22. While this plot was being hatched, Fabius wished to devise a scheme to draw Hannibal away from the neighbourhood, and he therefore gave orders to the garrison of Rhegium81 to overrun and ravage the territory of the Bruttians and take Caulonia82 by storm. This body of troops at Rhegium was 8,000 strong. Many of them were deserters, and they included the worse elements of the force which Marcellus had sent home from Sicily in disgrace;83 in fact they were men who were considered expendable and whose loss would cause the least possible harm or distress to Rome. Fabius hoped that by throwing out this force as bait before Hannibal he would lure him away from Tarentum, and this was exactly what happened. Hannibal immediately hurried with his army to Bruttium to pursue them, and meanwhile Fabius moved in to besiege Tarentum.
On the sixth day of the siege, the young man, whose sister had helped him to concert his plan with the Bruttian commander, came to visit Fabius at night. He had seen and inspected the place where the Bruttian would be keeping watch to let in the besiegers and hand over the city. But Fabius was not prepared to make his plans entirely dependent on this act of treachery. Accordingly, he himself led a body of troops to the appointed place, while the rest of the army launched a general attack on the walls by land and sea. Their assault was accompanied by a tremendous clamour and commotion, until most of the Tarentines had rushed to the support of the defenders. Then the Bruttian gave Fabius the signal, whereupon he and his men scaled the walls and took possession of the city.
At this point, however, Fabius’ ambition seems to have proved stronger than his principles, for he ordered his men to put the Bruttian contingent to the sword before anyone else, so as to conceal the fact that he had captured the city by treachery. However, he completely failed to win the glory he sought and instead he incurred the charge of bad faith and inhumanity. Besides the Bruttians many of the Tarentines were killed, 30,000 of them were sold into slavery, their city was sacked by the Roman army and the public treasury was enriched by the sum of 3,000 talents. While everything else was being carried off as plunder, it is said that the officer who was drawing up a schedule of public property asked Fabius what were his orders concerning the gods, by which he meant the paintings and statues, and that Fabius replied, ‘Let us leave the Tarentines their angry gods.’ However, he removed the giant statue of Hercules84 and had it placed on the Capitol, and close by he erected an equestrian statue of himself in bronze. Fabius showed himself to be far more arbitrary in dealing with these matters than Marcellus, or rather he proved by the contrast between them that Marcellus was a man of extraordinary mildness and humanity, as I have indicated in his Life.85
23. It is said that Hannibal arrived within 40 stades86 of Tarentum when the city fell, and that in public he merely remarked, ‘It seems that the Romans have found another Hannibal, for we have lost Tarentum in the same way that we took it.’ But in private he admitted to his friends that he had long recognized that it was very difficult for them to conquer Italy with their present forces, and that he now believed it was impossible.
For this success Fabius celebrated a second triumph, which was even more magnificent than his first.87 The Romans saw that he was dealing with Hannibal like an experienced wrestler, and had mastered the technique of frustrating his opponent’s moves, now that his grips and holds had lost their original force. The truth was that some of Hannibal’s troops had become enervated by luxury and plunder,88 while others had had their fighting qualities blunted and worn down by incessant campaigning.
