Diplomatically, too, there were hiccups. Ribbentrop, clumsy as ever, chose a wholly inopportune moment to press upon the Italians a mutual assistance pact, directed against France and Britain, formalizing the Axis agreement. Ciano was contemptuous about Ribbentrop. Mussolini, interested in the long run in such a pact, told his son-in-law that Ribbentrop ‘belongs to the category of Germans who bring misfortune to Germany. He talks left and right all the time about making war, without having a particular enemy or clear objective in view.’ He was not to be taken seriously.219
Hitler, on the other hand, had done much to dispel any initial coolness towards the visit with his speech in Rome on the evening of 7 May in which he enthused over the natural ‘alpine border’ providing a ‘clear separation of the living spaces of the two nations’.220 This public renunciation of any claim on the South Tyrol was no more than Hitler had been stating since the mid-1920S. But, coming so soon after the Anschluß, it was important in assuaging the Italians, not least since Hitler was anxious to sound them out over Czechoslovakia. The soundings were, from Hitler’s point of view, the most successful part of the visit. He took Mussolini’s remarks as encouragement to proceed against the Czechs.221 State Secretary von Weizsäcker noted that Italy intended to stay neutral in any war between Germany and Czechoslovakia.222 Reporting on Hitler’s visit in a circular to German diplomatic missions, Ribbentrop stated: ‘As far as the Sudeten Question is concerned, discussions indicated without further ado that the Italians have understanding for our involvement in the fate of the Sudeten Germans.’223 Diplomatically, Hitler had achieved what he wanted from the visit.
Before the ‘Weekend Crisis’ of 20–22 May, no timetable had been established for an attack on Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, Hitler had plainly become increasingly interested in acting within the foreseeable future. Already in mid-May, he had spoken of solving the ‘Sudeten question’ by the end of the year, since the international situation might well deteriorate thereafter.224 At this point the ‘Weekend Crisis’ intervened.225
Reports reaching the French and British embassies and the Prague government on 19–20 May of German troop movements near the Czech border were treated seriously, given the shrill German anti-Czech propaganda and the tension in the Sudetenland on account of the imminent local elections there. The Czechoslovakian government responded to what they took to be a threat of imminent invasion by partially mobilizing their military reserves – close on 180,000 men.226 Tension rose still further when two Sudeten Germans were killed in an incident involving the Czech police. Meanwhile, Keitel’s explicit reassurance to the British Ambassador Henderson, which had been given to the press, that the movements were no more than routine spring manoeuvres, had led to a furious tirade by Ribbentrop, incensed that Henderson had not gone through proper diplomatic channels in publishing the information, and threatening that Germany would fight as it had done in 1914 should war break out.227
This had the effect of stirring genuine alarm in the British Ambassador, worried that he had been misled by Keitel, and that a German invasion of Czechoslovakia was imminent. On the afternoon of Saturday, 21 May, Henderson was instructed by the British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax to inform Ribbentrop that the French were bound to intervene in the event of an attack on Czechoslovakia, and that the Germans should not depend upon the British standing by.228 Ribbentrop’s hysterical reply was scarcely reassuring: ‘If France were really so crazy as to attack us, it would lead to perhaps the greatest defeat in French history, and if Britain were to join her, then once again we should have to fight to the death.’229 By the Sunday, 22 May, however, British reconnaissance on the borders had revealed nothing untoward.230 It had been a false alarm.
