This is the sentiment and expression of the philosopher Epictetus, derived from the doctrines of the Stoics, that we have read in the book of which I spoke above.
10
I have heard Favorinus say that he had heard the philosopher Epictetus say, that most of those who gave the appearance of philosophizing were philosophers of this kind: ἄνευ τοῦ πράττειν, μέχρι τοῦ λέγειν (this means, “apart from deeds, as far as words”). There is a still more vigorous expression which he was accustomed to use, that Arrian has recorded in the books which he wrote about his discourses For Arrian says that when Epictetus had noticed a man lost to shame, of misdirected energy, and evil habits, bold, impudent in speech, and concerned with everything else but his soul, when he saw a man of that kind, continues Arrian, handling also the studies and pursuits of philosophy, and taking up physics, and studying dialectics, and taking up and investigating many a theoretical principle of this sort, he would call upon gods and men, and frequently, in the midst of that appeal, he would denounce the man in these words: “Ἄνθρωπε, ποῦ βάλλεις; σκέψαι, εἰ κεκάθαρται τὸ ἀγγεῖον. ἂν γὰρ εἰς τὴν οἴησιν αὐτὰ βάλῃς, ἀπώλετο· ἢν σαπῇ, οὖρον ἢ ὄξος ἐγένετο ἢ εἴ τι τούτων χεῖρον. Surely there is nothing weightier, nothing truer than these words, in which the greatest of philosophers declared that the writings and teachings of philosophy, when poured into a false and low-lived person, as though into a dirty and defiled vessel, turn change, are spoiled, and (as he himself says κυνικώτερον) become urine, or something, it may be, dirtier than urine.
The same Epictetus, moreover, as we have heard from Favorinus, was in the habit of saying that there were two vices which are far more severe and atrocious than all others, want of endurance and want of self-control, when we do not endure or bear the wrongs which we have to bear, or do not abstain from, or forbear, those matters and pleasures which we ought to forbear. “And so,’’ he says, “if a man should take to heart these two words and observe them in controlling and keeping watch over himself, he will, for the most part, be free from wrongdoing, and will live a highly peaceful life.” These two words, he used to say, were ἀνέχου and ἀπέχου.
10a
When the salvation of our souls and regard for our true selves are at stake, something has to be done, even without stopping to think about it, a saying of Epictetus which Arrian quotes with approval.
11
From the homilies of Arrian, exhorting to virtue
Now when Archelaus sent for Socrates with the intention of making him rich, the latter bade the messenger take back the following answer: “At Athens four quarts of barley-meal can be bought for an obol, and there are running springs of water.” For, look you, if what I have is not sufficient for me, still, I am sufficient for it, and so it too is sufficient for me. Or do you not see that Polus was not accustomed to act Oedipus the King with any finer voice or more pleasure to his audience than Oedipus at Colonus, the outcast and beggar? And then shall the man of noble nature make a poorer showing than Polus, and not play well any role to which the Deity assigns him? And will he not follow the example of Odysseus, who was no less pre-eminent in his rags than in his rich and purple cloak?
12
From Arrian
There are certain persons who exhibit their high spirit rather gently, and in a sort of passionless manner do everything that even those who are swept away by their anger do. We must be on our guard, therefore, against the error of these persons, as something much worse than violent anger. For those who give way to violent anger are soon sated with their revenge, but the others prolong it like men who have a light fever.
13
From the Memorabilia of Epictetus
But, says someone, I see the good and excellent perishing from hunger and cold. — And do you not see those who are not good and excellent perishing from luxury, and bombast, and vulgarity? — Yes, but it is disgraceful to be supported by another. — And who, O miserable fellow, is supported by himself alone, except the Cosmos? Whoever accuses Providence, therefore, because the wicked are not punished, and because they are strong and rich, is acting just as though, when the wicked had lost their eyes, he said they were not being punished because their finger-nails were in good condition. Now, as for me, I assert that there is much more difference between virtue and property than there is between eyes and finger-nails.
14
From the Memorabilia of Epictetus
. . . bring forward the ill-natured philosophers, who think that pleasure is not something natural, but a sequel of things that are natural, as justice, self-control, and freedom. Why indeed, then, does the soul take delight in the lesser goods of the body, and enjoy calm therein, as Epicurus says, and yet not find pleasure in its own goods, which are very great? Verily nature has also given me a sense of shame, and frequently I blush, when I feel that I am saying something disgraceful. It is this emotion which does not allow me to lay down pleasure as the good and end of life.
15
From the Memorabilia of Epictetus
At Rome the women have in their hands Plato’s Republic, because he insists on community of women. For they pay attention only to the words, and not to the meaning of the man; the fact is, he does not bid people marry and live together, one man with one woman, and then go on to advocate the community of women, but he first abolishes that kind of marriage altogether, and introduces another kind in its place. And in general people delight in finding excuses for their own faults; for, indeed, philosophy says we ought not to stretch out even our finger at random!
