I have more confidence than ever in Tatu, and you should feel the same way.
I won’t say definitively that he can’t make mistakes. But if he makes a mistake, after discussing it, our duty is to follow his directives, whatever they are. I’m not joking when I say that it is a thousand times preferable to die in battle, even if we think it’s for a useless cause, than to create a spectacle of defeat by refusing to fight. Cuban revolutionaries can die, but they cannot become frightened.
I hope… I am sure that you will do your revolutionary duty as a soldier, a Cuban and a man and that you will do this not only by fulfilling your duty personally but also as a responsible leader through setting an example to others.
Venceremos! [We will win!]
The other note, dated the first of the month, is addressed to Tembo.
Comrade:
I am sending you these lines of greeting from a trench three kilometers from the askaris [soldiers]. I also want to let you know about the situation here: the Congolese are trying to pick a fight with us and speaking badly of Tatu; they blame him for the burning of the peasants’ homes, for the loss of weapons, the lack of food and the errant life of the peasants.
On our side the disenchantment is total. I have learned that a majority of the Cubans who came with Tatu will request a meeting with you and propose leaving. This is the attitude of 17 men here, plus seven in the group that has arrived. Emilio, this attitude has become almost universal among the compañeros; we struggle to convince them that now is the time for maximum firmness, but there is great disenchantment, great mistrust and an immense desire to get out of the Congo. They base themselves on the attitude they observe among the Congolese, for whom the struggle seems to be over. The compañeros suggest that things have turned out this way because of Tatu, and they see little desire in him or his attitude to find an exit from this situation.
This is what I want to tell you, so that your assistance can be as effective as possible.
Politico
As can be seen in this last letter, there was an almost complete disintegration of the troop; some party members were even proposing to hold a meeting to discuss a withdrawal. I was extremely sharp in my response, warning that I would not accept any such demand or any meeting of that kind and would treat it as treachery, and that I would even regard as cowardice any act of allowing such proposals to circulate. I still had a remnant of authority that maintained some degree of cohesion among the Cubans; but that was all. But much worse things were happening on the Congolese side. During this time, I received a letter from Jerome Makambile, a “provincial deputy and people’s representative on the CNL,” in which he accused Massengo of murdering women and, having presented the case at length, invited me to meet him in Fizi to assess the situation in that area. At a time when communications with abroad were in greater peril and we had a central point and a General Staff to defend, this gentleman was firing off letters left and right (I received several from him) to organize the meeting. The following paragraph gives some idea of the limbo in which the revolution was then hanging:
I take the liberty of reproducing for you here the aspirations, wishes and proposals of the entire population in the Fizi region:
1. The people demand that the military power of our revolution should be entrusted to the friendly forces that are coming to help us until the country is stabilized.
2. The people request intensive aid from friendly countries consisting of:
a) military operations, personnel, weapons, equipment, money, etc.;
b) technical assistance, engineers, various kinds of technicians, doctors, etc.;
c) social assistance, teachers, traders, industrialists, etc.
The idea of handing all the military power over to Cubans was nothing other than an attempt at sedition using us as cover and had no origin other than tribal differences between these people and the Kabila-Massengo group—unless the enemy had a hand in it.
The only news that altered this absurd and gloomy picture was a report from Aly that he had engaged in two battles and inflicted a number of casualties on the enemy. All this was in spite of continual rows with the military commander of the region and the fact that, in practice, he and his group of compañeros had had to carry out operations against the army alone. In one of these, they captured documents outlining the enemy’s plans and several maps, as well as a radio, two mortars, a bazooka, four FALs, a Super-FAL, ammunition and reserves. It was a good attack, a harsh blow for the enemy, but it was not enough to alter the situation. Among the captured papers was the following document.
2.
SECRET
ORDER OPS No. 2
Ops South Map scale 1/200,000 No. 1 Bendera
Map scale 1/100,000 Katenga
1. Situation.
a) Enemy forces:
1) Enemy bttln. (± 360 men) under command of Captain Busindi, mostly composed of Babembe and a group of Tutsis (Rwandan) in Katale.
