130. DGFP, D, VII, 156–7, N0.142.
131. Hoffmann, Hitler Was My Friend, 102. Speer’s account, 176, differs in detail, recording Hitler’s reactions on receiving the telegram (for which see Domarus, 1233).
132. Steinert, 85–6. And see Schmidt, 449; Shirer, 145.
133. Baumgart, 142 (the comment written in November 1939 of General Liebmann), and 145 n.100, citing Rundstedt’s recollections in testimony at Nuremberg on 19 June 1946; see also Below, 181.
134. TBJG, I/7, 72 (22 August 1939).
135. TBJG, I/7, 72 (24 August 1939): ‘Wir sind in Not und fressen da wie der Teufel Fliegen.’
136. Seraphim, Rosenberg-Tagebuch, 89–90 (22 August 1939).
137. See DBS, vi.985–6.
138. DBS, vi.988.
139. Hoffmann, Hitler Was My Friend, 103.
140. TBJG, I/7, 73 (23 August 1939).
141. Watt, How War Came, 466.
142. Cit. Werner Maser, Der Wortbruch. Hitler, Stalin und der Zweite Weltkrieg, (1994), 4th edn, Munich, 1997, 59–60.
143. Watt, How War Came, 467–70.
144. Meehan, 233–4. Halifax stressed only the importance of the effect on morale.
145. Watt, How War Came, 463.
146. The order to attend the meeting was delivered to General Liebmann on the morning of 21 August (Baumgart, 141).
147. Below, 181.
148. Baumgart, 144 n.97, 148.
149. Baumgart, 144 n.97. Some present later claimed that they were there in uniform. The most contemporary accounts, however, mention civilian clothes. Below, 180, confirms this.
150. Baumgart, 142.
151. Baumgart, 143 and n.93–6, 148.
152. Baumgart, 143 and n.96.
153. Baumgart, 148 n.111. The notes were handwritten headings, according to Below, 181.
154. Baumgart, 120.
155. Baumgart, 122–8. For the significance of the document, its authenticity, and the authorship of the best version (that of Canaris), see Baumgart’s article, and his reply, ‘Zur Ansprache Hitlers vor den Führern der Wehrmacht am 22. August 1939 (Erwiderung)’, VfZ, 19 (1971), 301–4, to Hermann Böhm, ‘Zur Ansprache Hitlers vor den Führern der Wehrmacht am 22. August 1939’, VfZ, 19 (1971), 294–300.
156. IMG, xxvi, 338–44, Doc. 798-PS; DGFP, D, VII, 200–204 (quotations 204), No.192; Baumgart, 149 and n.113 for the timing and lunchtime break, 135–6, n.67. Also Below, 181.
157. For the time, Baumgart, 126, 149 n.113. Below recalled that he spoke for about two hours. (Below, 180). Baumgart, 132–3 n.53, 55 for operational talks, and reference to Halder and Warli-mont; Below, 181.
158. On the different interpretations of what Hitler meant by this phrase, see Baumgart, 133 and n.57.
159. IMG, xxvi, 523–4, D0C.1014-PS; DGFP, D, VII, 205–6, No.205–6 (quotations, 205).
160. Baumgart, 146.
161. Baumgart, 146.
162. Below, 181, thought the Soviet pact had silenced some sceptics.
163. Baumgart, 148. For Hitler’s insistence that the West would not intervene, see IfZ, F34/1, Vormann Memoirs, Fols.42–3.
164. Hassell, 71.
165. Below, 181–2.
166. Baumgart, 143 n.96, 146; Schmidt, 449–50; Bloch, 246.
167. Schmidt, 455. Hoffmann’s account of the visit to Moscow (Hitler Was My Friend, 103–14) is inaccurate and self-important. The signs are that Stalin was, in fact, less than happy at Hoffmann’s photographic interference and did not welcome the publicity (Ribbentrop Memoirs, 114).
168. Based on Ribbentrop Memoirs, 110–13, and Schmidt, 450–52. Both are variedly inaccurate on the time of arrival and first talks; see Bloch, 247. Though Schulenburg had been in Moscow for years, it was the first time that he had spoken to Stalin.
