128. Account of the decision for the Anschluß based on Below, 92; Leonidas E. Hill (ed.), Die Weizsäcker-Papiere 1933–1950, Frankfurt am Main/Berlin/Vienna, 1974, 124 (26 March 1938); Domarus, 820–21; Schmidl, 214–15; ‘Anschluß’ 1938, 328ff; Irving, Führer, 91.
129. Kube, 248–9; David Irving, Göring. A Biography, London, 1989, 210–11. The frequently cited version – see, for example, Toland, 452; Irving, Führer, 91; Wagner and Tomkowitz, 211 – of Göring sending an intermediary to Linz with the suggestion of moving to full Anschluß and Hitler agreeing, rests on a single piece of doubtful testimony, and reflects Göring’s embellishment of his own role. (See Kube, 248 n.117.) Papen, influenced by Göring’s Nuremberg testimony, also stated that Hitler moved to Anschluß at Göring’s insistence (Papen, 438).
130. Domarus, 821; Below, 92; Pauley, 219–20.
131. Below, 92–3; Domarus, 822; Gedye, 318; Botz, Wien, 72.
132. Botz, Wien, 119.
133. Domarus, 822.
134. Gedye, 318.
135. Below, 93; Schroeder, 85; Domarus, 822; Gedye, 318–19; Botz, Wien, 73.
136. Keitel, 180.
137. Botz, Wien, 69–71.
138. Botz, Wien, 73–4.
139. Botz, Wien, 55–8.
140. Domarus, 823; Botz, Wien, 75.
141. Domarus, 824; Wagner and Tomkowitz, 226–9.
142. Papen, 432–3. Papen says the meeting lasted an hour. Botz, Wien, 76, 120, 523 n.19, claims it was no longer than a quarter of an hour. Hitler’s tight schedule would not have allowed for Papen’s lengthier audience.
143. Papen, 433; Botz, Wien, 120.
144. Botz, Wien, 123; Lewy, 212.
145. Domarus, 825; Botz, Wien, 122.
146. Domarus, 825–6; Botz, Wien, 76, 523 n.19.
147. Domarus, 830.
148. Domarus, 832–50.
149. BA, R55/445, ‘Wahlparole Nr.8’, 1 April 1938.
150. Domarus, 850.
151. BA, R55/445, ‘Rundspruch Nr.69. Tagesparole vom 11. April 1938, betr. die Kommentierung des Wahlergebnisses’. [‘Ein solches, beinahe 100 prozentiges Wahlergebnis ist gleichzeitig ein Ruhmesblatt für alle Wahlpropagandisten.’]
152. See Botz, Der 13.März 38, 2.4–6, and, especially, Botz, Wien, ch.II; Ernst Hanisch, National sozialistische Herrschaft in der Provinz. Salzburg im Dritten Reich, Salzburg, 1983, 52–71, for the vote in Austria; also Helmut Auerbach, ‘Volksstimmung und veröffentlichte Meinung’, in Knipping and Müller, 273–93, here 279. One example, cited by Auerbach (279 n.33), of ballot-rigging was the case in the Konstanz area where thirty-two voting slips containing ‘Nein’ votes had been counted as ‘Ja’. (See Jörg Schadt (ed.), Verfolgung und Widerstand unter dem Nationalsozialismus in Baden. Die Lageberichte der Gestapo und des Generalstaatsanwalts Karlsruhe 1933–1940, Stuttgart, 1976, 270.)
153. Tb Irving, 123 (20 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92, 110.
154. Papen, 438.
155. Botz, Wien, 57.
156. Gerhard Botz, ‘Die Ausgliederung der Juden aus der Gesellschaft. Das Ende des Wiener Judentums unter der NS-Herrschaft (1938–1943)’, in Gerhard Botz, Ivar Oxaal, and Michael Pollak (eds.), Eine zerstörte Kultur. Judisches Leben und Antisemitismus in Wien seit dem 19. Jahrhundert, Buchloe, 1990, 285–312, here 289–90; Gedye, 307–9.
