Hitler and Horthy conducted their talks in German, without interpreters present. Paul Schmidt, Hitler’s interpreter, was waiting with his colleagues outside in the hall when, suddenly, the door to the room in the palace where the talks were being held was flung open and Admiral Horthy, red in the face, rushed out, followed hurriedly by a furious Hitler, who eventually managed to catch up with his discomfited guest to accompany him to his rooms, as protocol demanded, before disappearing in a rage for urgent discussions with Ribbentrop.80
The meeting with the Hungarian head of state had, indeed, been tempestuous. Hitler had at the outset accused the Hungarian government, on the basis of information from the German secret service, of negotiating with the Allies in an attempt to take Hungary out of the war. Holding fast, as ever, to his notion that the Jews were behind the war, and that, consequently, the continued existence of Jews in any country provided, in effect, a fifth-column subverting and endangering the war effort, Hitler was especially aggressive in accusing Horthy of allowing almost a million Jews to exist without any hindrance, which had to be seen from the German side as a threat to the eastern and Balkan fronts. Consequently, the German leadership, continued Hitler, had justified fears of a defection taking place, similar to that which had happened in Italy. He had, therefore, decided upon the military occupation of Hungary, and demanded Horthy’s agreement to this in a signed joint declaration. Horthy refused to sign. The temperature in the meeting rose. Hitler declared that if Horthy did not sign, the occupation would simply take place without his approval. Any armed resistance would be crushed by Croatian, Slovakian, and Romanian as well as German troops. Horthy threatened to resign. Hitler said that in such an event he could not guarantee the safety of the Admiral’s family. At this base blackmail, Horthy sprang to his feet, protesting: ‘If everything here is already decided, there’s no point in staying any longer. I’m leaving immediately,’ and stormed out of the room.81
While Horthy was demanding to be taken to his special train, and Ribbentrop was berating Döme Sztojay, the Hungarian ambassador in Berlin, an air-raid alarm sounded. In fact, the ‘air-raid’ was merely a ruse, complete with smoke-screen covering of the palace at Klessheim, and alleged severance of telephone links with Budapest. This elaborate deceit was used to persuade Horthy to put aside thoughts of a premature departure and compel him to enter into renewed talks with Hitler. Ribbentrop let Schmidt know, in an aside, that if Horthy did not concur with German demands, he would not be returning with an honorary escort, but as a prisoner. The browbeating and chicanery, as usual, did the trick. When Horthy returned to his train that evening, it was in the accompaniment of Security Police chief Ernst Kaltenbrunner and Ribbentrop’s emissary in Hungary, Edmund Veesenmayer, endowed with plenipotentiary powers to ensure that German interests were served. And this was only once Horthy had finally agreed to install a puppet regime, with Sztojay as prime minister, ready to do German bidding.82
Next day, 19 March 1944, Hungary was in German hands. Not only could extra raw materials and manpower immediately be exploited for the German war effort; but, as Hitler had told Goebbels a fortnight earlier, the ‘Jewish question’ could now be tackled in Hungary.83
With the German takeover in Budapest, Hungary’s large and still intact Jewish community – some 750,000 persons – was doomed. The new masters of Hungary did not lose a minute. Eichmann’s men entered Budapest with the German troops. Within days, 2,000 Jews had been rounded up. The first deportation – a train with over 3,000 Jewish men, women, and children packed in indescribable conditions into about forty cattle-wagons – left for Auschwitz a month later.84 By early June, ninety-two trains had carried almost 300,000 Hungarian Jews to their deaths.85 When Horthy halted the deportations a month later, triggering the events that would lead to his own deposition, 437,402 Hungarian Jews had been sent to the gas-chambers.86
V
On the day that German troops entered Hungary, a strange little ceremony took place at the Berghof.87 The field-marshals, who had been summoned from different parts of the front, witnessed the presentation to Hitler by their senior, Rundstedt, of a declaration of their loyalty, which they had all signed. The signatures had all been collected, on a tour of the front, by Hitler’s chief Wehrmacht adjutant, General Schmundt. The idea, characteristically, had come from Goebbels (though this was kept quiet, and not made known to Hitler).88 It had been prompted by the anti-German subversive propaganda disseminated from Moscow by the captured General Walter von Seydlitz-Kurzbach and other officers who had fallen into Soviet hands at Stalingrad.89 In reality, the effect of the Seydlitz propaganda was minimal. But these were nervous times for the Nazi leadership. Schmundt’s main intention, in any case, was to remove Hitler’s distrust towards his generals, and to improve the icy relations which had been so much in evidence at the January meeting interrupted by Manstein. It was, nevertheless, both remarkable in itself and a clear sign that all was not well, if in the midst of such a titanic conflict the senior military leaders should see fit to produce a signed declaration of loyalty to their supreme commander and head of state. Manstein, the last field-marshal to sign the document, certainly thought so. He felt the declaration to be quite superfluous from a soldier’s point of view.90 Hitler seemed moved by the occasion.91 It was a rare moment of harmony in his dealings with his generals.
