When Smith saw the circular he blew up. In a stern note to Eisenhower he pointed out that this ran directly against War Department policy. He said it was inevitable that “every negro organization, pressure group and newspaper will take the attitude that, while the War Department segregates colored troops … the Army is perfectly willing to put them in front lines mixed in units with white soldiers, and have them do battle when an emergency arises.” Smith added that “two years ago I would have considered the … statement the most dangerous thing that I had ever seen in regard to negro relations.”
By then the crisis had passed, and Eisenhower—no more ready to promote a social revolution than Smith—gave in. He said he did not want to “run counter to regs in a time like this” and personally rewrote the circular. The upshot was that the blacks who did volunteer—and non-coms had to give up their stripes to do so—were segregated into all-Negro platoons, with white non-coms and officers.15
Since the blacks had to be trained before they could fight, they could offer no immediate help in the Ardennes anyway. Neither could the reserves who were available in the United States, but Eisenhower wanted to use the crisis to get as many men sent over as he could, in order to be at full strength for the final offensive into Germany. On December 19, therefore, he informed Handy that he was sending the G-ls from SHAEF, Twelfth Army Group, and Com Z to Washington to “present an accurate and comprehensive picture of our critical replacement situation.” He hoped they could bring about “a better mutual understanding of the problem.…”16 But the War Department would not change its position. When the G-ls arrived Handy asked a number of pointed questions and made it clear that there was a great contrast between the drastic steps taken in the United States to recover manpower and the relatively poor performance of ETO in this regard, where Com Z had an exorbitant number of troops.17
The British were more sympathetic to Eisenhower’s cause. Churchill immediately decided to have a new call-up of civilians, one which reached deeply into Britain’s remaining industrial force, to provide Eisenhower with 250,000 more men.18 Smith, contrasting the War Department and the British Ministry of Defence, told a Chief of Staffs’ meeting, “When I was tossing on my bed last night, the thought came to me, ‘Should we not go on record to our Masters in Washington that if they want us to win the war over here they must find us another ten Divisions.’ Look at Britain, about to produce another 250,000 men. If she can do that we should produce another 2,500,000.”19
The search for long-term replacements went on simultaneously with the effort to find men to plug the present gaps. On December 19, late in the evening, Eisenhower told Bradley and Lee to remember “the vital importance of insuring that no repeat no Meuse bridges fall into enemy hands intact.” He wanted Lee to organize service units to protect them.20 The order to protect the bridges was a matter of routine, but to Bradley it seemed to indicate that Eisenhower was getting “an acute case of the shakes.” The Twelfth Army Group chief of staff, Major General Leven C. Allen, read the message and asked, “What the devil do they think we’re doing, starting back for the beaches?”21
Evidence indeed seemed to be mounting that Eisenhower had gone into a panic. There was the frantic effort to find replacements, the most shocking aspect of which, given the era’s social climate, was Eisenhower’s willingness to use black troops alongside whites. In addition, there was his concern about the Meuse bridges. Adding to the impression of panic were the elaborate security precautions taken at SHAEF to protect Eisenhower. But these could quite legitimately be explained. As a part of their over-all plan for the Ardennes offensive, the Germans had organized a special group of English-speaking German soldiers, dressed them in American uniforms, given them American jeeps to drive, and spread them behind the American lines. Their mission was to issue false orders, spread defeatism, and capture bridges and road junctions. Rumor quickly spread, however, that their main intention was to assassinate the Supreme Commander.
