[22] But anyone whose sole passion is reading books, and who does little else besides, having moved here for this – my advice for them is to go back home immediately and attend to business there, [23] because they left home for nothing. A student should practise how to expunge from his life sighs and sorrow, grief and disappointment, exclamations like ‘poor me’ and ‘alas’; [24] he should learn what death is, as well as exile, jail and hemlock, so at the end of the day he can say, like Socrates in prison, ‘Dear Crito, if it pleases the gods, so be it,’5 – instead of, ‘Poor me, an old man – is this what old age held in store for me?’ [25] Don’t imagine that I am referring to anyone humble or obscure, either; Priam says it, so does Oedipus. In fact, all the kings of legend can be found saying it. [26] For what else are tragedies but the ordeals of people who have come to value externals, tricked out in tragic verse?
[27] If I had to be deceived into believing that externals, which lie outside our power, are not man’s proper concern, personally I would consent to such a deception, provided it really could enable me to live an untroubled life, in peace of mind. Which condition you prefer you can determine for yourself.
[28] What does Chrysippus give us? ‘To make certain,’ he says, ‘that these doctrines promising freedom from passion and serenity are legitimate, [29] take all my books,∗ and you will find that the knowledge that makes me impassive is faithful to, and in accord with, nature.’ How lucky we are! A benefactor – and how great a benefactor! – has shown us the way.6 [30] Men have erected altars to Triptolemus7 for giving us the art of farming; [31] but the man who found, disclosed and explained the truth to everyone – not the truth that pertains just to living, but to living well – who among you ever raised an altar, built a temple, erected a statue or venerated God for that? [32] We offer the gods sacrifice because they gave us wheat and wine. But they have produced such wonderful fruit in a human mind, as part of their plan to bestow on humanity the true secret of happiness. Are we going to forget to express our gratitude to them on that account?
I 5 Against the Sceptics8
[1] If a man objects to truths that are all too evident, it is no easy task finding arguments that will change his mind. [2] This is proof neither of his own strength nor of his teacher’s weakness. When someone caught in an argument hardens to stone, there is just no more reasoning with them.
[3] Now, a person can suffer two kinds of petrifaction,9 that of the intellect, and that of the sense of honour, when somebody assumes a defiant stance, resolved neither to assent to self-evident truths nor leave off fighting. [4] Most of us dread the deadening of the body and will do anything to avoid it. About the deadening of the soul, however, we don’t care one iota. [5] Even in the case of the soul, we regard a man as pitiable if he is deficient in thinking or learning. We pity the mentally retarded, and students with learning difficulties. But if somebody’s sense of shame and respect are dead, we will actually call this determination.
[6] ‘Do you realize that you are awake?’
‘No, any more than when I dream and have the impression that I am awake.’
‘And is the one impression in no way different from the other?’
‘No.’
[7] Can I go on reasoning with such a person? What fire or iron can be applied to him, to make him conscious of his condition? He senses it, but pretends he doesn’t; that makes him even worse off than a corpse.
[8] One person does not notice a contradiction in his reasoning; he is unfortunate. Another person notices it, all right, but does not budge and does not back down; he is even more unfortunate. [9] His sense of honour and truthfulness has been excised, and his reason – not excised, but brutalized. Am I to call this strength of character? I can’t – any more than I can apply the same name to the ‘strength’ of degenerates that enables them to say and do in public whatever they please.
I 6 On providence
[1] It is easy to praise providence for everything that happens in the world provided you have both the ability to see individual events in the context of the whole and a sense of gratitude. [2] Without these, either you will not see the usefulness of what happens or, even supposing that you do see it, you will not be grateful for it.
[3] If God had created colours, but not the faculty of vision, colours would have been of little use. [4] Or if God had created vision, but not made sure that objects could be seen, vision would have been worthless. [5] And even if he had made them both, but not created light – [6] then neither would have been of any value.
So who contrived this universal accommodation of things to one another? Who fitted the sword to the scabbard and the scabbard to the sword? No one? [7] In the case of artifacts, it is just this kind of symmetry and structure that regularly persuade us that they must be the work of some artisan, instead of objects created at random. [8] Do sword and scabbard testify to their creator, whereas visible things, vision and light, together, do not? [9] What about the desire of the male for sex with the female, and their ability to use the organs constructed for that purpose – don’t they proclaim their creator, too?
