20 “had knowledge”/“turned”/tried approaching: Chicago Tribune, 11/16/02. In an extraordinary episode right after 9/11, German police raided Mamoun Darkazanli’s apartment only to find it empty of documents. The raid was followed, however, by the mysterious delivery to the authorities of a bag of Darkazanli’s papers—by a man claiming to be a burglar who had stolen them from the suspect. The “burglar’s” account, however, appeared to be bogus. In light of the earlier CIA insistence on trying to persuade Darkazanli to become an informant, one German investigator remembered, “We all thought, ‘CIA.’ ” As of this writing, Darkazanli was reportedly still in Hamburg and at liberty (Chicago Tribune, 11/16/02).
21 Jarrah stopped Dubai/“It was”: Corbin, 179–;
22 “because his name”: McDermott, 294n3;
23 learn fly/spread Islam: Corbin, 180, McDermott, 186;
24 “What happened”: McDermott, 187.
25 item redacted: Ziad Jarrah chronology, “03009470—ACS Download Documents, Packet 6,” CF. The FBI’s “Hijackers’ Timeline [redacted]” has also been heavily censored at that point. Because the episode was first reported as having occurred in January 2001—not, as was in fact the case, in 2000—U.S. sources were initially able to deny that Jarrah had been questioned at Dubai in response to a CIA request. They also denied ever having been told about it. Vanity Fair reported in 2004 that the CIA had merely asked foreign border agencies to “question anyone [authors’ italics] who may have been returning from a training camp in Afghanistan.” While acknowledging that U.S. officials said it was untrue that Jarrah had been stopped specifically because his name was on a U.S.-supplied watchlist, investigative reporter Terry McDermott noted in 2005 that Washington had abandoned its initial denial it had been advised of about the Jarrah stop. “The United States,” McDermott wrote, “has acknowledged in internal documents and in communications with German investigators that the Emiratis did contact them.… They decline to say what they told the Emiratis” (Timeline: “Hijackers Timeline [redacted],” 11/14/03, INTELWIRE; reported as 2001: CNN, 8/1/02, McDermott, 294n3, Corbin, 179–; deny: CNN, 8/1/02, Statement of Eleanor Hill, 9/20/02, JI; McDermott: McDermott, 186, 294n3).
26 DIA/disquieting claim/four on radar: Statement of Mark Zaid, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 9/21/05, MFR 04021341, 7/13/04, CF, MFR [names & number redacted], Defense HUMINT Service Officers, Bagram Base, 10/21/03, CF; WSJ, 11/17/05, NYT, 8/9/05, 8/11/05, Fox News, 8/28/05, Lance, Triple Cross, 330–;
27 “data mining”/“use of high-powered”/visa records: Anthony Shaffer, Operation Dark Heart, NY: Thomas Dunne, 2010, 17–,164–, 245–, 272–, Bergen Record (N.J.), 8/14/05.
28 evidence destroyed: Though the Able Danger claim had not yet emerged when Congress’s Joint Inquiry was at work, its staff did question Major Keith Alexander of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, and twice visited the unit from which much of the Able Danger material reportedly originated. On both occasions, asked whether they knew of any evidence that the government had prior knowledge or should have had prior knowledge of the attack, military personnel said they knew of none.
A Defense Department report, and a Senate Intelligence Committee review, were to conclude in 2006 that the Able Danger claims were unsupported by the evidence. It is clear from both documents that witnesses’ memories were confused, as one might expect so long after the fact. Relevant documentary material that existed in 2003 now does not. Some was inadvertently destroyed during an office move. Some duplicate documentation Shaffer kept at his office, his attorney told the Committee on the Judiciary, was “apparently destroyed—for reasons unknown—by DIA in spring 2004.” The DOD report says no such documentation was found at Shaffer’s office (Joint Inquiry: corr. Miles Kara, 2011; claims unsupported: Defense report: “Alleged Misconduct by Senior DOD Officials Concerning the Able Danger Program & Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer,” U.S. Dept of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, 9/18/06; Senate review: Roberts & Rockefeller to colleagues, 12/22/06, www.intelligence.senate.gov; had Commission followed/destroyed?: Statement of Mark Zaid, Judiciary Committee, U.S. Senate, 9/21/05, Shaffer, 164–, 246–, Kean & Hamilton, 114, 294–, MFR 04021341, 7/13/04, CF).
