The problem comes with the next flight of players. What is the guard worth who helps Jabbar on defense and feeds him on offense? The superstar does not play in a vacuum; without the help of extremely able assistants, he cannot accomplish much. Even Jabbar was unable to get his team very far until his supporting cast of players was sharply strengthened; Oscar Robertson was needed to augment the unusual talents of the great center.
But even this formidable pair did not click until other positions were filled with truly able players. I learned this truth about the superstars when I followed the history of Lombardi’s superlative fullback Jim Taylor. When paired with Paul Hornung behind that formidable line led by Jerry Kramer, Taylor was well-nigh unstoppable, and many people, including me, considered him one of the best fullbacks, all things considered, ever to have played in the NFL.
But then he was traded to New Orleans, and I remember telling my friends, ‘He’ll turn that franchise around.’ He did nothing of the sort. Behind a weak line, without the one-two punch of Paul Hornung to divert opponents, he accomplished little. He didn’t tear the opposition apart, as he had at Green Bay, and he didn’t score. He may once have been a superstar, but without topnotch support he quickly sudsided into just another journeyman ballplayer.
I would estimate that at least 40 percent of the superstar’s performance derives from his supporting players. He always has the capacity to break loose in some breath-taking exhibition—for a brief, dazzling spell—but he cannot win games consistently without first-class support. Consequently, if Jabbar is paid $400,000 a year, the steady pros who enable him to play his game, and especially to win, must be worth 40 percent of that, or $160,000.
So I conclude that the star-slightly-under-the-superstar is also worth a high salary. But that brings us to the fifth and sixth men on the basketball team, or the last three men in the baseball line-up, or the journeymen linemen in football. Games have become so highly technical, and coaching so perceptive, that the presence on the opposing team of even one weak player is enough to send the troops crashing into him and scoring almost at will.
How often have you watched a quarterback, advised by phone from coaches perched high in the stands, isolate an inadequate opposing cornerback and throw so many passes in his zone that the poor man becomes dizzy? A really inept defensive back might throw away three touchdowns in one half, and there goes the game.
One Sunday afternoon I watched Earl-the-Pearl Monroe, the best one-on-one player in the heat of the game I have so far seen, isolate a New York Knicks guard—Earl was then playing for Baltimore—and pump in some thirty points at critical junctures of the game. His shots were beyond believing, but they were made possible by a guard who couldn’t quite keep up with him. In the next game New York slapped Dave DeBusschere on him, and that was the end of Earl-the-Pearl.
The question is, if the inadequate player in a minor position can lose a game for you, what should you be willing to pay to get an adequate one who will help you win? Sixty to seventy thousand would not be out of line, because if you string along with the inadequate man you can get cheap, you neutralize the abilities of the superstar whom you pay $400,000.
Rationalization like this explains the salary schedule for a run-of-the-mill team like the Philadelphia 76ers. (Says Mark Heisler, a staff writer of the Philadelphia Bulletin, who compiled this list, ‘When in doubt, I guessed low.’)
These figures highlight the fact that it is basketball, with its five-man teams, which pays the highest salaries. The following table, abstracted from various sources, shows the rough relationship among the four major sports:
AVERAGE SALARIES IN FOUR MAJOR SPORTS
The low salaries in football are a result of the relatively short season, the few games played and the large number of players per squad. The high average salary for hockey is startling, and reflects the recent rapid expansion of this sport. Clarence Campbell, in an interview, bemoaned the inflated salaries:
In 1965, when we had six teams in the old NHL, the average player’s salary was $16,333. The average ticket price was $2.50, arenas were filled to 96 percent capacity and it cost an average of $850,000 to operate a team.
Now we have eighteen NHL teams, an average charge of $6.61 a ticket, and it costs $3,500,000 to operate a team. Attendance has dropped to just above 90 percent capacity, and the average player’s salary is $75,314.
Before we enter a discussion of the moral justification for high salaries, it will be instructive to compare a few outstanding ones, insofar as rumored estimates allow:
PROBABLE INCOME, EXCLUDING ENDORSEMENTS AND PERSONAL APPEARANCES, FOR SELECTED ATHLETES IN VARIOUS SPORTS
Up to this point my reasoning on sports salaries has been relative. No moral absolute or social imperative has been considered. If superstar Jabbar produces additional earnings of $1,000,000, the owners can certainly afford to pay him $400,000. And if he gets that much, his supporting stars are entitled to $160,000, and if they earn that much, it is not illogical to pay the journeymen who make the game possible $60,000 or $70,000. But now it is obligatory to raise the social issue: Is it desirable that any of these players receive salaries of that size?
Before we grapple with that treacherous problem, let’s take a look at what really happens in our paying of athletes, and those associated with them. Not long ago (in Sports Illustrated, February 15, 1971) Melvin Durslag unearthed details of the deal arranged by coach George Allen when he shifted from the Los Angeles Rams to the Washington Redskins. Durslag is a witty writer, always on the lookout for a laugh; therefore, I cannot verify what follows, but he swears this was it: a base salary of $125,000; a bonus for signing of $25,000; use of a $150,000 home; incentive bonuses each year of $5,000 for getting to divisional; $10,000 for a conference championship; $15,000 for getting to the Super Bowl; a car and driver; a $250,000 life insurance policy; a generous expense account; traveling expenses; hotel expenses; moving expenses from Los Angeles to Washington; six weeks’ paid vacation; total possession of any revenue from radio, TV and endorsements; and an option to buy 5 percent of the club stock for $500,000. (The stock would probably be worth $1,000,000 on the open market.)
