The bottom line for New Delhi remains the right of the Afghan people to decide their own destiny. It sees the role of the international community as helping Afghanistan to do just that. And it doesn’t believe Kabul is ready for the world to give up on it yet.
There really are only two choices confronting the international community unless one counts ‘cut and run’—to invest and endure or to improve conditions to a point that we can exit. India has already made up its mind—invest and endure is the way forward, because we believe in the cause of peace, democracy and development in Afghanistan. India trusts that the friends of Afghanistan will do likewise.
I will deal more briefly with some of India’s other relationships in our neighbourhood, starting with India’s northern neighbours, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh.
India and Nepal share a unique relationship of friendship and cooperation underpinned by linguistic, cultural and civilizational links, wide-ranging commercial and economic ties, and extensive people-to-people contacts. It is said that when the princely states in British India were being integrated into the Indian Union, the maharaja of Nepal sent an emissary to find out where he had to sign up, but India demurred, recognizing the value of a buffer state on its northern border. So Nepal remained independent, but as the only country whose nationals required no passports to cross into India. The border is notoriously porous, and at times of trouble Nepalis swarm across it, transforming entire Indian neighbourhoods into Nepali colonies.
Few countries have a relationship as wide-ranging and multifaceted as that between India and Nepal. There is an open border between the two countries, extensive marital, kinship and cultural links, and nationals of one are treated as nationals by the other, adding up to a relationship as intense and intimate as it is possible to find between two sovereign states. Indian economic, political, educational, religious, spiritual and cultural influence on—some critics would say dominance of—Nepal is pervasive. The close connections between the armed forces of the two nations have in a sense made India the ultimate guarantor of law and order in Nepal (though this can create complications, as occurred in 2009 when India was accused of supporting the Nepali armed forces chief when he resisted demands from Maoist Prime Minister Prachanda to resign).
At the same time it has not always been seen as a wholly positive relationship. The former Indian diplomat Rajiv Sikri wrote that ‘Indians have taken Nepal too much for granted. India’s approach towards Nepal has been dismissive and neglectful. The Indian government and public have never shown adequate sensitivity to Nepali pride and uniqueness.’ India has an evident stake in Nepalese stability, and our bilateral relations have to be based on common economic prosperity. To build interdependencies that integrate our two countries and create the necessary conditions for economic integration, it is imperative to ensure greater connectivity of goods, people and ideas. New Delhi does not seem to have appreciated sufficiently the importance of investing in rail and road links and using infrastructure development to promote greater integration with Nepal. The two countries are working on an economic package for developing a skill base for industrial development and an ambitious programme to upgrade the infrastructure along their borders. India clearly needs to go beyond its currently reactive approach to events on the ground in Nepal to evolve a positive agenda that would be more proactive, support economic growth and progress and serve to strengthen its democracy and civil society.
Increased bilateral trade with and investments in Nepal would contribute to economic development and prosperity for both countries. The 1996 trade treaty marked a turning point in trade relations between the two countries. It resulted in phenomenal growth of bilateral trade, which witnessed a sevenfold increase in a decade (Nepal’s exports to India increased eleven times and Indian exports to Nepal increased six times). In addition, Indian investments in Nepal increased by seven times. The 2009 revised trade treaty has retained the positive features of the previous treaty and built on it to further enhance and expand bilateral trade between the two countries.
The problems that have arisen recently in the India–Nepal relationship, in the analysis of India’s foremost scholar of Nepal, Professor S.D. Muni, resulted from a number of factors:
principal among them the Maoists’ deviations from assurances sought by India and given by them on a number of bilateral issues; their propensity to use the China card beyond the ‘red lines’ drawn by India; [and] their unwillingness or incapacity to give up strong arm methods in dealing with their political opponents. Relevant as well were abrasive diplomatic behaviour of Kathmandu based Indian diplomacy; India’s fears that the Maoists were inclined to and capable of changing Nepal’s domestic power equations; and finally Delhi’s fears that a Constitution drafted under assertive Maoist leadership may not be compatible with the democratic profile of Nepal.