157. Gedye, 295.
158. Carl Zuckmayer, Als wärs ein Stück von mir. Erinnerungen, Frankfurt am Main (1966), 1971, 61.
159. George Clare, Last Waltz in Vienna. The Destruction of a Family, 1842–1941, Pan Books edn, London, 1982, 177–8.
160. Botz, Wien, 55; Gedye, 300–302; Wagner and Tomkowitz, 160–61.
161. Gedye, 305, 307, 313.
162. See Hans Safrian, Eichmann und seine Gehilfen, Frankfurt am Main, 1995, ch.1, especially 36ff.; Wildt, 52–4.
163. Janßen/Tobias, 190–94, quotation 194.
164. Cit. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’. 130–31; and see Auerbach in Knipping and Müller, 278.
165. See Karl Stadler, Österreich 1938–1945 im Spiegel der NS-Akten, Vienna/Munich, 1966, ch.2; Botz, Wien, 355–64, 475–82; Tim Kirk, Nazism and the Working Class in Austria. Industrial Unrest and Political Dissent in the National Community, Cambridge, 1996, ch.2.
166. See Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 124–32.
167. The German minority had indeed suffered some forms of economic and bureaucratic discrimination at the hands of the Czechs, though seldom of a serious nature before the Nazi takeover of power in Germany had given a new edge to ethnic tensions – mainly stirred up by the Sudeten Germans. Even then, Nazi propaganda within and outside the Sudetenland contrived to exaggerate the alleged maltreatment of the German population. See Ronald M. Smelser, The Sudeten Problem 1933–1938. Volkstumspolitik and the Formulation of Nazi Foreign Policy, Folkestone, 1975, 8–9, 214ff.; and, especially, the contemporary observations on the nature and degree of the discrimination against the German minority – described as ‘easily the most privileged in the whole of Europe’ – in Gedye, 396: ‘At no time politically persecuted, always arrogantly conscious of the backing of Germany’s sixty-six millions, its real grounds of complaint were limited to certain economic disabilities – which were in part politically necessary because of German disloyalty to the Republic – and to petty officiousness practised by some of the local Czech officials… Their minor grievances had been continually exaggerated, inflated, and trumpeted abroad by the German propaganda machine because they were an instrument to forward the German plans for hegemony in Eastern Europe.’
168. Helmut Groscurth, Tagebücher eines Abwehroffiziers 1938–1940, ed. Helmut Krausnick and Harold C. Deutsch, Stuttgart, 1970, 111–12 (4 September 1938).
169. Wiedemann, 171.
170. IMG, xxxiv.732–47, Doc.175–C.
171. IMG, xxxiv.745–7. See also ADAP, D, VII, 547ff The term ‘living space’ was not understood by Beck and the army leadership in the same way that Hitler deployed it. But the vagueness of the concept meant such dangerous overlaps were possible. See Müller, Heer, 250 and n.215.
172. See Timothy W. Mason, Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft. Dokumente und Materialien zur deutschen Arbeiterpolitik 1936–1939, Opladen, 1975, ch.XII.
173. Müller, Beck, 521; Klaus-Jürgen Müller, ‘The Structure and Nature of the National Conservative Opposition in Germany up to 1940’, in H. W. Koch (ed.), Aspects of the Third Reich, London, 1985, 132–78, here 159.
174. See Kube, Ch.VII.
175. See Hans Bernd Gisevius, To the Bitter End, Cambridge, Mass., 1947, 275–326; Erich Kordt, Nicht aus den Akten… Die Wilhelmstraße in Frieden und Krieg. Erlebnisse, Begegnungen und Eindrücke 1918–1945, Stuttgart, 1950, 232–57; Müller, in Koch, Aspects, 156ff.; Hans Rothfels, The German Opposition to Hitler. An Assessment, London, 1970, 56–63; and, especially, Harold C. Deutsch, The Conspiracy against Hitler in the Twilight War, Minneapolis, 1968, ch.1; and Peter Hoffmann, Widerstand-Staatsstreich-Attentat. Der Kampf der Opposition gegen Hitler, (1969), 4th edn, Munich/Zurich, 1985, ch.IV.
