56 Cambone note: Notes of Stephen Cambone, 9/11/01, released under FOIA to Thad Anderson, www.outragedmoderates.org.
CHAPTER 32
1 “Had the hijackers”: Kean & Hamilton, 234;
2 “The terrorists”/“a sensitive”: press briefing, 9/18/01, www.defenselink.mil.
3 Iran not know re 9/11: CR, 241. Iranian contacts with al Qaeda went back at least as far as bin Laden’s time in Sudan. Up to ten of the future muscle hijackers traveled through Iran, as did Binalshibh—who said they did so because Iran did not stamp Saudi passports. Numerous al Qaeda operatives fled to Iran following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11, and members of the bin Laden family were given sanctuary there. In 2010, in what was surely a crude exercise in political mischief making, Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, claimed that 9/11 had been merely a “big fabrication” to justify U.S. actions abroad (CR, 240, trial transcript, U.S. v. Ali Mohamed, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of NY, 10/20/00, Shenon, 372, int. Thomas Joscelyn, FrontPage Magazine, 9/28/07, ABC News, 2/11/10, Newsweek, 8/19/02, Tenet, 244, The Independent [U.K.], 3/7/10);
4 “convincing evidence”: www.thedailybeast.com, 5/20/11, Daily Mail (U.K.), 5/20/11, www.newsmax.com, 5/19/11.
5 no evidence Iraq: CR, 66, Staff Statement 15, CO;
6 last-minute changes/Snell/Jacobson/De: Shenon, 398–.
7 Bandar delight/posted: press statement, 7/22/04, www.saudiembassy.net. Prince Bandar’s own name and that of his wife, Princess Haifa—whose name featured in an intriguing part of the investigators’ work, described later, in the Notes to Ch. 33—made fleeting appearances in the Report’s endnotes, but not in the text (CR, 482n66, 498n123, 557n27, 563n19);
8 “no evidence”/“problematic”/“a commitment”: CR, 171, 371–;
9 Khilewi/“A Saudi citizen”: Middle East Quarterly, 9/98, & see WP, 8/25/94, New Yorker, 10/22/01;
10 Khalifa: see Ch. 20 and related Notes, “In re search of luggage and personal belongings, Khalifa v. U.S,” 3/6/95 cited in ed. Berger, Khalifa, “Top al Qaeda Fundraiser Dead,” www.counterterrorismblog.org.
11 limousine/“high-ranking”/Prince Sultan: Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002 [author was in fact Michael Scheuer], 138–, Lance, Triple Cross, 166, “Mohammed Jamal Khalifa: Life & Death Secrets,” INTELWIRE. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8/11/00. The authors are unaware of any response by or on behalf of Prince Sultan to the report that he welcomed Khalifa home. Nor have they been able to establish that Khalifa did carry a diplomatic passport.
12 “Since 1994”/“ ’96 is the key”: New Yorker, 10/16/01;
13 Paris meeting/protection money: Complaint, Thomas Burnett et al. v. al Baraka Investment & Development et al., U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, pt. 1080, Trento, 306–, Greg Palast, The Best Democracy Money Can Buy, NY: Plume, 2004, 99–;
14 Kerrey: LAT, 6/20/04;
15 “It’s a lovely”: transcript, Frontline: “Saudi Time Bomb,” www.pbs.org;
16 Turki recalled: Time, 8/31/03, int. Turki, OnLine NewsHour: Inside the Kingdom, 1/21/02, www.pbs.org, Lacey, Inside the Kingdom, 208–, 364, Wright, 266–, 288–, Anthony Cordesman, “Saudi Security & the War on Terrorism,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 4/22/02, Bergen, 240;
17 Others say two trips: Rashid, 48 & see LAT, 6/20/04;
18 Khaksar/deal: Guardian, 3/2/03, NYT, 3/24/09 & see WP, 1/15/06;
19 Turki deny: MSNBC, 9/5/03;
20 met with OBL: Reeve, 194—citing interview with U.S. intelligence source;
21 “at least two”/“The deal was”: U.S. News & World Report, 1/6/02;
22 named the two: Henderson, formally a journalist with the BBC and the Financial Times, later named Naif and Sultan in this connection in articles in The Wall Street Journal and in a paper published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. The authors are not aware that Prince Naif or Prince Sultan has commented on the allegation (WSJ, 8/3/05, “After King Abdullah: Succession in Saudi Arabia,” Policy Focus 96, 8/09);”hundreds”/“Saudi official”: int. & corr. Simon Henderson, WSJ, 8/12/02.