The crisis blew over as quickly as it had started. But reactions abroad, not least in Britain, ran along the lines that German action had been intended, and that Hitler had backed down under pressure.231 According to Jodl’s diary notes – though they were compiled some weeks later – Hitler was affronted by the loss of German prestige.232 Keitel later recalled Hitler stating that he was not prepared to tolerate ‘such a provocation’ by the Czechs, and demanding the fastest possible preparations for a strike.233 It was not as a result of the crisis that Hitler resolved to crush Czechoslovakia before the year was out. That, as we have noted, was his intention already before the crisis. But the crisis accelerated matters. The blow to pride reinforced his determination to act as soon as possible. Delay was ruled out. ‘After 21 May it was quite clear that this problem had to be solved one way or the other. Every further postponement could only make the question more difficult and the solution thereby bloodier,’ was how he himself put it in retrospect.234
After days of brooding over the issue at the Berghof, pondering the advice of his military leaders that Germany was ill-equipped for an early strike against the Czechs, Hitler returned to Berlin and summoned a meeting of his top generals, together with leading figures from the Foreign Ministry, for 28 May.235 The day before the meeting, Hitler had told Raeder to speed up the construction programme for battleships and submarines.236 The target was plainly Britain. But Hitler did not expect war with the British over Czechoslovakia. The conflict with the west, he declared at the military conference the next day, would come after a further three or four years.237 Hitler told his generals bluntly: ‘I am utterly determined that Czechoslovakia should disappear from the map.’238 He claimed Germany was stronger than in 1914. He pointed to the train of successes since 1933. But there was no such thing as a lasting state of contentment. Life was a constant struggle. And Germany needed living-space in Europe, and in colonial possessions. The current generation had to solve the problem. France and Britain would remain hostile to an expansion of German power. Czechoslovakia was Germany’s most dangerous enemy in the event of conflict with the west. Therefore it was necessary to eliminate Czechoslovakia. He gave the incomplete state of Czech fortifications, the underdeveloped British and French armaments programmes, and the advantageous international situation as reasons for early action. The western fortifications were to be drastically speeded up. These would provide the framework for a ‘lightning march into Czechoslovakia’.239
Two days later, the revised ‘Case Green’ was ready. Its basic lines were unchanged from those drawn up earlier in the month by Keitel and Jodl. But the preamble now ran: ‘It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the foreseeable future.’ Keitel’s covering note laid down that preparations must be complete by 1 October at the latest.240 From that date on, Hitler was determined to ‘exploit every favourable political opportunity’ to accomplish his aim.241 It was a decision for war – if need be, even against the western powers.242
Chief of Staff Beck responded with two memoranda of 29 May and 3 June, highly critical both of Hitler’s political assumptions with regard to Britain and France, and of the operational directives for ‘Case Green’.243 Even so, as in his earlier memorandum of 5 May, there was significant overlap with Hitler’s basic assumptions about the need for ‘living-space’ (even if Beck had a much more limited conception of what this implied) and to eliminate – if necessary through war – the state of Czechoslovakia. The ‘cardinal point’ (as he put it) of disagreement was about the prospect of a war against France and Britain which, Beck was certain, Germany would lose.244 Beck was still at this time labouring under the illusion that Hitler was being badly advised by the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW, High Command of the Wehrmacht). His chief target was less Hitler than what in his view was a malformed structure of military command.245 What only gradually became clear to Beck was how far he had isolated himself even in the army’s own high command. In particular, the head of the army, Brauchitsch, though sharing some of Beck’s reservations, would undertake nothing which might appear to challenge or criticize Hitler’s plans.246 The distance between Brauchitsch and Beck became more marked. Increasingly, the head of the army looked to Beck’s deputy, General Franz Haider.247
At a meeting of around
forty army high commanders at Barth in Pom-erania on 13 June, Brauchitsch served initially as Hitler’s mouthpiece, in a morning session informing the assembled officers, most of whom had until then known nothing of Hitler’s directive and were taken completely by surprise, of the decision to solve the Czech problem by force. In such a tense situation, Brauchitsch appealed for, and received, the loyalty of his leading officers. The meeting had been called by Hitler to inform the officers about the Fritsch affair and head off the disaffection about the treatment of the former highly revered army leader which had lingered, and had been growing, since his complete exoneration by a military court.248 By the time Hitler arrived, around noon, Brauchitsch’s surprise announcement about the imminence of war had helped him out of his internal difficulties. Hitler’s subsequent skilfully toned ‘rehabilitation’ of Fritsch – though without restoring him to his office – had then fully warded off the possible crisis of confidence. He ended by taking up the theme introduced by Brauchitsch: in the face of impending danger of war, he appealed to his generals for loyalty.249 The generals complied. Any hopes that Beck – not present at the meeting – might have cherished of a united rejection by the military leadership of Hitler’s Czech adventure were revealed as futile.
