One additional condition came with the appointment: Paulson would have to divest his huge holding of Goldman Sachs stock—some 3.23 million shares, worth about $485 million—as well as a lucrative investment in a Goldman fund that held a stake in the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. Because new Internal Revenue Service rules allowed executives who entered into government service to sell their interests without a penalty, Paulson saved more than $100 million in taxes. It was perhaps one of the most lucrative deals he ever struck, but for many months prior to the crisis, he watched chagrined as Goldman’s shares rose from about $142, when he sold them, to their high of $235.92 in October 2007.
Henry Merritt Paulson Jr. was officially nominated for Treasury secretary on May 30, 2006. Just seven days later, the Washington Post featured a profile of him that opened: “In an administration with just two and a half years to go, Henry M. Paulson Jr., President Bush’s nominee for Treasury secretary, may have little chance to make a mark on many economic issues.”
Nothing could have played more effectively to his immediate sense of buyer’s remorse—and motivate him to overcome the challenge.
By Wall Street standards, Paulson was something of a baffling outlier, a titan who had little interest in living a Carnegie Hill multimillionaire’s life. A straight-shooting Midwesterner, he had grown up on a farm outside Chicago and had been an Eagle Scout. He and Wendy assiduously avoided the Manhattan society scene, trying to get to bed before 9:00 p.m. as often as they could, and preferred bird-watching in Central Park—Wendy led tours in the mornings for the Nature Conservancy—near their two-bed-room, twelve-hundred-square-foot apartment, a modest residence for one of the highest-paid executives on Wall Street. Paulson wore a plastic running watch, and any inclination he might have had to spend money was discouraged by Wendy, the daughter of a Marine officer whose frugality had kept him firmly grounded. One day, Paulson came home with a new cashmere coat from Bergdorf Goodman, to replace one that he had had for ten years. “Why did you buy a new coat?” Wendy asked. The next day, Paulson returned it.
And despite his prodigious fund-raising for President Bush, he hardly fit the image of a Republican hardliner. A hard-core environmentalist whose only car was a Toyota Prius, he was the subject of a good deal of negative publicity—and the scourge of some annoyed Goldman Sachs shareholders—when in 2006 he donated 680,000 acres of land Goldman owned in the South American archipelago of Tierra del Fuego to the Wildlife Conservation Society. He was WCS chairman, as it happened, and his son was one of its advisers. Although the irony could not be appreciated by anyone at the time, the firm had acquired the ecologically sensitive South American land as part of a portfolio of mortgage defaults.
Paulson had a long history of exceeding others’ expectations. Despite his relatively modest frame—six feet one, 195 pounds—he had been an all–Ivy League tackle for Dartmouth, where his ferociousness in playing earned him the nicknames “The Hammer” and “Hammering Hank.” But unlike his hard-partying teammates, he kept orange juice and ginger ale in a refrigerator at his fraternity, Sigma Alpha Epsilon, to drink during beer parties. (He met his future wife when she was a student at Wellesley; Wendy’s classmates there included Hillary Rodham, who in some ways was her rival. Wendy was president of the class of 1969; Hillary was president of the student body.) Paulson graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Dartmouth in 1968 with a major in English literature.
Paulson had first come to Washington in 1970, after graduating from Harvard Business School, and at the time he didn’t even own a suit. Armed with a recommendation from one of his undergraduate professors at Dartmouth, Paulson landed a job as a staff aide to the assistant secretary of Defense and would soon display some of the skills that would later make him such an effective salesman at Goldman Sachs. In just two years he advanced to the White House, where he became assistant director of the Domestic Policy Council, then headed by John Ehrlichman, who would later be convicted of conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and perjury in the Watergate cover-up. Paulson served as a liaison with the departments of Treasury and Commerce. “Given how [Hank] moved from a low-ranking position in the Pentagon to the White House, you have to conclude he’s got pretty good antenna for what’s going on,” recalled a friend and former Goldman executive, Kenneth Brody. “[B]ut when Watergate came, there was never a mention of Hank.”
When Wendy became pregnant with their first child in 1973, Paulson, eager to earn some money, decided to leave the Nixon White House and started looking for work in the financial sector—but not if it meant living in New York. He interviewed with a number of financial firms in Chicago, and of all the offers he received, he was most attracted to two Manhattan firms with major Chicago offices: Salomon Brothers and Goldman Sachs. He decided on Goldman after Robert Rubin, a Goldman partner and future Treasury secretary, Gus Levy, a legend at the firm, and John Whitehead, among others, convinced him that he could be successful there and never have to live in Gotham. His salary: $30,000.
In January 1974, Paulson moved his family back to where he had grown up, Barrington Hills, a town of fewer than four thousand residents northwest of Chicago. Paulson bought five acres of the family farm from his father, who was a wholesale jeweler. There, up a winding road from his parents’ home, he built an unpretentious wood-and-glass house, nestled among tall oak trees at the end of a half-mile driveway.