Now, there was a certain Marcus Livius,89 who had been in command of the garrison at Tarentum when Hannibal had persuaded the city to revolt. He had seized the citadel, however, and had never been dislodged from this position, but continued to hold out until the town was recaptured by the Romans. Livius was annoyed at the honours which were conferred on Fabius, and on this occasion he was so far carried away by his jealousy and ambition as to declare that it was not Fabius but he who was responsible for the capture of Tarentum. At this Fabius burst out laughing and retorted: ‘You are quite right, Livius. If you had not lost the city, I could never have recaptured it.’90
24. One of the many marks of honour which the people bestowed upon Fabius was to elect his son as consul.91 After he had taken up his office and was dealing with some business concerning the conduct of the war, his father, either because of his age and weakness, or perhaps because he was putting his son to the test, mounted his horse and rode towards him through the crowd of bystanders. The young man caught sight of him at a distance and refused to allow this affront to his office. He sent a lictor to order him to dismount and approach on foot if he had any business with the consul. Those who were present were offended at this command and turned their eyes towards Fabius in silence, while their looks expressed their indignation at such officious treatment of a man of his reputation. But Fabius himself leapt from his horse, and with open arms almost ran to his son and embraced him affectionately, saying, ‘You are right, my son, both in your thought and your action. You understand the nature of the people who have chosen you to govern and the grandeur of the office you have received from them. This was the way in which we and our forefathers made Rome great, by putting the honour and the service of our country before those of our own parents and children.’92
And indeed, there is a similar story concerning the great-grandfather of our Fabius.93 Even though he possessed the greatest reputation and influence of any man in Rome, had served five times as consul and had celebrated the most magnificent triumphs after the greatest wars of his time, nevertheless, when his son became consul and set out for the war, he himself served as his subordinate.94 Then, in the triumph that followed,95 while the son entered the city in a four-horse chariot, the father followed on horseback with the rest of the procession, and he took pride in the fact that while he had authority over his son as a private individual96 and was himself in both name and in reality the greatest man of the state, yet he was ready to submit himself to the law and the chief magistrate. This, of course, was not the only admirable thing about him.
Fabius had the misfortune to lose his son, but he bore this blow patiently like a wise man and a good father. It is the custom at Rome, whenever a famous man dies, for one of his relatives to pronounce a funeral oration. Fabius delivered this from his place in the forum, and later wrote out his speech and distributed it among his friends.97
25. Meanwhile, Cornelius Scipio98 had been sent to Spain, where he not only defeated the Carthaginians in a series of battles and drove them out of the country, but also brought a great many tribes over to his side, captured great cities and achieved glorious deeds for Rome. When he returned to the capital, he was acclaimed and idolized as no Roman had ever been before, and was promptly elected consul.99 But since he recognized that the people expected and demanded some achievement from him, he came to the conclusion that the strategy of containing Hannibal in Italy was now out of date and had become an old man’s task. His plan was that the Romans should pour troops into Libya, attack and ravage the territory of Carthage itself and transfer the scene of the war from Italy to Libya, and so he threw himself heart and soul into the task of arousing the people to support this policy.
But now Fabius did his utmost to spread doubts and misgivings of every kind against the proposal. He argued that they were rushing into grave and unknown perils under the leadership of a hot-headed young man, and he did not hesitate to say or do anything which he thought might dissuade his fellow-countrymen from adopting his opponent’s policy. He succeeded in convincing the senate, but the people believed that he was attacking Scipio out of jealousy of his exploits, and also because he was afraid that if Scipio achieved some brilliant and decisive success and either finished off the war or removed it from Italy, then he himself might be condemned as a lazy and cowardly general for having allowed the fighting to drag on for so many years.
It seems likely that Fabius’ opposition originally sprang from his instinctive caution and prudence and that he was genuinel
y alarmed by the risks involved in Scipio’s strategy, which indeed were great, but that in the course of time the effort to check his opponent’s rising influence made his attitude more violent and extreme and introduced an element of ambition and personal rivalry into the conflict. He even tried to persuade Crassus,100 Scipio’s fellow-consul, not to hand over the command of the army to his colleague but to lead it to Carthage himself, if the decision to invade Africa were adopted, and he also prevented the voting of any funds for the campaign. Scipio was left in the position of having to find the money himself, and he therefore collected it on his private account from the cities of Etruria, which were devotedly loyal to him.101 As for Crassus, he remained at home,102 partly because by nature he was a gentle man and had no inclination to quarrel with his colleague, and partly on account of his religiosity, since he held the office of high priest.103
26. After this Fabius adopted a different set of tactics. He tried to prevent the young men who were anxious to serve under Scipio from taking part in the campaign. He complained at meetings of the senate and assembly that it was not merely a question of Scipio’s running away from Hannibal: he was proposing to sail off with the whole reserve of Italy’s manpower, and he was deluding these young men with false hopes and persuading them to abandon their parents, their wives and their city, while a conquering and still undefeated enemy threatened the very gates of Rome. He succeeded in alarming the Romans to such an extent with these arguments that they decreed Scipio should take with him only the troops that were already in Sicily,104 together with a detachment of 300 picked men who had served him loyally in Spain. In insisting on this policy, Fabius was clearly dominated by the dictates of his own cautious nature.