Thus everyone at SHAEF became extra conscious of security. Eisenhower was sealed into the Trianon Palace. Guards with machine guns were placed all around the Palace and when Eisenhower went to Verdun or elsewhere for a meeting, he was led and followed by armed guards in jeeps. Butcher noted that “he is a prisoner of our security police and is thoroughly but helplessly irritated by the restriction on his moves.”22 After two days of being so confined, he came out of his office, grumbled, “Hell’s fire, I’m going out for a walk. If anyone wants to shoot me, he can go right ahead. I’ve got to get out!” Slipping out a back door, he walked around the yard in the deep snow.23
Throughout France and Belgium, the presence of a great number of M.P.s added to the impression of panic. Understandably nervous at the idea of thousands of German soldiers running around in American uniforms, they stopped every passing car and—ignoring rank and credentials—quizzed the occupants on American slang or customs. Who is Minnie Mouse’s husband? was one favorite, while baseball questions in general were popular. Bradley once had to identify the capital of Illinois (the M.P. was dubious, for he thought it was Chicago), the position of the guard in football, and Betty Grable’s spouse.24 Perhaps most serious of all, SHAEF public relations ordered a news blackout, which gave the impression in the United States that the Allies were taking a terrific beating and that Eisenhower did not want to let the American people know about it.25
But Eisenhower had not panicked. Although he was under pressure from all sides, especially from De Gaulle, not to give up any ground, he insisted on following his own plans. The Supreme Commander was not going to lose his chance to beat the exposed Germans by holding to a sterile policy of rigid defense. Late in the evening of December 19, for example, in his first message to Montgomery since the attack began (no British troops were yet engaged), he expressed his offensive approach. Eisenhower asked Montgomery’s appreciation of the situation on the north flank of the penetration, “particularly with reference to the possibility of giving up, if necessary, some ground on the front of the First Army and to the north thereof in order to shorten our line and collect a strong reserve for the purpose of destroying the enemy in Belgium.” Montgomery replied that the 7th Armored Division was holding at St. Vith and he saw “no need at present to give up any of the ground that has been gained in the last few weeks by such hard fighting.”26 On Twenty-first Army Group’s particular front, it turned out, Montgomery was right, and Eisenhower went along with him.
While Eisenhower was dispatching his message to Montgomery, Strong was reporting to Whiteley that the Germans would soon drive a wedge between Bradley’s two forces, making it impossible for Bradley to communicate with First Army. Whiteley thought that under the circumstances the best thing to do would be to give Montgomery command of all forces north of the Ardennes, with Bradley retaining those to the south. This meant Bradley would keep Third Army, while Montgomery got U. S. First and Ninth Armies. Such a plan was exactly what Montgomery had all along been proposing and Eisenhower refusing, but Whiteley felt the communications problem so serious that this stop had to be taken. He took the proposal to Smith, who called Bradley on the telephone to discuss the proposed shift with him. Bradley said he doubted that it was necessary, and indicated that he feared “coordination between both Army Groups would have to be directed from SHAEF.” (SHAEF thought it had always been co-ordinating the army groups.) Bradley’s strange comment pointed out one long-range significant result of the Bulge. Both Twelfth and Twenty-first Army Groups had come to think of themselves as independent agencies; the Bulge gave Eisenhower the opportunity to assert himself and take full control. Smith brushed aside Bradley’s objection and said, “It seems the logical thing to do. Monty can take care of everything north of the Bulge and you’ll have everything south.” Bradley was concerned that such a move would discredit the American command. “Bedell,” he said, “it’s hard for me to object. Certainly if Monty’s were an American command, I would agree with you entirely.”27
No decision was made that night. Th
e next morning, December 20, Eisenhower met with Tedder, Smith, Strong, and Whiteley in the Trianon Palace. Smith brought up Whiteley’s proposal. It was obvious that giving Montgomery command of two American armies at the height of the battle would be a blow to American pride. The German penetration, on the other hand, was getting deeper every minute, and Bradley’s communication lines to Hodges, which ran through the Ardennes, had been cut. Bradley still had auxiliary circuits available, but it was not certain that they would suffice, and in any case his major preoccupation was Patton’s attack. Eisenhower decided that national pride would have to suffer and declared that he would make the command shift.
He called Bradley on the telephone and told him what he was going to do. Bradley accepted it. The Supreme Commander then told Bradley that he could fall all the way back to the Meuse if that was the line he could “hold the best and cheapest,” but that when Patton attacked it should be in great strength. After hanging up, Eisenhower placed a call to Montgomery to inform him of the command switch.
