Any design has its critics and many have argued that the evolution of the battlecruiser as a type stalled with the Reliant class. This criticism is especially relevant when compared to the revolutionary designs BuShips has adopted for smaller warships. However, it has always been a solid performer and an additional three squadrons were ordered as part of the emergency wartime construction programs as a stopgap while the new Agamemnon and Nike classes were tooling up to go into series production.
Agamemnon-class pod battlecruiser
Mass: 1,750,750 tons
Dimensions: 815 × 118 × 110 m
Acceleration: 692.6 G (6.792 kps²)
80% Accel: 554.1 G (5.434 kps²)
Broadside: 10G, 30CM, 30PD
Fore: 4G, 12PD
Aft: 4MP, 4G, 12PD
Pods: 360
Number Built: 85+
Service Life: 1919–present
The Agamemnon-class BC(P) is one of the few new classes that Vice Admiral Toscarelli of BuShips managed to get approved under the Janacek Admiralty, though the design lagged behind the Grayson implementation of a similar concept. It was an effort to keep the battlecruiser a viable unit in the days of multi-drive missile (MDM) pod-based combat. The Agamemnon has a stern hammerhead designed around a pod core capable of deploying four-pod patterns. This design required significant alterations to the stern taper and aft impeller ring. As in the Medusa and Invictus classes, the pod core extends past the midline. Forward of the core the hull design is similar to a conventional battlecruiser, though to optimize pod storage the RMN has forgone any broadside missile launchers. In order to maximize salvo density rather than missile range, Agamemnon pods were usually loaded with the Mark 16 dual-drive missile. This design allowed BuShips to fit fourteen missiles into each pod and maintain actual missile densities per pattern close to that of a Medusa or Invictus.
Starting with the second unit of the class, HMS Ajax, BuShips began to send units already fitting out and in various stages of construction through a refit program to add the Mk20 Keyhole platform. Just over four squadrons were refitted, a process which eliminated half of the broadside graser mounts and resulted in significantly thinner armor over the primary fusion plant. It was originally planned to incorporate the design modification from the keel out in a Flight III build, but with evidence pointing to two of the three losses at Solon being due to reactor hits, that decision is being reevaluated and it is probable that any future Keyhole-capable BC(P)s will be more heavily redesigned to avoid the potential vulnerability of the Flight IIs.
This is a class whose time came too late in many ways. Against a Navy with no MDMs or pod-layers, it is a devastatingly effective platform, as even the Mk16s normally carried by the Agamemnons can be launched in quantities great enough to reduce any conventional superdreadnought to scrap well before it could get into its own missile range. Against a peer competitor, however, the limitations of the class quickly become apparent. Despite accepting a design with nearly twice the mass of a conventional battlecruiser, the designers were still forced to make fundamental sacrifices to fit in the pod core and other weaponry. The result is a design that can lay down an impressive weight of fire as long as its ammunition lasts, but which has limited magazine depth and is extremely fragile. In many ways the Agamemnon is even less suited to stand in the wall of battle than an older Reliant, despite its far greater firepower.
Nike-class battlecruiser
Mass: 2,519,750 tons
Dimensions: 1012 × 129 × 114 m
Acceleration: 674.3 G (6.613 kps²)
80% Accel: 539.4 G (5.29 kps²)
Broadside: 25M, 12G, 32CM, 30PD
Chase: 4G, 12PD
Number Built: 12+
Service Life: 1920–present
A single Nike-class battlecruiser was commissioned by the Janacek Admiralty as an operational prototype. For almost a year, HMS Nike (BC-562) was the only ship of her class in service, but the prototype’s combat performance convinced the White Haven Admiralty to proceed with mass production of the class. The first new-construction ships entered service in early 1921 PD.