However, no sooner had Scipio arrived in Africa than almost immediately news began to arrive in Rome of extraordinary achievements, brilliant exploits and decisive victories.105 The reports were quickly substantiated by the immense spoils which followed these successes. The king of Numidia was captured, two of the enemy’s camps were burned and destroyed, together with great quantities of men, horses and arms, and envoys were sent to Hannibal106 with urgent instructions that he must abandon his fruitless hopes in Italy and hasten home to the rescue of his native city. And yet when every tongue in Rome was applauding Scipio’s victories, this was the moment which Fabius chose to demand that he should be recalled107 and a successor sent out. He did not attempt to justify this request, but merely repeated the familiar proverb to the effect that it was dangerous to entrust such immense operations to the fortune of one man, since it was difficult for any single man to enjoy good fortune at all times.
This proposal offended most of Fabius’ fellow-citizens, who felt that he was now acting out of mere peevishness and malice, or else that in his old age he had lost all his courage and confidence and was obsessed by an exaggerated fear of Hannibal. For even when Hannibal and his army had sailed away from Italy,108 Fabius still could not refrain from casting gloom over the general rejoicings and dashing his fellow-countrymen’s spirits. The city, he prophesied, was now facing her final and most terrible ordeal, for they would find Hannibal a far more formidable enemy under the walls of Carthage than he had ever been in Italy, and Scipio would have to meet an army which was still reeking with the blood of many generals, dictators and consuls. By means of such speeches he again succeeded in filling the city with dismay, and although the war had been transferred to Africa, yet its terrors seemed to have moved closer than ever to Rome.
27. But not long afterwards Scipio defeated Hannibal himself109 in a pitched battle and crushed the pride of Carthage underfoot. He gave his countrymen a joy that went far beyond all their hopes, and in restoring their supremacy, ‘righted the ship that storms so long had tossed’.110 Fabius Maximus, however, did not live to see the end of the war, nor did he ever hear of Hannibal’s overthrow, nor witness the glorious and lasting prosperity of his country, for at about the time when Hannibal sailed from Italy, he fell sick and died.
Epaminondas was buried by the Thebans at public expense, because when he died, so the story goes, he was so poor that nothing was found in his house but a single iron spit.111 The Romans did not bury Fabius at the expense of the state, but every citizen contributed the smallest coin in his possession towards the funeral.112 This was not because he was so poor as to need their help, but rather because they felt that they were burying the father of the people. Thus, in his death he received the honour and regard which he had earned by the conduct of his life.
Comparison of Pericles and Fabius Maximus
1 (28). Such, then, is the story of these men’s lives. Now, since each of them left behind many noble proofs of his excellence both in civic and military affairs, let us begin with their accomplishments in war. Pericles had at his disposal a people who were at the height of their prosperity, were great in their own right and at the peak of their imperial power.1 One could, therefore, attribute it to the good fortune and might of his city that Pericles never experienced a reversal or a defeat, whereas Fabius, because he took charge of Rome’s affairs when its circumstances were disgraceful and disastrous, did not merely preserve intact a city that was flourishing but instead restored his from the brink of total catastrophe. Furthermore, the glorious deeds of Cimon,2 the victorious trophies set up by Myronides3 and Leocrates4 and the many triumphs of Tolmides5 made it possible for Pericles, when he held the office of general, to enrich his city with holidays and festivals6 rather than wage war for the sake of recovering Athens’ possessions or protecting her from her enemies. But Fabius, who witnessed so many routs and defeats, saw so many consuls and praetors slain and slaughtered, and beheld lakes and plains and forests filled with the bodies of soldiers and rivers flowing with blood and gore as far as the sea, took Rome into his own hands, reviving and steadying his city, which he would not allow to collapse into utter ruin owing to the failures of other men. Mind you, managing a city that has been humbled by misfortunes, and has little choice but to hearken to a man of good sense, might be deemed less difficult than reining in the insolence and audacity of a people7 rendered conceited and arrogant by their success, and it was by way of this very achievement that Pericles most clearly showed himself to be master in Athens. Still, the severity and the magnitude of the evils afflicting the Romans revealed the steadfast resolution and greatness of Fabius, who never allowed himself to become confused and who never abandoned his carefully reasoned plans.