23 7,000: WSJ, 2/15/11;
24 “They would go out”: MSNBC, 9/5/03 & see WP, 7/19/07;
25 “We’ve got”: U.S. News & World Report, 10/11/98;
26 “an interminable”/“Your Royal Highness”: Tenet, 106–;
27 Gore/“The United”: CR, 122.
28 “never lifted”/clerics: Baer, See No Evil, 33. The two clerics were Salman al-Awadah and Safar al-Hawali (National Review, 3/11/03, Erik Stakelback, “The Saudi Hate Machine,” 12/17/03, www.investigativeproject.org);
29 “the Saudi government”: Report, JI, 110;
30 “As one of”/“foreign enemy”: Scheuer, Marching Toward Hell, 72, 15;
31 “You’ve got to be”: Wright, 238.
32 “All the answers”: Brisard & Dasquié, xxix. The O’Neill conversation was with Jean-Charles Brisard, who began investigating terrorist finances for French intelligence in 1997. After 9/11, he became a lead investigator for the legal firm Motley Rice in connection with the civil action brought by 9/11 victims’ families against a list of Saudi-based Islamic charities, a number of financial institutions, and several members of the Saudi royal family. He provided written testimony to the U.S. Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs in 2003 (ints. Jean-Charles Brisard, Written Testimony, Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, 10/22/03, www.banking.senate.gov, Brisard & Dasquié, xxvii–, xxi).
33 longtime head: Prince Turki had resigned as GID chief, after a quarter of a century, just ten days before 9/11. The reason for the resignation remains unclear. Turki’s departure was the more striking, reportedly, because he had been confirmed in his post as recently as the end of May (Simon Henderson, “A Prince’s Mysterious Disappearance,” NPR, 10/22/10, Hamel, 237).
34 “At the instruction”: Arab News, 9/18/02. On another occasion, in a 2010 CNN interview, Prince Turki said much the same. “From my previous experience, there is a continuous exchange of information between the CIA and the Saudi security agencies” (CNN, 11/17/10);
35 GID/U.S. understanding: e.g., Cordesman, “Saudi Security”;
36 specifically/“What we told”: USA Today, 10/16/03, Salon, 10/18/03;
37 Bandar hinted: transcript of int. Bandar, Frontline: “Looking for Answers,” www.pbs.org;
38 Abdullah now king: Abdullah had succeeded to the throne in 2005, on the death of his long-ailing and incapacitated half-brother King Fahd;
39 “Saudi security”: ABC News, 11/2/07, CNN, 11/2/07;
40 “We have sent”/British deny: John Simpson int. of King Abdullah, BBC News, 10/29/07, CNN, 10/29/07;
41 denial: Wright, 448;
42 silence: Scheuer, Marching Toward Hell, 72–;
43 “There is not”: USA Today, 10/16/03.
44 Turki stood by/Badeeb: Wright, 448, 310. A Saudi security consultant, Nawaf Obaid, also told author Lawrence Wright that the terrorists’ names were passed to the CIA station chief in Riyadh. Wright believed Turki’s 2003 account, and indicated in a New Yorker article that the CIA had consulted the Saudi authorities—after learning from an intercept on the Yemen phone “hub” that Mihdhar was headed to Kuala Lumpur (Wright, 310, 376n, 448, New Yorker, 7/10 & 16/06).
