At this time the guardsmen began to advance on all sides, giving the impression that they were preparing a final assault on our base. But this has not happened and the defenses are quite solid, at least in terms of weapons, although we lack ammunition and the Congolese recruits cannot be relied upon.
We hold a quadrilateral area in the mountains, framed by the following points—which you may be able to locate on a map—and are in enemy hands with our own forces close by: Baraka, Fizi, Lubondja, Lulimba, [Front de] Force-Bendera and Kabimba. The enemy has outposts this side of Baraka and Kabimba. Aly attacked them on three occasions on the Kabimba front, and the second time he captured their general orders for an offensive designed to take our base and clear an area 25 kilometers around it, while four PT boats (Ermens-Luka) guard the lake to prevent supplies from reaching us. Their aircraft consists of eight T-28s, two B-26s and one DC-3 for reconnaissance and back-up, and a helicopter for liaison. This little air force is sowing terror among the Congolese comrades.
From a military point of view, the situation is difficult insofar as our troops are collections of armed men without the slightest discipline and with no fighting spirit; but the terrain could hardly be better for the purpose of defense.
Today I have just been appointed area commander of operations, with full authority to instruct the troops and to command our artillery (a battery of 82-type mortars, three recoilless 75 mm. cannon, and 10 AA 12.7 machine guns). The Congolese officers’ morale has improved with the succession of defeats, and they have become convinced that they have to take things seriously.4 I have prepared them for the news from Tanzania, as if I were speculating about the Accra Conference and the fact that the Tanzanians are not handing over the weapons in store there. Some people here say they are prepared to risk their lives and maintain the revolution at all costs. But we don’t know the views of Kabila, who has been saying that he will come here soon. I have received Fidel’s recent cables; one seems to be a reply to my letters, the other to the last communication from Tanzania. With regard to my letter, I think there has again been some exaggeration; I tried to be objective but I was not entirely pessimistic. There was a time when all the Congolese officers were said to be on the point of leaving en masse; I had decided that in such an eventuality I would remain here with around 20 carefully chosen men (the goat can’t give any more milk), send the rest to the other side, and keep on fighting until something developed or all possibilities had been exhausted. In that case I would go by land to another front, or avail myself of the sacred right of asylum on neighboring shores. Faced with the latest news from Tanzania, my reaction was the same as Fidel’s: we cannot leave. Moreover, not a single Cuban should leave on the proposed conditions. There should be a serious discussion to settle matters with the Tanzanian leaders.
These are my proposals: Either a high-level Cuban delegation should visit Tanzania or Tembo should go from here, or there should be a combination of the two. Their argument should be more or less the following: that Cuba offered aid subject to Tanzania’s approval; that Tanzania accepted and the aid has been effective. This was unconditional and without a time limit. We understand Tanzania’s present difficulties, but we do not agree with what is being proposed. Cuba will not go back on its promises, nor can it accept a shameful withdrawal that would leave our unfortunate brothers at the mercy of the mercenaries. We would abandon the struggle only if, for well-founded reasons or from force majeure, the Congolese asked us to do so, but we will fight for this not to happen. It should be pointed out to the Tanzanian government that the accord that has been reached is like the Munich agreement and gives neocolonialism a free hand. In the struggle against imperialism, there can be no retreat and no deferment; force is the only language understood. If the Congo were to stabilize under the present government, Tanzania would be in the dangerous position of being surrounded by more or less hostile countries; the revolution here might exist without Tanzania, but only at the cost of great sacrifice; we would not be responsible if it were destroyed for lack of aid, etc., etc.
It is appropriate to demand that the Tanzanian government maintains telegraphic communications; that they allow boats to depart with food once or twice a week; that they permit us to bring over two speedboats; that they give us some of the stored weapons for a one-off shipment and let mail through once a fortnight.
I raise the matter of the boats because the situation has become desperate. The little Soviet ferries are very slow and the enemy has speedboats; we have to shoot our way through, and last time Changa arrived wounded and one of our men was hit in the hand. The boats have to cross in twos because they frequently break down en route and one has to take the other in tow. Tanzania will certainly not accept such a situation (of daily combat), and for that reason it will be necessary to keep the boats on our side of the lake, bringing them out to collect things and return the same night. One of the boats must be transportable over steep mountains, in case we temporarily lose control of the lakeshore. We should insist on retaining our present ability to have somewhere in Tanzania known to very few people, where we can go at night and leave before daybreak, so that with good boats, this would just appear to be one of the smuggling operations that are common on these shores. But our method is to play fair; and we need to keep out of trouble so that we can devote ourselves to the important things. We also recommend giving the Soviets and the Chinese a copy of the final text in order to forestall any maneuver to discredit us.
