By August 1940, when he began to plan his own intervention, Heß was deeply disappointed in the British response to the ‘peace-terms’ that Hitler had offered. He was aware, too, that Hitler was by this time thinking of attacking the Soviet Union even before Britain was willing to ‘see sense’ and agree to terms. The original strategy lay thus in tatters. Heß saw his role as that of the Führer’s most faithful paladin, now destined to restore through his personal intervention the opportunity to save Europe from Bolshevism – a unique chance wantonly cast away by Churchill’s ‘warmongering’ clique which had taken over the British government. Heß acted without Hitler’s knowledge, but in deep (if confused) belief that he was carrying out his wishes.

  Heß now became an unwitting pawn in the moves by British intelligence to bluff Stalin. Churchill was reluctantly dissuaded by Anthony Eden and Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, from his initial instinct to make maximum propaganda capital out of Heß’s capture – something Hitler and Goebbels both expected and feared.224 Prompted by a report from Sir Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador to Moscow, that Heß’s flight to Scotland had newly inflamed the old paranoia in the Soviet leadership of a peace arranged between Britain and Germany at Russia’s cost, Eden and Cadogan devised a more subtle ploy, aimed at strengthening Soviet resistance to Hitler. The absence of anything more than the most terse public statement about Heß’s capture was part of the idea.225

  By the beginning of June, thanks to the code-breaker ‘Ultra’, which since mid-1940 had enabled the decrypting of German military intelligence cyphers, the British cabinet was aware that Hitler would strike against the Soviet Union during the second half of the month.226 The British had also been tipped off, indirectly, through a leak passed on via Dahlems, by no less a person than Göring – concerned, as Heß was, to avoid a two-front war.227 Anxious to wean the Soviet Union away from Germany, Churchill was among a number of those who had let Stalin know as early as April to expect a German attack.228

  The aim of Eden, Cadogan, and Lord Beaverbrook was now to exploit Heß’s capture by sowing further doubts in Stalin’s mind about whether Britain was about to strike a deal with Hitler, based upon peace proposals advanced by the former Deputy Führer, while at the same time, through warnings of German intentions, leaving the door open to a rapprochement between Britain and the Soviet Union. The threat of a compromise peace, it was reasoned, might strengthen Moscow’s fears of isolation to the extent that the Red Army could launch a preventive attack on the Wehrmacht. At the same time, supplying Stalin with information about German plans could encourage him to seek contact with Britain. Either way, British interests would be well served. Stalin was, therefore, sent deliberately conflicting signals of British intentions. Under the pressure they were attempting subtly to exert, the British Secret Service envisaged a third – the most likely – reaction by Stalin: adopting a wait-and-see stance.229

  Predictably, Stalin indeed followed the third option. He brushed away warnings, confident that Hitler would not risk a two-front war. Heß’s defection bolstered this confidence, since Stalin presumed the Deputy Führer had been commissioned by Hitler to put out peace feelers, and that only a few weeks remained available if an attack were to be launched. The silence from London about Heß together with rumours that Britain might be ready to pull out of the war, aligned with the warnings of an imminent attack by Hitler on Russia, further reinforced the presumption of a serious split within the British government. From Stalin’s point of view, this meant the likelihood of delay, thereby hindering agreement with Germany, and blocking the chances of a German attack while there was still time that year.230

  However, Stalin tried to keep his options open – just in case. On the day that the capture of Heß was announced in London, 13 May, Stalin had four additional armies moved into the western border area of the Soviet Union. A further twenty-five divisions followed early in June, when rumours of Berlin and London agreeing a separate peace were rife.231 By the time ‘Barbarossa’ came to be launched, large Russian tank divisions were ranged in forward positions in an arc around Bialystok and Lemberg. They were intended to be in a position to convert readily into an attack-force should, against Stalin’s expectations, a separate peace be speedily agreed between Britain and Germany.232

  Stalin had seen in Heß’s flight to Britain a rationality, as part of Hitler’s planned strategy, which was not there. He had been encouraged in this by British policy. What the Soviet dictator could not contemplate was, unfortunately for him and his country, the real position: that Hitler had had nothing to do with the absurd Heß adventure; that he had no desire at this point to enter into negotiations with Britain; and that he was fixated upon a ‘war of annihilation’ to destroy the Soviet Union, aimed at leaving Britain then with no choice but to seek terms.

