These words of Sun Tzu were once quoted by Han Hsin in explanation of the tactics he employed in one of his most brilliant battles. . . . In 204 B.C., he was sent against the army of Chao, and halted ten miles from the mouth of the Ching-hsing pass, where the enemy had mustered in full force. Here, at midnight, he detached a body of 2000 light cavalry, every man of which was furnished with a red flag. Their instructions were to make their way through narrow defiles and keep a secret watch on the enemy. “When the men of Chao see me in full flight,” Han Hsin said, “they will abandon their fortifications and give chase. This must be the sign for you to rush in, pluck down the Chao standards and set up the red banners of Han in their stead.”
Turning then to his other officers, he remarked: “Our adversary holds a strong position, and is not likely to come out and attack us until he sees the standard and drums of the commander-in-chief, for fear I should turn back and escape through the mountains.” So saying, he first of all sent out a division consisting of 10,000 men, and ordered them to form in line of battle with their backs to the River Ti. Seeing this manœuvre, the whole army of Chao broke into loud laughter.
By this time it was broad daylight, and Han Hsin, displaying the generalissimo’s flag, marched out of the pass with drums beating, and was immediately engaged by the enemy. A great battle followed, lasting for some time; until at length Han Hsin and his colleague Chang Ni, leaving drums and banner on the field, fled to the division on the river bank, where another fierce battle was raging. The enemy rushed out to pursue them and to secure the trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of men; but the two generals succeeded in joining the other army, which was fighting with the utmost desperation. The time had now come for the 2000 horsemen to play their part.
As soon as they saw the men of Chao following up their advantage, they galloped behind the deserted walls, tore up the enemy’s flags and replaced them by those of Han. When the Chao army turned back from the pursuit, the sight of these red flags struck them with terror. Convinced that the Hans had got in and overpowered their king, they broke up in wild disorder, every effort of their leader to stay the panic being in vain. Then the Han army fell on them from both sides and completed the rout, killing a great number and capturing the rest, amongst whom was King Ya himself. . . .
After the battle, some of Han Hsin’s officers came to him and said: “In The Art of War, we are told to have a hill or tumulus on the right rear, and a river or marsh on the left front. [This appears to be a blend of Sun Tzu and T’ai Kung. See chapter IX, paragraph 9, and note.] You, on the contrary, ordered us to draw up our troops with the river at our back. Under these conditions, how did you manage to gain the victory?”
The general replied, “I fear you gentlemen have not studied The Art of War with sufficient care. Is it not written there: ‘Plunge your army into desperate straits and it will come off in safety; place it in deadly peril and it will survive’? Had I taken the usual course, I should never have been able to bring my colleagues round. What says the Military Classic?—‘Swoop down on the market-place and drive the men off to fight’ [This passage does not appear in the present text of The Art of War]. If I had not placed my troops in a position where they were obliged to fight for their lives, but had allowed each man to follow his own discretion, there would have been a general débandade, and it would have been impossible to do anything with them.” The officers admitted the force of his argument, and said, “These are higher tactics than we should have been capable of.”
59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm’s way that it is capable of striking a blow for victory.
Danger has a bracing effect.
60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves to the enemy’s purpose.
Ts’ao Kung says: “Feign stupidity”—by an appearance of yielding and falling in with the enemy’s wishes. Chang Yü’s note makes the meaning clear: “If the enemy shows an inclination to advance, lure him on to do so; if he is anxious to retreat, delay on purpose that he may carry out his intention.” The object is to make him remiss and contemptuous before we deliver our attack.
61. By persistently hanging on the enemy’s flank, we shall succeed in the long run in killing the commander-in-chief.
[The last is] always a great point with the Chinese.
62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning.
63. On the day that you take up your command, block the frontier passes, destroy the official tallies,
[The official tallies were] used at city-gates and on the frontier. They were tablets of bamboo or wood, one half of which was issued as a permit or passport by the official in charge of a gate. When this half was returned to him, within a fixed period, he was authorised to open the gate and let the traveller through.
Not unlike our passports and visas for visiting other countries today.
DG
and stop the passage of all emissaries.
Either to or from the enemy’s country.
64. Be stern in the council-chamber,
Show no weakness, and insist on your plans being ratified by the sovereign.
so that you may control the situation.
Mei Yao-ch’ên . . . understands the whole sentence to mean: Take the strictest precautions to ensure secrecy in your deliberations.
65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in.
66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear, and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground.
Ch’ên Hao’s explanation . . . is clear enough: “If I manage to seize a favourable position, but the enemy does not appear on the scene, the advantage thus obtained cannot be turned to any practical account. He who intends, therefore, to occupy a position of importance to the enemy, must begin by making an artful appointment, so to speak, with his antagonist, and cajole him into going there as well.”
