69 Aug. 6 PDB: released 4/10/04, “Withdrawal Notice re 4–12–04 memo re Aug. 6 PDB, Withdrawal Notice re 5–16–01 Daily UBL Threat,” B6, Dan Marcus files, CF. The PDB also referred to the fact that, as indicated by the attacks on the American embassies in Africa in 1998, bin Laden prepared operations “years in advance and is not deterred by setbacks.” The PDB also stated that the FBI was currently “conducting approximately 70 full field investigations throughout the U.S.” that it considered bin Laden–related. This last assertion turned out to be a CIA misunderstanding of a liaison call to the FBI. Some seventy individuals were apparently being investigated by the FBI (Testimony of Thomas Pickard, 4/13/04, CO, Zegart, 109).
70 redacted: Fact Sheet on Aug. 6, 2001, PDB, Office of the Press Secretary, 4/10/04, www.gwu.gov;
71 “said nothing”/at own request: remarks by the President to the Travel Pool [Fort Hood, TX], 4/11/04, www.whitehouse.gov;
72 Bush/Commission meeting/Ben-Veniste account: Ben-Veniste, 293– & see Shenon, 291–, 340–, CR, 260–, Kean & Hamilton, 206–;
73 Clarke “in writing”: see CR, 255, 263, 535n5;
74 “I really don’t”: Testimony of Condoleezza Rice, 4/8/04, CO.
75 nobody could have foreseen: Rice acknowledged in her 2004 Commission testimony that she had misspoken in her comment to the press in 2002 that “no one” could have predicted hijackers using planes as missiles. Given the Genoa situation, she said—and given that others had indeed foreseen the possibility—Rice said she ought to have said only that she could not have imagined an attack using planes in that way. By contrast, Louis Freeh—FBI director until June 2001—told the Commission that the possible use of planes in suicide missions had in his experience been part of the planning for potential terrorist events (misspoken/she could not: Testimony of Condoleezza Rice, 4/8/04, CO, Ben-Veniste, 251, Press Briefing by Condoleezza Rice, 5/16/02, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov; Freeh: Testimony of Louis Freeh, 4/13/04, CO).
76 follow up/discussed with Ashcroft?: The job of making contact with domestic agencies, Bush told Commissioner Jamie Gorelick, was not Rice’s but that of White House chief of staff Andy Card. This assertion was impossible to check because the commission was bound by yet another condition, not to raise questions arising from the Rice or Bush-Cheney interviews with other White House officials. (Ben-Veniste, 303).
77 Rice in Texas?: A contemporary Washington Post report of the President’s activity on August 6 stated that he “held a 45-minute meeting with four senior officials here and talked by telephone with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice about Macedonia.” (authors’ italics) (WP, 8/7/01, USA Today, 8/6/01, 10:24 P.M. update);
78 doubt/“asked for it”: Ben-Veniste, 300, remarks by the President to the Travel Pool, [Fort Hood, TX], 4/11/04, www.whitehouse.gov;
79 “All right”: Suskind, One Percent Doctrine, 1–, Ben-Veniste, 300, additional information gathered by authors, not for attribution;
80 “no formal”: Tenet to Kean & Hamilton, 3/26/04, “PDB—letter from Tenet re Aug. 6 PDB,” B6, Dan Marcus files, CF;
81 “none”: Ben-Veniste, 391.
82 “current”/“pay more”: Shenon, 379, 437n. This account of the August 6 PDB episode is intended by the authors to be not an assessment of the document’s quality but a summary of its content—in the context of the way President Bush, National Security Adviser Rice, and press secretary Fleischer described its contents. Author Amy Zegart severely criticized the quality of the PDB in her book Spying Blind, on the CIA and the FBI and their role prior to 9/11. She judged it a “tragically shoddy piece of intelligence.” Former CIA counterterrorism chief Cofer Black, however, characterized it as a “place-marker” or “reminder” that bin Laden’s ultimate objective was “to strike hard against the United States” (Zegart, 108, Testimony of Cofer Black, 4/13/04, CO).