Beck’s own position, and the force of his operational arguments, weakened notably in mid-June when the results of war games – initiated by the General Staff itself, and requested neither by Hitler nor the OKW – demonstrated, in contrast to Beck’s grim prognostications, that Czechoslovakia would in all probability be overrun within eleven days, with the consequence that troops could rapidly be sent to fight on the western front.250 His differences with Brauchitsch were unmistakably evident at the concluding discussion of the war-games exercise during the second half of June. Even in the General Staff itself, Beck’s Cassandra warnings were regarded as exaggerated.251 Increasingly despairing and isolated, Beck went so far in summer as to advocate collective resignation of the military leadership to force Hitler to give way, to be followed by a purge of the ‘radicals’ responsible for the high-risk international adventurism.252 ‘The soldierly duty [of the highest leaders of the Wehrmacht],’ he wrote on 16 July 1938, ‘has a limit at the point where their knowledge, conscience, and responsibility prohibits the execution of an order. If their advice and warnings in such a situation are not listened to, they have the right and duty to the people and to history to resign from their posts. If they all act with a united will, the deployment of military action is impossible. They will thereby have saved their Fatherland from the worst, from destruction (Unter-gang)… Extraordinary times demand extraordinary actions.’253
It proved impossible to win over Brauchitsch to the idea of any generals’ ultimatum to Hitler, even though the Army Commander-in-Chief accepted much of Beck’s military analysis and shared his fears of western intervention. At a meeting of top generals summoned for 4 August, Brauchitsch did not deliver the speech which Beck had prepared for him. Instead, distancing himself from the Chief of the General Staff, he had Beck read out his own memorandum of 16 July, with its highly pessimistic assessment of eventualities following an invasion of Czechoslovakia.254 Most of those present agreed that Germany could not win a war against the western powers. But Reichenau, speaking ‘from his personal knowledge of the Führer’, warned against individual generals approaching Hitler with such an argument; it would have the reverse effect to that which they wanted. And General Ernst Busch questioned whether it was the business of soldiers to intervene in political matters. As Brauchitsch recognized, those present opposed the risk of a war over Czechoslovakia. He himself commented that a new world war would bring the end of German culture. But there was no agreement on what practical consequences should follow. Colonel-General Gerd von Rundstedt, one of the most senior and respected officers, was unwilling to provoke a new crisis between Hitler and the army through challenging him on his war-risk policy. Lieutentant-General Erich von Manstein, Commander of the 18th Infantry Division, who would later distinguish himself as a military tactician of unusual calibre, advised Beck to rid himself of the burden of responsibility – a matter for the political leadership – and play a full part in securing success against Czechoslovakia.255
Brauchitsch, spineless though he was, was plainly not alone in his unwillingness to face Hitler with an ultimatum. The reality was that there was no collective support for a frontal challenge. Brauchitsch contented himself with passing on Beck’s memorandum to Hitler via one of his adjutants.256 When Hitler heard what had taken place at the meeting, he was incandescent. Brauchitsch was summoned to the Berghof and subjected to such a ferocious high-decibel verbal assault, lasting several hours, that those sitting on the terrace below the open windows of Hitler’s room felt embarrassed enough to move inside.257
Hitler responded by summoning – an unorthodox step – not the top military leadership, but a selective group of the second tier of senior officers, those who might be expecting rapid promotion in the event of a military conflict, to the Berghof for a meeting on 10 August. He was evidently hoping to gain influence over his staff chiefs through their subordinates. But he was disappointed. His harangue, lasting several hours, left his audience – which was fully acquainted with the content of Beck’s July memorandum – still unconvinced.258 Enraged at one point by doubts about the western fortifications, he snarled: ‘General Adam said the Westwall would only hold for three days. I tell you, it will hold for three years if it’s occupied by German soldiers.’259 The crisis of confidence between Hitler and the army general staff had reached serious levels. At the same time, the assembled officers were divided among themselves, with some of them increasingly critical of Beck.260