Mei Yao-ch’ên explains that this “artful appointment” is to be made through the medium of the enemy’s own spies, who will carry back just the amount of information that we choose to give them. Then, having cunningly disclosed our intentions, “we must manage, though starting after the enemy, to arrive before him” (chapter VII, paragraph 4). We must start after him in order to ensure his marching thither; we must arrive before him in order to capture the place without trouble.
67. Walk in the path defined by rule,
[The Chinese character] stands for “a marking-line,” hence a rule of conduct [following the rules of the philosopher Mencius]. Ts’ao Kung explains it by the similar metaphor “square and compasses.” The baldness of the sentiment rather inclines me to favour the reading adopted by Chia Lin, . . . which yields an exactly opposite sense, namely: “Discard hard and fast rules.”
Chia Lin says: “Victory is the only thing that matters, and this cannot be achieved by adhering to conventional canons.” It is unfortunate that this variant rests on very slight authority, for the sense yielded is certainly much more satisfactory. Napoleon, as we know, according to the veterans of the old school whom he defeated, won his battles by violating every accepted canon of warfare.
and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle.
Tu Mu says: “Conform to the enemy’s tactics until a favourable opportunity offers; then come forth and engage in a battle that shall prove decisive.”
68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose you.
As the hare is noted for its extreme timidity, the comparison hardly appears felicitous. But of course Sun Tzu was thinking only of its speed. The words have been taken to mean: You must flee from the enemy as quickly as an escaping hare; but this is rightly rejected by Tu Mu.
XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE
I love the smell of napalm in the morning.
Lt. Col. Bill Kilgore in Apocalypse Now, screenplay by Joh
n Milius (1976)
Rather more than half the chapter (paragraphs 1-13) is devoted to the subject of fire, after which the author branches off into other topics.
1. Sun Tzu said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first is to burn soldiers in their camp;
Li Ch’üan says: “Set fire to the camp, and kill the soldiers” (when they try to escape from the flames). Pan Ch’ao, sent on a diplomatic mission to the King of Shan-shan [see chapter XI, paragraph 51, note], found himself placed in extreme peril by the unexpected arrival of an envoy from the Hsiung-nu [the mortal enemies of the Chinese]. In consultation with his officers, he exclaimed: “Never venture, never win! [Otherwise translated: Unless you enter the tiger’s lair, you cannot get hold of the tiger’s cubs.] The only course open to us now is to make an assault by fire on the barbarians under cover of night, when they will not be able to discern our numbers. Profiting by their panic, we shall exterminate them completely; this will cool the King’s courage and cover us with glory, besides ensuring the success of our mission.”
“The officers all replied that it would be necessary to discuss the matter first with the Intendant. Pan Ch’ao then fell into a passion: ‘It is to-day,’ he cried, ‘that our fortunes must be decided! The Intendant is only a humdrum civilian, who on hearing of our project will certainly be afraid, and everything will be brought to light. An inglorious death is no worthy fate for valiant warriors!’ All then agreed to do as he wished.
“Accordingly, as soon as night came on, he and his little band quickly made their way to the barbarian camp. A strong gale was blowing at the time. Pan Ch’ao ordered ten of the party to take drums and hide behind the enemy’s barracks, it being arranged that when they saw flames shoot up, they should begin drumming and yelling with all their might. The rest of his men, armed with bows and crossbows, he posted in ambuscade at the gate of the camp. He then set fire to the place from the windward side, whereupon a deafening noise of drums and shouting arose on the front and rear of the Hsiung-nu, who rushed out pell-mell in frantic disorder. Pan Ch’ao slew three of them with his own hand, while his companions cut off the heads of the envoy and thirty of his suite. The remainder, more than a hundred in all, perished in the flames.
“On the following day, Pan Ch’ao went back and informed Kuo Hsün [the Intendant] of what he had done. The latter was greatly alarmed and turned pale. But Pan Ch’ao, divining his thoughts, said with uplifted hand: ‘Although you did not go with us last night, I should not think, Sir, of taking sole credit for our exploit.’ This satisfied Kuo Hsün, and Pan Ch’ao, having sent for Kuang, King of Shan-shan, showed him the head of the barbarian envoy. The whole kingdom was seized with fear and trembling, which Pan Ch’ao took steps to allay by issuing a public proclamation. Then, taking the king’s son as hostage, he returned to make his report to Tou Ku.”
the second is to burn stores;
Tu Mu says: “Provisions, fuel and fodder.” In order to subdue the rebellious population of Kiangnan, Kao Kêng recommended Wên Ti of the Sui dynasty to make periodical raids and burn their stores of grain, a policy which in the long run proved entirely successful.
the third is to burn baggage-trains;
An example given is the destruction of Yüan Shao’s waggons and impediments by Ts’ao Ts’ao in 200 A.D.
the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines; the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy.