45 Scheuer/“fabrication”: Scheuer, Marching Toward Hell, 72–;
46 Bandar/Commission: MFR of int. Prince Bandar, Access Restricted, Item (3 pages) withdrawn, 10/14/08, CF.
47 Turki/“I can”: corr. Kristen Wilhelm. This reply to the authors’ inquiry is known as a “Glomar Response” to a request under the Freedom of Information Act—so called after the first occasion on which it was used, when the CIA sought to prevent publication of a Los Angeles Times story on the agency’s operation to raise a sunken Soviet submarine. The U.S. ship that had been intended for use in the operation to raise the sub was called the Glomar Explorer. The Glomar Response has
been used in cases involving both national security and privacy issues (“The Glomar Response,” http://nsarchive.wordpress.com).
48 “penetrated al Qaeda”: Seattle Times, 10/29/01;
49 returned to Saudi/disclosed: Report, JI, 131–.
50 “presented with”: Staff Report, “9/11 & Terrorist Travel,” 12, 15, 37. Before 9/11, according to the Commission’s staff report on terrorist travel, neither State Department personnel processing visa applications nor immigration inspectors were aware of such indicators. Even two years after the attacks, the information had “yet to be unclassified and disseminated to the field.”
51 Commission footnote: The Commission footnote appears to distinguish the cases of Mihdhar, the Hazmi brothers, and two other hijackers from those of the other ten Saudi hijackers. This may reflect the possibility that only the passports of Mihdhar and his named comrades were marked by the Saudi authorities. Absent fuller and clearer information, it is impossible to know (CR, 563n32).
52 “contained a secret”: Bamford, Shadow Factory, 58;
53 Trento account/“We had been”: Joe Trento, “The Real Intelligence Cover-up,” 8/6/03 & Joseph Trento & Susan Trento, “The No Fly List,” 1/11/10, http://dcbureau.org, & Trento & Trento, refs., conv. Joseph Trento.
54 Kuala Lumpur “to spy”: Trento & Trento, 7–. The administrator of the Islamic Center of San Diego, whom Mihdhar and Hazmi asked for assistance following their arrival in early 2000, said after 9/11 that he had “suspected that Mihdhar might have been an intelligence agent of the Saudi government” (CR, 517n29, 220).
55 Mihdhar multiple-entry visa: Trento & Trento, 8. According to the Trentos, citing Michael Springmann, who had years earlier served as head of the visa department in the Jeddah consulate, the CIA would have known this fact even sooner—because a CIA officer in the Jeddah consulate “routinely approved visas for Saudi intelligence operatives as a courtesy” (Trento & Trento, 8—see Michael Springmann, “A Sin Concealed—the Visas for Terrorists Program,” 12/13/07, http://visasforterrorists.blogspot.com).
56 “were perceived”: Trento & Trento, 9;
57 “Many terrorists”: ibid, 187;
58 “because they were”: Joe Trento, “The Real Intelligence Cover-up,” 8/6/03, http://dcbureau.org;
59 “In fact”: Trento & Trento, 9.
60 account bumps facts?: The Trento account, for example, asserts that the “complacency” of the Bush administration in summer 2001 is explained by CIA assurances that it had high-level penetration of al Qaeda via the GID. In fact, as documented in this book, the CIA leadership was far from complacent that summer, desperately worried and telling the White House—notably Condoleezza Rice—as much (Trento & Trento, 193; see—re far from complacent—pp. 315–16).
61 “[name redacted]”: Executive Summary, Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, 6/05, www.cia.gov;
62 “hostile service”/passed to al Qaeda: Risen, State of War, 181–;
63 “On some occasions”: Report, JI, 274;
64 Rahman defense: New York, 3/27/95.
65 screen saver: The intelligence counterparts who told the CIA about bin Laden’s picture being used as a screen saver were those of Jordan—apparently in the late 1990s (Risen, 182);
66 “80% sympathetic”: The Times (London), 7/5/04.