16
From the Memorabilia of Epictetus
One ought to know that it is not easy for a man to acquire a fixed judgement, unless he should day by day state and hear the same principles, and at the same time apply them to his life.
17
From Epictetus
Now when we have been invited to a banquet, we take what is set before us; and if a person should bid his host to set before him fish or cakes, he would be regarded as eccentric. Yet in the world at large we ask the gods for things which they do not give us, and that too when there are many things which they actually have given us.
18
From the same
Those are amusing persons, he said, who take great pride in the things which are not under our control. A man says, “I am better than you; for I have many estates, and you are half-dead with hunger.” Another says, “I am a consular.” Another, “I am a procurator.” Another, “I have thick curly hair.” But one horse does not say to another horse, “I am better than you, for I have quantities of fodder, and a great deal of barley, and my bridles are of gold, and my saddle-cloths are embroidered,” but “I can run faster than you can.” And every creature is better or worse because of its own particular virtue or vice. Can it be, then, that man is the only creature without a special virtue, but he must have recourse to his hair, and his clothes, and his grandsires?
19
The same
When men are sick and their physician gives them no advice, they are annoyed, and think that he has given them up. And why should not a man feel that way toward the philosopher, and so conclude that he has given up hope of one’s ever coming to a sound state of mind, if he no longer tells one anything that is of any use?
20
The same
Those whose bodies are in good condition can endure heat and cold; so also those whose souls are in an excellent condition can endure anger, and grief, and great joy, and every other emotion.
21
From Epictetus
For this reason it is right to praise Agrippinus, because, although he was a man of the very highest worth, he never praised himself, but used to blush even if someone else praised him. His character was such, said Epictetus, that when any hardship befell him he would compose a eulogy upon it; on fever, if he had a fe
ver; on disrepute, if he suffered from disrepute; on exile, if he went into exile. And once, he said, when Agrippinus was preparing to take lunch, a man brought him word that Nero ordered him into exile; “Very well,” said he, “we shall take our lunch in Aricia.”
22
From Agrippinus
When Agrippinus was governor, he used to try to persuade the persons whom he sentenced that it was proper for them to be sentenced. “For,” he would say, “it is not as an enemy or as a brigand that I record my vote against them, but as a curator and guardian; just as also the physician encourages the man upon whom he is operating, and persuades him to submit to the operation.”
23
From Epictetus
Nature is wonderful, and, as Xenophon says, “fond of her creatures.” At all events we love and tend our body, the most unpleasant and dirtiest thing that there is; why, if we had had to tend our neighbour’s body for no more than five days, we could not have endured it. Just consider what a nuisance it is to get up in the morning and brush some other person’s teeth, and then after attending to a call of nature to wash those parts. Truly it is wonderful to love a thing for which we perform so many services every day. I stuff this bag here; and then I empty it; what is more tiresome? But I must serve God. For that reason I remain, and endure to wash this miserable paltry body, and to feed and shelter it; and when I was younger, there was still another behest which it laid upon me, yet nevertheless I endured it. Why, then, when Nature, which gave us our body, takes it away, do you not bear it? — I love it, says somebody. — Well, but as I was just now saying, is it not Nature that has given you this very affection? But the same Nature also says, “Let it go now, and have no more trouble with it.”
24
The same
If a man dies young, he blames the gods , because, when it was long since time for him to rest, he has trouble; yet none the less, when death draws nigh, he wishes to live, and sends for the doctor, and implores him to spare no zeal and pains. People are very strange, he used to say, wishing neither to live nor to die.
25
From Epictetus
When you attack someone with vehemence and threatening, remember to tell yourself beforehand that you are a tame animal; and then you will never do anything fierce, and so will come to the end of your life without having to repent, or to be called to account.
26
You are a little soul, carrying around a corpse, as Epictetus used to say.
27
We must discover, said he, an art that deals with assent, and in the sphere of the choices we must be careful to maintain close attention, that they be made with due reservations, that they be social, and that they be according to merit; and from desire we must refrain altogether, and must exercise aversion towards none of the things that are not under our control.
28
It is no ordinary matter that is at stake, said he, but it is a question of either madness or sanity.
28a
Socrates used to say, “What do you want? To have souls of rational or irrational animals?” “Of rational animals.” “Of what kind of rational animals? Sound or vicious?” “Sound.” “Why, then, do you not try to get them?” “Because we have them.” “Why, then, do you strive and quarrel?”