29 Grenzfahndung: The two known to have been under border watch were Said Bahaji and Mounir Motassadeq (ints. Mounir el-Motassadeq, Motassadeq’s lawyer Udo Jacob, Dr. Manfred Murck, Dr. Herbert Müller, McDermott, 73–, 297n23, Stern [Germany], 8/13/03, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 2/2/03).
30 officials unhelpful: The two other organizations that declined interview requests were the Generalbundesanwalt, or Public Prosecutor’s Office—which has responsibility for terrorist cases—and the Bundeskriminalamt, the Federal Criminal Police Agency. The latter was the source of most German-related information in the 9/11 Commission Report.
31 Müller “Atta was”: Dr. Müller serves with the Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz Baden-Württemberg—Stuttgart is the state capital of Baden-Württemberg;
32 “Some countries”: Staff Statement 11, CO;
33 intermittent friction: Executive Summary, “Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks,” Office of the Inspector General, 06/05, Report, JI, 186–, 274–;
34 Polt: MFR 04016468, 10/9/03;
35 “They lied”: int. Dirk Laabs.
36 coded conversation: MFR 04019350, 3/18/04 (re Moussaoui team briefing), CF, corr. Kristen Wilhelm, 2011, CR, 245–530n151–152, Staff Statement 16, CO. The exchange was referred to earlier on pp. 323–24.
37 intercept by Germans?: At one stage, in 2000, the Germans had repeatedly discussed applying for clearance to wiretap the Marienstrasse apartment, but at that point decided there was insufficient evidence to justify the request. The 9/11 Commission Report states: “Only after 9/11 would it be discovered that [KSM] had communicated with a phone that was used by Binalshibh … the links to Binalshibh might not have been an easy trail to find and would have required substantial cooperation from the German government” (discussed: Vanity Fair, 11/04, NYT, 6/20/02; “Only after”: CR, 277, & see 245).
38 Berlin visit: The German officials known to have spoken with the U.S. congressional delegation were Ronald Schill, minister of the interior for Hamburg, Deputy Minister Walter Wellinghausen, Reinhard Wagner, chief of the Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz Hamburg, his deputy Manfred Murck, and Bruno Franz of the Hamburg police. (Contemporary information provided to the authors)
CHAPTER 31
1 Soon after 1:00 P.M./“Oh, Jesus”: Suskind, One Percent Doctrine, 3–, & see Tenet, 167. Tenet’s aide Michael Morell, the president’s CIA briefer, remembered of the videoconference on the afternoon of 9/11, “They had done name traces on the flight manifests. And when we got to Omaha, and we got to the briefing area, George Tenet briefed the President on the fact that we already knew three of these guys were al Qaeda.” Tenet has recalled that, when he told Bush the CIA had been aware of information about Mihdhar and Hazmi he “shot Mike Morell one of those, ‘I thought I was supposed to be the first to know’ looks.” The reference to three, as distinct from two, of the men on the planes being associated with al Qaeda presumably includes Nawaf al-Hazmi’s brother Salem (Suskind, 9; Tenet, 169).
2 manifest: Exhibit P200054, U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui,; Tenet claimed/“CIA had multiple”: Tenet, 195–, 205;
3 Tenet on oath/“like a grand”: Shenon, 256–;
4 “We just didn’t believe”/outraged: New Yorker, 11/8/04.
5 NSA identified/Hada/“hub”: Bamford, Shadow Factory, 7–, FBI report, “PENTTBOM, Summary of Captioned Investigation,” 11/5/01, authors’ collection, transcript, Nova: The Spy Factory, 2/3/09, www.pbs.org, Wright, 275–;
6 NSA did not share: Report, JI, 145, Atlantic, 12/04, Bamford, Shadow Factory, 16, 26–, & see Scheuer, Marching Toward Hell, 91–.
7 Hada phone/FBI/1998 attack/OBL phone/link: Report, JI, 129, 145, Wright, 277–, 343, Testimony of [unnamed] CIA Officer [accepted as Wilshire], 9/20/02, JI. Bin Laden stopp
ed using his satellite phone in September 1998, apparently because he knew or guessed it was being intercepted (WP, 12/22/05, Report, JI, 69).
8 1999 intercept/“Khalid”/“Nawaf”/Malaysia: The intercepted conversation also included a reference to “Salem” as making the trip, too—evidently Hazmi’s brother Salem, who was also to be one of the hijackers. Although the NSA had access to information indicating that the three first names were all linked to the surnames Hazmi and Mihdhar, they did not pass those names to the CIA and FBI—thus making the CIA’s task more difficult than it need have been (CR, 181, JI Report, 145–, 155–, Staff Statement 2, CO, Bamford, Shadow Factory, 16–).