  VII

  By the middle of May, after a week preoccupied by the Heß affair, Hitler could begin to turn his attention back to this imminent showdown. The directive he signed on 23 May, supporting the pro-Axis regime in Iraq (which had come to power following a military coup at the beginning of April, had refused to allow British troop movements in the country, and had sent Iraqi troops to surround a British air-base) had little more than nominal significance. A small number of German aeroplanes, carrying troops, had already flown to Iraq in mid-May. They could do little to help the weak Iraqi army fend off the invading British relief forces, which ultimately re-established a pro-British administration. In any case, Hitler’s directive made plain that a decision on any German attempt to undermine the British position in the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf would only follow ‘Barbarossa’.233

  The end of what had been a troubled month for Hitler brought further gloom to the Berghof with the news on 27 May of the loss of the powerful battleship Bismarck, sunk in the Atlantic after a fierce battle with British warships and planes. Some 2,300 sailors went down with the ship.234 Hitler did not brood on the human loss. His fury was directed at the naval leadership for unnecessarily exposing the vessel to enemy attack – a huge risk, he had thought, for potentially little gain.235

  Meanwhile, the ideological preparations for ‘Barbarossa’ were now rapidly taking concrete shape. Hitler needed to do nothing more in this regard. He had laid down the guidelines in March. These sufficed, we saw earlier, for the High Commands of the Wehrmacht and the Army to convert them in May and early June into the series of orders to liquidate the Soviet Political Commissars and offer a ‘shooting licence’236 against the Russian civilian population outside the jurisdiction of military courts for German soldiers.237 It was during May, too, that Heydrich assembled the four Einsatzgruppen (‘task groups’) which would accompany the army into the Soviet Union. Each of the Einsatzgruppen comprised between 600 and 1,000 men (drawn largely from varying branches of the police organization, augmented by the Waffen-SS) and was divided into four or five Einsatzkommandos (‘task forces’) or Sonderkommandos (‘special forces’).238 The middle-ranking commanders for the most part had an educated background. Highly qualified academics, civil servants, lawyers, a Protestant pastor, and even an opera singer, were among them.239 The top leadership was drawn almost exclusively from the Security Police and SD.240 Like the leaders of the Reich Security Head Office, they were in the main well-educated men, of the generation, just too young to have fought in the First World War, that had sucked in völkisch ideals in German universities during the 1920s.241 During the second half of May, the 3,000 or so men selected for the Einsatzgruppen gathered in Pretzsch, north-east of Leipzig, where the Border Police School served as their base for the ideological training that would last until the launch of ‘Barbarossa’.242 Heydrich addressed them on a number of occasions. He avoided narrow precision in describing their target-groups when they entered the Soviet Union. But his meaning was, nevertheless, plain. He mentioned that Jewry was the source of Bolshevism in the East and had to be eradicated in accordance with the Führer’s aims. And he told them th
at Communist functionaries and activists, Jews, Gypsies, saboteurs, and agents endangered the security of the troops and were to be executed forthwith.243 By 22 June the genocidal whirlwind was ready to blow.

  ‘Operation Barbarossa rolls on further,’ recorded Goebbels in his diary on 31 May. ‘Now the first big wave of camouflage goes into action. The entire state and military apparatus is being mobilized. Only a few people are informed about the true background.’ Apart from Goebbels and Ribbentrop, ministers of government departments were kept in the dark. Goebbels’s own ministry had to play up the theme of invasion of Britain. Fourteen army divisions were to be moved westwards to give some semblance of reality to the charade.244

  As part of the subterfuge that action was to be expected in the West while preparations for ‘Barbarossa’ were moving into top gear, Hitler hurriedly arranged another meeting with Mussolini on the Brenner Pass for 2 June.245 It was little wonder that the Duce could not understand the reason for the hastily devised talks.246 Hitler’s closest Axis partner was unwittingly playing his part in an elaborate game of bluff.

