By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the enemy from anticipating his purpose.
38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him. He carries his men deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand.
39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and none knows whither he is going.
Tu Mu says: “The army is only cognisant of orders to advance or retreat; it is ignorant of the ulterior ends of attacking and conquering.”
40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:—this may be termed the business of the general.
Sun Tzu means that after mobilisation there should be no delay in aiming a blow at the enemy’s heart. Note how he returns again and again to this point [see paragraph 23 above]. Among the warring states of ancient China, desertion was no doubt a much more present fear and serious evil than it is in the armies of to-day.
41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground;
Chang Yü says: “One must not be hide-bound in interpreting the rules for the nine varieties of ground.”
the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the fundamental laws of human nature: these are things that must most certainly be studied.
42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that penetrating deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means dispersion.
43. When you leave your own country behind, and take your army across neighbouring territory, you find yourself on critical ground.
This “ground” is cursorily mentioned in chapter VIII, paragraph 2, but it does not figure among the nine situations of this chapter or the six kinds of terrain in chapter X. One’s first impulse would be to translate it [as] “distant ground” (. . . in the sense of “distant lands”), but this . . . is precisely what is not meant here. Mei Yao-ch’ên says it is “a position not far enough advanced to be called ‘facile,’ and not near enough to home to be called ‘dispersive,’ but something between the two.”
That, of course, does not explain the name, which seems to imply that the general has severed his communications and temporarily cut himself off from his base. Thus, Wang Hsi says: “It is ground separated from home by an interjacent state, whose territory we have had to cross in order to reach it. Hence it is incumbent on us to settle our business there quickly.” He adds that this position is of rare occurrence, which is the reason why it is not included among the six kinds of terrain.
When there are means of communication on all four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways.
44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. When you penetrate but a little way, it is facile ground.
45. When you have the enemy’s strongholds on your rear, and narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground.
46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity of purpose.
This end, according to Tu Mu, is best attained by remaining on the defensive, and avoiding battle.
On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection between all parts of my army.
As Tu Mu says, the object is to guard against two possible contingencies: “(1) the desertion of our own troops; (2) a sudden attack on the part of the enemy.” Mei Yao-ch’ên says: “On the march, the regiments should be in close touch; in an encampment, there should be continuity between the fortifications.”
47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear.
This is Ts’ao Kung’s interpretation. Chang Yü adopts it, saying: “We must quickly bring up our rear, so that head and tail may both reach the goal.” That is, they must not be allowed to straggle up a long way apart. Mei Yao-ch’ên offers another equally plausible explanation: “Supposing the enemy has not yet reached the coveted position, and we are behind him, we should advance with all speed in order to dispute its possession.” . . .
Ch’ên Hao, on the other hand, assuming that the enemy has had time [to] select his own ground, quotes [Sun Tzu’s admonition] against coming exhausted to the attack. His own idea of the situation is rather vaguely expressed: “If there is a favourable position lying in front of you, detach a picked body of troops to occupy it; then if the enemy, relying on their numbers, come up to make a fight for it, you may fall quickly on their rear with your main body, and victory will be assured.” It was thus, he adds, that Chao Shê beat the army of Ch’in.
48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defences.
As Wang Hsi says, “fearing a surprise attack.”
On ground of intersecting highways, I would consolidate my alliances.
49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of supplies.
The commentators take this as referring to forage and plunder, not, as one might expect, to an unbroken communication with a home base.
On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road.
[Ts’ao Kung puts it thus:] “Pass away from it in all haste.”
50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat.
[Mêng Shih says:] “To make it seem that I mean to defend the position, whereas my real intention is to burst suddenly through the enemy’s lines.” [Mei Yao-ch’ên says:] “In order to make my soldiers fight with desperation.” [Wang Hsi says:] “Fearing lest my men be tempted to run away.” Tu Mu points out that this [injunction] is the converse of chapter VII, paragraph 36, where it is the enemy who is surrounded.
In 532 A.D., Kao Huan, afterwards Emperor and canonised as Shên-wu, was surrounded by a great army under Êrh-chu Chao and others. His own force was comparatively small, consisting only of 2000 horse and something under 30,000 foot. The lines of investment had not been drawn very closely together, gaps being left at certain points. But Kao Huan, instead of trying to escape, actually made a shift to block all the remaining outlets himself by driving into them a number of oxen and donkeys roped together. As soon as his officers and men saw that there was nothing for it but to conquer or die, their spirits rose to an extraordinary pitch of exaltation, and they charged with such desperate ferocity that the opposing ranks broke and crumbled under their onslaught.
On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving their lives.
Tu Yu says: “Burn your baggage and impedimenta, throw away your stores and provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your cooking-stoves, and make it plain to your men that they cannot survive, but must fight to the death.” Mei Yao-ch’ên says epigrammatically: “The only chance of life lies in giving up all hope of it.” This concludes what Sun Tzu has to say about “grounds” and the “variations” responding to them.
Reviewing the passages which bear on this important subject, we cannot fail to be struck by the desultory and unmethodical fashion in which it is treated. Sun Tzu begins abruptly in chapter VIII, paragraph 2, to enumerate “variations” before touching on “grounds” at all, but only mentions five, namely nos. 5, 7, 8 and 9 of the subsequent list, and one that is not included in it. A few varieties of ground are dealt with in the earlier portion of chapter IX, and then chapter X sets forth six new grounds, with six variations of plan to match. None of these is mentioned again [until] at last, in chapter XI, we come to the Nine Grounds par excellence, immediately followed by the variations. . . .
Though it is impossible to account for the present state of Sun Tzu’s text, a few suggestive facts may be brought into prominence: (1) chapter VIII, according to the title, should deal with nine variations, whereas only five appear. (2) It is an abnormally short chapter. (3) Chapter XI is entitled The Nine Grounds. Several of these are defined twice over, besides which there are two distinct lists of the corresponding variations. (4) The length of the chapter is disproportionate, being double that of any other except IX. I
do not propose to draw any inferences from these facts, beyond the general conclusion that Sun Tzu’s work cannot have come down to us in the shape in which it left his hands: chapter VIII is obviously defective and probably out of place, while XI seems to contain matter that has either been added by a later hand or ought to appear elsewhere.
51. For it is the soldier’s disposition to offer an obstinate resistance when surrounded, to fight hard when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he has fallen into danger.
[Chang Yü] alludes to the conduct of Pan Ch’ao’s devoted followers in 73 A.D.: “When Pan Ch’ao arrived at Shan-shan, Kuang, the King of the country, received him at first with great politeness and respect; but shortly afterwards his behaviour underwent a sudden change, and he became remiss and negligent. Pan Ch’ao spoke about this to the officers of his suite: ‘Have you not noticed,’ he said, ‘that Kuang’s polite intentions are on the wane? This must signify that envoys have come from the Northern barbarians, and that consequently he is in a state of indecision, not knowing with which side to throw in his lot. That surely is the reason. The truly wise man, we are told, can perceive things before they have come to pass; how much more, then, those that are already manifest!’ Thereupon he called one of the natives who had been assigned to his service, and set a trap for him, saying: ‘Where are those envoys from the Hsiung-nu who arrived some days ago?’
“The man was so taken aback that between surprise and fear he presently blurted out the whole truth. Pan Ch’ao, keeping his informant carefully under lock and key, then summoned a general gathering of his officers, thirty-six in all, and began drinking with them. When the wine had mounted into their heads a little, he tried to rouse their spirit still further by addressing them thus: ‘Gentlemen, here we are in the heart of an isolated region, anxious to achieve riches and honour by some great exploit. Now it happens that an ambassador from the Hsiung-nu arrived in this kingdom only a few days ago, and the result is that the respectful courtesy extended towards us by our royal host has disappeared. Should this envoy prevail upon him to seize our party and hand us over to the Hsiung-nu, our bones will become food for the wolves of the desert. What are we to do?’ With one accord, the officers replied, ‘Standing as we do in peril of our lives, we will follow our commander through life and death.’ ” For the sequel of this adventure, see chapter XII, paragraph 1, note.
52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighbouring princes until we are acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides.
These sentences are repeated from chapter VII, paragraphs 12-14—in order to emphasise their importance, the commentators seem to think. I prefer to regard them as interpolated here in order to form an antecedent to the following words. With regard to local guides, Sun Tzu might have added that there is always the risk of going wrong, either through their treachery or some misunderstanding . . . : Hannibal, we are told, ordered a guide to lead him into the neighbourhood of Casinum, where there was an important pass to be occupied; but his Car- thaginian accent, unsuited to the pronunciation of Latin names, caused the guide to understand Casilinum instead of Casinum, and turning from his proper route, he took the army in that direction, the mistake not being discovered until they had almost arrived.
This mistake almost cost Hannibal his army: The troops were hemmed in by the mountains on either side of the route to Casilinum. The Roman commander, Fabius, figured he had Hannibal trapped. But in one of military history’s greatest ruses, Hannibal, in a tactic similar to what T’ien Tan had used in China some sixty years earlier, took advantage of the cover of night, disguised cattle with fire to surprise and terrify his enemy, and escaped. See the note for chapter IX, paragraph 24. DG
53. To be ignorant of any one of the following four or five principles does not befit a warlike prince.
“One who rules by force,” was a term specially used for those princes who established their hegemony over other feudal states. The famous “warlike princes” of the 7th century B.C. were (1) Duke Huan of Ch’i, (2) Duke Wên of Chin, (3) Duke Hsiang of Sung, (4) Prince Chuang of Ch’u, and (5) Duke Mu of Ch’in. Their reigns covered the period 685-591 B.C.
54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy’s forces. He overawes his opponents, and their allies are prevented from joining against him.
Mei Yao-ch’ên constructs one of the chains of reasoning that are so much affected by the Chinese: “In attacking a powerful state, if you can divide her forces, you will have a superiority in strength; if you have a superiority in strength, you will overawe the enemy; if you overawe the enemy, the neighbouring states will be frightened; and if the neighbouring states are frightened, the enemy’s allies will be prevented from joining her.” . . .
Ch’ên Hao and Chang Yü take the sentence in quite another way. The former says: “Powerful though a prince may be, if he attacks a large state, he will be unable to raise enough troops, and must rely to some extent on external aid; if he dispenses with this, and with overweening confidence in his own strength, simply tries to intimidate the enemy, he will surely be defeated.” Chang Yü puts his view thus: “If we recklessly attack a large state, our own people will be discontented and hang back. But if (as will then be the case) our display of military force is inferior by half to that of the enemy, the other chieftains will take fright and refuse to join us.”
In seizing a state, the usurper ought to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke, so as not to have to repeat them daily. Thus, by not unsettling men, he will be able to reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does otherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to keep the knife in his hand.
Noccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (1532)
55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, nor does he foster the power of other states. He carries out his own secret designs, keeping his antagonists in awe.
The train of thought [according to Li Ch’üan] appears to be this: Secure against a combination of his enemies, “he can afford to reject entangling alliances and simply pursue his own secret designs, his prestige enabling him to dispense with external friendships.”
Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms.
This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch’in State became a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy by which the famous Six Chancellors gradually paved the way for her final triumph under Shih Huang Ti. Chang Yü, following up his previous note, thinks that Sun Tzu is condemning this attitude of cold-blooded selfishness and haughty isolation. He again refers to the warlike prince once more, thus making it appear that in the end he is bound to succumb.
56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule,
Wu Tzu less wisely says: “Let advance be richly rewarded and retreat be heavily punished.”
issue orders without regard to previous arrangements;
“In order to prevent treachery,” says Wang Hsi. The general meaning is made clear by Ts’ao Kung’s quotations from the Ssu-ma Fa [a military treatise thought to be from the 6th century B.C.]: “Give instructions only on sighting the enemy; give rewards only when you see deserving deeds.” . . . Ts’ao Kung’s paraphrase I take to mean: “The final instructions you give to your army should not correspond with those that have been previously posted up.” Chang Yü simplifies this into “your arrangements should not be divulged beforehand.” And Chia Lin says: “There should be no fixity in your rules and arrangements.” Not only is there danger in letting your plans be known, but war often necessitates the entire reversal of them at the last moment.
and you will be able to handle a
whole army as though you had to do with but a single man.
57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know your design.
Literally, “do not tell them words”; i.e., do not give your reasons for any order. Lord Mansfield once told a junior colleague to “give no reasons” for his decisions, and the maxim is even more applicable to a general than to a judge. Capt. Calthrop translates this sentence with beautiful simplicity: “Orders should direct the soldiers.” That is all.
William Murray, first Earl of Mansfield (1705-1793) was a British chief justice known for his unpopular prosecutions of rebel Irish lords and certain libel cases, which led to the burning of his home during the Gordon Riots. DG
When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them nothing when the situation is gloomy.
58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; plunge it into desperate straits, and it will come off in safety.