169. Below, 182.
170. Below, 183. Speer, 177, gives a distorted version of the incident, which is also graphically described by the ‘manager’ (Verwalter) at the Berghof, Herrmann Döring, BBC-Archive, ‘The Nazis: A Warning from History’, Transcript, Roll 244, Fols.30–37. Speer recalled after the war that no one hearing Hitler was shocked by his remarks about the shedding of much blood, and that Germany would have to plunge into the abyss with him if the war was not won. Speer himself was taken, so he recalled, by ‘the grandeur of the historical hour’ (Albert Speer, Spandau. The Secret Diaries, Fontana edn, London, 1977, 40–41 (entry for 21 December 1946)).
171. Schmidt, 452–3; Below, 183; Ribbentrop Memoirs, 113. A telegram containing just those words followed within two hours (DGFP, D, VII, 220, 223, Nos. 205, 210).
172. Ribbentrop Memoirs, 113; Schmidt, 454. Hoffmann’s account, Hitler Was My Friend, 109–11, cannot be trusted.
173. Bloch, 249 (contradicting Ribbentrop’s own claim, Ribbentrop Memoirs, 113, that they were signed before midnight).
174. TBJG, I/7, 75 (24 August 1939).
175. Below, 183.
176. Watt, How War Came, 463, 465. Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary of State in the USA, was told on 22 August by Joseph E. Davies, former US Ambassador in Moscow, that news of the non-aggression pact was ‘not unexpected’ (Davies, 453–4).
177. The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 200.
178. Nicolson, 154.
179. Chips, 208–9.
180. N. J. Crowsen (ed.), Fleet Street, Press Barons, and Politics: the Journals of Collin Brooks, 1932–1940, Camden Soc, 5th Ser., vol.11, London, 1998, 252.
181. Roberts, 174; Allan Merson, Communist Resistance in Nazi Germany, London, 1985, 212–13.
182. Heinz Kühnrich, ‘Der deutsch-sowjetische Nichtangriffsvertrag vom 23. August 1939 aus der zeitgenössischen Sicht der KPD’, in Eichholtz and Pätzold, 517–51, here 519 (quotation), 529.
183. Below, 184.
184. See TBJG, I/7, 74–7 (24 August 1939, 25 August 1939) for the uncertainty of Goebbels who, at this time on the Berghof, was probably echoing Hitler’s own sentiments.
185. Documents concerning German-Polish Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939, London, 1939, 96–8, No.56; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 170–71 (here 171), No.207; DGFP, D, VII, 215–16, No.200; Henderson, 256.
186. Documents, 99, No.57; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 161–3 (here 162), No.200; see Henderson, 247–8, 256–7, 301–5.
187. Documents, 99–100, N0.57; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 161–3 (here 163), N0.200; DGFP, D, VII, 210–16, No.200; Domarus, 1244–7.
188. DBFP, 3rd Ser.VII, 201–2 (quotation 201), N0.248.
189. Documents, 100–101, N0.58; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 201–2 (here 202), N0.248; DGFP, D, VII, 210–16, No.200; Henderson, 257; Domarus, 1249–50.
190. Domarus, 1247–8; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 177–9 (here, 178), No.211.
191. Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, 252.
192. TBJG, I/7, 76 (25 August 1939); Below, 187; Watt, How War Came, 464–5. And see Hitler’s remarks to Reich Press Chief Otto Dietrich: ‘No democratic government can survive such a defeat and embarrassment as Chamberlain and Daladier have had inflicted on them through our Moscow treaty.’ (cit. Peter Kleist, Zwischen Hitler und Stalin, Bonn, 1950, 66. (‘Keine demokratische Regierung kann sich halten, der eine solche Niederlage und zugleich Blamage zuteil geworden ist, wie Chamberlain und Daladier durch unseren Moskauer Vertrag.’)) The speeches of Chamberlain and Halifax can be found in Documents, 107–18.
193. Ribbentrop Memoirs, 116.
194. Documents, 120–22, N0.68; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 227–31, Nos.283–4; Henderson, 259; Schmidt, 458–9; Domarus, 1256–7.