  Hitler did not mention a word of ‘Barbarossa’ to his Italian friends. He claimed on the return journey to have dropped a hint.247 But, if so, it completely passed Mussolini by. The two dictators talked alone for almost two hours, before being joined by their Foreign Ministers. Hitler had wept, Mussolini reported, when he spoke about Heß.248 If so, he was weeping about the political damage the former Deputy Führer had done. There were no personal lamentations for the loss of one of his most loyal devotees over so many years.249 Ciano and Ribbentrop were meanwhile reviewing relations with a number of countries and the general state of the war. ‘Rumours in circulation on the beginning of operations against Russia in the near future,’ remarked Ribbentrop, ‘are to be considered devoid of foundation, at least excessively premature.’ He conveyed the impression that the German build-up of troops was solely in response to the Soviet military concentration on the German frontier, and that any action by the Reich would only follow an attempted attack by the Red Army.250

  Hitler had evidently, to Mussolini’s irritation, monopolized their private ‘discussion’. He now proceeded to do the same in the presence of the Foreign Ministers. His rambling tour d’horizon was practically devoid of any genuine substance that might have warranted an urgent meeting.251 The Italians, worried that the purpose of the meeting was to force concessions on them to the advantage of France, were glad to learn that relations between Germany and France were unchanged.252 Hitler, his views as always amplified by Ribbentrop, described what he saw as an increasingly critical situation in Britain, speculating on Lloyd George as Churchill’s likely successor and a much more amenable policy towards peace with the Axis as a consequence. He ruled out an invasion of Cyprus, which Mussolini had encouraged. Finally, turning to the ‘Jewish Question’, Hitler declared that ‘all Jews must get out of Europe altogether after the war’, and mentioned Madagascar – a project definitively discarded over six months earlier – as a possible solution.253 The Soviet Union was noticeable for its absence in the discourse.254

  The published communiqué simply stated that the Führer and Duce had held friendly discussions lasting several hours on the political situation.255 The deception had been successful. Ciano’s general impression was ‘that for the moment Hitler has no precise plan of action’. Mussolini, too, so Ciano remarked, was ‘convinced that a compromise peace would be received by the Germans with the greatest enthusiasm. “They are now sick of victories…”’256

  When he met the Japanese ambassador Oshima the day after his talks with Mussolini, Hitler dropped a broad hint – which was correctly understood – that conflict with the Soviet Union in the near future was unavoidable.257 But the only foreign statesman to whom he was prepared to divulge more than hints was the Romanian leader Marshal Antonescu, when Hitler met him in Munich on 12 June.258 Antonescu had to be put broadly in the picture. After all, Hitler was relying on Romanian troops for support on the southern flank. Antonescu was more than happy to comply. He volunteered his forces without Hitler having to ask. When 22 June arrived, he would proclaim to his people a ‘holy war’ against the Soviet Union.259 The bait of recovering Bessarabia and North Bukovina, together with the acquisition of parts of the Ukraine, was sufficiently tempting to the Romanian dictator.260 Even to Antonescu, a few days before ‘Barbarossa’, Hitler betrayed as little as possible. His explanation for the coming showdown with the Soviet Union was couched entirely in terms of a necessary defensive reaction to counter the military menace posed to Germany and Europe through Stalin’s expansionism. He mentioned no date. Antonescu divined, however, that one was imminent.261 The Romanian leader agreed that a conflict with Russia could not be delayed. The Soviet army would not offer strong resistance, he thought, and the people wanted their liberation. The Romanian people were thirsting for their revenge for the injustices they had suffered at the hands of the Russians. Comparisons with Napoleon were out of place, he said, given the motorization of modern warfare. Hitler rejoined ‘that the aim of the action did not consist of allowing the Russian armies to retreat into their vast land, but that the armies had to be annihilated (vernichtet)’.262