83 “had written”: Ben-Veniste, 301–.
84 manager alerted/Moussaoui/“goal”/“I am sure”/$6,800: Stipulation, 3/1/06, U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui, 3/1/06;
85 “joy ride”: “Moussaoui, Zacarias, IT—Other,” 8/19/01, U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui, Exhibit 692;
86 string of questions/detained/“martyrs”/“unambiguous”/“convinced”/: CR, 273–, FBI IG, MFR 04019350, 3/18/04, CF, Report, JI, 22–;
87 KSM would tell/“problematic personality”: KSM SUBST, CR, 247, 531n162;
88 met Binalshibh/$14,000/telephone number: Staff Report, “Monograph on Terrorist Financing,” CO, MFR, 04019350, 3/18/04, Indictment & Exhibits MN00601, MN00601.1, MN00601.2, U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui, CR, 225, 520n54.
89 agents knew nothing: Had agents been cleared to examine Moussaoui’s possessions, they would have discovered letters purporting to show that Moussaoui was acting as consultant in the States for a company called “InFocus Tech.” The signature on the letters was that of Yazid Sufaat, the owner of the Kuala Lumpur condominium in which the terrorist meeting—attended by Mihdhar and Hazmi—had been held in January 2000. The FBI had been aware of that meeting at the time, so—had the Bureau’s system been adequately coordinated—discovery of the letters in timely fashion would immediately have linked Moussaoui to al Qaeda. (Report, JI, 26, Exhibit OK01043, U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui).
90 appeals/70 messages: Statement of Eleanor Hill re “The FBI’s Handling of the Phoenix Electronic Communication and Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui Prior to Sept. 11, 2001,” 9/24/02 [as updated 10/17/02], JI, USA Today, 3/2/06, Newsday, 3/21/06, LAT, 3/21/06;
91 “spun up”/“take control”: FBI IG.
92 “That’s not”: Statement of Eleanor Hill. The headquarters failure to respond positively on Moussaoui was to lead to protracted outrage and regret. The wrangle had centered on the complex matter of how legally to get access to Moussaoui’s possessions. The options available were either a criminal search warrant or a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (FISA) warrant—permitted, in this context, if it can be shown that the subject is an agent of an international terrorist group and is engaged in terrorism on behalf of that group. The case agent in Minneapolis, concerned that there was insufficient probable cause for a criminal warrant, favored the FISA option—only to be confronted by legalistic hurdles thrown up by headquarters. The go-ahead was given only on September 11, after the two strikes on the World Trade Center. Evidence and detainee statements were eventually to link Moussaoui to KSM and Binalshibh, and he is now serving a life sentence for conspiracy to commit acts of terror and air piracy. As of this writing, the only other person convicted—of being an accessory to the murder of the people aboard the planes on 9/11—is Mounir Motassadeq, who is serving fifteen years in Germany. Motassadeq, an associate of the Hamburg-based hijackers, was accused of helping the hijackers prepare for the 9/11 operation. In a lengthy prison interview, Motassadeq told the authors that—while he had certainly been an associate and friend of the future hijackers in Hamburg—he had had no knowledge whatsoever of what they were plotting. The authors came away from the interview doubting that he was guilty as charged (warrant options: e.g., Graham with Nussbaum, 51; go-ahead: FBI IG; evidence/sentence: Indictment, U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui, 12/01, AP, 5/4/06, CNN, 4/23/05; Motassadeq: NYT, 1/9/07, Der Spiegel, 1/12/07, Economist, 9/3/02, CBS News, 10/22/02, ints. Motassadeq, Udo Jacob, 2009).