At Goldman, Paulson was given an unusual amount of responsibility for a junior investment banker. “You know, Hank, we ordinarily don’t hire guys as young as you into this role but, you know, you look old,” Jim Gorter, a senior partner, told him, referring to his rapidly receding hairline. Having quickly proved himself with important Midwestern clients like Sears and Caterpillar, he was soon marked as a rising star at the firm’s Manhattan headquarters. In 1982 he made a partner, placing him in an elite group of men and a few women who were entitled to a bigger share of the bonus pool. When he became co-head of investment banking and a member of the firm’s management committee from Chicago, he was obliged to spend a great deal of time on the phone, which he did somewhat famously, leaving interminable messages at all hours of the day.
Only four years later, in September of 1994, however, Goldman Sachs was in turmoil. An unexpected spike in interest rates around the world had hit the firm hard, sending profits tumbling more than 60 percent during the first half of the year. Stephen Friedman, the firm’s chief executive, suddenly announced he was resigning; thirty-six other Goldman partners soon left, along with their capital and connections.
To stanch the bleeding, the firm’s board turned to Jon Corzine, Goldman’s soft-spoken head of fixed income. The directors saw Paulson as a natural number two who would not only complement Corzine but send a signal that investment banking, Paulson’s specialty, would remain as key an area as ever for Goldman. They were betting that Corzine and Paulson could form a partnership as powerful as that of Friedman and Robert Rubin, and before them, John Whitehead and John Weinberg.
There was only one problem with the plan: Neither man cared much for the other.
At a meeting at Friedman’s apartment on Beekman Place, Paulson expressed resistance to the idea of working under Corzine, or even to relocating to New York, which he had doggedly avoided all these years. Corzine, who was known to be especially persuasive in one-on-one encounters, suggested that he and Paulson take a walk.
“Hank, nothing could please me more than to work closely with you,” Corzine said. “We’ll work closely together. We’ll really be partners.” Within an hour they had reached a deal.
On arriving that year in New York, Paulson moved quickly. He and his wife looked at dozens of apartments in just a few days. After narrowing the list down to two, Paulson walked quickly through the rooms of each, cell phone pasted to his ear, and signaled to his wife his choice. Then he ran to catch a plane.
As president and chief operating officer respectively, Paulson and Corzine worked tirelessly in the fall of 1994 to address Goldman’s problems, trave
ling around the world to meet with clients and employees. Paulson was given the unenviable task of cutting expenses by 25 percent. Their efforts paid off: Goldman Sachs turned around in 1995 and had strong profits in both 1996 and 1997. Yet the crisis convinced Corzine and some others at Goldman that the firm needed to be able to tap the public capital markets so that it could withstand shocks in the future. The solution, they believed, was an initial public offering.
But Corzine did not have a strong enough hold on the firm when, in 1996, he first made the case to its partners for why Goldman should go public. Resistance to the idea of an IPO was strong, as the bankers worried it would upend the firm’s partnership and culture.
But with a big assist from Paulson, who became co-chief executive in June 1998, Corzine ultimately won the day: Goldman’s initial public offering was announced for September of that year. But that summer the Russian ruble crisis erupted and Long-Term Capital Management was teetering on the brink of collapse. Goldman suffered hundreds of millions of dollars in trading losses and had to contribute $300 million as part of a Wall Street bailout of Long-Term Capital that was orchestrated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. A rattled Goldman withdrew its offering at the last minute.
What was known only to a small circle of Paulson’s closest friends was that he was actually considering quitting the firm, tired of Corzine, New York, and all the internal politics. However, the dynamic at Goldman shifted dramatically in December 1998: Roy Zuckerberg, a big Corzine supporter, retired from Goldman’s powerful executive committee, leaving it with five powerful members: Corzine, Paulson, John Thain, John Thornton, and Robert Hurst. At the same time, Goldman’s board had become increasingly frustrated with Corzine, who had engaged in merger talks with Mellon Bank behind their backs.
A series of secret meetings in various apartments quickly followed and resulted in a coup worthy of imperial Rome or the Kremlin. Persuaded to stay and run the firm, Paulson and the three other committee members agreed to force Corzine’s resignation. Corzine had tears in his eyes when he was told of their decision.
Paulson became sole chief executive, with Thain and Thornton as co-presidents, co-chief operating officers, and heirs presumptive. And in May 1999, shares of Goldman made their trading debut in a $3.66 billion offering.
By the spring of 2006, Paulson had stayed longer in the CEO spot than he had expected and had risen to the very top of his profession. He was awarded an $18.7 million cash bonus for the first half of the year; in 2005 he was the highest paid CEO on Wall Street, pulling in $38.3 million in total compensation. Within Goldman he had no challengers, and his handpicked successor, Lloyd Blankfein, was patiently waiting in the wings. The bank itself was the preferred choice as adviser on the biggest mergers and acquisitions, and was a leading trader of commodities and bonds. It was paid handsomely by hedge funds using its services, and it was emerging as a power in its own right in private equity.
Goldman had become the money machine that every other firm on Wall Street wanted to emulate.