9 “something more”: CR, 181;
10 “operational”/“operatives”: ibid., Report, JI, 144;
11 passport photographed: The Dubai stopover and the copying of Mihdhar’s passport was briefly mentioned earlier in Ch. 27, p. 319. “This is as good”: Mayer, 18;
12 Mihdhar tracked/photographed/pay phones/computers: CR, 181–, Staff Statement 2, CO, Die Zeit, 10/2/02, FBI IG;
13 directors/Berger/Clarke: Staff Statement 2, CO, CR, 181.
14 Bangkok: Staff Statement 2, CO. It would later be established that two suspects who had already, on January 6, made short trips out of Malaysia—for only a matter of hours—had also been Attash and Hazmi (Staff Statement 2, CO, CR, 159).
15 according CIA trail lost/Thai authorities responded/Jan. 15 to LA/cables: CR, 181–, FBI IG, Staff Statement 2, CO, Tenet, 196–. The two terrorists flew in aboard UA 002, arriving at 1:27 P.M. Bin Laden aide Attash had reportedly headed back to Afghanistan via Karachi to report to bin Laden (UA 002: “Hijackers Timeline [redacted],” 11/14/03, INTELWIRE; Attash: CR, 159);
16 “OBL associates”: Executive Summary, Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, Office of the Inspector General, CIA, 6/05;
17 “Action Required”: Report, JI, 147;
18 “The threat”: CR, 176, 501n17;
19 “It is important”: ibid., CTC Watchlisting Guidance, cited at Report, JI, 1;
20 CIA did not alert State/FBI: Report, JI, 40–, 144–, Executive Summary, Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, Office of the Inspector General, CIA, 6/05, FBI IG, Graham with Nussbaum, 7–, CR, 355;
21 “promised to let”: Staff Statement 2, CO;
22 “Michelle”/“to the FBI”: FBI IG, & see Executive Summary, Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, Office of the Inspector General, CIA, 6/05;
23 “James”/“as soon as”/“in the event”: Statement of Eleanor Hill, 9/20/02, JI, Report, JI, 81, FBI IG;
24 refused interview: FBI IG;
25 “Michelle” prevaricated: FBI IG;
26 Wilshire/“did not know”: ibid. In the transcript of a hearing before a U.S. Senate subcommittee, the former deputy chief’s name is rendered not as “Wilshire” but as “Wilshere.” The authors have used “Wilshire,” the spelling most commonly used. (“The Global Reach of al Qaeda,” Hearings, Subcommittee on International Operations & Terrorism, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 107th Cong., 1st Sess., 12/18/01, 7–);
27 Wilshire deliberately/draft cable/Miller CIR/“pls hold”: FBI IG, & see Executive Summary, Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, Office of the Inspector General, CIA, 6/05.
28 “Doug came”/“Is this a no go”: Bamford, Shadow Factory, 18–. In a detailed note for his book Disconnecting the Dots, due for publication in 2011, author Kevin Fenton would note that Rossini was to resign from the FBI in 2008 after breaching regulations. He had, according to an FBI press release, used Bureau computers to find out information for personal purposes. Fenton argues cogently, however, that the lapse does not detract from Rossini’s credibility on the matter of the blocked CIR. The fact of its blocking, and that the agent saw relevant cables in 2000, is well documented (Fenton, proof copy kindly shared with the authors, 2011, 44n26).
29 “unable to locate”: FBI IG;
30 Wilshire int. redacted: corr. Kristen Wilhelm, 2011.
31 Wilshire proposed: FBI IG. Wilshire’s actions in July 2001 were reportedly spurred by his review of the CIA cable and email traffic recording Mihdhar’s movements in January the previous year—including the information that Mihdhar had a valid U.S. multiple-entry visa. For reasons unknown, but perhaps because he feared discovery of the fact that he had been in the United States the previous year, Mihdhar had meanwhile obtained a new passport and a new visa in June 2001. He used this new visa when he reentered the United States on July 4. There is no evidence that Wilshire or anyone else at CIA was aware of the new passport and visa at the time the search for Mihdhar was renewed in July 2001 (Wilshire spurred: CR, 267–, FBI IG; new passport/visa: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 33–.)
