The leading German divisions, foremost of which was the 2d Panzer, which reached Celles some ten miles from the Meuse, had been immobilized since December 21. Von Manteuffel’s vague hopes of reaching Allied supply dumps and getting desperately needed fuel had not been realized. On December 22 Tedder, infected by the spirit of the ground soldiers around him, commented, “The fact that the Hun has stuck his neck out is, from the point of view of shortening the whole business, the best thing that could happen. It may make months of difference. But he might have waited until after Xmas!”40
The Bulge could be compared to a gigantic Kasserine. As in February of 1943, the Germans had made a bold bid to reverse the strategic situation. The daring of their attack caused some anxious moments, but they were never really strong enough to succeed. The key problem was timing. At what point would the Germans decide they had had enough and start to pull back? At Kasserine the Allies had let an opportunity slip by because they delayed a day too long in starting the counterattack. Eisenhower realized the danger of piecemeal assault, of throwing divisions against the German flanks as soon as they were ready. If Bradley and Montgomery did that, each individual division would be destroyed by the powerful German Panzer armies and nothing would be accomplished.
At a meeting with his senior assistants at SHAEF on December 21, Eisenhower said he wanted Bradley informed that Patton’s attack should be limited in scope. He wanted Patton to break through to Bastogne and relieve the encircled troops there, but otherwise the Supreme Commander declared that Bradley should hold the attack in check and not let it spread, because “it was for the purpose of establishing a firm stepping off point for the main counter-offensive.” Eisenhower said that what he feared was having the impetuous Patton talk Bradley into allowing him to attack at once without waiting for a fully coordinated counteroffensive.41 Eisenhower was pleased to learn that Montgomery was gathering two corps, one British and one American, on the German’s northern flank. That would give him the force he wanted for a two-pronged attack.
The following day the defensive phase of the battle ended. The morning of December 23 broke clear and cold, with virtually unlimited visibility. For the first time since the counterattack had begun, SHAEF could get its planes into the air. That morning 241 C-47s, each carrying 1200 pounds of supplies, made air drops to the 101st in Bastogne, bringing mostly artillery ammunition, which had almost run out. At the same time fighter planes escorting the C-47s strafed the Germans in the Bastogne ring, while 82 P-47s hit them with fragmentation bombs, napalm, and machine gun fire. The German attacks continued until December 26, when Patton forced his way through to Bastogne and broke the encirclement, but for the 101st the crucial day was December 23. Eisenhower had sent the 11th Armored Division, which had just reached Europe and had been assigned to Sixth Army Group, on a forced march to the Meuse. On December 23 it took its place in the line.42
To the north, Montgomery was tidying up the battle front. He told Eisenhower he had reorganized First Army and it was “in good trim.… We will fight a good battle up here.” Actually First Army had not been reorganized so much as it had re-established communications with its units, many of which had been cut off. Through great effort, Hodges had been able to direct a coherent defense that, at least as much as the more publicized struggle at Bastogne, had been responsible for stopping the Germans. Still, Montgomery was worried that he would not get enough support from Twelfth Army Group. Patton’s attack, he declared, would probably not be strong enough to “do what is needed … [and] I will have to deal unaided with both Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies.” On Christmas Day he decided to shorten his own front and asked Eisenhower to send him some reserves from Sixth Army Group. Bradley met with Montgomery on Christmas Day. The field marshal, it seemed to Bradley, had adopted a highly defensive attitude. Montgomery rubbed salt into the wounds, making no attempt to disguise his view that the American command had deserved the German counteroffensive. He told Bradley that if there had been a single thrust none of this would have happened, and “now we are in a proper muddle.” Montgomery reported that Bradley “looked thin, and worn and ill at ease” and said the American general agreed with everything he said. Montgomery noted of Bradley: “Poor chap; he is such a decent fellow and the whole thing is a bitter pill for him.”43 After the meeting Bradley wrote Hodges—who had already expressed his displeasure at the idea of giving up more ground—to outline his views. Bradley made it clear that as he had no control over First Army his letter should not be considered a directive. He then said he viewed with misgivings any plan to give up terrain which might be favorable for future operations, especially since he felt the Germans had suffered more than First Army and since Hodges had the greater strength in the area. Bradley then told SHAEF that he wanted First and Ninth Armies back.44