The telephone connection with Montgomery was unfortunately indistinct. After failing to make himself understood, Eisenhower gave up and sent the orders by wireless.28 Montgomery, however, anxious to step forward and take control, heard what he wanted to hear and attached his own meaning to the garbled conversation. He told Brooke that Eisenhower had called. “He was very excited,” Montgomery said, “and it was difficult to understand what he was talking about; he roared into the telephone, speaking very fast.” The only thing that Montgomery understood was that Eisenhower was giving him command of everything north of the Ardennes. “This was all I wanted to know. He then went on talking wildly about other things.…”29
That both Montgomery and Bradley felt Eisenhower had a bad case of nerves strongly indicates that the Supreme Commander was probably indeed unsure of himself. But aside from the contrary evidence—no one at SHAEF thought so—Montgomery’s and Bradley’s reactions could be viewed more accurately as a reflection of their own nervousness. Bradley was upset, for obvious reasons. He had lost practically two divisions, one of his corps had been badly surprised, and the Germans had made a deep penetration into his line. It was difficult to keep up a brave or calm exterior in the face of such calamities. Eisenhower seemed to be blaming him for these developments when he took two armies away from Twelfth Army Group and gave them to Montgomery, and a number of staff officers at Bradley’s headquarters were furious. Under the circumstances, Bradley was not entirely objective in his estimate of Eisenhower. And Montgomery, though of course worried about a serious situation, could not totally repress a feeling akin to glee—everything he had predicted had come true, and now Eisenhower had to turn to him to set things right. He was inclined to exaggerate any slightly excited tone in Eisenhower’s voice, or even a rise in voice level on a poor telephone connection, and he thus interpreted it as panic. There was of course tension in the air; coupled with the previous relations between Montgomery and Eisenhower, sharp or loud words spoken in heat during moments of stress led to misunderstanding, not so much of what was said but of the emotion involved.
Within two hours of his conversation with Eisenhower, Montgomery had visited with Hodges and Simpson. A British officer who accompanied him said he strode into Hodges’ headquarters “like Christ come to cleanse the temple.” Montgomery reported to Brooke that neither Simpson nor Hodges had seen Bradley or any of his staff since the battle had begun and there were no reserves anywhere. Morale was low, and Simpson and Hodges “seemed delighted to have someone to give them firm orders.”30
While Montgomery scurried about acting as though to retrieve the situation and rescue the Americans from their mistakes, Eisenhower continued to shape the battle. He informed the CCS of his command changes and added that he had instructed Montgomery and Bradley “to hold their flanks securely but with minimum forces, to gather all available reserves and to thrust with great force against the flanks of the penetration.” Weather had completely shut down air operations, so the Allied air forces were unable to do anything to help, but for once Eisenhower was thankful for bad weather—it prevented the Germans from flying reconnaissance missions and he thought that because of it the concentrations on their flanks could be carried out secretly.31
Eisenhower had set the forces in motion for his counterattack; now he had to wait for them to get in place, and not incidentally for the Germans to lose their momentum and slow down. Meanwhile he worked to smooth relations between his commanders. He realized that staff officers, especially junior ones, at Twelfth Army Group and Third Army had a strong antipathy toward SHAEF, a feeling based on the belief that Montgomery had too great an influence with Eisenhower. The situation was so bad that even before the German attack, the War Department had sent an observer to ETO to make a report. Montgomery, of course, felt Bradley and Patton had the inside track to Eisenhower.32 That both army groups were suspicious may only have indicated how well SHAEF was doing what it was supposed to do, but the situation was hardly helped when Bradley and Montgomery would barely speak to each other. More serious were the attitudes of Simpson and Hodges, who did not like Montgomery either but who would now have to take orders from him.
To cheer Bradley, and to make certain that no one interpreted the command shift as a criticism of his abilities, Eisenhower cabled Marshall on December 21, asking the Chief of Staff to promote Bradley to four-star rank. “While there was undoubtedly a failure, in the current operations to evaluate correctly the power that the enemy could thrust through the Ardennes,” he said, weather was a factor in the inability to see what was coming, and anyway “all of us, without exception, were astonished at the ability of the volksturm [sic] division to act offensively.” Bradley had “kept his head magnificently” and had proceeded “methodically and energetically.” Eisenhower said he retained his confidence in Bradley and that there was no tendency in any quarter to blame him for the counteroffensive.33
Eisenhower then sent a cable to both Hodges and Simpson, congratulating them for what they had done so far and pointing out that “your good work is helping create a situation from which we may profit materially.” He asked them to remain calm, determined, and optimistic. Getting to the point, he added, “… now that you have been placed under the field marshal’s operational command I know that you will respond cheerfully and efficiently to every instruction he gives.”34 Montgomery had not been impressed with Hodges, and the field marshal called on the telephone to tell Smith that some changes in command might become necessary because of physical exhaustion. As a British soldier, however, he was unwilling to relieve U.S. commanders personally. Smith told Montgomery that if such a step had to be taken, Eisenhower would take it. Eisenhower then sent a message to Montgomery, pointing out that “Hodges is the quiet reticent type and does not appear as aggressive as he really is. Unless he becomes exhausted he will always wage a good fight.” Montgomery replied that Hodges was improving.35
Eisenhower wanted to encourage the men of the AEF as well as their commanders. On December 21 he told his staff to draft an Order of the Day, a brief one, not more than twenty-five words if possible. He said he did not want an order on a pessimistic note but one of encouragement that would point out the opportunity now available to the AEF. After making a number of changes in the draft, Eisenhower issued it on December 22. “We cannot be content with his mere repulse,” he said of the enemy. “By rushing out from his fixed defenses the enemy may give us the chance to turn his great gamble into his worst defeat.… Let everyone hold before him a single thought—to destroy the enemy on the ground, in the air, everywhere—destroy him!”36
The strategic situation was rapidly becoming more and more favorable to the Allies, but on the map, based on territory overrun, it still looked as if the Germans might win a great victory. Von Manteuffel’s forces continued to grind forward in the Ardennes. Because of this Eisenhower welcomed the moral support he received from the United States. On December 20 he learned that he had been promoted again, this time to
the newly created rank of General of the Army (Marshall, MacArthur, and Arnold were the only other Army officers who received the right to wear five stars). Then, on December 22, Eisenhower received a warm Christmas letter from Marshall. Marshall said that Eisenhower, through his leadership, wisdom, patience, and tolerance, had “made possible Allied cooperation and teamwork in the greatest military operation in the history of the world, complicated by social, economic and political problems almost without precedent.” Marshall concluded, “You have my complete confidence.” Eisenhower told Marshall that the letter “was the brightest spot in my existence” since the AEF reached the West Wall. “Short of a major defeat inflicted upon the enemy, I could not have had a better personal present.”37
By this time the spirit at SHAEF was almost buoyant. On December 23 St. Vith finally fell to the Germans, removing an important block on their right flank, but the 7th Armored made a successful withdrawal and soon returned to the battle. It had stalled an entire German corps that was flushed with earlier easy victories, choked one of the main enemy lines of communication, forced days of delay on the westward movement of troops and supplies, and given Montgomery and Bradley time to organize an effective defense.38 Bastogne, meanwhile, held. On December 19 Middleton had given Brigadier General Anthony C. McAuliffe command of the Bastogne forces, mainly consisting of the 101st Airborne. Middleton gave McAuliffe one standing order: “Hold Bastogne.” Despite intensive attack from three and sometimes more German divisions, the 101st held on, even after being encircled on December 21. The men were short of all supplies; the Germans were launching concentric attacks; the weather was bitterly cold. The attacks reached their peak on December 22. At noon on that day the Germans issued an ultimatum calling for “the honorable surrender of the encircled town.” McAuliffe sent back a one-word answer: “Nuts.”39