In a deal like that, there is a degree of insanity, but the same can be said for many American salaries. Mike Douglas earns $2,200,000 for talking on TV. Charles Bronson gets $1,500,000 for making a sadistic motion picture. Mick Jagger earns $3,000,000 for singing songs that few over the age of twenty-two can understand. Erika Jong makes more than a million dollars for composing the sexual memoirs of an addlepated young woman. Sally Struthers picks up $156,000 for acting in All in the Family. And a Harvard philosophy graduate with a Yale M.A. in theology is lucky if he can earn $10,000 a year. Dr. Harvey R. Rutstein, in a letter to The New York Times, analyzed this phenomenon:
Many women and men study, at significant financial investment, ten to twenty years to attain a doctoral degree. Recent developments and economic setbacks have decreased demand for these intellectually trained people. They now drive cabs, tend bars, sell insurance. Athletes, many of whom were high school dropouts, are building $200,000 homes.
The answer is depressing but inordinately simple. There are few ‘gray’ zones in sports. A puck goes in the net or misses, the ball through the basket or out, and clearly there is always a winner and a loser. Soul-searching is not required, a weighing of dismal alternatives obviated. We have escaped to the black and white of sports from the frustrations and confusions of such gray zones as the Vietnam war, police corruption, morality of abortion, bounding inflation, dismal political leadership alternatives, safety on the streets.
In ancient Rome, citizens befuddled by the complexities of the waning empire found in the battles waged by the gladiators precisely this simplistic relief from the governmental problems of their day. Cynics are always citing the downfall of Rome as a gloomy precedent; the relevant fact is that after the introduction of those gigantic athletic festivals in the Colosseum, Rome survived rather successfully for another four cen
turies, and I suppose we can survive our excessive sports salaries.
‘$100,000 … $200,000 … $300,000 …’
But then the moral problem arises. Should a well-run society divert so high a percentage of its gross national product into sports, when there are so many other aspects of our national life which cry for attention? A recent study has shown that we spend about one hundred billion dollars a year on sports and recreation, considerably more than we spend for national defense. If this vast sum went for the improvement of the national health, fine. If it encouraged our citizens to become active participants and to avoid physical and mental deterioration, fine. And if it encouraged young people to build patterns of living that would serve them throughout life, fine.
But if a great deal of this investment is merely subtracted from the creative process of the nation, and siphoned into the hands of a few essentially brash young men and women, the consequences can only be destructive. Our nation may be generating deep resentments in establishing and promulgating such unbalanced priorities.
An interesting case developed with Bill Walton of UCLA. In the final game of the 1973 NCAA finals against Memphis State, Walton gave an overwhelming exhibition of how basketball should be played, on television, watched by more than 30,000,000. He shot twenty-two times from the field and sank twenty-one, an unheard-of percentage. He was also devastating on defense, and with that one game, showed that he would be worth whatever the pros might decide to pay him. Therefore, when the Portland Trail Blazers signed him for $2,500,000, it was confidently expected that he would be ‘the white hope’ in competition against the great black centers of the NBA.
He was a bust. In his early games he was downright inept when going against older, experienced hands like Jabbar or Thurmond. Then he developed bone spurs. Then he began to sulk, complaining that the coldness of the Portland floor aggravated his feet. Then he fell into some kind of unspecified trouble with the FBI over his supposed knowledge of the whereabouts of Patty Hearst. Then he gave a jolting interview in which he excoriated both the FBI and the United States. And finally he drew down his enormous salary after having played few games and making little contribution when he did play.
I talked with seven notable athletes about this extraordinary performance, sometimes at length, and those over the age of thirty were disgusted with Walton’s behavior, saying that it brought discredit to sports, but those under thirty unanimously defended him, arguing that Walton represented the sports star of the future, the player who would not allow himself to be pushed around by owners, or press, or public opinion, or the FBI. One superstar told me, ‘If his feet hurt, no obligation to play. If he has a bone spur, he owes the management nothing. The day is past when outsiders are going to tell us when to perform and how and for what purposes.’
Bob Briner, long associated with sports, wrote a scathing article on incidents like this, well before Walton surfaced, in which he said:
Americans who fear that there has been too much emphasis placed on victory should be relieved to know that winning or losing has become nearly irrelevant with large numbers of our major league players … The salary drive used to be restricted to the last few weeks of a season. Now the season is the salary drive. The pros play the statistics game for eighty games, then play basketball if they make the play-offs.