195. Documents, 122–3, No.69; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 230, No.284; Domarus, 1257.
196. Henderson, 259. See also DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 235, 239, Nos.286, 293.
197. TBJG, I/7, 77 (26 August 1939).
198. IMG, xxviii.389, D0C.1780-PS (Jodl’s diary, 23 August 1939) for the time set for the operation. Hitler took the decision to go ahead at 3.02p.m. on 25 August and various subsidiary orders to army units followed (Franz Halder, Kriegstagebuch. Täglich
e Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres 1939–1942, ed. Arbeitskreis für Wehrforschung Stuttgart, 3 vols., Stuttgart, 1962–4 (= Halder KTB), i.33 (26 August 1939); Vormann, in IfZ, F34/1, Fol.24). Saturday -a day favoured by Hitler for the withdrawal from the League of Nations, the introduction of conscription, the reoccupation of the Rhineland, and the Anschluß – was possibly chosen since it delayed the likely response time of the British government. (See Domarus, 1239 and n.654. See also Weinberg II, 634; Walther Hofer, Die Entfesselung des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Frankfurt am Main, 1964, 274; Hermann Graml, Europas Weg in den Krieg. Hitler und die Mächte 1939, Munich, 1990, 287 (and 277ff. for a detailed account of the developments during the last days of August.)
199. Weinberg II, 633–4.
200. Below, 178.
201. Generaloberst Halder, Kriegstagebuch. Bd. 1: Vom Polenfeldzug bis zum Eride der Westoffensive (14.8.1939–30.6.1940), ed. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Stuttgart, 1962 [= Halder KTB], 26 (22 August 1939); The Halder War Diary, 1939–1942, ed. Charles Burdick and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, London, 1988 (the abridged English translation of Halder KTB = Halder Diary), 32; DGFP, D, VII, 557–9, Appendix I (extracts from Halder’s diary); Domarus, 1239.
202. Below, 182.
203. TBJG, I/7, 77 (26 August 1939).
204. Henderson, 258; Halder KTB, i.31 (25 August 1939), mentions the lifting of telephone restrictions on Britain and France by Canaris. TBJG, I/7, 79–80 (27 August 1939), refers to the introduction of ration cards, though not yet for bread and potatoes. See Shirer, 148, 150 for grumbling at the ration cards.
205. Halder KTB, i. 31–3 (25–6 August 1939), IfZ, F34/1, Vormann, Fols.24–5.
206. Halder KTB, i. 31 (25 August 1939), 39 (28 August 1939); IfZ, F34/1, Vormann, Fols. 26–8.
207. Müller, Heer, 416–17.
208. Halder KTB, i. 33 (26 August 1939), 39 (28 August 1939); Engel, 59 and n.160.
209. Domarus, 1254–5.
210. Weinberg II, 630–31.
211. DGFP, D, VII, 285–6, No.271. Mussolini remarked that he had been preparing for war in 1942.
212. Schmidt, 462.
213. TBJG, I/7, 78 (26 August 1939). See Halder’s remark: ‘Führer rather gone to pieces’ (‘Führer ziemlich zusammengebrochen’), Halder KTB, i.34 (26 January 1939). According to Vormann, Hitler walked up and down the room in a state of agitation speaking to this and that person. To Vormann, he said: ‘We now have to be sly, sly as foxes’ (‘“Schlau müssen wir jetzt sein, schlau wie die Füchse”’) (IfZ, F34/1, Vormann, Fol.26).
214. IfZ, F34/1, Vormann, Fol.43: ‘The refusal of Mussolini was felt on all sides to be treachery and most harshly condemned’ (‘…war die Absage Mussolinis allseitig als Verrat empfunden und schärfstens verurteilt worden’). See also Below, 187–9, where, however, Hitler, despite the ‘hard words’ against his ally, did not doubt Mussolini’s loyalty.
215. IfZ, F34/1, Vormann, Fols.26–8; Ribbentrop Memoirs, 117. On the effect on Hitler’s prestige, Müller, Heer, 420 and n.206.