Five days later, Hitler attempted once more to counter the effects of Beck’s memorandum on the leading generals during artillery exercises at Jüterbog, some forty miles south of Berlin. He rehearsed once more his array of arguments about the favourable international constellation justifying his decision to solve the Czech problem by force that autumn. What he could not dispel was the fear and belief that the west would act to defend Czechoslovakia.261 Beck made a last attempt to persuade Brauchitsch to take a firm stance against Hitler.262 It was whistling in the wind. On 18 August, Beck finally tendered the resignation he had already prepared a month earlier.263 Even then, he missed a last trick. He accepted Hitler’s request – ‘for foreign-policy reasons’ – not to publicize his resignation. A final opportunity to turn the unease running through the army, and through the German people, into an open challenge to the political leadership of the Reich – and when Beck knew that only Ribbentrop, and perhaps Himmler, fully backed Hitler – was lost.264 Beck’s path into fundamental resistance was a courageous one. But in summer 1938 he gradually became, at least as regards political strategy, an isolated figure in the military leadership. As he himself saw it several months later: ‘I warned – and in the end I was alone.’265 Ironically, he had been more responsible than any other individual for supplying Hitler with the military might which the Dictator could not wait to use.266
By midsummer, therefore, Hitler was assured of the compliance of the military, even if they were reluctant rather than enthusiastic in their backing for war against the Czechs, and even if relations were tense and distrustful. And as long as the generals fell into line, his own position was secure, his policy unchallengeable.
As it transpired, his reading of international politics turned out to be closer to the mark than that of Beck and the generals. In the guessing – and second-guessing political poker-game that ran through the summer, the western powers were anxious to avoid war at all costs, while the east-European neighbours of Czechoslovakia were keen to profit from any war but unwilling to take risks. Diplomatic activity, increasingly feverish as the summer wore on, in any case appeared less and less likely to bear dividends – not least since the greatest warmonger other than Hitler himself was his Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop.
Messages, often doom-laden, sometimes conflicting, and inv
ariably treated with differing degrees of belief and scepticism, were passed from those close to oppositional sources within Germany.267 Soundings were taken by unorthodox routes. Göring put out feelers through a number of informal links. He let it be known that he would be interested in coming to London himself to carry out discussions about Anglo-German relations at the highest level. Göring was instrumental in the invitation extended by the British government to Fritz Wiedemann, Hitler’s adjutant, to come to London.268
The ostensible purpose was to discuss the possibility of a future visit by Göring himself. Becoming increasingly estranged from Hitler over the high-risk foreign policy, Wiedemann was particularly anxious to bypass Ribbentrop when he met Lord Halifax in London in mid-July. He had been given his instructions not by Hitler, but by Göring. Hitler had approved the visit, though given Wiedemann no message to convey to London. Wiedemann, connected with Beck, Göring, and others anxious to avoid military conflict, tried to assure the British that Germany wanted a peaceful solution to the Czech crisis. But he himself knew differently. He had been present at Hitler’s explicit briefing on 28 May.269 In any case, Hitler was uninterested in Wiedemann’s ‘mission’. On his adjutant’s return to Berlin, Hitler accorded him a mere five minutes to report, and ruled out any visit by Göring.270 Ribbentrop’s wrath at being bypassed helped discredit Wiedemann in Hitler’s eyes, leading to the former adjutant’s ‘exile’ as Consul General in San Francisco.271