Salary schedules for black players raise unique problems. It is not widely known that the typical black athlete consistently earns more than the typical white. The statistics on this are overwhelming, but what they mean is that in order to stay on a big-league team, the black has to be so much better than his white competitor that he is forced to be almost a superstar. If a team has seven blacks and seventeen whites, a good few of the latter might be marginal players, which would mean that their modest salaries would bring the white average down. But none of the seven blacks could be marginal; to land a place on a team, the black must be a star, so he earns a star’s salary.
But when it comes to matching a particular black star against a comparable white, the latter almost always earns the higher salary. As Ebony pointed out, in 1971 Carl Yastrzemski earned $35,000 more than either Hank Aaron or Willie Mays, although both of them excelled him in reputation, performance and years in the league.
If one is able to accept the gross imbalance existing in all American salaries, there should be no complaint against those paid to athletes. The Pelé case summarizes the problem. Originally it was announced that he would earn a yearly salary of $7,200,000, which was incomprehensible. But then it was revealed that this was for three years, not one, which was still perplexing. Next it was announced that it would be $4,500,000 for three years, which was approaching reason. And finally we discovered that the figure included all sorts of business deals, advertising income and collateral perquisites. As in similar cases, the final figure made sense: about $800,000 a year for athletic skills, the rest for serving as ambassador for soccer. It was a sound business deal, and the results started coming in right away. Each of the first games in which he appeared drew 20,000 more customers than usual; he was photographed with the President; and he appeared on television constantly, selling soccer.
But I must reiterate that sports salaries are earned while the athletes are young, which means that most of the money will have vanished before the player reaches forty. Also, in every publicized deal there is a substantial amount of hot air; most of the vaunted millionaires never materialize; and on prudent reflection I still think the young man who trains himself to be a certified public accountant does better for himself, over a lifetime, than the hotshot nineteen-year-old athlete who picks up a contract which evaporates after three years, leaving him with no profession and no pension.
The lack of noblesse oblige among the newer crop of athletes disturbs me. The appalling frequency with which players break contracts, use blackmail to force renegotiation of old ones, and express contempt for the public makes me think that American sports may soon be in danger. Once-ardent fans will back away from supporting ingratitude, and one franchise after another will find itself in deepening trouble.
As teams move from place to place, athletes shift from city to city, never staying long. They become wandering mercenaries, much like the German knights of the late Middle Ages, generating few local loyalties. They pick up their high pay for a few years, but it will be difficult to hold on to, and in the end they will have found more disappointment than satisfaction.
There must be a better way, for the profession of athletes goes back at least four thousand years, and many men and women have found honor and satisfaction in it.
*The league folded in 1976, but may be resuscitated later.
TWELVE
Government Control
To compare America’s appetite for sports with that of the rest of the world’s is impossible unless one carefully stipulates what period he is discussing. Looking at the world sports scene as it existed in 1970, I can state categorically that compared with many other nations, the United States did not then overemphasize sports. Had I never lived abroad, I might have believed otherwise, but to accept the charge that our nation was then sports-mad would be to misread our situation and ignore conditions in the rest of the world.
I believe that in 1970 our emphasis was just about what it should have been, as the following tabular summary of my judgment proves. I constructed this table in that year and trust that it represents conditions as they existed then. Observe that in each of the four categories numerous additional nations could have been listed; the four chosen are merely indicative. Also, the rank order within each category is meaningful, the nation at the top of a category being considerably more sports-minded than the one at the bottom.
Concerning the relative ratings of the first four, I have no compunctions. Those nations are sports-crazy to a degree barely understood in the United States. In the second group I vacillate in my ranking of Japan and Australia; I used to think the latter a scene of sports frenzy, but I am told by responsible observers that in
recent years the sports addiction in Japan has multiplied. I place Great Britain ahead of the United States for two reasons: the excessive betting there, and the disgraceful and riotous behavior of the British soccer fans, their excesses being far worse than anything we see in the United States—so far. It is possible that Belgium ought to be ahead of us, too, considering its maniacal behavior when Eddy Merckx and Jackie Ickx were competing in international races. I also have mild doubts about the proper placement of Ireland; it lacks major teams, but its devotion to horse racing, under ideal conditions, might warrant a higher rating.
COMPARISON OF SIXTEEN SELECTED NATIONS AS TO THEIR EMPHASIS ON SPORTS IN 1970
The significant point is that prior to 1970 America rated just about where it ought to have been: a wealthy nation capable of supporting professional teams, but doing so within a rule of reason. Problems arise with the post–1970 period, when new leagues in old sports began to proliferate and when new sports which had never before fielded professional teams organized leagues in such sports as lacrosse, tennis, volleyball and box soccer. Whether this explosion has escalated America into the category of Excessive Emphasis is for each critic to decide for himself.
My own judgment is that it has not. We are still well within the bounds of reason and are protected, since non-Viable leagues will perish financially if they do represent an unhealthy overemphasis. But for an American critic to imagine that even with our post–1970 expansion we equal East Germany in our devotion to sports is to misunderstand available data. For example, Austria, with a population of only 8,060,000, has just passed legislation which will permit government to spend $60,000,000 a year on sports. To equal an expenditure like that, the United States, with a population of 210,000,000, would have to budget $1,564,000,000, which is many times what our federal government provides.