israelis would do next. Was Sharon going to take out Arafat?
The Israelis were also in a bind. Sharon had tried negotiating; and when that broke down, he’d tried a powerful military incursion. Now he seemed to have spent most of his options. He had to be asking himself, “What do I have to do to get this monkey off my back?” He was under a lot of political pressure, and hadn’t produced anything. He was getting a lot of bad world press as a result of the heavy retaliatory attacks.
So I think that for different reasons they were both desperate to get this thing restarted.
The decision was made for me to return immediately after the holidays. But this time there would be a different approach: Our visit was to be short, only four days. We would convene the Trilateral Committee, and give them very specific tasks and goals to accomplish over the course of two to three weeks. During that time, Aaron would return to determine whether or not there was significant progress. If there was, I would return to move to the next phase.
There were several reasons for this approach: First, we had to take the “theater” out of the meetings. With me out of the way, the temptation to waste time in heated rhetoric would be gone. Second, we had to force both sides to put more effort into bilateral communication and coordination, and not to rely on us to arbitrate every issue. Third, we wanted to take away our high profile, which drew press focus that was frequently disruptive. Fourth, low-key talks (unburdened of my continuous, direct involvement) might reduce the extremists’ will—and opportunity—to use terrorist attacks to break up the talks.
ROUND TWO
Aaron and I left for Israel on January 2, 2002, and arrived on the third.
As soon as we landed, we were briefed by the Israelis on an impending takedown operation: A ship in the Red Sea, the Karine A, had sailed from Iran with fifty tons of illegal weapons and ordnance ordered by the Palestinian Authority—a serious violation of the Oslo Agreement. Under that agreement, the Authority was permitted certain weapons and ordnance for their security. Though they actually had more weapons than the agreement permitted, the Israelis had looked the other way, as long as the excess weapons of the security forces were limited to small arms. But on the Karine A were Katyusha rockets, 120-millimeter mortars, and other high-caliber weapons systems, as well as explosives, mines, and demolitions. All this went way beyond Oslo.
The Israelis were planning to grab the ship when it moved into international waters, which would be around noon the following day. (The operation had to take place in international waters, rather than, for example, Saudi territorial waters.)
This news put me in a fury; it was a total surprise to me. No one had briefed us on it before we left the States, and now it threatened to derail our efforts before they even got off the ground. . . . Later, to my immense relief, both the Israelis and the Palestinians kept their cool and did not use the takedown as an excuse to back away from the Trilateral Committee meetings or our proposed plan. Still, my mission was once again off to a less-than-desirable start.
The next morning at Prime Minister Sharon’s farm in southern Israel, I received more information on the pending operation: It would occur at noon during my first scheduled meeting with Chairman Arafat in Ramallah. Before I left the farm, I asked Sharon if I could break the news of the Karine A to Arafat. I wanted to see the look on Arafat’s face when I told him about it.
“Yes,” he said, “but don’t do it before noon. That’s when we’re going to run the takedown.”
Later that morning, I met with the members of the Quad, who recommitted to working with us. Since they had significant influence on the Palestinians, they proved to be invaluable in facilitating progress on confidence-building actions during my return to the U.S.; their permanent representatives added greatly to the undertakings of our embassy and consulate.
I FLEW to Ramallah, where I had a typically pleasant meeting with Arafat; he once again promised to take the actions necessary to implement the Tenet plan.
Noon came and we began preparing for lunch.
“Umm,” I asked myself, “should I give him the word during lunch?” I thought on that. “No,” I concluded, “I’ll wait till afterward.”
About
halfway through the meal, people all of a sudden started running around with panicked looks, cell phones were firing up, aides were whispering in Arafat’s ear. I can understand enough Arabic to pick up on alarms and excitement. They had gotten word of the Karine A takedown.
I watched Arafat across the table, trying to gauge his reaction. He seemed both confused and dismissive. (One of his defense mechanisms is to deny bad news and seem indifferent to it, both at the same time.)
Finally, I asked him, “What’s going on?”
“It’s nothing. Forget it.”
“Well,” I said, “I know about the Karine A, I know about its cargo, and I know the Israelis were going to mount an operation to take it down. It looks like they’ve done that.”
“That is not true,” he shot back. “This was not our ship. It’s an Israeli plot. This is an Israeli setup.”
I gave him a skeptical smile and a shake of the head.
But later, after the ship’s master admitted Palestinian Authority involvement and the TV news was filled with pictures of the ship and the huge amount of weapons aboard, Arafat vowed to investigate. The investigation never happened.
Meanwhile, I gave Arafat’s top subordinates a warning. “Look,” I told them, “you better think hard about how you want to respond to this thing. I’m not sure it will be a good idea to try to shift the blame . . . or claim an Israeli plot. There’s evidence that leads right back to you. We and the Israelis know that Chairman Arafat made payments to the Iranians, bought the weapons, and chartered the ship; we know that the captain of the ship is a Palestinian Authority guy; and he is now spilling his guts.”
The situation was obviously looking bad for the Palestinians.
At this point, Arafat dumped the blame on one of his own people. It was an obvious scam. The guy could never have put out that kind of money without Arafat knowing about it.