These are all core issues that cannot be wished away. In addition, China’s quickening activity in Nepal has not gone unnoticed in New Delhi. In recent years, China has been meeting with and courting Nepali political parties, and investing heavily in Nepali business and economic activities. A number of high-level (and high-profile) visits have taken place, and Beijing has been commenting publicly on Nepali developments with a frequency and freedom that would not have previously been associated with that country.
Nepal is going through a historic transition and India has consistently maintained that the political process—the peace process, the drafting of the new constitution by a duly elected Constituent Assembly, and its implementation with the cooperation of all political tendencies in a democratically elected Parliament—has to be both Nepali owned and Nepali driven. There is some legitimate anxiety about the anti-Indian sentiments expressed by the Nepali Maoists, currently in government, though it is understood that reassurances have been conveyed to New Delhi that a Maoist-run Nepal would not allow itself to be used against Indian interests. Most Indians are with the people of Nepal in this period of historic transition and in their quest for a multiparty democracy.
The developments in our neighbourhood with respect to Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and the Maldives (at least until the recent change of regime) have been remarkably positive. They have pointed towards greater understanding, cooperation and partnership rather than towards disagreement, let alone conflict.
India’s relations with Bhutan are an excellent example of good-neighbourly relations and—unlike some of the other relationships in the subcontinent—have been characterized by mutual understanding, trust and cooperation. The year 2009 was a momentous year in India–Bhutan relations. It marked the celebrations of the golden jubilee of the visit of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to Bhutan in 1958, the coronation of the fifth king of Bhutan and the 100th anniversary of the Wangchuck dynasty. India shared its experience of democracy and constitutional processes with Bhutanese officials working on the transition from monarchy to democracy. New Delhi welcomed Bhutan joining the ranks of democratic countries and the development has only helped strengthen relations. The previous client–state relationship reflected in the India–Bhutan friendship treaty of 1950 was altered when the treaty was updated in 2007; it now not only reflects the contemporary nature of the two countries’ bilateral relationship but also lays the foundation for their future development in the twenty-first century.
India is the largest development partner of Bhutan. It has been providing assistance to Bhutan ever since the latter initiated planned development efforts in the early 1960s. Hydropower exports from Bhutan to India—aiming at a target of 10,000 MW of hydropower by 2020—have already overtaken tourism as the single largest contributor to the impressive recent growth in Bhutan’s GDP. India has constructed three substantial hydroelectric projects—Chukha, Kurichhu and Tala—which are a major source of revenue generation for Bhutan, and the country is developing additional hydroelectric projects, for which India would remain the main customer. From 2006, Bhutan’s exports to India have exceeded its imports from India, due to its growing exports of
hydropower to its energy-starved southern neighbour.
Bhutan has other significant benefits from its relationship with India. It enjoys preferential trade and transit facilities that India does not accord to other states (bar Nepal). India finances nearly three-fifths of Bhutan’s budget, holds 61 per cent of Bhutan’s debt stock and has built crucial border roads and other major infrastructural facilities. India remains Bhutan’s most important trade partner, its products constituting over 70 per cent of Bhutan’s total imports, while Bhutan’s exports to India are close to 99 per cent of its total exports. India is also committed to the construction of the first rail link between our countries and to assisting Bhutan in information technology development and dissemination.
It is a relationship that has comfortably weathered Bhutan’s internal transition and its opening up to the wider world. In the words of a neutral and not-uncritical observer, the Canadian diplomat David Malone: ‘In spite of clear Indian dominance of its small Himalayan neighbour, the relationship has been a genuinely friendly, positive, and mutually respectful one, with India working hard to keep its own profile in Bhutan as low as possible and the Bhutanese mostly expressing appreciation for India’s contributions.’