After thirty-two years at Goldman, Paulson had a tough time adjusting to life in government. For one, he had to make many more phone calls because he could no longer blast out long voice-mail messages to staffers, as was his custom at Goldman; Treasury’s voice-mail system, he was repeatedly informed, did not yet have that capacity. He was encouraged to use e-mail, but he could never get comfortable with the medium; he resorted to having one of his two assistants print out the ones sent to him through them. And he had little use for the Secret Service officers accompanying him everywhere. He knew CEOs who had security with them constantly, and he had always considered such measures the ultimate demonstration of arrogance.
Much of the Treasury staff did not know what to make of Paulson and his idiosyncracies. The staffers would go to Robert Steel, his deputy secretary and a former Goldman alum, for advice on how best to interact with their quirky new boss. Steel would always tell them the same three things: “One: Hank’s really smart. Really smart. He’s got a photographic memory. Two: He’s an incredibly hard worker, incredibly hard. The hardest you’ll ever meet. And he’ll expect you to work just as hard. Three: Hank has no social EQ [Emotional Quotient], zero, none. Don’t take it personally. He has no clue. He’ll go to the restroom and he’ll only halfway close the door.”
Early in his tenure, Paulson invited some staff members to his house, a $4.3 million home in the northwestern corner of Washington (which, in a bizarre coincidence, had once belonged to Jon Corzine). The group gathered in the living room, whose big windows looking out over the woods almost made it seem as if they were sitting in a fancy tree house. Surrounding them were photographs of birds, most of them taken by Wendy.
Paulson was intensely explaining some of his ideas to the group. Wendy, thinking it odd that her husband had forgotten to offer their guests anything to drink on such a hot summer day, interrupted the meeting to do so herself.
“No, they don’t want anything to drink,” Paulson said distractedly before resuming the meeting.
Some time later Wendy came out with a pitcher of cold water and glasses, but no one dared indulge in front of the boss.
Paulson had inherited a department that was in disarray. His predecessor, John Snow, the former chief of the railroad company CSX, had been marginalized, and the demoralized staff felt both neglected and underappreciated. Paulson thought he could remedy that. But what surprised him was how few employees there actually were. He had assumed that government inefficiency would guarantee that he would have to deal with thousands of bodies being underutilized. Although he now oversaw a department of 112,000, it was light on the financial side, and he knew he would have to bring in seasoned Wall Street veterans who knew what it meant to work hard.
The Goldman connection was the one factor of which Paulson had to be mindful, as impractical as that seemed to him. He knew conspiracy theories about Goldman’s supposed influence over Washington bloomed anew whenever a top Goldman executive took a government job, whether it concerned Robert Rubin’s becoming Treasury secretary under Clinton or even Jon Corzine’s election as senator from New Jersey, despite being ousted from the firm. (Rubin, who was now at Citigroup, also reminded him about being careful in dealing with Goldman before he took the job.)
In his first few weeks on the job, as the economic clouds were gathering but no one was yet forecasting a storm, Paulson focused on improving the morale at Treasury. He visited departments that had not seen a cabinet member for years and ordered the refurbishment of the building’s basement gym. Paulson was serious about physical fitness and often biked around the capital, whenever Wendy could get him off the phone.
Early on, Paulson had concerns about the markets. In his first briefing with President Bush and his economic team, at Camp David on August, 17, 2006, he warned that the economy was overdue for a crisis. “When there is a lot of dry tinder out there, you never know what will light it,” he said. “We have these periods every six, eight, ten years, and there are plenty of excesses.”
Paulson made it clear that the administration would have to confront at least one serious problem: the subprime mortgage mess, which had already begun to have repercussions. Bear Stearns and others were deeply involved in this business, and he needed to find a way to obtain “wind-down authority” over these troubled broker-dealers. Traditional banks had the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or FDIC, and the Federal Reserve effectively protecting them from going bankrupt; these agencies had a built-in transition plan that allowed them to take failing banks safely into receivership and auction them off. But the FDIC had no authority over investment banks like Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns, and Lehman Brothers, and unless Paulson was given comparable power over these institutions, he said during the meeting, there could be chaos in the market.
On March 27, 2008, at 8:30 a.m., just three days after the “recut” Bear deal, Paulson and his lieutenants gathered for a meeting. He’d just arrived from his usual w
orkout at Sports Club/LA in the Ritz-Carlton hotel a few blocks away. His brain trust, Bob Steel, Jim Wilkinson, David Nason, Michele Davis, Phillip Swagel, Neel Kashkari, and several others, crammed into his office on the third floor of the Treasury Building, which overlooked the White House’s Rose Garden and afforded dramatic views of the Washington Monument to the south.
Paulson took a chair in the corner of the high-ceilinged space, its walls already decorated with dozens of his wife’s photographs of birds and reptiles. Some staffers found seats on his blue velvet couch; others stood, leaning against his mahogany desk, with its four Bloomberg screens flickering on top.
Paulson held these meetings with his inner circle each morning at 8:30 a.m., except for every other Friday, when he had breakfast with Ben Bernanke, the chairman of the Federal Reserve. Paulson would have preferred to have the staff meetings start even earlier, but these were government workers, and he was already pushing them pretty far. Most of his senior team were being paid around $149,000 a year, though each of them could have potentially been making much more in the private sector.