93 second development/New information/Wilshire reconsidered/“Something bad”: CR, 266–,FBI IG. In the 9/11 Commission Report, and in a 2004 review of the FBI’s handling of pre-9/11 intelligence information issued by the Justice Department’s inspector general, relevant CIA and FBI personnel are referred to by pseudonyms. True names of many of the individuals were revealed in evidence prepared in 2006 for Moussaoui’s trial. Others have been asserted by independent writers, notably Lawrence Wright and Kevin Fenton, and the authors have used these identifications in the text. The CIA officer named here as Tom Wilshire is “John” in the official reports. The FBI analyst Margarette Gillespie is “Mary” in reports, while the FBI
analyst Dina Corsi appears to be identical with “Jane” in the Commission Report and with “Donna” in the inspector general’s review. Steve Bongardt is “Steve B.” in the Commission Report and “Scott” in the review. Robert Fuller is “Robert F.” in the Commission Report and “Richard” in the review (CR 267–, & 537n63 et seq., FBI IG, McNulty to Troccoli 3/1/06, U.S. v Zacarias Moussaoui, Exhibit 952.B, Wright, 311, 340–, 352–, 425n, Kevin Fenton, “Aliases of 9/11 Figures Revealed,” 7/15/08, http://hcgroups.wordpress.com).
94 Wilshire suggested to Gillespie: Lawrence Wright’s The Looming Tower reads as if it was not Wilshire but CIA supervisor Clark Shannon who assigned Gillespie to this task. Wright’s New Yorker articles, however, also in 2006, say Wilshire assigned the work. So do other relevant sources (Wright, 340–. CR, 269–, New Yorker, 7/10/06, Substitution for the Testimony of “Mary,” U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui, Exhibit 940);
95 “It all clicked”/“watchlist”: CR, 266–, FBI IG;
96 not in U.S./FAA not informed: Report, JI, 15, Staff Report, “9/11 & Terrorist Travel,” CO, 42, Staff Statement 2, CO;
97 Corsi sent email/red tape/misinterpretation: FBI IG;
98 “Disneyland”: Wright, 353–;
99 “Someday”/Fuller: FBI IG;
100 “assigned no”: CR, 538n77.
101 Tenet fishing: Breitweiser, 193;
102 Tenet directed: Tenet, 159;
103 Tenet briefed/Aug. 23: ibid., CR, 275;
104 seriously/“If this guy”: Tenet, 202–;
105 “brow furrowed”/“no one ever”: Ben-Veniste, 301;
106 “I didn’t see”/lied: Testimony of George Tenet, 4/14/04, CO, Shenon, 361–.
107 Harlow re Aug. 17 & 31: Salt Lake Tribune, WP, 4/15/04. Probably because of an informal exchange Bush had with reporters the following day, it has been suggested that Tenet also met with the President on August 24. The wording of one of his answers could be taken to indicate to the press that there had been a Tenet visit on the 24th. The sense Bush intended, however, is not entirely clear and could equally refer to the visit of August 17 (exchange: Public Papers of the Presidents, George W. Bush, 2001, www.gpoaccess.gov, 1037; suggested: e.g. Robert Schopmeyer, Prior Knowledge of 9/11, Palo Alto, CA: Palo Alto Publishing, 2007, 512, corr. Robert Schopmeyer, 2011).
108 “to make sure”: Tenet, 159;
109 “not recall”: CR, 262.
110 “The question”: Newsweek, 5/25/02;
111 “I do not believe”: Testimony of Condoleezza Rice, 4/8/04, CO;
112 “an appalling”: Vanity Fair, 2/09;
113 “There was no”: Ben-Veniste, 307– & see 265.