Carrying fifty broadside launchers capable of off-bore firing the Mk16 DDM, the Nike can launch a salvo of fifty missiles into any aspect, and her magazines allow for over forty minutes of maximum rate fire. The class’ improved compensators allow an acceleration rate thirty percent greater than that of the Reliant class, despite being over twice the mass of the older unit. While suffering from the greatest “tonnage creep” of any class in RMN history, the Nike well illustrates the RMN’s policy of defining ships by their role and not by their tonnage. This has not prevented the size and classification from creating intense debate. In raw figures, these ships are five times the mass of a Saganami-C, with only a twenty-five percent increase in missile tubes. Accusations of poor design by BuShips and even outright incompetence are exacerbated by the fact that the Nike carries the same Mk16 DDM as the Saganami-C.
These critics overlook important difference in the capabilities of the two platforms and their designed missions. The Nike is designed to lead and survive independent long-duration deep-raiding missions in an era dominated by multi-drive missiles. The simple numbers of beam mounts, missile launchers and active defense systems belie qualitative per-mount differences. While a Nike and a Saganami-C may carry the same missile, each of a Nike’s launchers has four times the magazine capacity of her smaller heavy cruiser counterpart. A Nike’s grasers and point defense laser clusters are all superdreadnought grade. Their emitter diameter, plasma beam intensity, gravitic photon conditioning hardware, and on-mount energy storage capacity all rival the most modern capital ships. Finally, much of the Nike’s impressive mass is devoted to passive defense. Screening and sidewall generators have near-capital-ship levels of redundancy. The external armor system, internal mount compartmentalization, outer hull framing, and core hull construction are all designed to at least prewar superdreadnought standards. Nikes, finally, carry full flagship facilities and incorporate much greater Marine carrying and support capacity. The Saganami-Cs, while impressive space control platforms, have little or none of this capability.
The only reason, in fact, that a Nike might be less survivable than the prewar superdreadnought is the physical distance between the armor and the core hull. There simply is not enough depth to guarantee the same level of survivability to vital core systems as in a larger capital vessel. Early after-action reports indicate, however, that Nike’s survivability against her intended targets (heavy cruisers and other battlecruisers) has been extraordinary.
Above all other design elements, the addition of the Mark 20 Keyhole platform to the Nike class allows it a greater level of tactical flexibility than any other warship currently in service. This costs a tremendous amount of mass and creates interesting problems (which some commentators describe as weaknesses) in the armor system. But those costs buy the ability to tether the platforms outside the wedge, which, coupled with the off-bore missile launchers, makes Nike the one of the first warships that can fight an entire engagement with her wedge to the enemy. The telemetry repeaters allow full control of both missiles and counter-missiles, and the platforms’ onboard point defenses thicken defensive fire. In addition, the Keyhole platform can act as a “handoff” relay, allowing a Nike to coordinate offensive and defensive missile control for another ship while both keep their wedges to the threat. This flexibility has resulted in vastly increased computational complexity in offensive and defensive engagement programming and helps to explain much of the class’ survivability.
LAC CARRIERS (CLAC)
The first Minotaur-class LAC carriers were developed in secret along with the Shrike-class advanced LACs as part of Project Anzio. Experience with LACs as parasite craft in the Trojan-class Q-ships had shown they could be a powerful force multiplier when transported and serviced by a dedicated carrier, and the RMN set out to design a carrier that could keep up with the rest of the fleet and even survive in the wall of battle if necess
ary.
Original doctrine had the carriers launching their LACs and then staying far outside the range of the enemy wall of battle, screened by a cruiser squadron or other light units. This doctrine was intended above all to preserve the carrier, since it provided the only hyper-capable way to safely recover the LACs once committed to action.
On many raids and offensive actions this has proved to be a viable approach, but on major offensives or defensive actions the carriers are more likely to stay with the wall of battle, lending their active defenses to the other ships in formation and simultaneously taking shelter under the wall’s antimissile umbrella.