176. For Beck, see above all Müller, Beck, ch.6. Müller’s interpretation of Beck gave rise to strong criticism from Peter Hoffmann, ‘Generaloberst Ludwig Becks militärpolitisches Denken’, HZ, 234 (1982), 101–21, who saw in Müller’s treatment an undue emphasis on opportunism at the expense of stress on ethical motivation; and a sharp riposte from Klaus-Jürgen Müller, ‘Militärpolitik nicht Militäropposition!’, HZ, 235 (1982), 355–71. For Canaris, see Heinz Höhne, Canaris – Patriot im Zwielicht, Munich, 1976.
177. On Weizsäcker, see Rainer A. Blasius, Für Großdeutschland – gegen den großen Krieg. Staatssekretär Ernst Freiherr von Weizsäcker in den Krisen um die Tschechoslowakei und Polen 1938/39, Cologne/Vienna, 1981; and Rainer A. Blasius, ‘Weizsäcker kontra Ribbentrop: “München” statt des großen Krieges’, in Knipping and Müller, 93–118. As with Beck, Weizsäcker’s motives have been differently interpreted. Leonidas E. Hill, the editor of Weizsäcker’s papers, underlines the State Secretary’s emphasis o
n a peaceful evolution to Germany’s position as a world power (Leonidas E. Hill, ‘Alternative Politik des Auswärtigen Amtes bis zum 1. September 1939’, in Jürgen Schmädeke and Peter Steinbach (eds.), Der Wider stand gegen den Nationalsozialismus. Die deutsche Gesellschaft und der Widerstand gegen Hitler, Munich/Zurich, 1985, 664–90, here 669–78). Blasius, in contrast, stresses Weizsäcker’s affinity with Hitler’s expansionist aims, though growing opposition to a war which he is certain will bring catastrophe on Germany.
178. See Ritter, ch.10; Klemens von Klemperer, German Resistance against Hitler. The Search for Allies Abroad, 1938–1945, Oxford, 1992, 86–101; Patricia Meehan, The Unnecessary War. Whitehall and the German Resistance to Hitler, London, 1992, 86–7, 102–3, 122ff.
179. A term used by the Regierungspräsident of Niederbayern and the Oberpfalz in his report of 8 September 1938, GStA, MA 106673. The SD’s annual report for 1938 also spoke of a ‘war psychosis’ (Meldungen aus dem Reich. Die geheimen Lageberichte des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS 1938–45, 17 vols, ed. Heinz Boberach, Herrsching, 1984 (=MadR), ii.72–3).
180. See Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’ 132–9; and Auerbach, in Knipping and Müller, 28off.
181. Bloch, 175.
182. Weizsäcker-Papiere, 136; ADAP, D, II, No. 374, 473; Blasius, in Knipping, 101.
183. Henderson thought another crisis like that on 21 May would push him over the edge (DBFP, Series 3, II, Appendix 1, 649, 651, 653, and Doc.823, 284).
184. Tb Irving, 123 (20 March 1938).
185. IMG, xxviii.372.
186. Weinberg II, 318; see also 366–70; Gerhard L. Weinberg, ‘The May Crisis, 1938’, JMH, 29 (1957), 213–25, especially 225; and Donald Cameron Watt, ‘Hitler’s visit to Rome and the May Weekend Crisis: A Study in Hitler’s Response to External Stimuli’, JCH, 9 (1974), 23–32 (and Weinberg’s criticism of Watt’s interpretation, in Weinberg II, 366 n.210).
187. See, for this term – derived from the analysis of Nazi rule by Franz Neumann, Behemoth. The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, London, 1942 (see his comments on 296, 382–3) – Peter Hüttenberger, ‘Nationalsozialistische Polykratie’, GG, 2 (1976), 417–42.
188. Müller, Heer, 327; Müller, Beck, 350–51.
189. Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Armee, Politik und Gesellschaft in Deutschland 1933–1945, Paderborn, 1979, 43–4.
190. Even reports from oppositional sources made plain that, while opinion was divided on the likelihood and the outcome of war, extensive nazified sections of the population remained firmly behind Hitler. (See DBS, v.684–90, report for July 1938, drawn up on 24 August 1938.)