Don’t worry about us. We will bring honor to Cuba and we won’t be annihilated, but I will certainly shake off a few slackers as soon as our position becomes clearer.
Rushed, warm greetings to all from all.
Tatu
P. S. I think you should talk to Karume to see if an air base can be obtained, either in Zanzibar with a stop-off in Tanzania, or just in Zanzibar. The type of aircraft will have to depend on what is achieved. One idea that might be acceptable to Tanzania is to have doctors at Kigoma Hospital, so that they can move around with some degree of freedom. They should speak English, be professional and good revolutionaries, or come close to this prototype. That’s it.
Concerned about the inefficient command structure, I proposed a plan for a small, flexible General Staff that would actually be of some use; but in the discussions we had with all those in charge, Massengo argued it was impossible to change things so quickly as a few days earlier a structure had been devised in which Siki would participate and this was still waiting for Kabila’s approval. It was as if my operational idea had been for a General Staff like that of the Soviet Army on the eve of the capture of Berlin, but my only option was to give way. I asked to be given responsibility for training and for the attempt to create a practically oriented school, but instead I was appointed head of operations (theoretically the second rank in the army command) and given responsibility for the organization of artillery and instruction. The command post was to be taken with a large pinch of salt, but I did what was humanly feasible to detain the collapse.
Azima’s company, which had fallen apart after the disaster on October 24 and the flight of most of the Congolese, was brought back up to its complement. But now we didn’t have weapons; while we had been making fruitless efforts to organize a nucleus of fighting men, an enormous quantity of weapons and equipment in Kigoma had been haphazardly distributed without any prior agreement, so that the supplies and stores at the base were at rock bottom. Thus all our woes were now compounded by a lack of firepower. There were some reserves of 12.7 bullets and mortar shells, but nothing for the artillery and, most important, no ammunition for our most widely used rifle, the SKS or point trente in our jargon.
Nevertheless, doing the best we could, we organized the ammunition stores and took measures to distribute the weapons and form an artillery unit. Maffu, who had arrived from Mundandi’s zone, was sent to Kisoshi (between Kazima and Kibamba) to try to give the defense a little cohesion.
Before leaving, he related a hair-raising experience. One ni
ght two Congolese emissaries turned up in the camp from Calixte’s base nearby. Because it was already late, our compañeros invited them to stay the night there, but they explained that Mundandi had asked them to spend the night in his hut and they headed off. The next day they failed to appear. When Mundandi was asked about them, he said he had sent them away because they had tried to trick him into thinking they were political commissars, whereas they had been ordinary soldiers. A short time later, two Rwandans who had not been seen before in the camp appeared wearing those compañeros’ blue jackets and helmets, which the Rwandans normally don’t wear. Calixte then sent someone to find out where his men were, as they had not returned to their base. All this suggests that they were murdered by Mundandi’s people for some motive that is not clear, whether it was a simple case of robbery, or because the differences between these groups had become so extreme. I told Massengo of my suspicions, but nothing was done because of the sudden rash of unfortunate events.
We received a letter from Mbili at the Lubondja front saying that the Congolese were exerting huge pressure on his men and he did not think he could hold out much longer; the demoralization was very great.
He warned me of a plot to ask me to allow some Cubans to withdraw from the struggle. The political commissar Karim wrote me an emotional letter explaining that, if he had sent Tembo the previously mentioned note, it had been to warn us about the situation and that he himself would make every effort to fulfill his duty; he attached a list of compañeros who were proposing to pull out of the struggle—a majority of those with Mbili. Subsequently, some of the men with the best record of conduct to that point then made the same request to Mbili personally, but he managed to persuade them to withdraw it. Mbili himself wrote a note defending the political commissar from what I had implied when I said that I would treat as cowardice any toleration of open defeatism on the grounds that Karim was helping him a lot in a difficult and thankless task.
Meanwhile, Aly arrived from Kabimba to explain his conflicts with the officers there. After talking to Massengo and “Tremendo Punto,” we decided that the latter should go with Aly to ascertain what was happening and, if necessary, to put another Cuban in his position of command or to withdraw all the troops. I wrote to Mbili authorizing him to put some distance between himself and the men at the Lubondja barrier. Meanwhile, we continued to make improvements to the defenses at the base, preparing gun emplacements and trenches, and waiting for the moment when the guardsmen appeared in force and we could deliver a heavy blow. The six men who were to go and work with Mundandi were warned to stay together and split up into four and two only at the moment of an engagement; they were told to risk their lives only to the extent that the Rwandans did because I was wary of yet another instance of the duplicity that we had come to expect.