216. Schmidt, 462.
217. Schmidt, 459–61; IMG, x.240; Robert Coulondre, Von Moskau nach Berlin 1936–1939. Erinnerungen des französischen Botschafters, Bonn, 1950, 421–4; Weinberg II, 634 and n.32; Hofer, Entfesselung, 275; Graml, Europas Weg, 288–9.
218. Weinberg II, 635.
219. Ribbentrop Memoirs, 116–17. There is no corroborative support for Ribbentrop’s unlikely claim that, learning of the British-Polish pact, he had persuaded Hitler to halt the attack on Poland (Domarus, 1259; Schmidt, 459; Weinberg II, 637–8; and for Ribbentrop’s claim see also Bloch, 253). Below, 187, seems directly drawn from Ribbentrop’s memoirs and cannot be taken as supportive evidence. Brauchitsch – ‘not unjustifiably’, in Engel’s view – also claimed to have persuaded Hitler to postpone the attack (Engel, 59 (26 August 1939)). Goebbels makes it plain in his diary notes that it was the news from Mussolini that was decisive in the change of plan (TBJG, I/7, 78 (26 August 1939)).
220. A point made by Weinberg II, 635.
221. Ribbentrop Memoirs, 117; Bloch, 254.
222. Domarus, 1261.
223. IMG, iii.280.
224. Dahlerus, 53–6.
225. Domarus, 1261.
226. Domarus, 1264–5; CD, 135.
227. CD, 135; DGFP, D, VII, 324–6, N0.320.
228. TBJG, I/7, 80, 82–3 (28 August 1939, 29 August 1939).
229. Domarus, 1265–6.
230. Engel, 60 (27 August 1939, 29 August 1939).
231. Dahlerus, 56.
232. DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 283–4, Annex I to Doc.349.
233. Dahlerus, 56–66 (quotation, 66: ‘Sein ganzes Verhalten machte den Eindruck eines völlig Anormalen’).
234. Dahlerus, 69–70.
235. Dahlerus, 78–9.
236. DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 318–20, 321–2, Nos.402, 406.
237. DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 324, No.411, and, especially, 328, No.420.
238. TBJG, I/7, 80 (28 September 1939).
239. Groscurth, 187 (27 August 1939).
240. Halder KTB, i. 40 (28 August 1939).
241. TBJG, I/7, 81 (28 August 1939). Goebbels was evidently getting a preview on 27 August of the talk Hitler would give the next day.
242. Halder KTB, i. 38 (28 August 1939), trans. Halder Diary, 37.
243. Documents, 128, No.75; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 330–32, 351–5, Nos.426, 455.
244. Henderson, 262.
245. Documents, 128–31, here 129, No.75; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 352, N0.455.
246. DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 330, No.426; Alan Bullock, Hitler. A Study in Tyranny, (1952), Harmonds-worth, 1962, 541.
247. Documents, 126–8, No.74; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 321, No.426.
248. Henderson, 262.
249. TBJG, I/7, 83 (29 August 1939).
250. TBJG, I/7, 84 (30 August 1939). The plebiscite idea formed part of the proposals read out by Ribbentrop at his meeting with Henderson late on the evening of 30 August (Documents, 146, N0.92).
251. IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation, Bd.20, Aug. 1939; Irving, Führer, 222–3; Irving, War Path, 255–6.
252. Henderson, 263. Shirer, 150–54, remarked on how few people, and those with grim, silent faces, had been there the previous evening when Henderson went to the Reich Chancellery.
253. Henderson, 265; Documents, 138, No.79 (text, 135–7, no.78); DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 374–5 (here 374), N0.490, 388–90 (here, 390), No.502; Domarus, 1285–7.
254. Henderson, 267.
255. Documents, 138–9, No.80; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 376–7 (here 376), N0.493.
256. Documents, 140, No.82; DBFP, 3rd Ser., 400–401 (here 401), No.520.
257. Schmidt, 465.
258. Dahlerus, 99–100.
259. Documents, 139, Nos.81–2; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 391, 400–401, Nos.504, 520; Henderson, 268–9.
260. Domarus, 1289.
261. Domarus, 1290 and n.809 for Hitler’s use of ‘Führer’ alone after decrees from now on (though not consistently).
262. Dieter Rebentisch, Führerstaat und Verwaltung im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Verfassungsentwicklung und Verwaltungspolitik 1939–1945, Stuttgart, 1989, 117–32; also Broszat, Staat, 382.