No fewer than four totally diverse explanations of this sentence are given by the commentators, not one of which is quite satisfactory. . . . The interpretation which I have adopted is that given by Tu Yu . . . : “To drop fire into the enemy’s camp. The method by which this may be done is to set the tips of arrows alight by dipping them into a brazier, and then shoot them from powerful crossbows into the enemy’s lines.”
2. In order to carry out an attack with fire, we must have means available.
Ts’ao Kung thinks that [“means” indicates] “traitors in the enemy’s camp.” . . . But Ch’ên Hao is more likely to be right in saying: “We must have favourable circumstances in general, not merely traitors to help us.” Chia Lin says: “We must avail ourselves of wind and dry weather.”
The material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness.
[The Chinese character] is explained by Ts’ao Kung as “appliances for making fire.” Tu Mu suggests “dry vegetable matter, reeds, brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc.” . . . Chang Yü says: “vessels for hoarding fire, stuff for lighting fires.”
3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special days for starting a conflagration.
A fire must not be begun “recklessly” or “at haphazard.”
4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days are those when the moon is in the constellation of the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing or the Cross-bar; for these four are all days of rising wind.
These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th, 27th, and 28th of the Twenty-eight Stellar Mansions, corresponding roughly to Sagittarius, Pegasus, Crater and Corvus.
5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible developments:
6. (1) When fire breaks out inside the enemy’s camp, respond at once with an attack from without.
7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy’s soldiers remain quiet, bide your time and do not attack.
The prime object of attacking with fire is to throw the enemy into confusion. If this effect is not produced, it means that the enemy is ready to receive us. Hence the necessity for caution.
8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it up with an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are.
Ts’ao Kung says: “If you see a possible way, advance; but if you find the difficulties too great, retire.”
9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from without, do not wait for it to break out within, but deliver your attack at a favourable moment.
Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs had reference to the fire breaking out (either accidentally, we may suppose, or by the agency of incen-diaries) inside the enemy’s camp. “But,” he continues, “if the enemy is settled in a waste place littered with quantities of grass, or if he has pitched his camp in a position which can be burnt out, we must carry our fire against him at any seasonable opportunity, and not wait on in hopes of an outbreak occurring within, for fear our opponents should themselves burn up the surrounding vegetation, and thus render our own attempts fruitless.”
The famous Li Ling once baffled the leader of the Hsiung-nu in this way. The latter, taking advantage of a favourable wind, tried to set fire to the Chinese general’s camp, but found that every scrap of combustible vegetation in the neighbourhood had already been burnt down.
On the other hand, Po-ts’ai, a general of the Yellow Turban rebels, was badly defeated in 184 A.D. through his neglect of this simple precaution. At the head of a large army he was besieging Ch’ang-shê, which was held by Huang-fu Sung. The garrison was very small, and a general feeling of nervousness pervaded the ranks; so Huang-fu Sung called his officers together and said: “In war, there are various indirect methods of attack, and numbers do not account for everything. [The commentator here quotes from Sun Tzu, chapter V, paragraphs 5, 6 and 10.] Now the rebels have pitched their camp in the midst of thick grass which will easily burn when the wind blows. If we set fire to it at night, they will be thrown into a panic, and we can make a sortie and attack them on all sides at once, thus emulating the achievement of T’ien Tan [who used converted spies to devastating effect].”
That same evening, a strong breeze sprang up; so Huang-fu Sung instructed his soldiers to bind reeds together into torches and mount guard on the city walls, after which he sent out a band of daring men, who stealthily made their way through the lines and started the fire with loud shouts and yells. Simultaneously, a glare of light shot up from the city-walls, and Huang-fu Sung, sounding his drums, led a rapid cha
rge, which threw the rebels into confusion and put them into headlong flight.
10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do not attack from the leeward.
Chang Yü, following Tu Yu, says: “When you make a fire, the enemy will retreat away from it; if you oppose his retreat and attack him then, he will fight desperately, which will not conduce to your success.” A rather more obvious explanation is given by Tu Mu: “If the wind is in the east, begin burning to the east of the enemy, and follow up the attack yourself from that side. If you start the fire on the east side, and then attack from the west, you will suffer in the same way as your enemy.”
11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze soon falls.
[Compare this] to Lao Tzu’s saying: “A violent wind does not last the space of a morning” (Tao Té Ching, chapter 23). Mei Yao-ch’ên and Wang Hsi say: “A day breeze dies down at nightfall, and a night breeze at daybreak. This is what happens as a general rule.” The phenomenon observed may be correct enough, but how this sense is to be obtained is not apparent.