2 (29). Pericles’ conquest of Samos8 can be set beside Fabius’ capture of Tarentum,9 and so too, by Zeus! his taking of Euboea10 with Fabius’ seizing the cities of Campania,11 although the reduction of Capua was the work of the consuls Fulvius and Appius.12 In so far as set battles are concerned, Fabius seems to have won only one, the victory for which he celebrated his first triumph,13 whereas Pericles erected nine trophies14 for defeating enemies on land and at sea. However, one can find no record of any action by Pericles that is comparable to Fabius’ when he snatched Minucius away from Hannibal and saved an entire Roman army.15 That was a truly noble deed, demonstrating in a single moment Fabius’ valour, his intelligence and his kindness. Then again, we have no evidence that Pericles ever suffered a defeat on the order of Fabius’ when Hannibal out-generalled him through his cunning stratagem employing oxen.16 Fabius had actually trapped his enemy within a narrow defile, which, by a stroke of good fortune for the Romans, Hannibal had entered of his own accord, but he let him escape unnoticed in the night, and when day came Hannibal advanced forcefully, defeating his erstwhile captor.
Furthermore, if it is essential that a good general not only take full advantage of present circumstances but also be a sound judge of things to come, then we must certainly notice that Pericles foresaw and foretold how the Athenians’ war would come to an end, for they tried to accomplish too much and lost their empire.17 But it was only by rejecting Fabius’ advice that the Romans decided to send Scipio against the Carthaginians18 and consequently won a complete victory – not through good luck but rat
her on account of the wisdom and valour of their general, who utterly vanquished the enemy. Therefore, the very disasters suffered by his country attest to Pericles’ keen intellect, while the Romans’ victory is proof that Fabius got it wrong. Indeed, it is no worse for a general to stumble into misfortune because he lacks perspicacity than it is for him to miss an opportunity because he lacks confidence. Inexperience, in my opinion, is the common cause of each failure, for it both engenders rashness in a man and robs him of his courage.19 So much, then, for their achievements in war.
3 (30). Let us now turn to civic affairs. Pericles is the object of harsh criticism on account of his role in the Peloponnesian War, the complaint being that he caused it by refusing to make any concessions to the Spartans when he was at odds with them.20 But I am confident that Fabius Maximus would never have conceded anything to the Carthaginians and would nobly have endured any danger for the sake of Rome’s empire. Nevertheless, the decency and mildness that Fabius displayed towards Minucius count as reproaches against Pericles’ factious subversion of Cimon21 and Thucydides,22 worthy and aristocratic men whom he subjected to ostracism and banishment. Still, Pericles had more power and influence than did Fabius. For this reason, he was able to prevent any other general’s faulty strategy from doing his city harm. The sole exception was Tolmides, who was alienated from Pericles and opposed him violently: this man ultimately met with defeat when he attacked the Boeotians.23 All the others, however, took Pericles’ part and deferred to his judgement, so great was his authority. Fabius, by contrast, though sure and unerring in his own commands, was inferior to Pericles in that he was unable to restrain his fellow Romans, who would not have suffered so many great disasters had Fabius possessed the same influence with them that Pericles had over the Athenians.