Eisenhower met with his assistants in the Trianon on December 26 to discuss the situation. He did not want to restore First and Ninth Armies to Bradley yet, for he thought it still logical that Montgomery control the forces on the northern flank of the penetration. What he was most concerned with was building up a strategic reserve. The way to do it was to have Devers shorten his line by withdrawing to the Vosges, thus freeing two or three divisions. Eisenhower went to the map, pointed, and—according to the minutes of the meeting—told his G-3, “Pinky” Bull: “ ‘Pink,’ you’d better go and see Devers today. I think the best line is this.” Eisenhower outlined the withdrawal on the map. “I’ll tell you, boys,” he continued, “what should be done. See Devers and give him this line. It will be a disappointment giving up ground, but this area is not where I told Devers to put his weight.”45
Eisenhower’s confidence in himself had grown tremendously during the crisis. He was laying down the line, telling the boys how it should be done. Two of his bitterest critics have recognized this change: “In all his career as Supreme Commander there was perhaps no other time when Eisenhower revealed so clearly the greatness of his qualities,” Chester Wilmot has said. He points out that it was Eisenhower who on the first day overruled Bradley, decided the German attack was a major one, and acted accordingly. Eisenhower was the one who took Whiteley’s suggestion and made Bastogne the concentration point for the 101st Airborne. It was the Supreme Commander who recognized the logic of the situation and, overriding national considerations and Bradley’s protests, gave Montgomery the command of the forces north of the Ardennes. When the American commanders argued for a rigid defense with no abandonment of ground, Eisenhower saw to it that the front was shortened and reserves accumulated. Finally, Eisenhower was the one who insisted that Bradley and Patton restrain their enthusiasm to penetrate quickly and make the Allied counterattack “methodical and sure.”46
Sir Arthur Bryant, who quoted with approval every criticism of Eisenhower by Brooke that he could find in Brooke’s diary, also recognized Eisenhower’s achievement at the Bulge. “Calamity acted on Eisenhower like a restorative and brought out all the greatness in his character,” Bryant wrote.47
But Eisenhower still had the supreme test to face. Giving firm orders to Bradley, Patton, and Devers was one thing, giving them to Field Marshal Montgomery quite another. Eisenhower was beginning to share Bradley’s worry that, as at Kasserine, the Allies would be too late in their counterattack. Montgomery, it appeared, was going to insist that every condition was optimum before he moved forward. Two days after Christmas, at a SHAEF meeting, the discussion centered upon the need to begin soon. Tedder emphasized that the good weather would not last much longer and that it was important to hit the Germans while the airplanes could still fly. At this point word arrived that Montgomery had a new plan for attack, one that involved two corps. “Praise God from whom all blessings flow,” Eisenhower remarked.48 The Supreme Commander decided he would go to Montgomery’s headquarters the next day to see what could be done about moving up the date of the attack and strengthening it.
CHAPTER 16
Showdown with Montgomery, De Gaulle, and Brooke
“There is
only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them!”
—Sir Winston Churchill
“Give me allies to fight against!”
—Napoleon
Ferdinand Foch, Eisenhower’s predecessor, once summed up his views on the subject of alliance command after reading a paper by a young French officer, Charles de Gaulle, in which De Gaulle had been critical of the Allied leadership in World War I. “There will never be an interallied command in a true sense,” Foch declared, “unless you can make it a coalition of disinterested parties.”1
When Eisenhower met with Montgomery on December 28 there was a temporary lull on the battle front. The Germans had been met and stopped. To the north, Twenty-first Army Group’s line ran along the Maas River to Sittard, then turned directly east and, crossing the West Wall, reached the Roer River at Linnich. Simpson’s Ninth Army occupied the west bank of the Roer from Linnich to Monschau (Simpson had taken over part of Hodges’ front on December 20). Neither Simpson nor Dempsey had been much involved in the Battle of the Bulge. At Butgenbach, near the Eisenborn Ridge, the First Army line bent backward—this was the beginning of the German salient. One key factor in the Allied success at holding the German offensive had been Hodges’ ability to hold Eisenborn Ridge. From Butgenbach, Hodges’ line ran almost straight west to Celles, the tip of the salient. At this point Montgomery had positioned the British 29th Armored Division and there also, held the British 30 Corps in reserve. Below Celles, Bradley’s Twelfth Army Group took over. On the southern flank of the salient the German line went east-southeast back to Trier and the West Wall, with an American salient into the German line at Bastogne. Devers was east of the Vosges. He had made some limited withdrawals and U. S. Seventh Army was occupying a part of the old Maginot Line.