CHAPTER 33
1 tens of thousands: Reuters, 9/11/01;
2 honked horns: transcript, Frontline: “Saudi Time Bomb,” www.pbs.org;
3 killed camels: int. of Saad al-Fagih for Frontline: “Looking for Answers,” www.pbs.org;
4 screen savers/“somebody”: int. of person in Saudi Arabia who asked to remain anonymous;
5 Ahmed/“muted”/“So, they lost”: Qanta Ahmed, 395.
6 survey/Prince Nawwaf: The survey was conducted by the Saudi GID, the intelligence service, and leaked to The New York Times a year later by a U.S. administration official. Prince Nawwaf had become GID chief following the resignation of Prince Turki. In a 2004 interview, Prince Bandar was to claim the situation was very different, that a Zogby poll “showed 91 percent of Saudis said they like America.” What the poll actually said was that 91 percent of Saudis said they had “no quarrel with the people of the United States, yet their overall impression of the American people is 70% unfavorable, 24% favorable” (leaked survey: NYT, 1/27/02, Middle East Economic Digest, 9/14/01; Bandar: int. Bandar, Meet the Press, NBC, 4/25/04).
7 “Almost unanimously”: Kean & Hamilton, 113.
8 Bandar/“not Arabs”/“My God”: New Yorker, 3/24/03;
9 Palestinians celebrating: There were numerous reports of Palestinians celebrating the attacks. It has been suggested, though, that some news footage of Palestinians supposedly celebrating 9/11 was a distortion—that it in fact showed celebration of something else. For more on the reaction to 9/11 across the Middle East, see Ch. 14, p. 154 (ed. Woods, 12);
10 “condemned”: statement, 9/11/01 cied in Cordesman, “Saudi Official Statements on Terrorism, After the Sept. 11 Attacks,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 11/01;
11 Abdullah fumed/declined/snapped/“I reject”/Bush responded: WP, 2/10/02, New Yorker, 3/24/03, Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud, 241–, Online NewsHour: Inside the Kingdom, www.pbs.org.
12 Abdullah pulled: Atlantic Monthly, 5/03, Lacey, Inside the Kingdom, 232, WP, 2/12/02. Though Saudi Arabia at the time produced only some 18 percent of the crude oil consumed by the United States, it has what other oil-producing countries do not have—the world’s only surplus production capacity. It means that world oil prices are controlled by Saudi Arabia, according to its decisions as to how much oil to make available at any given time. It had used the oil weapon in 1973, after the Yom Kippur War, by joining with other countries in cutting off the oil supply and in 1990–1991—in reverse—by increasing supply when Iraqi oil was cut off during the Gulf War (Atlantic, 2/21/08, Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 2007, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 2007, 821).
13 15 were Saudi: Newsweek, 11/19/01, New Yorker, 3/24/03;
14 “That was a”: transcript, Frontline: “House of Saud,” www.pbs.org;
15 75 royals/Caesars Palace: Las Vegas to Counterterrorism, 9/25/01, FBI documents obtained under FOIA by Judicial Watch;
16 One of OBL’s brothers: Unger, 7;
17 more than 20: e.g., re International Flight 441 from Boston, 9/17/03, “Ryan Air folder,” B70, T5, CF;
18 Prince Ahmed/yearling: Jason Levin, From the Desert to the Derby, NY: Daily Racing Form Press, 2002, 1, 15, Unger, 7, 255–;
19 unable to charter/flight on 13th: MFR of Dan Grossi, “Dan Grossi, Tampa-Lexington Flight,” B70, T5, CF, “his father or his uncle”: ibid., Unger, 9;
20 Bandar statement: press release, 9/12/01, www.saudiembassy.net;
21 Bush appointment/welcomed/cigars: Unger, 7, William Simpson, 315, New Yorker, 3/24/03;
22 assistant rang/Watson/Clarke: int. of Bandar, Meet the Press, 4/24/04, Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, 171–, MFR 04019823, 6/3/04, CR, 557, Shenon, 287;
23 photo published: Woodward, State of Denial, facing p. 274;
24 “not inclined”: corr. Jodie Steck, George W. Bush Presidential Library, 2011.