Minotaur-class LAC carrier
Mass: 6,178,500 tons
Dimensions: 1131 × 189 × 175 m
Acceleration: 428.2 G (4.199 kps²)
80% Accel: 342.6 G (3.359 kps²)
Broadside: 30CM, 28PD
Chase: 9M, 4G, 10CM, 10PD
LAC Bays: 100
Number Built: 18
Service Life: 1912–present
As the first operational unit of Project Anzio, The Minotaur-class LAC carrier can embark one hundred Shrike- or Ferret-class LACs in individual bays along the broadsides. Each bay is sealed by an armored hatch and can be completely pressurized if necessary to provide a “shirtsleeves” environment for hull maintenance, though that is rarely done for routine maintenance and operations. The LAC is held in place by a docking cradle, while an oversized boarding tube seals over the nose, allowing for easy access to the graser emitter and point defense for maintenance. Separate loading tubes run from the carrier’s high-speed magazines to the LAC’s missile and counter-missile launchers, allowing a LAC to be re-armed with a standard missile package in a matter of minutes.
Offensively, the Minotaur-class CLACs carry offensive weapons only in the hammerheads, with a heavy defensive weapons fit on the broadsides. The Minotaurs were the very first ships to be built from the keel out to fire the new (at the time) Mk41 capacitor-driven multi-drive missile, though they carry them in too few numbers to be more than a minor deterrent against anything larger than a heavy cruiser. The addition of the MDMs gave them the ability to harass any light raiding force dispatched to attack the carriers while the LACs were in-system, while the squadron would be forced to run from anything heavier.
The entire LAC complement of the carrier is organized into a single LAC wing, with a separate wing staff reporting to the wing CO, called the COLAC. The COLAC in turn reports to the carrier’s commanding officer. Carrier-based support is provided by the LAC crews themselves, along with a core of specialists belonging to the wing. Much of the early doctrine was built by the crew and COLAC of HMS Minotaur during working up, with modifications for lessons learned at the Second Battle of Hancock.
Hydra-class LAC carrier (Flight II)
Mass: 6,145,750 tons
Dimensions: 1129 x 188 x 174 m
Acceleration: 428.5 G (4.203 kps²)
80% Accel: 342.8 G (3.362 kps²)
Broadside: 36CM, 36PD
Chase: 12M, 12CM, 12PD
LAC Bays: 112
Number Built: 94+
Service Life: 1914–present
While officially on the books as the Minotaur-B class, these ships are most often referred to as the Hydra class, after the lead unit of the new design. The Hydra class is slightly smaller than the Minotaur but carries twelve more LACs, extending the broadside length by sixty meters and cutting the chase magazine space in half.
While their active defenses are markedly lighter than those of the Medusa and Invictus classes, the Hydras have proved reasonably survivable in support of the wall of battle, especially when included in the defensive umbrella of the rest of the wallers.
Starting in 1920 PD, the Flight II Hydras have had their launch tubes and magazines configured to fire the Mk23 fusion-powered MDM rather than the much larger Mk41, and the elimination of all chase beam weaponry allowed them to increase the launch tubes to twelve, in addition to an increase in the defensive armament. This change reflects the operational realities of how little business carriers have in engaging in beam combat with ships of the wall, as well as providing them with a credible threat at extended range against anything below the wall.
DREADNOUGHTS (DN)
The RMN built two squadrons of battleships shortly after the first transit through the Manticore Wormhole Junction, and they served as the primary defensive component of Home Fleet, with regular overhauls, for nearly 250 years.
By the time the Navy began its expansion under King Roger III, the People’s Republic of Haven had over two hundred battleships already in commission, and Roger flatly refused to build a warship that was qualitatively inferior to anything Haven had in service at the time. The last of the RMN’s small battleship force was decommissioned in 1868 PD, when sufficient dreadnoughts had been built to replace them.
Unlike the People’s Navy with their core of battleships for rear area support or the Imperial Andermani Navy with its “fast wing” of light superdreadnoughts, the RMN has historically kept all of its capital ships concentrated into heterogeneous squadrons and task forces filling the same doctrinal niche, the wall of battle. The natural consequence of this doctrine would have been for the RMN to begin building the more-powerful superdreadnoughts for the wall after inertial compensator improvements made the SD concept viable. Even with the strength of their economy, though, Manticore was unable to afford the number of hulls necessary, and hence continued to augment their superdreadnought force with new dreadnought construction.