Von Rundstedt wanted to pull out of the exposed tip of the salient, re-establishing a defensive line along the base from St. Vith to Wiltz. He was concerned about his tanks and wished to put them in reserve, both to preserve them and to have them available later to meet Allied counterthrusts. Hitler refused him. He said they should continue the offensive to the Meuse and that Von Rundstedt should concentrate on taking Bastogne. Hitler also decided to launch an offensive, beginning January 1, against Devers in the Vosges. He thought Sixth Army Group had been so weakened by stretching its front that the Germans could force a breakthrough there. None of these plans were very realistic, for all German divisions were under strength and badly battered. Supplies were, in many cases, non-existent.
Eisenhower sensed this and wanted to hit the salient as quickly as possible. Montgomery hesitated. He told the Supreme Commander that he was sure the Germans would make one last great attack in the north, against First Army. He thought the best thing to do would be to receive that attack, then launch his counterattack when the Germans were stopped. Eisenhower insisted that Von Rundstedt would either start to pull out of the salient or put infantry divisions into the line and his tanks in reserve. The latter, Eisenhower said, “we must not allow to happen.” He repeated that he wanted Montgomery to attack quickly. Montgomery replied that first he must meet and stop the attack he expected against First Army. Eisenhower responded that if no attack came Montgomery should strike on January 1. He thought Montgomery agreed.2
When Eisenhower got back to Versailles he felt he had things well in hand. Tedder was going to Moscow to confer with Red Army leaders in an attempt to co-ordinate future operations and find out when the Russian winter offensive would begin (it started on January 12 and the Russians have since claimed that it saved the Western Allies from disaster in the Bulge). Eisenhower told Tedder to inform Stalin that his intentions were to eliminate the salient, pin down the Panzers committed to the battle and destroy them, and then start a strong drive toward Bonn. “The basic thing,” Eisenhower said, “is to defeat the German armies west of the Rhine. For this, everything must be concentrated to get to the Rhine from Bonn northwards.” Eisenhower was holding to his pre-December plan of making a major effort in the north with a secondary one in the south, and the key to its success lay in destroying Von Rundstedt’s tanks in the Bulge.3
The next day, December 30, De Guingand came to SHAEF with the bad news that Montgomery would not attack until January 3. Montgomery had been wise to send De Guingand instead of coming himself, for De Guingand was popular at SHAEF—he had a sense of balance and humor. Still, the blow was more than any of the SHAEF senior officers could take. “What makes me so Goddam mad,” Smith exploded, “is that Monty won’t talk in the presence of anyone else.”4 Montgomery claimed that Eisenhower had misunderstood him at their recent meeting, and De Guingand said there had been no agreement on a January 1 attack. Eisenhower muttered that Montgomery was wrong. Montgomery was holding the 30 Corps out of the line, waiting for an attack that Eisenhower was sure would never come. Eisenhower wanted the corps committed. The Supreme Commander dictated a blistering letter to the field marshal demanding that he live up to his promises, but De Guingand talked Eisenhower out of sending it.*
The next day, New Year’s Eve, De Guingand returned to Versailles after a conference with Montgomery. He insisted that a delay in the attack was necessary, for it was impossible to switch suddenly from defensive positions to the offensive without careful preparation. Montgomery, he reported, felt the Allies had the enemy “on the run like a wet hen from one side of the salient to the other,” that time was on the Allied side, and that Eisenhower should let the Germans exhaust themselves before attacking, since nothing could be worse than an ill-prepared offensive. Eisenhower was disturbed. He said Montgomery had definitely promised him he would attack on January 1. De Guingand said Eisenhower must have misunderstood. Eisenhower sent some staff officers to the files to see if they could find a message from Montgomery confirming the arrangements, but De Guingand warned that the mission was fruitless. “Knowing Monty,” he said, “the last thing he would do is to commit himself on paper.”5 Bradley, meanwhile, had already attacked, believing that Montgomery would begin his offensive on January 1. But Montgomery did not, and the Panzer divisions in the north were switched to the south to stop Bradley.