191. Weinberg II, 328, 363–4.
192. Weinberg II, 341, 352ff.
193. Weinberg II, 322–3.
194. Weinberg II, 343.
195. Weinberg II, 348; quotation from Lord Halifax to Henderson, 19 March 1938.
196. Weinberg II, 325. For the exaggeration of grievances in German propaganda, see Gedye, 396.
197. Tb Irving, 91 (7 March 1938); and see Irving, Goebbels, 242.
198. Weinberg II, 334.
199. IMG, xxviii.372. The British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had himself ‘likened Germany to a boa constrictor that had eaten a good meal and was trying to digest the meal before taking anything else’ (cit. Weinberg II, 302).
200. ADAP, D, II, 157, No.106; and see Smelser, 217ff
201. DGFP, D, II, 242, N0.135.
202. DGFP, D, II, 198, N0.197; Weinberg II, 335.
203. Weinberg II, 321; and see Michels, 382, for Goebbels’s propaganda during the Sudeten crisis.
204. See his views as recorded in Hoßbach’s memorandum of the meeting on 5 November 1937 (DGFP, D, I, 29–39, especially 32–4, No.19; Weinberg II, 317, 336).
205. See Hitler’s ‘Denkschrift zur Frage unserer Festungsanlagen’ of 1 July 1938 in Otto-Wilhelm Förster, Das Befestigungswesen, Neckargemünd, 1960, Anlage 13, 123–48; also John D. Heyl, ‘The Construction of the Westwall, 1938: An Exemplar for National Socialist Policymaking’, Central European History, 14 (1981), 63–78; and Weinberg II, 318.
206. See Weinberg II, 337.
207. Keitel, 182. Keitel dates the meeting to 20 April. But for the correct date of 21 April see IMG, xxv.415–18, Doc.388–PS; Domarus, 851 (and 851–2 for Schmundt’s notes); and Weinberg II, 337–8 and n.91.
208. Domarus, 851–2; Weinberg II, 338.
209. Keitel, 183; DGFP, D, II.300–303, here 300, No.175.
210. Müller, Beck, 510 (full text pp.502–12); Müller, Heer, 301ff.
211. Keitel, 184; Müller, Heer, 305.
212. Keitel, 184–5; Below, 105–6; Weinberg II, 318, 371; and see Franz W. Seidler, Fritz Todt. Baumeister des Dritten Reiches, Munich, 1986, ch.4. I am grateful to Steven F. Sage for sharing some insights into Todt and his work, which will be re-evaluated in his forthcoming study, and letting me see an unpublished paper he had compiled on Todt. The army’s planning for the Westwall had looked to the construction of large, well-provisioned underground fortresses mirroring the French Maginot Line. This clashed with Hitler’s conception of a far greater number of relatively simple fortified gun-sites and anti-tank structures, aimed heavily at deterrent effect. (See Heyl, 64–5.)
213. See Below, 106.
214. Monologe, 344 (16 August 1942).
215. Schmidt, 390; Bloch, 181.
216. Ciano, Tagebücher 1937/1938, 156–9 (entries for 3–9 May 1938); Eugen Dollmann, Dolmetscher der Diktatoren, Bayreuth, 1963, 37–8; Wiedemann, 140.
217. Schmidt, 392–3; Wiedemann, 141–2; Ciano, Tagebücher, 156, note. There are minor discrepancies between the reliable description of Schmidt and that of Wiedemann (who does not mention the performance of Aïda, and has Hitler inspecting a Nazi formation following a glittering dinner attended not by the King, but by the Crown Prince).
218. Bloch, 181.
219. Ciano, Tagebücher, 157 (entry for 6 May 1938); Bloch, 182; see also Schmidt, 394.
220. Domarus, 861; and see Schmidt, 394–5.
221. DGFP, D, I, 1108–10, No.761–2; Weinberg II, 340.
222. DGFP, D, I, 1110, No.762; Weinberg II, 309.
223. Politisches Archiv, Auswärtiges Amt, Bonn, Pol.2a 1 (6936), Bd.16, Deutsch-italienische pol. Beziehungen, Jan.-Sept. 1938. (‘Was sudetendeutsche Frage anlangt, so ergaben Unterhaltungen ohne weiteres, daß Italiener für unsere Anteilnahme am sudetendeutschen Schicksal Verständnis haben.’)