CHAPTER 28
1 Hello Jenny: With a few minor changes to ensure verbatim translation from the German, the “Dear Jenny” message is as reported by Al Jazeera reporter Yosri Fouda, drawing on his encounter with Binalshibh in Karachi in 2002 (see pp. 243–45). Binalshibh dated the message as having been sent on or about August 21, 2001. According to Fouda, Binalshibh produced the message “on a floppy disk” and showed it to him “on screen.” The 9/11 Commission Report does not reproduce the “Dear Jenny” message, but refers to coded August “communications” between Atta and Binalshibh that were recovered when KSM was captured. These messages included a discussion of targets dated as having occurred on August 3. In a related note, the Commission quotes Binalshibh as claiming that the words “law” and “politics” were both used to refer only to the Capitol—though the reference was surely in fact to two separate targets (Fouda & Fielding, 138–, The Australian, 9/9/02, Sunday Times [London], 9/802, CR 248–, 531n 165/166).
2 August 29 call/Atta riddle: Reporter Fouda, who learned of the puzzle in 2002 from Binalshibh, rendered it as reproduced in the text. The Commission Report referred to it as “two branches, a slash, and a lollipop.” A factor in choosing the date September 11, according to a note found on KSM’s computer following his capture, was that the U.S. Congress would be in session in the Capitol by that time (Fouda & Fielding, 140, CR, 249, Staff Statement 16, CO).
3 Binalshibh passed on: The Commission Report, drawing on reports of the interrogations of KSM and Binalshibh, states that KSM was informed of the date by Zacaria Essabar, an associate Binalshibh used to carry the message from Germany to KSM in Pakistan. KSM said Essabar brought him the date in a letter, while Binalshibh has said he entrusted Essabar only with a verbal message. Binalshibh has also claimed that he called KSM on the subject. The fact that information was extracted from the prisoners under torture may account for the seeming contradictions. As of this writing, Essabar’s whereabouts are unknown (CR249, 531n173, KSM SUBST, Wanted Notice, Bundeskriminalamt Wiesbaden, 2008).
4 inspector doubts/Kahtani/“He started”: MFR 04016447, 11/12/03, CF, CR, 12, 248, 564n33;
5 “round out”: KSM SUBST;
6 “like a soldier”: MFR 04016447, 11/12/02, CF.
7 340 five rather than four: Kahtani, who was captured in Afghanistan after 9/11, was one of the prisoners “tortured”—in the words of the retired judge appointed to decide on prosecutions at Guantánamo. The record indicates that he strongly resisted interrogation. He remains a Guantánamo detainee as of this writing. Commission staff identified nine other recruits who were at some point considered for assignment to the 9/11 operation (captured/“tortured”: WP, 1/14/09; resisted: Interrogation Log, Detainee 063, www.ccrjustice.org, “The Guantánamo Docket,” NYT website, as of 1/12/11; nine other: Staff Statement 16, CO, CR, 235).
8 Atta at airport: Staff Statement 16, CO, Mohammed al-Kahtani, “RFBI 03013592, Documents Relating to PENTTBOM Briefing of Dec. 10, 2003, Packet 2, CF;
9 Atta free/rental cars/flying/hijackers everyday activities: “Hijackers Timeline [redacted],” 11/14/03, INTELWIRE;
10 moved out Paterson/flight manuals: MFR 04016237, 11/6/03, CF, NYT, 10/28/01;
11 Valencia/“thought they were gay”: Die Zeit (Germany), 10/2/02;
12 men tugging/retrieve towel: St. Petersburg Times, 9/1/02. Simpson believed the men who tried her door were Ahmad al-Haznawi and Ahmed al-Nami;
13 Surma: ibid.;
14 Warrick: ibid., Observer [U.K.], 9/16/01, int. Brad Warrick.
15 Longshore/Dragomir: WP, 10/5/01, Chicago Tribune, 9/18/01. Though this incident was reported in major newspapers, it is not certain that the men Dragomir remembered were Jarrah and a companion—or indeed that the companion was Atta, as the manager thought he might have been. The date of the incident is also not entirely clear—it was reported both as having occurred on August 30 and in “late August.” That said, Jarrah was in the area on August 30, having just returned from Baltimore. He moved out of the accommodations he had been renting for some time on August 31, took another condominium close by—and was apparently using the Internet at a Kinko’s in Hollywood—where the reported Longshore Motel incident occurred—on September 3, at a time Atta was also there (“Hijackers Timeline [redacted],” 11/14/03, INTELWIRE, Profile, Ziad Samir Jarrah, ACS Download Documents, Pkt. 6, 03009470, CF).