28b
“Me miserable, that this has befallen me!” Say not so, but rather, “Fortunate that I am, because, although this has befallen me, I continue to live untroubled, being neither crushed by the present nor afraid of the future.” For something of this kind might have befallen anyone; but not everyone would have continued to live untroubled by it. Why, then, count the former aspect of the matter a misfortune, rather than this latter good fortune? And in general do you call a man’s misfortune that which is not an aberration from man’s nature? And does that seem to you to be an aberration from the nature of man which does not contravene the will of his nature? What then? This will of man’s nature you have already learned; this, then, which has befallen you does not prevent you, does it, from being just, high-minded, self-controlled, self-possessed, deliberate, free from deceit, self-respecting, free, and everything else, the possession of which enables the nature of man to come into its own?
Remember for the future, whenever anything begins to trouble you, to make use of the following judgement: This thing is not a misfortune, but to bear it in a noble spirit is good fortune.
DOUBTFUL FRAGMENTS
29
From the Encheiridion of Epictetus
Under all circumstances take thought of nothing so much as safety; for it is safer to keep silence than to speak; and refrain from saying what will be devoid of sense and full of censure.
30
From Epictetus
We ought neither to fasten our ship to one small anchor nor our life to a single hope.
31
From the same
We ought to measure both the length of our stride, and the extent of our hope, by what is possible.
32
From Epictetus
It is much more necessary to cure the soul than the body; for death is better than a bad life.
33
From the same
Those of our pleasures which come most rarely give the greatest delight.
34
From the same
If a man should overpass the mean, the most delightful things would become least delightful.
35
No man is free who is not master of himself.
36
The truth is something immortal and eternal, and does not present us with a beauty that withers from the passage of time, nor a freedom of speech which can be taken away by justice, but it presents us with what is just and lawful, distinguishing the unlawful therefrom, and refuting it.
The Greek Texts
The ancient Forum at Rome — Epictetus spent his youth as a slave in Rome to Epaphroditos, a wealthy freedman and secretary to Nero.
LIST OF GREEK TEXTS
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CONTENTS
THE DISCOURSES
BOOK I.
BOOK II.
BOOK III.
BOOK IV.
ENCHIRIDION
FRAGMENTS
1 (175). STOBAEUS, ECLOGAE, II. 1, 31
2 (135). STOBAEUS, IV. 44, 65
3 (136). STOBAEUS, IV. 44, 66
4 (169). STOBAEUS, II. 8, 30. MUSONIUS, FRAG. 38 (H)
5 (67). STOBAEUS, III. 19, 13. MUSONIUS, FRAG. 39 (H.)
6 (69). STOBAEUS, III. 20, 60. MUSONIUS, FRAG. 40 (H.)
7 (70). STOBAEUS, III. 20, 61. MUSONIUS, FRAG. 41 (H.)
8 (134). STOBAEUS, IV. 44, 60. MUSONIUS, FRAG. 42 (H.)
9 (180). GELLIUS, XIX. 1, 14–21
10 (179). GELLIUS, XVII. 19
10a (181). ARNOBIUS, ADVERSUS GENTES, 2, 78
11 (174). STOBAEUS, IV. 33, 28
12. STOBAEUS, III. 20, 47
13. STOBAEUS, I. 3, 50
14 (52). STOBAEUS, III. 6, 57
16 (78). STOBAEUS, III. 29, 84
17 (15). STOBAEUS, III. 4, 91
18 (16). STOBAEUS, III. 4, 92
19 (17). STOBAEUS, III. 4, 93
20 (18). STOBAEUS, III. 4, 94
21 (56). STOBAEUS, III. 7, 16
23 (94). STOBAEUS, IV. 53, 29
24 (95). STOBAEUS, IV. 53, 30
25 (71). STOBAEUS, III. 20, 67
26 (176). MARCUS AURELIUS, 4, 41
27 (177). MARCUS AURELIUS, 11, 37
28 (178). MARCUS AURELIUS, 11, 38
28a. MARCUS AURELIUS, 11, 39
28b. MARCUS AURELIUS, 4, 49, 2–6
29 (77). STOBAEUS, III. 35, 10
30 (89). STOBAEUS, IV. 46, 22
31 (90). STOBAEUS, IV. 46, 23
32 (92). STOBAEUS, IV.
53, 27
33 (54). STOBAEUS, III. 6, 59. DEMOCRITUS, FRAG. 232 (DIELS)
34 (55). STOBAEUS, III. 6, 60. DEMOCRITUS, FRAG. 233 (DIELS)
35 (114). FLORILEGIUM, COD. PARIS. 1168
36 (140). ANTONIUS, 1, 21
Source text: Epicteti Dissertationes ab Arriano digestae. Epictetus. Heinrich Schenkl. editor. Leipzig. B. G. Teubner. 1916. With thanks to the Pegasus Digital Library.
THE DISCOURSES
Arriani epistula ad Lucium Gellium
Ἀρριανὸς Λουκίῳ Γελλίῳ χαίρειν.