Normality was, however, soon to be resumed. Within a week, Manstein was back at the Berghof. The Ist Panzer Army, under General Hans Valentin Hube, was in imminent danger of encirclement by Soviet troops who had broken through from Tarnopol to the Dniester. Manstein insisted (against Hube’s recommendation that his army seek safety by retreating to the south over the Dniester) on a breakthrough to the west, in order to build a new front in Galicia. For this, reinforcements to assist the Ist Panzer Army would be necessary. For these to be provided from some other part of the front, Hitler’s agreement was necessary. Sharp exchanges took place between Manstein and Hitler at the midday military conference. But Hitler refused to concede to Manstein’s request, and held the field-marshal personally responsible for the unfavourable position of his Army Group. Further deliberation was adjourned until the evening. Disgusted, Manstein told Schmundt that he wished to resign his command if his orders did not gain Hitler’s approval.
When discussion continued at the evening conference, however, Hitler had, astonishingly, changed his mind. Who or what had persuaded him to do so, or whether he had simply brooded on the matter before altering his decision, is unclear. At any rate, he now offered Manstein the reinforcements he wanted, including an SS Panzer Corps to be taken away from the western front.92 Manstein went away momentarily satisfied. But Hitler resented having concessions wrung from him – particularly after his initial refusal in front of a sizeable audience. And, from Hitler’s point of view, Manstein had in previous weeks been both troublesome and ineffectual in command. Hitler’s way of dealing with major military setbacks was invariably (apart from his kid-glove treatment of his old political ally, Göring, as Luftwaffe chief despite the disasters in the air-war) to blame the commander and to look for a replacement who would fire the fighting morale of the troops and shore up their will to continue. It was time for a parting of the ways with Manstein, as it was with another senior field-marshal, Kleist, who, two days after Manstein, had also paid a visit to the Berghof, requesting permission for Army Group A on the Black Sea coast to pull back from the Bug to the Dniester.93
On 30 March, Manstein and Kleist were picked up in Hitler’s Condor aircraft and taken to the Berghof. Zeitzler told Manstein that after his last visit, Göring, Himmler, and probably Keitel had agitated against him. Zeitzler had himself offered to resign, an offer that had been summarily turned down.94 Schmundt had seen to it that the dismissals of the two field-marshals were carried out with decorum, not with rancour.95 They were replaced by Walter Model and Ferdinand Schörner, both tough generals and favourites of Hitler, whom he regarded as ideal for rousing the morale of the troops and instilling rigorous N
ational Socialist fighting spirit in them. At the same time, the names of the army groups were altered to Army Group North Ukraine and Army Group South Ukraine. The Ukraine had, in fact, already been lost. The symbolic renaming was part of the aim of reviving morale by implying that it would soon be retaken.