16 Hazmi phoned: CR, 223, 249;
17 Abdullah had known/helped: CR, 216, 220, 516n20, Los Angeles to Counterterrorism, 1/8/02, FBI 302 re canvas of hotels, 1/15/02, & FBI 302 re int. instructors Sorbi Flight School, 4/11/02 INTELWIRE, San Diego Union-Tribune, 5/26/04, LAT, 7/24/04, MSNBC, 9/8/06;
18 activist/another man/“planes falling”: San Diego to Ottawa, 4/11/02, San Diego, Squad 15, to San Diego, 2/4/03, INTELWIRE, CR, 218–.
19 “acting”/“nervous”: MFR 04017535, 11/18/03, MFR 04017543, 11/18/03, CF. In detention after 9/11, first as a material witness and then on immigration charges, Abdullah would refuse a 9/11 Commission request to interview him. While in prison, it was alleged, he told other inmates that he had known that Hazmi and Mihdhar were involved in plans for a terrorist attack. According to one inmate, he said he had known the plan was for a 9/11-style attack and that he “found out” three weeks before the attacks occurred. Abdullah, who had arrived in the United States via Canad
a using a Yemeni passport identifying him as “al Mihdhar Zaid” but then changed his name, was charged with an immigration offense and deported in 2003. 9/11 Commission executive director Philip Zelikow has described the report’s findings on Abdullah as “ominous.” In a 2004 interview with The Washington Post, however, Abdullah denied having had any foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks. Reports suggest the possibility that the hijacking references in the notebook found among his possessions may have been written by someone else (refuse: CR, 517n31; involved: ibid., 218–; “Zaid”: “Inside I.C.E. [Immigration and Customs Enforcement],” Dept. of Homeland Security, Vol. 4, 5/25–6/7/04, www.ice.gov; “ominous”: Zelikow to Shenon, 2/12/07, www.philipshenon.com; denied: WP, 8/10/04; notebook: ibid., 516n21, 218).
20 obtained IDs: Staff Report, “9/11 & Terrorist Travel,” 39, FBI 302 of int. Victor Lopez-Flores, 9/23/01, 9/25/01, 10/06/01, 11/8/01, 11/13/01, “Lopez-Flores,” B11, T5, CF, Graham, with Nussbaum, 76;
21 airline reservations/tickets: “Hijackers Timeline [redacted],” 11/14/03, INTELWIRE;
22 frequent flier: ibid., Staff Report, “Monograph on the Four Flights & Civil Aviation Security,” CF, MH, 9/18/01;
23 changed assignments: “Hijackers Timeline [redacted],” 11/14/03, INTELWIRE;
24 Muslim meals: Time, 9/24/01;
25 beyond destinations: “Hijackers Timeline [redacted],” 11/14/03, INTELWIRE;
26 transcontinental/fuel/explosive: ibid., eds. Der Spiegel, 32.
27 Atta thought: CR, 531n171. As things were to turn out, and as noted in Ch. 2 on p. 20, many Trade Center workers did not reach their place of work before the attacks began. They were delayed by voting in local elections and traffic jams.
28 shopped knives/Stanley two-piece/Leatherman/Dollar House/folding knife: Staff Report, “Monograph on the Four Flights & Civil Aviation Security,” CF, “Hijackers Timeline [redacted],” 11/14/03, INTELWIRE, witness list, “Hijacker Knife Purchases,” B18, T7, CF. The folding knife would be found later in Atta’s shipped baggage, which failed to make the transfer to American 11, the plane he hijacked on 9/11 (witness list, “Hijacker Knife Purchases,” B18, T7, CF).