The end of martial law in Bangladesh with the 2009 elections and the ushering in of a democratic government led by the Awami League opened up a window of opportunity for both sides to address issues of genuine mutual concern in a purposeful and focused manner that builds on our commonalities. It may be a cliché to speak of the multifaceted nature of relations between the two countries and the historical and traditional bonds of friendship the two countries share, but there is no doubt that the cliché is a cliché because it is true. It helps that Bangladesh, once again since 2009 under the leadership of Sheikh Hasina Wajed, daughter of Bangladesh’s pro-India founding father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, seems to understand that its own prospects for prosperity are closely tied to India’s.
Soon after coming to power, the government of Sheikh Hasina arrested and handed over a pair of wanted terrorists who had previously enjoyed sanctuary on Bangladeshi soil. The hostility of Bangladesh’s few, but vociferous, anti-Indian Islamist politicians has been curbed by firm governmental action. Discussions on sharing of river waters, dam construction and similar issues have taken place in the framework of a mutual determination not to harm each other’s interests. India’s decision to permit duty-free access to the exports of the least developed countries has benefited Bangladeshi trade with India, which has burgeoned dramatically, with Bangladesh’s exports to India crossing the $1-billion mark in a twelve-month period for the first time in 2012. Issues of road and rail connectivity are on the table, trade is being given a new impetus and both nations are cooperating on combating terrorism.
Most strikingly, a seemingly intractable territorial irritant—the existence of small enclaves of each country within the other’s borders—was settled during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Dhaka in September 2011 on terms that even Bangladeshis found generous on India’s part. It is a pity that parliamentary ratification of the land transfer (which requires a two-thirds majority in both Houses that the United Progressive Alliance government does not have) has not yet happened. It will require an effort to persuade the opposition parties to cooperate, but the effort is well worth making; otherwise the perception that ‘India does not deliver on its promises’ will gain ground. While one much-anticipated agreement on the sensitive issue of sharing the waters of the river Teesta fell through at the last minute (on which more later), other accords ranged from trade, transit and transportation to electricity and an end to shootings on the border.
Of even greater long-term significance is a $10-billion project to provide transit through Bangladesh to India’s north-eastern states, the so-called seven sisters, long the stepchildren of Indian development because of their geographical remoteness from India’s booming economy, to which they are connected only through a thin sliver of Indian territory north of Bangladesh. In 1947 the North-East had a higher per capita income than most of the rest of India, but it has languished since independence because Partition cut it off from the Indian heartland. Greater integration with India will be a huge asset to Bangladesh as well, helping to develop roads, railways and trade and lifting the country’s economic growth by an estimated 2 per cent additionally. While transit through Bangladesh would also have security benefits for India (it would simplify the military’s task of bringing supplies and reinforcements to combat insurgencies in the North-East and to shore up our border defences against China), the economic benefits have clearly been uppermost in both countries’ minds.
Both countries speak of their relations as (in the words of one Bangladeshi spokesman) ‘time-tested and based on shared history, culture, language, religion, traditions and values’. The two countries’ closer engagement has embraced areas as diverse as joint water resources management, land boundary demarcation, trade, power, connectivity, infrastructure development, cultural and educational exchange and poverty alleviation. While it may have been true that, for some years, Bangladesh was reluctant to sell natural gas to India for fear of being seen domestically as submitting to Indian ‘exploitation’, public opinion has shifted significantly. Polls conducted by both Bangladeshi and foreign researchers have confirmed that hostility towards India is now expressed only by a tiny minority and that regard for India, as well as support for its rise as a significant power, is a widespread sentiment. This is a welcome change, and augurs well for the future.