Eisenhower thought Montgomery’s sense of timing in military operations deficient. That point may be open to question, but there can be none about Montgomery’s total lack of a sense of timing in personal relations, or his complete inability to see things from someone else’s point of view. At the height of the debate over what Montgomery had or had not promised, the field marshal sent a letter to Eisenhower, damning the Supreme Commander’s policies and demanding that he, Montgomery, be given full control of the land battle. He did not mention the date of his attack.
Montgomery urged Eisenhower to write a directive setting tasks and objectives for the two army groups. After it was sent out, “one commander must have powers to direct and control the operations; you cannot possibly do it yourself, and so you would have to nominate someone else.” He suggested that Eisenhower put into his directive a statement that would read, “From now onwards full operational direction, control, and coordination of these operations is vested in the C.-in-C. 21 Army Group.…” Montgomery said Eisenhower should assign all available offensive power to the northern line of advance to the Ruhr; otherwise there would be another failure.6
Because Eisenhower had given him command of two American armies, Montgomery felt the Supreme Commander was in his power now, disagreements over dates of attack notwithstanding. Marshall feared Montgomery was right. On December 30, after reading in the London papers that Eisenhower intended to leave First and Ninth Armies with Montgomery, the Chief of Staff cabled the Supreme Commander: “My feeling is this: under no circumstances make any concessions of any kind whatsoever. You not only have our complete confidence but there would be a terrific resentment in this country following such action.… You are doing a fine job and go on and give them hell.”7 Eisenhower’s advisers at SHAEF also thought he needed bucking up, and several counseled him to have a showdown with Montgomery. S
mith had a frank discussion with De Guingand and let him know that if someone had to go it would not be Eisenhower.
Montgomery, Marshall, Smith, and the others had all misjudged Eisenhower. He was not Montgomery’s man, he had no intention of leaving both American armies with Montgomery, and he needed no encouragement to settle matters with the field marshal. The Bulge had given Eisenhower complete confidence in himself. On New Year’s Eve he sent to Bradley and Montgomery a directive covering future operations. His plan remained what it had always been—a major thrust by Montgomery, a secondary one by Bradley. Because Montgomery needed the extra help, Eisenhower allowed him to retain U. S. Ninth Army but returned First Army to Bradley’s control. “The one thing that must now be prevented,” he emphasized, “is the stabilization of the enemy salient with infantry, permitting him opportunity to use his Panzers at will on any part of the front. We must regain the initiative, and speed and energy are essential.”8
Eisenhower dictated a short covering note to Bradley to accompany the directive, then dictated a letter to Montgomery. It was simple and direct. “I do not agree,” Eisenhower said, referring to Montgomery’s contention that there should be a single ground commander. “My plan,” the Supreme Commander added, put a complete U.S. army under Montgomery; this he had done only because “I consider [it] militarily necessary.…” He said he had done all he could for Montgomery and did not want to hear again about placing Bradley under Twenty-first Army Group: “I assure you that in this matter I can go no further.… I have planned” to advance on a broad front, he said, and instructed Montgomery to read his directive carefully. All the vagueness of earlier letters and directives to Montgomery was now gone.
In conclusion, Eisenhower told Montgomery that he would no longer tolerate any debate on the subject. “I would deplore the development of such an unbridgeable gulf of convictions between us that we would have to present our differences” to the CCS, he said, but made it clear that if Montgomery went any further that was exactly what he would do. “The confusion and debate that would follow would certainly damage the good will and devotion to a common cause that have made this Allied Force unique in history,” Eisenhower added, but he could do nothing else if Montgomery persisted.9