263. Schmidt, 465–9, here 467–8.
264. Henderson, 270–71; Documents, 142–3, N0.89, 145–6, no.92; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 413–14, 432–3, Nos.543, 574; text of Hitler’s offer, Domarus, 1291–3. Schmidt claimed that Ribbentrop did not read the terms too quickly, though Henderson had noted that in his report to Halifax immediately after the meeting (Documents, 145, No.92 (DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 432–3, N0.574)). For Hitler’s order to Ribbentrop not to hand out the terms, see IMG, x. 311.
265. Documents, 146, No.92; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 433, No.574.
266. Henderson, 271.
267. Schmidt, 469.
268. TBJG, I/7, 86 (31 August 1939).
269. Domarus, 1297; Henderson, 275, 277; TBJG, I/7, 87 (1 September 1939).
270. Dahlerus, 107.
271.
Halder KTB, i. 46 (30 August 1939).
272. Halder KTB, i. 47 (31 August 1939).
273. Halder KTB, i. 46 (30 August 1939).
274. IMG, xxxiv, 456–9, D0C.126-C; Weisungen, 23–5.
275. Halder KTB, i. 47–8 (31 August 1939), trans. Halder Diary, 43 (31 August 1939). See also Groscurth, 195, n.441 for the timing of the transmission of the attack order, passed on by Brauchitsch at 16.20 hours. TBJG, I/7, 87 (1 September 1939) notes that at midday Hitler gave the order to attack ‘in the night approaching 5a.m.’.
276. IMG, ix.313 (Ribbentrop testimony).
277. TBJG, I/7, 87 (1 September 1939).
278. TBJG, I/7, 88 (1 September 1939).
279. Henderson, 276; Ribbentrop Memoirs, 125; Josef Lipski, Diplomat in Berlin 1933–1939, ed. Waclaw Jedrzejewicz, New York/London, 1968, 609–10; Irving, Führer, 225; Irving, War Path, 260.
280. Domarus, 1305–6.
281. Heinz Höhne, The Order of the Death’s Head. The Story of Hitler’s SS, London, 1969, 238–44. In the most spectacular of the ‘incidents’, the attack on the Gleiwitz radio station, Polish uniforms were not used (as some post-war testimony claimed), and were not necessary. An SS guard had already taken over the watch on the station to ensure the success of the operation when, as pre-arranged, five SD men dressed in civilian clothes entered the building to carry out the attack (Jürgen Runzheimer, ‘Der Überfall auf den Sender Gleiwitz im Jahre 1939’, VfZ, 10 (1962), 408–26).
282. Shirer, 152.
283. StA Bamberg, K8/III, 18473, LR Ebermannstadt, 31 August 1939. See also DBS, vi.980–83; Steinert, 91ff.; Wolfram Wette, ‘Zur psychologischen Mobilmachung der deutschen Bevölkerung 1933–1939’, in Wolfgang Michalka (ed.), Der Zweite Weltkrieg. Analysen-Grundzüge-Forschungsbilanz, Munich-Zurich, 1989, 205–23, here 220; and DRZW, i.142.
284. Horst Rohde, ‘Kriegsbeginn 1939 in Danzig – Planungen und Wirklichkeit’, in Michalka (ed.), Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 462–81, here 462, 472–7, 479 n.1; Levine, 153; Domarus, 1307–8. It should have been the cruiser Königsberg, but that ship had developed engine trouble (Levine, Hitler’s Free City, 152). See Baumgart, 147, for Liebmann’s report of the conversation he overheard between Raeder and Hitler following the meeting on the Berghof on 22 August. Raeder remarked that the Schleswig-Holstein would probably be sunk by Polish coastal batteries with the loss of 300 or so sea-cadets. Hitler replied with a dismissive wave of the hand. In fact, the attack on the Westerplatte did not go according to plan. The Luftwaffe had to intervene before the Westerplatte was finally taken on the afternoon of 1 September, by which time the Germans had lost between 40 and 50 men (Rohde, 474–5).