2) One pltn. (± 40 men) dressed as ANC:
Weapons: Chinese-made sub-machine guns; they picked up six traveling peons in the week of September 27, [19]65, 7 kilometers from Kabimba and forced them to carry sacks to their position (camp) along the Mama-Kasanga-Kalenga road.5
b) Friendly forces:
—The 5th Col. has occupied Baraka and will maintain the Baraka-Fizi-Lulimba line.
—The 9th Commando has occupied Lulimba.
—The 5th Inf. Bttln. has occupied Bendera.
—Detachment of (+ volunteers) 5th Cd. + I police pltn. (± 30 men) is occupying Kabimba.
—The 14th Inf. Bttln. (—) holds the rail and occupies Kabega-Maji-Muhala.
—lst Cpy. 14th Bttln. + one cpy. 12th Bttln. occupy Albertville.
Air force:
The air force (WIGMO) is supporting operations with:
—4 T-28s and 1 helicopter.
—2 B-26s temporarily based in Albertville.
—Extra air support may come from the WIGMO squadron (4 T-28s based in Ngoma) if absolutely necessary.
—1 DC3 FATAL, an air supply section, in Albertville.
Navy:
4 PT boats + Ermens-Luka (will prevent rebel elements crossing the lake throughout the operation).
c) Mission:
2nd Para-Bttln. (—) will execute movement from Albertville to Kabimba and take up final position.
2—Phase 2:
2nd Para-Bttln. (—), with help from Chief Mama Kasanga’s warriors, will reconnoiter north and north-east of Kabimba to locate enemy positions.
3—Phase 3:
2nd Para-Bttln. will carry out a raid to wipe out rebels north of Kabimba, including the rebel base at Katale.
Intelligence about the enemy
1) Katsheka: + 300 Tutsis assisted by ± 50 Cubans. The stores are to the north of the Katsheka River, under the command of Joseph Mundandi (Rwandan).
Weapons:
2 × 81 mm. mortars (one under repair)
2 × recoilless 75 cannon
2 × .50 antiaircraft guns
2 × .30 machine guns
30 automatic rifles + bazookas
Stock: 200 boxes of ammunition + 100 mines
2) Makungu: Position on the side of the hill. ± Babembe assisted by Cubans from Katsheka under command of Calixte (Mubembe). Arms comparable to Katsheka.
Stocks: ditto.
3) Katenga: Bivouac position in the forest. ± men (Babembe and others).
4) Kibamba: Enemy base by side of lake, bordering villages; port of arrival for supplies coming from Kigoma. EM rebel general (Javua).
Training center for new recruits.
Connection: telephone network from the hillside to the lake/ [Kionga] to Balabala.
5) Katale: North Kabimba; ± 300 men, former inhabitants of Albertville assisted by 12 Cubans. Commanded by Captain Businde [sic] (from Albertville).
Weapons:
2 ×75 recoilless canon
2 × 81 mm. mortars
12 ×.30 machine guns
150 AFN rifles
3 antiaircraft batteries
6) Lobunzo: ± 600 men, commanded by Colonel Petro (Mubembe).
Important store in the house of Chief Kilindi.
7) Kabanga: store and port (ships entering the Luvu estuary).
8) Kalonda-Kibuyu: occupied by rebels.
9) Fizi: administrative center.
10) Simbi: supply and instruction center.
11) Stores and port.
Their aim was to occupy the entire lakeshore and destroy our installations near Kigoma. Furthermore, apart from a few errors, it was clear they had a very accurate idea of our weaponry and manpower, as well as the number of Cubans. In other words, the enemy intelligence service worked perfectly, or almost perfectly, whereas we had no idea what was happening on their side.
The picture presented when I arrived at the base was not at all encouraging. We knew what the enemy wanted to do and we did not need to capture those documents to find this out; it was already clear and the spectacle of our collapse was truly terrible.