Soon enough, it would become clear yet again that changes in personnel and nomenclature would not suffice. The new commanders were no more able to stop the relentless Soviet advance than Manstein and Kleist had been. On 2 April, Hitler issued an operational order which began: ‘The Russian offensive on the south of the eastern front has passed its high-point. The Russians have used up and split up their forces. The time has come to bring the Russian advance finally to a halt.’96 It was a vain hope. A crucial component of the new lines drawn up was the provision for the Crimea, to be held at all cost. It was an impossibility. Odessa, the port on the Black Sea which was vital to supply-lines for the Crimea, had been abandoned on 10 April. By early May, the entire Crimea was lost, with Hitler forced to agree in the night of 8-9 May to the evacuation of Sevastopol by sea. The vain struggle to hold on to the Crimea had cost over 60,000 German and Romanian lives.97 When the Soviet spring offensive came to a halt, the Germans had been pushed back in some sectors by as much as 600 miles inside a year.98
Hitler was furious about the collapse in the Crimea when Goebbels had the opportunity – the first for a month – of a private discussion with him in Munich on 17 April, following the funeral of Adolf Wagner, his former trusted chieftain in the ‘traditional Gau’ of Munich and Upper Bavaria. Events on the eastern front had moved much faster and developed more critically than could have been expected, Hitler remarked. Looking as always for scapegoats, he directed his fury at the commander in the Crimea, General Erwin Jaenecke, whom he saw as a defeatist, for too long thinking only of retreat. He spoke of a court-martial to establish the guilt of the military leadership on the Crimea (and ordered one at Jaenecke’s dismissal, following the evacuation of Sevastopol in early May).99 Hitler told Goebbels that he had brought the eastern front under control, and that, overall, the retreat had been stopped. ‘That would be marvellous,’ was Goebbels’s all too justified sceptical remark in his diary. Already, Hitler was thinking of a new offensive. When it would take place could not be known. But in Hitler’s eyes, it would follow directly upon the repelling of the invasion in the west. Turning to the western front, Hitler was full of praise for Rommel’s work in building up the Atlantic defences. The invasion would certainly come, he said, and perhaps even within the next month. But Rommel had given him a binding promise that everything would be ready by 1 May. Hitler’s own, at times seemingly absurd, optimism was certainly unrealistic. But it gained constant replenishment through the over-eagerness of his generals, as well as his party bosses, to say what they knew he wanted to hear. Self-deception, as well as deception, ran through the entire regime. Hitler was certain that the invasion would be repelled in grand style, and that this would lead to a crisis in Britain. Retaliation could then be let loose on a demoralized people, unleashing a shock of earthquake proportions.100
Goebbels was still concerned about Hitler’s health. When they had last met, just over a month earlier at the Berghof, they had been entertained by some of Eva Braun’s home movies from earlier years. Viewing the amateur films, it was plain how Hitler had aged and physically deteriorated during the war.101 Goebbels suggested to him that he might speak to the German people on 1 May. He had not been well enough to speak on ‘Heroes’ Memorial Day’ on 12 March, when Grand-Admiral Dönitz – one of the few military leaders whom Hitler greatly respected, and evidently a coming man – substituted for him.102 Hitler told Goebbels (who remarked on his nervous strain, particularly about Hungary, over the past weeks) that he was sleeping only about three hours a night – an exaggeration, but the long-standing problems of insomnia had certainly worsened. He did show some apparent inclination to give a radio address on 1 May, but claimed his health was not up to giving a speech in public. He did not know whether he could manage it.103
It was an excuse. When, following his discussion with Goebbels, he gave a fiery pep-talk, unprepared and without notes, to his Party leaders, there was no hint of concern about whether he might break down part-way through his speech (in which he declared, among other confidence-boosting claims, that the Soviet advance also had its advantages in bringing home to all nations the seriousness of the threat).104 But when speaking to the ‘Old Guard’, he was in trusted company. A speech, in the circumstances, to a mass audience when he was well aware of the slump in mood of the population was a different matter altogether.105