25 Florida/Kentucky flight: e.g., Unger, 7–. The confusion about the Tampa charter persisted in part because the FBI accepted, even after having been challenged by journalists, a secondhand report that Prince Ahmed’s son and his friends had driven rather than flown to Lexington, and because the Bureau’s own reports reflected confusion as to when U.S. airspace reopened to charter flights (Final Draft of response to October 2003 Vanity Fair article, “Saudi Flights,” B68, T5, CF, The Saudi Flights—A Summary, “Saudi Flights,” B6, Dan Marcus Files, CF, CTD to Counterterrorism, 9/24/03, FBI 265A-NY-280350, serial 1234567890, Vanity Fair, 10/03).
26 after airspace open: FAA Notices to Airmen [NOTAM], 1/9817, 1/9832, 1/9853, www.aopa.org, corr. Laura Brown, FAA. The records show tha
t U.S. airspace was open to almost all aircraft—including charter flights—as of 11:00 A.M. EDT on September 13. The exception was for “general aviation” flights—which, contrary to previous reporting, did not include charters such as the Tampa flight. In any event, the Tampa-to-Lexington flight took off at approximately 4:30 P.M.
27 on their way home: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, 171–, 270n49/50;
28 charter: Judicial Watch press release, 6/20/07, Counterterrorism to Boston, 9/21/01, FBI 265A-NY-280350, serial 1652;
29 watchlist: CR, 558, n31;
30 most not interviewed: CR, 557n28. It has been reported that one of those interviewed was Prince Ahmed, but there is no evidence of such an interview in FBI files thus far released (The Saudi Flights—A Summary, “Saudi Flights,” B6, Dan Marcus Files, CF).
31 agents interviewed family/Omar: FBI 302s of ints. Bin Laden family members 9/13–24/01 (inc. Omar Awadh), all in “Ryan Air folder,” B70, T5, CF.
32 Omar shared/briefly investigated: Coll, The Bin Ladens, 483–, 526–, Brisard & Dasquie, 176–, WP, 10/2/03. The group, of which Abdullah bin Laden was listed as president, was the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, or WAMY. The U.S. branch was operated by Abdullah, according to The Washington Post, until 9/11. Though it has been reported that Abdullah was on a flight with Saudis on board that departed on September 20—Ryan International 441—his name is not on the passenger list supplied by the charter company (Coll, 483–, WP, 10/2/03, passenger list in “Saudi Flights, FBI Docs., 3 of 4,” B70, T5, CF, Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, 272n94).
33 “Although”: NYT, 3/27/05;
34 “there is the existence”: CNN, 9/4/03. The reference is to the brother of Adel al Jubeir, mentioned earlier in this chapter (Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 11/07).
35 public relations firms/Another firm: The firms initially hired were Burson Marsteller and Qorvis Communications. Patton Boggs was used for the contacts with Congress. On one infamous occasion, Saudi PR maneuvers misfired. New York mayor Giuliani handed back a $10 million donation made to the Twin Towers Fund by Prince Alwaleed bin Talal in light of the press release the prince’s staff distributed following the presentation. It read: “We must address some of the issues that led to such a criminal attack. I believe the government of the United States of America should re-examine its policies in the Middle East and adopt a more balanced stance toward the Palestinian cause.… Our Palestinian brethren continue to be slaughtered at the hands of the Israelis while the world turns the other cheek.” This caused outrage in the United States. Prince Alwaleed, however, has also said: “You have to ask the simple question. Why fifteen Saudis? You can’t just say it happened by coincidence. Clearly, there’s something wrong with the way of thinking here [in Saudi Arabia], with the way people are raised” (PR firms: New Internationalist, 3/1/02, “Terrorism to End Terrorism,” fall 2001, www.prwatch.org, WP, 3/21/02, Washington Times, 12/9/04, Gold, 193; Alwaleed: Arab News, 10/14/01; Irish Times, 8/3/09, Giuliani, 374–).