[10] All right, then: What about the complex organization of the mind – built so that, when we meet∗ with sensible objects, we don’t just have their forms impressed upon us, we make a selection from among them; and add and subtract impressions to form various kinds of mental combinations; and from certain ideas make inferences to others somehow related10 – aren’t such abilities able to make a big enough impression so that it becomes impossible for us to discount the possibility of a creator? [11] If not, it’s left to us to explain who made them, and how such amazing and craftsmanlike abilities came into being by accident, on their own.11
[12] Are humans alone in possession of such skills? It’s true that there are many skills distinctive to humans, skills that as a rational animal he uniquely needs. But the irrational animals share with man many of the same faculties. [13] Do they also understand what happens? No – because use is one thing, understanding another. God needed animals that use impressions, like us; he had special need of us, though, because we understand their use.12
[14] And so for the beasts it is enough to eat, drink, sleep, breed and do whatever else it is that satisfies members of their kind. But for us who have been given the faculty of understanding, [15] this is not enough. Unless we act appropriately, methodically, and in line with our nature and constitution, we will fall short of our proper purpose. [16] Creatures whose constitutions are different have different ends and functions accordingly. [17] So, for creatures whose constitution is exclusively designed for use, use on its own suffices; but where the capacity to understand that use is added, the creature will only reach its end by bringing that capacity into play. [18] God created some beasts to be eaten, some to be used in farming, some to supply us with cheese, and so on. To fulfil such functions, they don’t need to comprehend impressions or make distinctions among them. [19] Man was brought into the world, however, to look upon God and his works – and not just look, but appreciate. [20] And so it is inexcusable for man to begin and end where the beasts do. He should begin where they do, but only end where nature left off dealing with him; [21] which is to say, in contemplation and understanding, and a manner of life otherwise adapted to his nature. [22] Come to look upon and appreciate God’s works at least once before you die.
[23] You eagerly travel to Olympia to see the work of Phidias, and all of you account it a shame to die never having seen the sight.13 [24] But when there is no need even to travel, when you are already there∗ because Zeus is present everywhere in his works, don’t you want to look at and try to understand them? [25] Will you never come to a realization of who you are, what you have been born for and the purpose for which the gift of vision was made in our case?
[26] ‘But difficult and disagreeable things happen in life.’ Well, aren’t difficulties found at Olympia? Don’t you get hot? And crowded? Isn’t bathing a problem? Don’t you get soaked through in your seats when it rains? D
on’t you finally get sick of the noise, the shouting and the other irritations? [27] I can only suppose that you weigh all those negatives against the worth of the show, and choose, in the end, to be patient and put up with it all. [28] Furthermore, you have inner strengths that enable you to bear up with difficulties of every kind. You have been given fortitude, courage and patience. [29] Why should I worry about what happens if I am armed with the virtue of fortitude? Nothing can trouble or upset me, or even seem annoying. Instead of meeting misfortune with groans and tears, I will call upon the faculty especially provided to deal with it.
[30] ‘But my nose is running!’ What do you have hands for, idiot, if not to wipe it? [31] ‘But how is it right that there be running noses in the first place?’ [32] Instead of thinking up protests, wouldn’t it be easier just to wipe your nose?
What would have become of Hercules, do you think, if there had been no lion, hydra, stag or boar – and no savage criminals to rid the world of? [33] What would he have done in the absence of such challenges? Obviouslyhe would have just rolled over in bed and gone back to sleep. So by snoring his life away in luxury and comfort he never would have developed into the mighty Hercules. And even if he had, what good would it have done him? [34] What would have been the use of those arms, that physique, and that noble soul, without crises or conditions to stir him into action?
[35] ‘In that case, perhaps he should have created them himself, by searching for a lion to bring into his land, and a boar and a hydra.’ [36] That would have been the act of a fool and a fanatic. Still, by showing up and being discovered, they proved useful as tests of Hercules’ manhood.
[37] Now that you know all this, come and appreciate the resources you have, and when that is done, say, ‘Bring on whatever difficulties you like, Zeus; I have resources and a constitution that you gave me by means of which I can do myself credit whatever happens.’
[38] But no. There you sit, worrying that certain events might happen, already upset and in a state about your present circumstances. So then you reproach the gods. [39] What else can come of such weakness except impiety? [40] And yet God has not merely given us strength to tolerate troubles without being humiliated or undone, but, as befitted a king and true father, he has given them to us free from constraint, compulsion and impediment. He has put the whole matter in our control, not even reserving to himself any power to hinder us or stand in our way. [41] And even though you have these powers free and entirely your own, you don’t use them, because you still don’t realize what you have or where it came from. [42] Instead you sit crying and complaining – some of you blind to your benefactor, and unable to acknowledge his existence; others assailing God with complaints and accusations from sheer meanness of spirit.
[43] I am prepared to show you that you have resources and a character naturally strong and resilient; show me in return what grounds you have for being peevish and malcontent.
I 7 On the utility of changing arguments,
hypothetical arguments and the rest
[1] Most people do not realize that practice in changing arguments, hypothetical arguments, arguments that conclude with a question and so forth, has a bearing on morals. [2] For we are interested in how the good man will act and acquit himself in any situation. [3] So let someone say that the virtuous man will spurn question and answer, or that, if he does engage in it, will be indifferent as to whether he behaves carelessly or at random. [4] And∗ if we accept neither alternative, then we have to concede that some study must be made of the areas with which questioning and answering are especially concerned.
[5] For what does reason purport to do?
‘Establish what is true, eliminate what is false and suspend judgement in doubtful cases.’
[6] And is that all one has to learn?
‘Yes.’
Well, is it enough if you don’t want to be conned in the use of money, just to be told to accept real coins and reject counterfeit ones?
[7] ‘No, it is not enough.’
What else is necessary?
‘Obviously the art of testing and distinguishing genuine coins from fake ones.’
[8] And so too in the case of reason, in addition to what we named, we also have to learn how to test and distinguish what is true, false and unclear.