Hitler’s birthday that year, his fifty-fifth, had the usual trappings and ceremonials. Goebbels had Berlin emblazoned with banners and a new slogan of resounding pathos: ‘Our walls broke, but our hearts didn’t.’ The State Opera house on Unter den Linden was festively decorated for the usual celebration, attended by dignitaries from state, party, and Wehrmacht. Goebbels portrayed Hitler’s historic achievements. The Berlin Philhar-monia, conducted by Hans Knappertsbusch, played Beethoven’s ‘Eroica’ Symphony.106 But the mood among the Nazi faithful at such events was contrived. Goebbels was well aware from reports from the regional propaganda offices that the popular mood was ‘very critical and sceptical’, and that ‘the depression in the broad masses’ had reached ‘worrying levels.’107 Away from the set-piece propaganda, enthusiasm was sparser and more muted. Bavarian reports from rural areas mentioned that little bunting was to be seen. Where loved ones had not returned from the war, this was especially noticeable.108 For such people, Goebbels’s eulogy in the Party’s main newspaper, the Völkischer Beobachter, stating that ‘the German people had never looked up to its Führer so full of belief as in the days and hours that it became aware of the entire burden of this struggle for our life’ sounded particularly hollow.109
Even at the Berghof, the mood was only superficially festive. Before the midday military briefing Hitler received the congratulations of all members of the household, and inspected all the presents arrayed in the dining-hall. Later there was to be a display of new prototype tanks on the Salzburg motorway, near Klessheim. But as soon as Chief of Staff Zeitzler appeared, it was business as usual as Hitler disappeared for discussions on the military situation.110 Among the guests that day was General Hube, high in Hitler’s esteem, who in recognition of his success in breaking through the Soviet encirclement with his 1st Panzer Army was promoted to Colonel-General. Hitler even had him in mind as a possible new army Commander-in-Chief. Late that night, Hitler gave his permission for Hube to depart for Berlin. The plane hit a tree on take-off, a wing broke off, and Hube was killed. It was almost a double tragedy for Hitler. Walther Hewel, Ribbentrop’s liaison at Führer Headquarters and well-liked at the Berghof, escaped the crash with no more than concussion and severe bruising. The loss of such an outstanding general as Hube was a blow to Hitler. He even took the risk of flying to Berlin – Goebbels thought it madness, given Allied dominance of the skies – a few days later, making a rare visit to the capital to honour Hube at an elaborate state funeral.111
In the interim, on 22 April, Hitler had once more entertained Mussolini to a lengthy monologue at Klessheim, aimed at stiffening his backbone. He drove home the dangers facing Germany and its allies. He did not betray a trace of defeatism. ‘The Führer did not know whether or when an invasion would occur,’ the record of the meeting ran, ‘but the English had adopted measures which could only be maintained for 6-8 weeks and a serious crisis would break out in England if the invasion did not occur. He would then deploy new technical weapons which were effective within a radius of 250–300 kilometres and would transform London into a heap of ruins.’112 The wishful thinking was necessary – and not just to shore up the flagging morale of the Duce.
VI
A familiar face, not seen for some months, had returned to the Berghof in mid-April. Since being admitted to the Red Cross hospital at Hohenlychen, seventy miles north of Berlin, fo
r a knee operation (accompanied by severe nervous strain), Albert Speer had been out of circulation. Hitler had seen him briefly in March, while Speer was convalescing for a short time at Klessheim, but the armaments minister had then left for Meran, in South Tyrol, to recover in the company of his family.113
An absent minister was an invitation, in the Third Reich, for others thirsting for power to step into the vacuum. Karl Otto Saur, the able head of the technical office in Speer’s ministry, had taken the opportunity to exploit Hitler’s favour in his boss’s absence. When a Fighter Staff had been set up in March – linking Speer’s ministry with the Luftwaffe to speed up and coordinate production of air-defence – Hitler placed it, against Speer’s express wishes, in the hands of Saur.114 And when, stung by the near-unhampered bombing of German cities, Hitler discovered that little progress had been made on the building of huge underground bomb-proof bunkers to protect fighter production against air-raids, Speer’s other right-hand man, Xaver Dorsch, head of the central office of the massive construction apparatus, the Organization Todt (OT), spotted his chance. Göring, pressed by Hitler on the non-production of the bunkers, and keen to emerge from the opprobrium of the continued failure of air-defence, summoned Dorsch in mid-April and told him that the ΟΤ would have to build the bunkers without delay. Dorsch replied that he had no authority within the Reich itself; Speer had designated the ΟΤ only for work outside the Reich borders. But he was alert enough and sufficiently briefed on the purpose and potential of the meeting to produce plans for such a project in France. Göring reported back to Hitler. That evening, Dorsch was commissioned by Hitler with the sole responsibility for the building of the six immense bunkers within the Reich itself – thereby overriding Speer – accompanied by full authority to assure the work had top priority.