32 Following a series: FBI IG, CR, 267–, & re discovered/search see Chs. 27, 28, & 29. Aside from the events described here, the CIA and the FBI disputed each other’s versions of events about the identification of Tawfiq bin Attash (referred to in the Commission Report as “Khallad”) in the Malaysia surveillance photos. The identification was made by a source the FBI and the CIA shared—a circumstance that led to a prolonged tussle between the agencies. This barely penetrable story is detailed in the Justice Department’s inspector general’s report. The bottom line is that FBI agents working the Cole investigation, who knew of Attash’s connection to that attack, would have been far more concerned—and pressed to know all the CIA knew about the Malaysia meeting—had they been told that Attash had been present. As it was, they would learn nothing of Attash’s link to Mihdhar and Hazmi until after 9/11. The CIA’s performance on this matter notwithstanding, it is evident that once the information on Mihdhar’s and Hazmi’s likely presence in the United States was passed to the Bureau in August 2001, the FBI fumbled badly. As described in Chapter 27 of this book, the agent at Bureau headquarters who processed the information misinterpreted regulations, with the result that the assignment of looking for Mihdhar and Hazmi was given to an inexperienced intelligence agent, rather than to the experienced criminal agents working the Cole investigation (FBI IG, Wright, 340–, New Yorker, 7/10 & 17/06).
33 “The weight”: Staff Statment 2, CO;
34 “that Mihdhar”: FBI IG;
35 CIA summary/acknowledged/accountability board: Executive Summary, Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, Office of the Inspector General, CIA, 6/05;
36 Goss declined/“amongst the finest”: Director’s Statement on Office of Inspector General’s Report, “CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks,” 10/6/05, www.cia.gov.
37 “excessive workload”: Executive Summary, Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, Office of the Inspector General, CIA, 6/05;
38 “nobody read”: NYT, 10/17/02;
39 “All the processes”: Report, JI, 151.
40 “It is clear”: Fenton, 311, 104. Fenton goes on to suggest that CIA officers may have been aware of the 9/11 plot and “desired the outcome we saw on our television screens.” Fenton has done an intriguing analysis, but the authors do not accept that there is sufficient evidence or rationale to accept such a heinous possibility (e.g., Fenton, 95, 239, 281, 241–, 327).
41 “good operational”: Executive Summary, Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, Office of the Inspector General, CIA, 6/05;
42 Maxwell: New Yorker, 7/10 & 17/06;
43 “They purposely”: Bamford, Pretext, 224.
44 run operations in U.S.: For evidence of the CIA having engaged in operations within the United States, readers could consult, for example, the report of the Senate committee that investigated intelligence agency abuses in the wake of the Watergate scandal. That report, published in 1976, details a number of such operations, including four mail-opening programs spanning a twenty-year period, and CHAOS, launched in 1967 to gather information that might reveal forei
gn government influence on antiwar and civil rights protesters (Final Report, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1976, 559–, 679–).
45 Yousef/“wanted to continue”/“fought”: New York, 3/27/95;
46 some Bureau agents: Wright, 312;
47 “Without penetrations”/select group: Report, JI, 388–. This was the Small Group, which typically included Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Attorney General Janet Reno, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, CIA director Tenet, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Hugh Shelton, and counterterrorism coordinator Richard Clarke (CR, 119–, 199, Shenon, 255);
48 Berger episode: unless otherwise indicated—Biography of Samuel Berger, http://clinton4.nara.gov, Investigative Summary & Exhibits, “Report of Investigation: Samuel R. Berger,” Office of the Inspector General, National Archives & Records Administration, www.fas.org, Kean & Hamilton, 183–, 297, Shenon, 1–249–, Fox News, 1/23/07;
49 MAAR/recommendations: Clarke, 215–, 219–, CR, 182, 504n78, Farmer, 41;
50 handwritten notes?: Farmer, 41;
51 “desperate”: ibid., 289;
52 “What information?”: www.usnewswire.com, 7/20/04.
53 “Michelle” “we need”: Staff Statement 2, CO;
54 “to determine”: Report, JI, 147;
55 “believed they were”: KSM SUBST. Ramzi Binalshibh was to tell reporter Yosri Fouda after 9/11, before his arrest, that “Brothers Marwan [Shehhi] and Ziad [Jarrah] were tailed by security officers throughout their reconnaissance flight from New York to California … But Allah was with them” (Fouda & Fielding, 135);