A telegram from Kigoma informed us that Vice-President Kawawa was there and that he had spoken with Kabila; according to the latter, he had promised support, asked what else was needed, and given assurances that the lake would be opened. If Kabila’s statements were true, then Tanzania’s attitude was even more incorrect.
We heard that there were 150 guardsmen at Kazima and there was a proposal for an attack signed by the political commissar of the Congolese forces there.
In another communication, Mbili informed us that some men he sent on reconnaissance had not detected any movement; they cautiously moved forward until they realized that the guardsmen had already withdrawn from Lubondja and left behind only an appeal to the population to lay down their weapons. He immediately gave the order for more reconnaissance, noting that there was no one at the former emplacement at Lambert’s barrier, nor had any enemy forces been seen on the road to Fizi; shortly before, large-scale movement of vehicles had been observed in the area. With the field now open, Lambert showed up with heroic tales of attacks, enemy losses and captured weapons, and announced that he had Fizi and Baraka surrounded with some 900 men, and that he wanted to collect the cannon, the mortars and the antiaircraft weapons to launch an attack. He was told that the mortars had been lost in the retreat and that the cannon had been sent to defend the base. In his letter Mbili explained he “would have liked to tell him everything that needed to be said, but I considered that it was not a good moment because of the nature of the situation. Once again we had to play the role of simpletons with these people.”
We had an antiaircraft machine gun at the barrier, and this was quickly sent to the base so that Lambert couldn’t claim it. Given all this new information, Mbili was ordered to go to reinforce the base and to leave only one group of men under Rebokate at the training camp located two hours away from the primitive barrier. It remained to be seen what would be the next step taken by the men who were retreating because they would obviously not give up the prize so readily.
Mbili also send another report about a meeting that Lambert held with his men. According to an observer who had managed to slip in, Lambert explained to them that he and 23 combatants had stopped the guardsmen in their tracks, that he had then left 150 men there with the Cubans but they had failed to do anything and had even lost all the heavy weapons. He also announced that the enemy was offering 500 francs5 and the possibility of a job for every soldier who gave himself up; he asked the combatants what they thought of this, and they said they did not agree with it. Lambert then warned them not to fall into the trap and, according to the informant, used quite a good argument; the men’s attitude seemed firm on this point. He criticized me for retreating to the base and advised the officer in charge to gather together all his men and weapons because they would be needed. This, too, was a direct attack on us which, despite his firm stance and his readiness to continue fighting, was designed to sow discord.
I had another talk with Compañero Massengo. Again I didn’t tell him about the new disposition of the Tanzanian government. We mainly discussed the idea of an attack on Kazima and, in this connection, I stressed again that more reconnaissance was needed before such a decision was taken. I was not happy about the proposed attack, fearing that it could become a rout and cause a further drop in morale. First, I wanted to be sure that there would be some heavy weapons to keep the enemy under fire and to prevent a counterattack.
On November 10, Hukumu suddenly turned up and reported that, after carrying out a mission to Lubondja, he had been joined in Nganja by some Rwandans who said that Front de Force had fallen into enemy hands. Shortly afterwards, the Cubans who had been with Mundandi arrived and informed me that, while they had been preparing to go down and carry out a sabotage operation, the Rwandan guards had reported the appearance of the enemy’s first assault troops, guided in three groups by peasants from the region. Mundandi decided not to mount a defense because of the difficulties of the position, but he was able to save nearly all his weapons and ammunition and took refuge in Nganja. He asked our compañeros to stay on, but Achali misinterpreted my orders and immediately returned to the base. Having spoken with them and explained that, now more than ever, we needed them to support the Rwandans, I sent them back again under the command of Tom, the political commissar. The next day, we got news that Makungu (the camp) had fallen in the same manner, and Calixte, the commander of that sector, joined us with his men.
It was important for us to hold onto the Nganja area, not only because it gave access to the base, but because we needed the cattle there now that the lake was more and more cut off and we were running low on food. We still had three animals that Compañero Nane had brought, but if that road was closed to us, we would be in quite a predicament without any kind of reserves. Meanwhile, we hastily prepared our little artillery unit under Compañero Azi, which had three mortars and quite a lot of shells, a cannon with 13 shells, and two 12.7 machine guns (one without a tripod) and plenty of ammunition. With all this, we thought we could resist the attack on the area and try to inflict quite a few losses on the enemy.
I sent Compañero Moja to check out Kisoshi and the adjacent areas, and the first thing he reported was that s
ome planes passing overheard had strafed them and that all the Congolese compañeros had abandoned him. He also said that there were three enemy boats in a menacing position; but there was no danger.
The supply ship was not crossing the lake, and Changa informed me that this was because it had nothing to bring. This provoked a series of fiery telegrams from us to Kigoma and Dar es-Salaam. I also sent a telegram to Cuba that said: