36 “We feel what”: transcript, Larry King, CNN, 10/1/01;
37 Abdullah to ranch/“Yes, I”: Lacey, Inside the Kingdom, 284–, Suskind, One Percent Doctrine, 104–, Remarks by the President After Meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah, 4/25/02, posted at www.globalsecurity.org, Fox News, 4/26/02.
38 “probably” stolen: BG, 9/15/01. The spokesman, Gaafar Allagany, was to say on September 19 that two men with the same names as those of two hijackers, a Salem al-Hazmi and an Abdulaziz al-Omari, had indeed had their passports stolen over the past few years. The two cases cited by Allagany turned out to be cases of mistaken identity—there is no evidence the passports of hijackers Hazmi or Omari had been stolen. On the issue of hijackers’ identity, see also Ch. 14 and its related Notes (WP, 9/20/01, 10/7/01, Telegraph [U.K.], 9/23/01).
39 “most people”: int. of Hatoon al Fassi for Frontline: “House of Saud,” www.pbs.org;
40 “There is no proof”: Gold, 185, citing Al Hayat, 10/23/01;
41 “another power”: NYT, 10/23/01;
42 Naif/“The names”: USA Today, 2/6/02;
43 “It is enough”: Lacey, Inside the Kingdom, 231;
44 “Zionists”/“we put big”: AP, 12/5/02 citing int. Naif by Al Siyasa (Kuwait), ’Ain al Yaqeen, 11/29/02 citing same int.;
45 “We’re getting”: LAT, 10/13/01;
46 “They knew”: New Yorker, 10/16/01;
47 not allowed access: Philadelphia Inquirer, 7/30/03;
48 “dribble out”: NYT, 12/27/01.
49 blocked attempts: U.S. News & World Report, 1/6/02, Suskind, One Percent Doctrine, 109. A State Department spokesman, Richard Boucher, had said in November that Saudi Arabia had been “prominent among the countries acting against the accounts of terrorist organizations … in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1333.” The following month, however, following a visit to Saudi Arabia by Treasury Department assets control chief Richard Newcombe, it was reported that the Saudis “had balked at freezing bank accounts Washington said were linked to terrorists.” Working with the Saudis had apparently been “like pulling teeth” (Boucher: State Department briefing, 11/27/01, http://usinfo.org; Newcombe: U.S. News & World Report, 1/6/02).
50 “It doesn’t look”: BG, 3/3/02;
51 few fluent Arabic: Report, JI, 59, 245, 255, 336, 358;
52 men believed to have helped: For information not particularly cited here, see Ch. 25 and its related Notes;
53 Thumairy diplomat: Kean & Hamilton, 308;
54 “in a Western”: MFR 04019254, 4/20/04;
55 “uncertain”: MFR of int. Omar al-Bayoumi, 10/18/03, CF;
56 Bayoumi’s income: Graham with Nussbaum, 167, int. Bob Graham;
57 three-page section; Report, JI, 175–;
58 Graham re payments: Graham with Nussbaum, 24–, 167–, 224–, int. Bob Graham.
59 payments originated embassy?: The 9/11 Commission was to report that it found no evidence that Mihdhar and Hazmi received money from Basnan—or Bayoumi. The public furor around the Basnan money centered on reports that it came to the Basnans in cashier’s checks in the name of Saudi ambassador Prince Bandar’s wife, Princess Haifa. The royal couple were predictably outraged by the notion that there could have been a link between the princess and terrorists. Such payments would have been in line, a Saudi embassy spokesman said, with her normal contributions to the needy. 9/11 Commissioner John Lehman surmised that the princess simply signed checks put in front of her by radicals working in the embassy’s Islamic Affairs office. Newsweek has reported that Saudi wire transfers amounting to $20,000 were made to an individual who was featured in another terrorist case, also in connection with medical treatment for the individual’s wife. Newsweek made no mention of Princess Haifa in that regard (Commission: CR, 516n24; furor: e.g., Newsweek, 11/22/02, 12/9/02, Washington Times, 11/26/02; outraged: Fox News, 11/27/02, LAT, 11/24/02, CounterPunch, 12/3/02, Lehman: Shenon, 185; $20,000: Newsweek, 4/7/04, Daily Times [Pakistan], 8/8/08).
60 Thumairy “might be”: CR, 217;
61 Bayoumi attracted/“connections”/left country: FBI IG, Report, JI, 173;
62 Basnan came up: Report, JI, 176;
63 party: ibid., 177;
64 did more for Islam: MFR 04017541A, 11/17/03, CF;
65 “wonderful”: Newsweek, 11/22/02;
66 contact with Binalshibh: MFR 04017541A, 11/17/03, CF.
67 agent or spy: Graham with Nussbaum, 11, 24–, 168–, 224–. At least five people told the FBI they considered Bayoumi to be some sort of government agent. According to Dr. Abdussattar Shaikh, in whose San Diego home future hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar eventually rented accommodations, one of those who expressed that view was none other than Hazmi himself. In an early interview with The New York Times after 9/11, Shaikh said Hazmi and Midhar had been his friends, that their identification as hijackers was perhaps a case of stolen identities. Congressional investigators would later be startled to discover something Sheikh had certainly not revealed to the Times—and that the FBI initially sought to conceal from the investigators. Shaikh had long been an FBI informant, and had regularly shared information with a Bureau agent named Steven Butler. Butler had on occasion talked with Shaikh at home while Hazmi and Mihdhar were in a room nearby. According to the agent, Shaikh had mentioned the pair by their first names, saying that they were Saudis. That rang no alarm bells for him, Butler recalled, because “Saudi Arabia was considered an ally.” The FBI, backed up by Bush officials, refused to allow Joint Committee staff to interview Shaikh. A 9/11 Commission memorandum, identifying Shaikh only as Dr. Xxxxxxxxxxx Xxxxxx, makes it clear that 9/11 Commission staff did talk to Shaikh. The memorandum does not say whether Shaikh shared with Agent Butler his belief that Bayoumi, the man who had introduced the hijackers to San Diego, was a Saudi agent. Nor is there evidence that Commission staff queried Shaikh about inconsistencies in his story of how he first met the two future hijackers. Shaikh’s simultaneous relationship with both the two terrorists and the FBI just might have led to their being unmasked—an even more glaring might-have-been when one recalls that the CIA had early on identified both men as terrorist suspects, and known they had visas for travel to the United States—yet failed to inform the FBI (see pp. 379–80). Much remains to be explained. The former chair of Congress’s joint probe, former senator Bob Graham, accepts that the FBI may at first have tried to conceal its relationship with Shaikh simply because it was a “big embarrassment.” Graham also raised the possibility, though, that what the FBI tried to hide was that Shaikh knew something that “would be even more damaging were it revealed.” What, too, of the report in the press that Agent Butler’s interview with congressional investigators had been “explosive,” that he “had been monitoring a flow of Saudi Arabian money that wound up in the hands of the two hijackers”? Butler, an official was quoted as having said, “saw a pattern, a trail, and he told his supervisors, but it ended there.” As of 2009, Shaikh was still living in San Diego.
Because of agencies’ iron rules about the protection of informants—whatever the full story of Shaikh’s relationship with the hijackers or with the FBI—there is little likelihood of learning more about him anytime soon. He is virtually invisible in the Commission Report, not even named in the index.
Much the same applies to the Report’s handling of Ali Mohamed, a truly significant figure in the sorry story of U.S. agencies’ understanding—or lack of it—of al Qaeda. “No single agent of al Qaeda,” the author Peter Lance has written, “was more successful in compromising the U.S. intelligence community than a former Egyptian army captain turned CIA operative, Special Forces advisor, and FBI informant” than former Egyptian army major Mohamed. “Mohamed succeeded in penetrating the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, while simultaneously training the cell that blew up the World Trade Center in 1993. He went on to train Osama bin Laden’s personal bodyguard, and photographed the U.S. embassy in Kenya—taking the surveillance pictures bin Laden himself u
sed to target the [1998] suicide truck bomb.”
Though beyond the scope of this book, there is much more to this labyrinthine tale. While the August 6, 2001, CIA brief delivered to President Bush did not mention Mohamed by name, it was shot through with references to him. He was that summer due to be sentenced for his crimes, having pled guilty to multiple terrorist offenses, including his role in the embassy bombings. FBI agent Jack Cloonan, who interviewed Mohamed in prison after 9/11, had the eerie sense that he “knew every detail” of the attacks, in spite of having been in custody for years. As of 2006, though reportedly still a prisoner at an unknown location, Mohamed had yet to be sentenced. There is just one reference to him in the 9/11 Commission Report—and no mention of his relationship with U.S. intelligence agencies (Hazmi view: MFR [unnumbered], 4/23/04, CF; Times interview: NYT, 10/24/01; investigators startled: Graham with Nussbaum, 159–, ints. Bob Graham, Eleanor Hill; informant/Butler talked: FBI IG, Report, JI, 162, “Conspiracy Theories: The Intelligence Breakdown,” www.cbc.ca; “ally”: Report, JI, 162; FBI refused: Joint Inquiry, Report, 3, Graham with Nussbaum, 162; Bush officials: “Bush Should Cry Uncle and Release Saudi Info,” 6/28/03, www.opednews.com, Report, JI, 3; Commission memorandum: MFR [unnumbered], 4/23/04, CF; inconsistencies: CR, 517n28; might-have-been: Report, JI, 19–; “big embarrassment”/“did know”: Graham with Nussbaum, 166; “explosive”/“monitoring”: U.S. News & World Report, 11/29/02; Shaikh 2009: Miriam Raftery, “Abdussattar Shaikh, Co-Founder of San Diego’s Islamic Center, Honored for 50 Years of Service Promoting Religious Tolerance,” 10/8/09, www.eastcountymagazine.org; “No single”: “A Conversation with Peter Lance,” 12/06, www.internetwritingjournal.com & see Wright, 179–, Bergen, OBL I Know, 142–; Aug. 6 brief: J. M. Berger, “What the Commission Missed,” 10/4/06, www.intelwire.com; “knew every”: ibid.; pled guilty: J. M Berger, ed., Ali Mohamed Sourcebook, INTELWIRE, 2006, 311; unknown location/yet to be sentenced: Bergen, OBL I Know, 433, Scott, 348n28, 157, 159; one reference: CR, 68 & see Staff Report, ”9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 57).
68 “incontrovertible”: Report, JI, 395. The document, which Graham dated as August 2, 2002, is partially cited in Congress’s Joint Inquiry Report in a passage about a CIA memo that cited “incontrovertible evidence that there is support for these terrorists [words redacted].” The Report goes on to state that “it is also possible that further investigation of these allegations could reveal legitimate, and innocent, explanations for these associations.” Senator Graham cast doubt on an FBI finding that Bayoumi and Basnan were neither agents nor accomplices in the 9/11 plot. Former Saudi ambassador Bandar, for his part, described reports that Bayoumi was a Saudi agent as “baseless” (Graham with Nussbaum, 169, 224–, 11n, Bandar press release, “Bayoumi is not a government agent,” 7/23/03, www.saudiembassy.net).
69 Commission interviews: e.g., MFR 04019365, 2/24/04;
70 Thumairy “deceptive”/denied/prompted/second interview/“say bad”/“implausible”: Snell, De, & Jacobson to Zelikow, 2/25/04, MFR 04019362, 2/23/04, CF;
71 Bayoumi favorable/stuck to story: Shenon, 309–, MFR of int. Omar al-Bayoumi, 10/18/03, CF;
72 Zelikow think not agent: Zelikow to Shenon, 10/18/07, www.philipshenon.com;
73 distinguishing mark: CR, 516n19;
74 salary approved/picture found: Report, JI, 174 & see Staff Statement 16, DOCEX 199-HQ-1361032, “Hijacker Primary Docs, PENTTBOM Memo re CD found,” B50, T5, CF;
75 “cleansed”/“deceptive”: MFR 04019367, 2/24/04, Snell, De, & Jacobson to Zelikow, 2/25/04, CF;
76 “the witness’ utter”: MFR int. of Osama Basnan, 10/22/03, CF.
77 Hussayen/Mosques/in States: WSJ, 2/10/03. In October 2001 the FBI began an investigation of Hussayen’s nephew Sami. He eventually became the first person to be charged under the broadened “material support” for terrorism provisions of the then new USA Patriot Act. The government sought to prove that Hussayen used his expertise as an Internet “webmaster” to further the cause of terrorists and promote violent jihad. The hard drive of a computer he had used, according to an agent’s testimony, contained “thousands” of photographs, of the World Trade Center, of the Pentagon, and of planes hitting buildings. Sami Hussayen was eventually found not guilty and returned to Saudi Arabia (Second Superceding Indictment, U.S. v. Sami Omar al Hussayen, U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho, AP, 3/12/03, Dept. of Justice press release, “Indictments Allege Illegal Financial Transfers to Iraq; Visa Fraud Involving Assistance to Groups that Advocate Violence,” 2/26/03, www.usdoj.gov, Seattle Times, 11/22/04).
78 Marriott Sept. 10/“muttering”/Paramedics/“faking”/kitchenette/“I don’t”: MFR 04017480, 10/9/03, MFR 04017486, 10/9/03, MFR 04017482, 10/9/03, MFR 04019354, CF, WSJ, 2/10/03, Telegraph (U.K.), 10/2/03, WP, 10/2/03, 3/12/03;
79 Aulaqi contact/move: See pp. 291–92;
80 son of minister: Dallas Morning News, 12/25/09;
81 preached Capitol: NYT, 5/8/10, Fox News, 11/11/10;
82 lunched Pentagon: NY Daily News, 10/21/10;
83 remained U.S.: WSJ, 2/10/03, ABC News, 11/30/09;
84 phone number/Binalshibh: Report, JI, 178;
85 Fort Hood/Detroit bomb/Times Square/cargo planes: Christian Science Monitor, 5/19/10, Fox News, 10/20/10, CNN, 1/7/10, Guardian (U.K.), 10/31/10, MSNBC, 11/1/10;
86 capture or kill: Christian Science Monitor, 5/19/10, NYT, 4/6/10;
87 “loose end”: McClatchy News, 11/21/09.
88 “that the Saudis”: int. Bob Graham.
89 “persuasive evidence”/“did not find”: Zelikow to Shenon, 10/18/07, www.philipshenon.com. The Commission, according to its Report, believed that al Qaeda likely did have “agents” in California, “one or more individuals informed in advance” of Mihdhar and Hazmi’s arrival. During their research, the authors also saw information suggesting that hijacker leader Mohamed Atta had contact in Florida with one or more wealthy Saudis. A senior law enforcement officer in Florida told the authors—on condition that he not be identified—that he was personally involved after 9/11 in investigating the activities of “a man married into one of the Saudi ruling families.” Until his sudden departure on August 30, 2001, the man had lived not far from Venice, where Atta, Shehhi, and Jarrah had trained to fly. The information gathered convinced the authors’ source that the three future hijackers visited the man’s house, where alcohol and women were made available. The authors have also seen a lengthy taped interview with a former Venice Yellow Cab driver named Bob Simpson. Simpson described having picked up a “wealthy Saudi businessman” at Orlando Executive Airport and later that day having taken him to an apartment building where he had previously picked up Mohamed Atta. After 9/11, Simpson said, the FBI questioned him about the Saudi. Simpson did work for Yellow Cab in 2001, but the authors’ efforts to trace him were unsuccessful (“agents”: CR, 215; Simpson: videotape & transcript in the collection of Daniel Hopsicker).
90 page 395: Report, JI, 395–;
91 CIA not obstruct: corr. office of Bob Graham, 2009;
92 Bush himself: ibid., Graham with Nussbaum, 228, 215–, 231, NYT, 6/24/09, Salon, 9/8/04;
93 Pelosi: CNN, 7/30/03;
94 “I went back”: Nation, 7/29/03.
95 should be made public: Prince Bandar, then ambassador to Washington, said in 2003 that there was nothing to hide, and Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal said it was an “outrage to any sense of fairness that 28 blank pages are now considered substantial evidence to proclaim the guilt of a country.” The Saudis, it was suggested, saw publication of the classified material as “a chance to clear their Kingdom’s name.” Senator Graham did not buy it. “It seemed to me,” he has written, “that George W. Bush and Prince Bandar were performing a sort of good cop–bad cop routine, in which Prince Bandar got to claim innocence of behalf of Saudi Arabia, while George W. Bush protected him by being the bad cop who wouldn’t release troubling information” (Bandar: “Saudi Ambassador Responds to
Reports of Saudi Involvement in 9/11,” 7/24/03, www.saudiembassy.net; “outrage”: AP, 7/29/03; “a chance”: AP, 7/30/03; “It seemed”: Graham with Nussbaum, 228–).
96 “I can’t tell you”: int. Eleanor Hill;
97 leaks/details/“central figure”/“very direct”/“cannot be”/Graham/“apparent”: Newsweek, 2/3/03, LAT, 8/2/03, Shenon, 50–, 308–, AP, 7/27/03, NYT, 8/1/03;
98 Zubaydah waterboarded June/July: int. of CIA OIG John Helgerson, Der Spiegel, 8/31/09, “Yoo’s Legal Memos Gave Bush Retroactive Cover for Torture,” 2/23/09, http://pubrecord.org, BBC News, 7/13/09.
99 Kiriakou/Zubaydah: As reported, what Kuriakou learned about Zubaydah’s references to the princes came to him not firsthand but from those reading the cable traffic. For that reason and because of the passage of time, he told the authors, he is today unsure whether the Zubaydah/princes element first surfaced during interrogation or because he was questioned about something found in the journal Zubaydah had kept.