224. Weizsäcker-Papiere, 127–8.
225. See the accounts in Bloch, 183–5; Weinberg II, 367–9; Weinberg, ‘May Crisis’, and Watt, ‘Hitler’s Visit to Rome’.
226. Boris Celovsky, Das Münchener Abkommen 1938, Stuttgart, 1958, 209 and n.2.
227. Schmidt, 395–6.
228. DBFP, Ser.3,1, 332–3, 341, Nos.250, 264.
229. DGFP, D, II, 315–17, No.186.
230. Bloch,185.
231. Bloch, 185; Weinberg II, 369.
232. IMG, xxviii.372. For the suggestion that the timing of Hitler’s order of 30 May was not caused by the May Crisis, but rested on his deliberations of 20 April, see Weinberg II, 366, and 337 n.87, and 370 n.219, for the dating of Jodl’s diary entry to June-July.
233. Keitel, 185 (on Hitler’s return to Berlin; he brings it in direct relation with new directions for ‘Green’). See also Hitler’s public statements, indicating his response to the ‘Czech provocation’, in speeches on 12 September 1938 and 30 January 1939 (Domarus, 868–9).
234. Wilhelm Treue (ed.), ‘Rede Hitlers vor der deutschen Presse (10. November 1938)’, VfZ, 6 (1958), 175–91, here 183.
235. Wiedemann, 126; Dülffer, Marine, Düsseldorf, 1973, 466.
236. Dülffer, Marine, 471–4. Hitler demanded the building of six heavy battleships – the beginnings of the later Z-Plan – saying to Raeder that he needed a ‘risk fleet’ in order to reach terms with Great Britain (‘… daß er eine Risikoflotte haben müsse, ohne die es nicht zu einem Ausgleich mit England kommen werde’). (IfZ, ZS-41, Admiral a.D. Werner Fuchs,
16 December 1951, Fol.16.) Raeder was well aware in 1938 of the hopelessness (Aussichtslosigkeit) of a war at sea against the British Navy (BA/MA, PG/34566, Akten des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine, Großadmiral Erich Raeder, ‘Aus der Unterrichtung des Amtschefs A am 12.7.38…’) The navy leadership saw the six battleships as the minimum over the following six years for an eventual conflict with Britain which would involve, taking account of the British Empire and other nations, war against a third to a half of the entire world (BA/MA, PG 34566, Admiral Rolf Carls, ‘Stellungnahme zur “Entwurfstudie” Seekriegführung gegen England’, September 1938).
237. Wiedemann, 128.
238. NCA, i.520–51, Doc.PS-3037; Wiedemann, 127.
239. Müller, Beck, 512–20 (and also 29off.).
240. IMG, xxv.433–9, here 433–4, Doc.388-PS; DGFP, D, II, 358–64, here 358, No.221.
241. ADAP, D, II, 377–80 (quotation, 377), NO.282; DGFP, D, II, 473–7, here 473, NO.282.
242. Michael Geyer, ‘Restorative Elites, German Society, and the Nazi Pursuit of War’, in Richard Bessel (ed.), Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Comparisons and Contrasts, Cambridge, 1996, 134–64, here 163; see also Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg (= DRZW), ed. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, 6 vols. so far published, Stuttgart, i.644ff.
243. Müller, Beck, 521–37 (and 289–97).
244. Müller, Beck, 523–5.
245. Müller, Heer, 313.
246. Müller, Heer, 313–14. See Janßen/Tobias, 206–19, for the inaccuracy of the rumours that Brauchitsch had been ‘bought’ by Hitler through a sizeable bribe to assist in the costs incurred through divorcing his wife in order to remarry. Brauchitsch’s subservience to Hitler was not purchased; it came naturally.
247. Müller, Heer, 314.
248. Müller, Armee, Dok.115, S.259–61 (Halder’s report on Hitler’s speech); Below, 103–5; Janßen/Tobias, 237ff.; Weinberg II, 385; Müller, Beck, 297; Müller, Heer, 315; IfZ, ED 1, Fol.416–17, ‘Personliche Erlebnisse des Generals d.Inf. a.D. Curt Liebmann in den Jahren 1938/39’ (compiled in November 1939).