1. Che’s note: This refers to a message urging them to carry out sabotage actions as soon as possible.
2. Che’s note: This was the meeting over which Massengo presided referred to above.
3. The diagram referred to was not included in Che’s original manuscript.
4. Underlined and emphasized in the original.
5. Che’s note: A reference to the failed attempt at an ambush described above.
A STAB IN THE BACK
We took initial precautions to turn the base into an impregnable redoubt, or at least into one that could be taken only at the expense of heavy enemy losses. Scouts went out to reconnoiter all the hillsides in the direction of Rwandasi, and to create a route connecting it with the road to its south that goes directly from Nganja to the lake. We ordered the construction of a series of well-protected wells; Cuban compañeros worked on these, and the idea was that all the equipment could be hidden there if we had to evacuate. The most vulnerable areas were protected with a line of freshly dug trenches.
When I arrived, I checked the organization of the radio equipment; this consisted of an apparatus with quite a long range that wasn’t very practical under those circumstances, with 12-volt batteries charged by a small generator; this made it necessary to have a large reserve of gasoline. The apparatus reached Dar es-Salaam, although weakly, and got through perfectly to Kigoma. The three compañeros responsible for transmissions (Lieutenant Tuma, the telegraph operator and the mechanic) performed their task capably. From October 22 (the day it began to operate) to November 20 (the night we left the Lake [Base]), they transmitted 110 messages in code and received 60. The total dedication and efficiency of these compañeros contrasted with the atmosphere of dereliction of duty and extreme apathy prevalent in our force. It is a fact that experienced men with a love for their work (although, it is only fair to say, on the margins of the daily struggle with the Congolese soldiers) were able to achieve magnificent results. And in spite of the qualification just noted, I would venture to say that if all the cadres had been of the same caliber, our performance—if not the final result—would have been different.
I spoke to Massengo by telephone as soon as I arrived, and he seemed in good spirits. His first proposal was to attack Kazima; this was his “pet idea.” I responded that we would discuss it the next day. I went down to see him and we had another conversation about the subject. I had been informed by the scouts, Nane and Kahama, that there were no guardsmen in the village, and I told him this. But he had different information that Captain Salumu’s men were close by and were reporting directly back to him; he insisted that guardsmen were there. We could not reach agreement about an attack and postponed the matter until fresh reconnaissance could establish the exact situation.
Commander Mundandi showed he was willing to meet my demands for improving the protection of the base, such as conducting a sabotage operation to cut the power lines, and sending me one of the cannon in their possession, while he concentrated on the defense of Nganja so that some men could be released to go to Kazima. He asked, in return, for some uniforms, shoes and food, and requested some Cuban technicians to carry out the sabotage, to handle the cannon and to help the Rwandans in their tasks. I promised to send him six men. Tom (the political commissar) and Aja would be responsible for destroying the electricity poles with a flare; Compañero Angalia would fire the cannon simultaneously at Front de Force as a diversion and try to hit the water pipe; and Achali would lead the group.
We received a cable advising that some important messages were coming for me, so I decided to wait at the Lake [Base]. I took the opportunity to have a good many talks with the cadres who remained there. One of these was Colonel Anzurumi, chief of staff of the Second Brigade (General Moulana’s brigade), who had always been in conflict with Lambert and the people at Kibamba Base, including Massengo, who never trusted him. I criticized him sharply and urged him to change his attitude. I referred to the loss of Baraka without a fight (he had been present there) and showed him the result of all the intrigues and disorder, and recalled that he had frequently offered to have his men train in heavy weapons at the lake but had not sent a single one. He took note of my advice, including my recommendation to send off a few men quickly to recover the cannon from the Karamba barrier and take it to Kibamba as part of a battery of heavy weapons; he had been pestering me with stories about how it had been saved from our disaster; now, after many adventures, it showed up with 13 shells. Changa arrived at dawn, his entrance having long been heralded by tracer bullets in the sky from a veritable naval battle that had broken out when he was surprised by patrol boats. He was carrying a man who had been wounded in the hand by a machine-gun bullet, and Changa himself had a face wound from the recoil of a bazooka that his compañeros had fired. The Congolese crew was very scared when they arrived, and it was difficult to get them to return in the days that followed.
A messenger came from Rafael simply to bring me this note.