The emergence of the modern missile pod, with its light-weight grav drivers, more numerous launch cells, and laser head-armed single-drive missiles, produced salvo densities which increased the relative vulerability of the already vulnerable dreadnought significantly. The type was increasingly relegated to rear area roles, and the introduction of the Medusa-class pod-layers of Operation Buttercup, armed with multi-drive laser head missiles, led to its outright demise. A dreadnought-sized ship of the wall simply could not support the mass and volume required to mount competitive offensive and defensive systems. Most of the remaining dreadnoughts were quietly retired by the Janacek Admiralty, and the last of them was decommissioned early in 1921 PD.
Ad Astra-class dreadnought (1878 refit)
Mass: 3,895,500 tons
Dimensions: 1064 × 154 × 144 m
Acceleration: 450.8 G (4.421 kps²)
80% Accel: 360.7 G (3.537 kps²)
Broadside: 18M, 14L, 12G, 6ET, 8CM, 18PD
Chase: 4M, 6L, 2G, 2CM, 8PD
Number Built: 11
Service Life: 1632–1913
The design of the Ad Astra class was refined over a few decades of operational experience with the Manticore-class battleship, a locally-built, Solarian licensed design. At almost twice the tonnage of the Manticores, they were the first Manticoran capital ships uncompromisingly designed for power projection as opposed to system defense. Reality fell somewhat short of expectations, however, as a succession of isolationist foreign policies resulted in a hyper-capable battle fleet that was firmly anchored to the Manticore system. Their first actual out-system deployment wasn’t until 1674 PD, when they accompanied the First Battle Squadron to Silesia after the Battle of Carson to force the Confederacy to sign the Cherwell Convention.
Nearing three hundred years old when the first one was decommissioned in 1908 PD, the Ad Astra-class dreadnought was the longest serving single class in the history of the RMN. Subject to several major refits, and rebuilt virtually from the keel out in 1878, the ships decommissioned in the early days of the war bear little resemblance to the original ships laid down in the seventeenth century.
A full two squadrons (sixteen hulls) were originally planned, but only eleven ships were actually built. The first four ran afoul of cost overruns and multi-year delays in construction as the yards were expanded to handle hulls of their size, and a bitter budgetary debate in Parliament in 1651 PD suspended the entire program for almost half a century
before the funding could be found to complete the class.
In the late 1880s, the entire class was modernized, despite the fact that the lead unit was over two centuries old. The original autocannon were replaced with modern point defense laser clusters, the armor was thickened in a few critical locations in response to the laser head threat, and electronics and missile launch systems were upgraded. Little could be done about the limited number of counter-missile launchers, a standard feature when these were built but a critical weakness in the era of the laser head.
Despite these shortcomings, the class continued well into the twentieth century, when the last units decommissioned midwar to provide crews for the final flight of Bellerophons.
Royal Winton-class dreadnought
Mass: 5,814,750 tons
Dimensions: 1216 × 176 × 164 m
Acceleration: 431.9 G (4.235 kps²)
80% Accel: 345.5 G (3.388 kps²)
Broadside: 20M, 18L, 16G, 6ET, 12CM, 28PD
Chase: 6M, 6L, 2G, 4CM, 10PD
Number Built: 21
Service Life: 1846–1916
Over seventy years after the last RMN ship of the wall had been completed, the Admiralty realized at the turn of the nineteenth century that it needed to modernize Home Fleet. While the previous classes had all seen service life extension programs and heavy refits, two centuries of advances in naval warfare had rendered them obsolete, despite their modernized weapon systems.
The design study for the Royal Winton and Samothrace classes began in 1812 PD, building on the Navy’s experiences with the existing wall of battle. The Royal Winton-class dreadnought was designed to completely replace the RMN’s handful of battleships, joining the Ad Astras to provide a total of two active battle squadrons of dreadnoughts each led by a division of superdreadnoughts, with sufficient hulls to rotate through regular refits without any reduction in deployable forces.