‘Necessarily.’
[9] What else does reason prescribe?
‘To accept the consequence of what has been admitted to be correct.’
[10] And is this all you need to know?
‘No, you also need to learn the rules of consequence, and how a conclusion sometimes follows from one premise, sometimes from several premises in combination.’
[11] Then surely this too must be acquired by the man intent on acquitting himself intelligently in logical matters – both when he offers his own proofs and demonstrations and when he is following the demonstrations of others, so that he isn’t fooled when they produce sophisms as if the proofs were really sound. [12] And so there has developed among us study and training in conclusive arguments and logical figures – both of which have proven indispensable.
[13] Now, there are cases where we have rightly granted the premises, and yet they yield a conclusion which, though false, nevertheless logically follows from the premises. [14] What am I to do then? Accept the false conclusion? [15] How can I? Say I erred in granting the premises? That has been ruled out too. Say it did not follow from the premises? But this is not an option either.
[16] So what should I do in such cases? Well, just as it is not enough to have borrowed money to establish that you’re still in debt, you still must stand by the loan and not have repaid it already; so in this case it is not enough to have granted the premises to establish that we must admit the conclusion: we must still be committed to the same premises. [17] Now, if the premises remain what they were when we granted them, then we are under every obligation to stand by what was granted and accept what follows. [18] But if they do not remain as they were, we don’t have to accept it,∗ [19] because the conclusion no longer holds for us. Nor is it fitting that we accept it, since we have retracted our admission of the premises.14
[20] That’s why we need to study premises of this kind, and in particular ones that involve changes and alterations such that, in the very process of questioning, answering, drawing conclusions and so forth, they undergo changes and cause the untutored to become confused when confronted with the conclusions. Why? [21] To avoid acting in these matters in a confused, awkward or inappropriate way.
[22] It is no different with hypotheses and hypothetical arguments. It is sometimes necessary to posit an hypothesis as a basis for the succeeding argument. [23] Then should we grant every hypothesis that is proposed, or not? And if not every one, then which? [24] And once we have admitted an hypothesis, should we abide by the admission come what may, or should we sometimes repudiate it? Should we accept what is consistent with it and reject what is in conflict?
‘Yes.’
[25] But someone says, ‘I will make you accept the hypothesis of something possible and lead you on to something impossible.’15 Will the wise man refuse to engage with such a person, and avoid all dialogue and examination? [26] But of all people he is supposed to be most adept in argument, expert in question and answer, and proof against sophisms and deceit. [27] Or will he engage with him but without caring whether he argues in a confused or careless manner? In that case how then will he be the sort of man we imagine him to be? [28] But in default of such training and preparation how can he follow the progress of an argument? [29] If someone can show us that he can, then all our logical exercises were a waste of time; they were otiose all along, not entailed by our preconception of a philosopher.
[30] Why are we still lazy, indifferent and dull? Why do we look for excuses to avoid training and exercising our powers of reason? [31] ‘Look, if I err in such matters I haven’t killed my father, have I?’ No, fool – for there was no father there for you to kill! What did you do instead? You made the only m
istake you had the opportunity to make.
[32] You know, I once said the same thing to Musonius when he reproached me for not discovering the omission in a certain syllogism. I said, ‘It’s not like I burned down the Capitol.’ And he said, ‘Idiot, the omission here is the Capitol.’ [33] I mean, are these the only crimes, killing your father and burning down the Capitol? But to use one’s impressions recklessly, carelessly and at random, to fail to analyse an argument as either valid proof or fallacy, and, in a word, to fail to see in the act of question and answer what agrees with your position and what conflicts – is nothing wrong in all of that?
I 8 That talents are treacherous for the uneducated
[1] It is possible to vary the forms of rhetorical proofs and enthymemes in as many ways as it is possible to vary terms that are equivalent to each other. [2] Take, for example, the following argument: ‘If you borrowed money from me and did not repay it, you owe me the money.’ This is equivalent to: ‘It is not the case that you borrowed and did not repay and do not owe me the money.’ [3] And no one is better equipped to argue skilfully than the philosopher. Because if the enthymeme is an incomplete syllogism, someone trained in the complete syllogism will a fortiori be no less proficient handling the incomplete syllogism.
[4] ‘So why aren’t we training ourselves and each other in this sort of argumentation?’
[5] Because at the moment, even though we aren’t being trained in these topics – aren’t, in fact, being distracted at all, so far as I have any say in the matter, from the business of improving our character – we still aren’t making progress toward the goal of virtue. [6] So what can we expect if we take on this additional project, especially since it won’t just distract us from weightier matters, but will be no small cause of pride and egotism? [7] Proof and persuasion are great talents, when they are trained, and especially when they’re complemented by a certain amount of verbal elegance. [8] In general every talent when it gets into the hands of the morally weak comes with the risk of making them conceited and full of themselves. [9] I mean, what’s to stop a promising young student from becoming a slave to – rather than a master of – these topics? [10] Won’t he brush these cautions aside and parade his learning in front of us, proud, elated and deaf to anyone who would forcefully remind him of the studies he has given up, and the areas where he stills falls short?