Compañero Tatu:
This morning Pablo was summoned by the government to be told that, in view of the agreements at the meeting of African heads of state1 concerning nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries, both they and other governments that have previously been giving aid to the Congolese liberation movement will have to change the nature of their support. Consequently, they have asked us to withdraw what we have here, as our contribution to this policy. They recognized that we [Cubans] had given more than many African states. They stated that nothing would now be given to the Congolese liberation movement until such time as we have withdrawn, and then the president himself will call the Congolese leaders to inform them of the decision taken by the African states. A report about this has been sent to Havana. We wait to hear your views.
Greetings,
Rafael
This was the coup de grâce for a moribund revolution. Because of the character of this information, I said nothing to the Congolese compañeros. I waited to see what would happen in coming days, but in conversation I hinted at the possibility of a change in Tanzania’s policy by referring to such things as the blocking of supplies in Kigoma. On November 4, a telegram arrived from Dar es-Salaam.
Letter from Fidel is being sent with messenger. Its main points are:
1. We should do everything except what is absurd.
2. If Tatu considers our presence is becoming pointless and unjustifiable, we should think of withdrawing. We should act in accordance with the objective situation and our men’s spirits.
3. If you think you should stay, we will try to send whatever human and material resources you think are necessary.
4. It worries us that you mistakenly fear that the attitude you assume will be viewed as defeatist or pessimistic.
5. If it is decided to leave, Tatu can maintain the status quo while returning here or staying at some other location.
6. Whatever the decision, we will support it.
7. Avoid to
tal annihilation.
But at the same time another telegram arrived:
To Tatu
From Rafael
Message received on the 4th. Whatever the new situation, Tshombe’s white mercenaries will remain in the country, attacking Congolese the people and committing all kinds of crimes and villainy. It would therefore be treason to withdraw our support from the Congolese revolutionaries unless they demand it or decide to abandon the struggle.
The compañeros who received these two cables were not yet aware of the contents of Rafael’s letter and felt there was a certain contradiction between them; the first summarized a letter from Havana in reply to the one I had sent on October 5; the second was in response to the report from Dar es-Salaam on the new attitude of the Tanzanian government.
We drafted a reply to Fidel, which was transmitted by radio from Dar es-Salaam.
Report to be sent by radio to Fidel:
Rafael:
During the days of your visit, Julio Cabrera Jimenez [Awirino] disappeared.2 We thought he had made off in haste because of the nature of our retreat, which didn’t seem to present a major danger despite the fact that it had the features of a rout that have colored our actions of late.
He has not reappeared, however, and we must give him up as dead or captured, the former being far more likely.
Immediately after the retreat, I gave Rafael Pérez Castillo3 a harsh warning for having abandoned the 75 mm. recoilless cannon, which was saved by the Congolese. Conditions were very bad at the new camp, but I relied on the guardsmen’s apparent immobility, and the work on establishing a dump at a distance for all the recovered ammunition was very slow. On the 24th, as if to celebrate our sixth month in these parts, the guardsmen advanced with the intention of burning down peasant hamlets, an intention that they carried out. We learned of their presence when they clashed with some Congolese who had left the camp. I ordered immediate resistance, so that we might hold out until nightfall and save the ammunition, but I was then informed that a large number of guardsmen were outflanking us through the hills, where I had not posted any defenses because I had not thought they would come that way. This disrupted the defense and we had to change our lines rapidly and send a squad to engage the guardsmen on the hillside. In reality, however, we discovered later that they had been advancing along a road to our front and the supposed guardsmen had been peasants fleeing across the hill. The defenses were strong enough to stop them, but our people retreated and I was told that the guardsmen had already reached the camp, which was not true; the retreat was scandalous, and I even lost the supply of tobacco. Only one unit did honor to our army and resisted for another hour, although by then its inferiority in terms of its number and position was quite clear; one of these men was Rafael Pérez Castillo (Bahasa), who extracted his cannon from the danger zone and continued fighting with a FAL. He was seriously wounded, and we had to carry him along appalling roads, longer and worse than those in the Cuban Sierra. At dawn on the 26th, when he seemed to be over the worst, he died. In the setback, we lost a 12.7 machine gun (abandoned by a Cuban who had been left without his Congolese assistants) and all the ammunition; we also lost the trust of the peasants and the rudiments of organization that we had begun to acquire.