  On 14 June Hitler held his last major military conference before the start of ‘Barbarossa’. The generals arrived at staggered times at the Reich Chancellery to allay suspicion that something major was afoot. Hitler sought an account from each army commander of planned operations in the respective theatres during the first days of the invasion. For the most part he listened without interruption. The picture he gleaned was one of numerical advantage, but qualitative inferiority, of the Red Army. The outlook was, therefore, positive. After lunch, Hitler spoke for about an hour.263 He went over the reasons for attacking Russia. Once again, he avowed his confidence that the collapse of the Soviet Union would induce Britain to come to terms.264 Hitler emphasized that the war was a war against Bolshevism. The Russians would fight hard and put up tough resistance. Heavy air-raids had to be expected. But the Luftwaffe would attain quick successes and smooth the advance of the land forces. The worst of the fighting would be over in about six weeks. But every soldier had to know what he was fighting for: the destruction of Bolshevism. If the war were to be lost, then Europe would be bolshevized.265 Most of the generals had concerns about opening up the two-front war, the avoidance of which had been a premiss of military planning. But they did not voice any objections. Brauchitsch and Halder did not speak a word.266

  Two days later Hitler summoned Goebbels to the Reich Chancellery – he was told to enter through a back door in order not to raise suspicions – to explain the situation. Hitler looked well, thought Goebbels, despite living in an extraordinary state of tension, as invariably was the case before major ‘actions’. Hitler told Goebbels that once the ‘action’ had started, he would become calm, as had been the case on numerous earlier occasions.267 He greeted his Propaganda Minister warmly. Then he gave him an account of developments. The Greek campaign had taken its toll of matériel, so that the military build-up had been somewhat delayed. But it would be completed now within a week, and the attack on Russia would then immediately commence, it was good that the weather was so poor, Hitler remarked, and that the harvest in the Ukraine had not yet ripened. As a result, they could hope to gain most of it. The attack would be the most massive history had ever seen. There would be no repeat of Napoleon (a comment perhaps betraying precisely those subconscious fears of history indeed repeating itself). The Russians had around 180–200 divisions, about as many as the Germans, he said, though there was no comparison in quality. And the fact that they were massed on the Reich borders was a great advantage. ‘They would be smoothly rolled up.’ Hitler thought ‘the action’ would take about four months. Goebbels estimated even less time would be needed: ‘Bolshevism will collapse like a house of cards,’ he thought. Hitler had by this time convinced himself of the preventive war theory he had concocted. ‘We have to act,’ Goebbels recounted. ‘Moscow
wants to keep out of the war till Europe is exhausted and sucked of its life-blood. Then Stalin would like to act, to bolshevize Europe, and bring in his form of rule.’ The German action would put a stop to this. No geographical limits were put on ‘the action’. The fight would continue until Russian power had ceased to exist.

  Goebbels continued his summary of Hitler’s argument – that the defeat of Russia would free some 150 divisions and massive resources for the conflict with Britain. ‘The thrust (Tendenz) of the entire campaign is clear,’ wrote Goebbels: ‘Bolshevism must fall and England will have its last conceivable continental weapon knocked out of its hand.’ ‘The Bolshevik poison must be removed from Europe.’ All true Nazis, he added, would rejoice to see the day that ‘genuine socialism’ took the place of ‘Jewish Bolshevism’ in Russia. The Pact of 1939 – ‘a stain on our badge of honour’ – would be washed away. ‘That which we have spent our lives fighting, we will now annihilate.’ He conveyed this thought to Hitler, who said: ‘Whether right or wrong, we must win. That is the only way. And it is morally right and necessary. And when we have won, who will ask us about the method? In any case, we have chalked up so much that we have to win, otherwise our entire people – and in first place we ourselves, with all that is dear to us – will be wiped out.’