This is not to suggest that all is merely sweetness and light between the two countries. Bangladesh has, in the not-so-distant past, served as a haven for Islamist fanatic groups and even terrorists, and has provided a sanctuary for Indian insurgents in the North-East. It has also been a source of illegal migration into India—some 20 million Bangladeshis are reliably estimated to have slipped into the country over the last two decades and disappeared into the Indian woodwork—and of counterfeit currency, which is regularly infiltrated into India by ISI operatives through the porous borders with Bangladesh and Nepal in an attempt to undermine the Indian economy. There are also lingering issues of border management and transit-related questions as well as controversies over water-sharing. This last erupted in the headlines when the chief minister of the Indian state of Paschimbanga (West Bengal), Mamata Banerjee, an important coalition partner of the Manmohan Singh government, vetoed a proposed agreement in 2011 to share the waters of the river Teesta, claiming it would deprive her farmers of adequate water. This was widely seen as a setback for a relationship that was once again beginning to blossom after a long freeze. It is clear that cooperation on sharing the Teesta waters is indispensable for Sheikh Hasina to be able to claim that Bangladesh has gained from her friendship with India; and we must all help persuade the Paschimbanga leadership that these waters are not ‘ours’ to ‘give’, but a shared natural resource (as we accepted in the Indus waters treaty with Pakistan) which we should use responsibly and equitably.
One project that could unite all four countries discussed in this section—in the sort of shared endeavour that could yet define a better future for the subcontinent—is a subregional joint water resources management project involving Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and India, intended primarily for flood control but that could go beyond it. The project, which has now begun to take off from the proverbial drawing board, envisages achieving both the mitigation and the augmentation of the dry season flows of the rivers that flow through the four countries. An added objective will be to harness the same rivers to generate hydroelectricity in a region where power shortages are perhaps the biggest obstacle to economic growth. If it happens, such a mutually beneficial project could offer a template for the rest of South Asia, helping change a narrative of hostility and stagnation into one of cooperation and dynamism.
At one level, nothing could be easier than speaking about India–Sri Lanka relations. After all, India is Sri Lanka’s closest neighbour. The relation
ship between the two countries is more than 2500 years old and both sides have built, and built upon, a long legacy of intellectual, cultural, religious and linguistic exchange. Lanka features centrally in the sacred ancient epic the Ramayana and, for that reason, is probably the one foreign country most non-political Indians are aware of. A significant Tamil minority on the island enjoys ties of kinship and cultural affiliation with India’s southern state of Tamil Nadu. In recent years, the relationship between India and Sri Lanka has been marked by frequent and close contact at the highest political level, growing trade and investment, cooperation in the fields of education, culture and defence, as well as a broad understanding on major issues of international interest. As the Sri Lankan scholar and diplomat Dayan Jayatilleka eloquently put it: ‘India inheres in the very fabric of the island. Sri Lanka is an inverted and miniaturized mirror of India. Even if the Tamil factor did not exist, Sri Lanka’s relationship with India would be its most vital external relationship.’
Sri Lanka is also economically South Asia’s most successful state in GDP terms, with a per capita income that is nearly double India’s. The end of the conflict with the LTTE has brought about a greater possibility for peace and stability in Sri Lanka and its neighbourhood. India has historically done its best to oppose and prevent the internal and external destabilization of its friendly smaller neighbours. The end of the conflict has presented Sri Lanka with an opportunity to heal the wounds created by decades of protracted conflict, to make a new beginning and to build a better future for its people. It has also opened up greater options for India and Sri Lanka to cooperate bilaterally and enlarge our areas of engagement.
India had strongly supported the right of the Government of Sri Lanka to act against terrorist forces. At the same time, it conveyed at the highest level its deep concern at the plight of the mostly Tamil civilian population, emphasizing that their rights and welfare should not get enmeshed in hostilities against the LTTE. The conclusion of the armed conflict saw the emergence of a major humanitarian challenge, with nearly 300,000 Tamil civilians housed in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs). India has emphasized to the Sri Lankan government the importance of focusing on issues of relief, rehabilitation, resettlement and reconciliation. India is now working actively in assisting in these ‘four Rs’ in Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka. We have provided humanitarian relief for the displaced people, medicines worth 225 million Sri Lankan rupees (about $1.8 million) and the services of a field hospital which treated more than 50,000 patients in 2009 before it was withdrawn.